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Introduction
Th e Upper Guinea Coast 
in Global Perspective
Jacqueline Knörr and Christoph Kohl
For centuries, the Upper Guinea Coast region of West Africa has been char-
acterized by connections and interactions with societies and thought worlds in 
various parts of Africa and beyond. Th is book explores these regional and global 
encounters and exchanges, and points to the disruptions and continuities they 
caused as well as to the region’s infl uences on other parts of the world. Its chapters 
focus on the region’s entanglements with diff erent societies, entanglements trig-
gered by the expansion of colonialism, the Atlantic slave trade and, more recently, 
densifying transnational networks and increased global interaction – processes 
and institutions that are interconnected and interdependent in manifold ways. 
Authors investigate various aspects of the Upper Guinea Coast’s connections with 
societies in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe as well as the region’s expo-
sure to external orders and value systems, including resulting creative adaptations 
and transformations. While historical perspectives are employed, this volume 
focuses primarily on current developments and present-day eff ects of historical 
interactions.
Th e notion ‘Upper Guinea Coast’, as it is understood here, follows Walter 
Rodney’s (1970) infl uential monograph A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 
1545–1800. It refers to a littoral West African region that stretches from present-
day Senegal in the north to the western part of Côte d’Ivoire, including the Cape 
Verdean archipelago. Th us, it entirely or partially covers the territories of Gam-
bia, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cape Verde. As 
elaborated in Knörr and Trajano Filho (2010: 2), we conceptualize the Upper 
Guinea Coast as a ‘primarily geographic label that helps us to place and correlate 
historical, cultural, linguistic, and social phenomena and processes in regional 
terms’. Besides their physical contiguity, the parts of the region are characterized 
by many similarities, from social and cultural forms and institutions to historical 
experiences, political structures and specifi cities concerning modes of social and 
societal interaction and processes of integration and confl ict (Knörr and Trajano 
Filho 2010: 2–10).
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Th e headings of the following sections refl ect our focus on four major dimen-
sions of the Upper Guinea Coast’s global connectedness: ‘Creole Connections’, 
‘Diasporic Entanglements’, ‘Travelling Models’ and ‘Interregional Integration’. 
Combining anthropological and historical perspectives, we look at the social in-
teractions, societal and political conditions, and historical contexts of the Upper 
Guinea Coast’s global connectedness, thereby trying to capture contemporary 
globalization in this particular region of the world in its synchronic and dia-
chronic relations and complexities.
Creole Connections
Trans-Saharan trade networks (see Austen 2010) have linked littoral commercial 
hubs with Africa’s interior for centuries. Th ey contributed to the spread of Islam 
and expansion of Mandingo and, later on, Fula domination over parts of the re-
gion, entailing both religious and ethnic conversions and migrations (Person 1968–
1975; Robinson 1985; Gaillard 2000). Coastal trading posts founded by the Por-
tuguese and Cape Verdeans have linked Europe with the Upper Guinea Coast 
and Africa’s interior since the late fi fteenth century. By also opening new (‘third’) 
spaces for European-African encounters, these entrepôts fostered the emergence 
of Luso-Creole culture and identities (including Luso-Creole language varieties 
and localized forms of Christianity) (Mark 2002; Brooks 2003; Havik 2004). 
‘Eurafricans’ (Brooks 2003) often functioned as intermediaries in economic, social 
and cultural interaction and exchange. In many cases they were also involved in 
the slave trade that connected West Africa with the Americas and Europe (see e.g. 
Green 2012; cf. Lahon 1999; Rodrigues 1999). Th e Upper Guinea Coast (Cape 
Verde, the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia) was not only a slave hub but also a 
fi nal destination for slaves and freed slaves. Mark and da Silva Horta (2011) have 
recently shown the outcomes these historic networks had in the Upper Guinea 
Coast region, outcomes that included resilience as well as the constant reshaping 
of identities and alliances. However, Upper Guinea’s relationships were not exclu-
sive to the ‘Atlantic World’ (Falola and Roberts 2008). Rather, the Upper Guinea 
Coast also served as a transit station for European colonizers and their concepts 
en route to Asia. Christoph Kohl picks up this fi nding in this volume. Taking the 
examples of Guinea-Bissau and Sri Lanka, he investigates how Portugal’s maritime 
expansion led to the emergence of Luso-Creole groups and languages along the 
Upper Guinea Coast, the Gulf of Guinea, and South and South-East Asia. Th e 
latter shared Portuguese features that were adapted in various ways to respond to 
the given local needs and interests (cf. Alpers 2012).
Th e end of the Atlantic slave trade in the Upper Guinea Coast region was 
due not least to the activities of British and American philanthropists and aboli-
tionists (cf. Everill 2013). From the late eighteenth century onward, freed slaves 
were ‘returned’ from the Americas and England to settle in Sierra Leone and 
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Liberia. Many Africans were rescued from slave vessels bound for the Americas 
and came to live along the Upper Guinea Coast (Peterson 1969; Shick 1980). 
Hence, in most parts of the Upper Guinea Coast, creole groups and categories 
of people emerged against colonial and philanthropic backdrops. Th eir interac-
tion among themselves as well as with local populations led to the emergence of 
new identities and sociocultural practices and institutions incorporating features 
of their respective backgrounds. Th ese populations – such as the Luso-Creole 
categories of people in Guinea-Bissau, the Krio of Sierra Leone, the Aku of the 
Gambia, the Americo-Liberians and the citizens of the ‘quatre communes’1 in 
Senegal – forged intra- and interethnic as well as regional and transnational ties 
to ensure their own reproduction and to gain and maintain social, economic 
and political infl uence. Th ey incorporated people of heterogeneous origins from 
Africa, Europe and the Americas and have often served as intermediaries between 
peoples of diff erent ethnic, cultural and regional backgrounds. Depending on 
social and political demands, they distinguished themselves from the indigenous 
local populations by stressing their relative European-ness or emphasizing the 
African dimension of their identity to strengthen links with local populations 
and power holders, not least by marrying women of local descent (Liebenow 
1969; Knörr 1995, 2010b; Trajano Filho 1998; Hughes and Perfect 2006; Jones 
2013). As Bruce Mouser shows in his contribution on Eurafrican families in the 
Rio Pongo area of Guinea, creolization also resulted in the establishment of local 
families who, having integrated into host societies, identifi ed with both their re-
spective local residence and their American or European background. Starting in 
the late eighteenth century, transcontinental merchants originating in the United 
States and Great Britain established factories in the Rio Pongo area. Th eir limited 
number and dispersal throughout the area facilitated their gradual integration 
into local kin networks and power structures characterized by landlord-stranger 
relationships (cf. Sarró 2009).
Depending on their social contextualization in a given historical situation, 
creole groups or sections among them have enjoyed elevated status and privileged 
lifestyles, or suff ered ridicule and discrimination, as the result of their being het-
erogeneous, (relatively) foreign in origin and more or less distant from (more) 
native populations (Knörr 1995, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b; cf. Kopytoff  1987; Erik-
sen 2002; Geschiere 2009). More often than not, despite their numerical inferi-
ority and often ambivalent status, creole populations managed to play infl uential 
roles in diff erent sectors of public life in both colonial and postcolonial times. 
In Guinea-Bissau, for example, creoles were major fi gures in the battle for inde-
pendence and in the conceptual implementation and political realization of the 
postcolonial nation state (Trajano Filho 1998; Havik 2004; Kohl 2009, 2011). 
As elsewhere, they have also contributed signifi cantly to the respective national 
culture through the languages they speak. In both Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Le-
one, creole languages have become lingua francas that are mastered by (almost) 
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everyone, thereby functioning as a means of interethnic communication and 
transethnic and national identifi cation and integration (cf. Vikør 2004).
Th e chapters by Bruce Mouser, Nathanial King and Christoph Kohl show 
that conditions in the Upper Guinea Coast region often facilitated the integra-
tion of creole features into social, cultural and political repertoires. Nonetheless, 
creole groups have often triggered confl ict in relation to exclusionary discourses 
and policies. Nathaniel King’s contribution explores how marginalized groups 
and individuals have appropriated so-called secret societies in Freetown for the 
past six decades. A culture of secrecy is ubiquitous in Sierra Leone, and in Free-
town secret societies used to function as a means of social status reproduction by 
the Krio group (Cohen 1971, 1981). In recent years noncreole and transethnic 
secret societies have emerged in Freetown as urban counter-institutions. Th eir 
members are mainly marginalized urban youths and adults using proclaimed 
Yoruba (hence, Nigerian) origins and related ritual practices as strategic means 
to increase their social and symbolic powers as well as their political infl uence.
Th e contributions in this volume illustrate that whether creole groups and 
identities play divisive or integrative roles largely depends on their social contex-
tualization within society at large.
Diasporic Entanglements
Th roughout its history the Upper Guinea Coast has produced and received di-
asporas, whose narratives of common origins and destinies constitute a vital di-
mension of their members’ identities. Slave communities of Upper Guinea Coast 
origin lived in Portugal (cf. Lahon 1999), in South America (cf. Tardieu 2001) 
and in the Caribbean (Morgan 2011). Th e notion of diaspora has been discussed 
controversially. However, at least three identifi able analytical core criteria are 
widely believed to be constitutive of diasporas. First, most agree that dispersion 
in space is one crucial element – despite the fact that the division of ethnic com-
munities by state borders may also be a salient criterion. Second, diasporas entail 
a homeland orientation, though in some cases diasporas are not oriented towards 
their ancestral homeland. Th ird, boundary maintenance occurs over an extended 
time period, albeit boundary erosion is an important feature of diasporas, too. 
Th is analytical understanding contrasts with ‘diaspora’ conceptualized as a sub-
stantialized category of practice, serving as a mobilizing, even political vehicle 
(Brubaker 2005).
Early diasporic entanglements in the Upper Guinea Coast region were 
prompted by the expansion of the Mandingo and Fula empires. European traders’ 
early settlement along the West African coast and subsequent European colonial 
penetration of the interior resulted in colonial migrant diasporas. With inde-
pendence came temporary development workers, diplomats and ‘expatriates’. Vice 
versa, the (former) European colonial metropolises as well as the United States 
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and Canada attracted migrants from the Upper Guinea Coast. In recent decades, 
armed confl icts have produced new categories of forced migrants – refugees and 
‘internally displaced persons’ – who sometimes turn into more or less perma-
nent diasporas. Diasporic relations include personal and political ties as well as 
the exchange of people, money, goods and ideas. Th ey entail networks between 
individuals and groups, families and nation states, family-run enterprises and 
consortiums. Diasporic entanglements – patterns of exchange and interaction 
between ‘diaspora’ and ‘home’ – are manifold and multifaceted.
Most studies dealing with diasporas focus on the diasporas as such but less so 
on their interactions with relatives and friends left behind at ‘home’. Recent re-
search has turned attention to diasporas’ countries and societies of origin, stress-
ing the perceptions, expectations and relationships that migrants experienced in 
their homeland societies. For instance, a recurring pattern concerns the social 
status paradoxes of African migration diasporas in the Global North: migrants 
who enjoyed high prestige in their homelands must now endure low social status 
in the countries of the Global North, as many of them work at unskilled jobs 
(Nieswand 2011). Against this background, the chapters by Anita Schroven and 
Heike Drotbohm are dedicated to the repercussions diasporic communities must 
confront at ‘home’ and to the contestations and negotiations their (diasporic) 
roles are subjected to. Anita Schroven analyses the perception of the Guinean 
transnational community’s engagement in both local and national politics ‘back 
home’ in Guinea. In doing so, she focuses on transnationals not as agents but as 
objects of (Guinean) discourses. Heike Drotbohm analyses the interaction be-
tween resident islanders and cognate visiting migrants from the United States, 
who meet during an annual patron saint festivity in Cape Verde. She points to 
commonalities, such as shared beliefs and origins, and to diff erences as well, like 
socioeconomic inequalities in the diaspora’s ‘home’. As a major hub for slave 
ships bound for the New World, Cape Verde was among the places that played 
a crucial role for the slave trade; the resulting dissemination of Upper Guin-
ean social, cultural and even agricultural models (cf. Carney 2001; Fields-Black 
2008; Hawthorne 2010) and, consequently, in the making of the ‘Black Atlantic’ 
(Gilroy 1993). More recently, the slave trade gave way to more or less voluntary 
migration, turning the impoverished archipelago into an early migrant labour 
reservoir par excellence. To this day, young Cape Verdeans search for jobs abroad 
in North America, Europe and other former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Both 
forced and voluntary migration have sustainably infl uenced social relationships 
and contributed to the proliferation and reconfi guration of cultural practices 
and values, both within the archipelago and across continents. Th is makes Cape 
Verde a transnational society per se. Drotbohm shows both the ongoing home 
‘rootedness’ of migrants and resident islanders’ interest in reproducing relation-
ships with infl uential migrants that hold promise for attaining prestige through 
the distribution of functions and resources.
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By contrast, Markus Rudolf discusses ways of making diasporas within a 
country. His study focuses on the case of Senegal, where ‘nordistes’ – inhabitants 
of the northern part of the country, including the capital Dakar – and Casa-
mançais originating from the country’s southernmost region, which has been 
shattered by violent confl ict for decades, maintain discourses that construct each 
other as diasporas in the respective counterpart’s territory. In this way, concepts 
frequently used when discussing diasporas, like ‘country of origin’ and ‘recipient’ 
country or society, become blurred and contested.
Pedro F. Marcelino’s essay examines the perception and stereotyping of 
various diasporic communities by members of the host society. Over the past 
decades, Cape Verde has (re-)transformed into a country that attracts migrants. 
Th e archipelago has been characterized by inward and outward migration since 
its colonization in the late fi fteenth century, and the resulting heterogeneity led 
to multiple processes of creolization that made diasporic peoples of European 
and African descent into Cape Verdeans. As a consequence, it is widely assumed 
that Cape Verdean creoleness has always been reproduced by integrating culture 
and identities of diff erent origins. Marcelino questions this assumption, arguing 
that Cape Verdeans’ attitudes towards immigrants depend on a set of interrelated 
markers; hence, the varying ‘attractiveness’ of diff erent diasporic communities 
relates to diff erent degrees of integration, implying diff erent extents of the respec-
tive boundary maintenance and boundary erosion.
Travelling Models
After the offi  cial termination of the Sierra Leonean Civil War in 2002, a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone was set up by the Sierra Leonean government and the 
United Nations to bring individuals responsible for war crimes to justice (An-
ders 2009). Simultaneously – and as in other postwar countries like Liberia and 
Guinea-Bissau – peace-building programmes devoting attention to former child 
soldiers and ex-combatants were established conjointly by the Sierra Leonean 
government, the United Nations, the international community, development 
agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Th e norms and values 
guiding these peace-building initiatives have functioned as global ‘travelling 
models’ that compete with more local practices and beliefs concerning the (re-)
establishment of peace and order (Knörr and Trajano Filho 2010; Knörr 2010b). 
Following actor-network theory, as developed by Bruno Latour (2005), and orga-
nizational sociology approaches (e.g. Czarniawska and Joerges 1996), ‘travelling 
models’ are conceived as ideas and practices that are transferred into diverging 
social, cultural, political and geographic settings, where they are recontextual-
ized, hence embedded and translated into new contexts (see e.g. Merry 2006; cf. 
Knörr 2007, 2014). Such travelling ideas and practices (i.e. narrative structures; 
trains of thought; beliefs; programmes; legal and normative orders) may become 
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materialized in printed documents, pictures, artefacts or voyagers, amongst oth-
ers. In their new context or ‘web of belief ’ (Quine and Ullian 1978) ‘travelling 
models’ are subject to innovations and transformations that involve processes of 
‘translation’ (Kaufmann and Rottenburg 2012) and ‘“de-strangement” of the ex-
ternal culture via its (meaningful) incorporation into what is familiar’ (cf. Knörr’s 
[2007: 33] elaborations on the ‘Ent-fremdung des Fremden’; Knörr 2014). Such 
processes of translation, transformation and de-strangement impact both the 
(travelling) ideas and practices as such and the contexts from which they origi-
nated and into which they are incorporated.
For centuries European presence was limited to relatively small coastal set-
tlements along the Upper Guinea Coast. Only from the early nineteenth century 
onwards did colonial penetration of the hinterland get under way, whereupon old 
and new colonial powers alike tried to impose their respective ideological models 
of colonization and domination, which had in common the belief in European 
supremacy. Th e emerging colonial orders introduced techniques to control, sub-
jugate and divide indigenous populations, leading to reconfi gurations of political 
structures, alliances and identifi cations, and to new waves of migrations within 
the region (see Galli and Jones 1987; van der Laan 1992). At the same time, re-
ward systems created new prospects of social upward mobility for some sections 
of colonial society, whose members adapted to its demands to varying degrees. 
European colonial metropolises became increasingly attractive in terms of edu-
cational and economic opportunities. Hence, earlier patterns of West Africans’ 
presence in cities like London (‘Black Poor’) and Lisbon (Braidwood 1994; Rod-
rigues 1999) continued, yet were transformed.
Formal European education contributed to the spread of ‘undesired’ anti-
colonial and nationalist ideologies among the emerging African middle class, 
among them many members of creole minorities. Writings such as those of the 
Caribbean-born Americo-Liberian Edward Wilmot Blyden (cf. Tibebu 2012), 
the African-American pan-Africanist and civil rights activist W.E.B. du Bois (du 
Bois 2012) and Jamaican Marcus Garvey (see Grant 2009) were received favour-
ably among intellectual circles in the region (and beyond). Pan-Africanist and 
proto-nationalist movements – some of them branches of metropolitan organi-
zations – led by members of the educated African middle class served as models 
of modern nationhood from about 1910 onwards. Postcolonial state ideology 
built heavily on material and ideological support from communist and socialist 
states in Eastern Europe and Asia. In Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, 
nationalist leaders referred to the modernist and socialist models of governance 
in vogue at the time (Cabral 1976, 1977; Diallo 1990). As in other parts of the 
postcolonial world, many political leaders in the Upper Guinea Coast region 
adapted the classic French model of nationhood that equates state, nation and 
culture (see Gellner 1998; Hobsbawm 1999). However, they had to cope with 
the facts that in their case – and unlike the European ideal type of nationhood – 
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state building had preceded nation-building, and postcolonial society remained 
characterized by ethnic diversity and allegiances. Th is challenge prompted some 
leaders, for instance Amílcar Cabral (1976), leader of Guinea-Bissau’s dominant 
independence movement, to adjust the European nation-building concept to 
postcolonial conditions by providing it with a ‘unity-in-diversity’ dimension that 
conceives of the nation as an umbrella covering the various ethnic groups living 
on the respective national territory. Vice versa, this model tends to conceptualize 
ethnic groups and identities as the respective nation’s roots, without which the 
latter cannot unfold (see Anderson 1999; Kymlicka 2004; Young 2004; Knörr 
2007, 2008, 2009b).
Th e former colonial powers continued to have a major impact on postcolonial 
developments. Independence went along with the provision of development co-
operation programmes that refl ected both hegemonic and philanthropic motives 
– prominently involving the former colonial powers – against the background of 
the East-West confl ict. While both political camps sought to disseminate their 
supposedly superior ideologies, African leaders adapted them to local conditions 
as well as their own political needs. Initially, development cooperation likewise 
followed modernist and neo-Marxist approaches, aiming to reproduce the Euro-
pean and North American unilateral path towards economic development and 
industrialization in the Upper Guinea Coast region and elsewhere in the so-called 
Th ird World.
Colonial domination, development aid, economic structural adjustment and 
international law, along with security and peace-building reforms, in- and out-
ward migration, and the expansion of media technologies, have all infl uenced 
societies in the Upper Guinea Coast region (and beyond) through concepts, 
ideas and practices related to and travelling with them. However, these fl ows 
are not unidirectional from the North to the South but rather proceed in a zig-
zag fashion whose travel itinerary often is not traceable, as organization theory 
(Czarniawska and Joerges 1996) has emphasized.
In his contribution, Wilson Trajano Filho traces the transatlantic semantic 
journey of the word tabanka, showing that origins other than Upper Guinean 
ones are conceivable since similar words exist in Angola, Congo, Central Africa, 
Hispanic America and the French-speaking Caribbean. Th e analysis shows that 
tracing the origins of travelling words and meanings is often highly speculative, if 
not impossible. Th e chapter may also be read as a warning against simple linear 
source-recipient transfer models (cf. Djelic 2008).
Th e Upper Guinea Coast has been integrated into global networks for cen-
turies, but the quality of its globalization has changed in recent times. Th e role 
of nonstate actors – notably supranational, transnational and economic organ-
izations (e.g. nongovernmental institutions and enterprises) – has increased, as 
has the number of new actors from countries of the Global South, such as China 
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and Brazil. Employment and education opportunities in the Americas, Europe 
and Asia in combination with new and improved communication and trans-
port networks have enabled growing numbers of Upper Guineans to keep in 
(virtual) touch with other parts of the world and to travel abroad. Nonetheless, 
the Global North’s exercise of power by disseminating values and ideas often 
coined as ‘Western’ sometimes provokes resistance to what are perceived as acts of 
‘cultural imperialism’ and ‘neocolonialism’, even as Western lifestyles, consumer 
goods, media and education attract people in the Global South and challenge 
local ways and traditions of (re-)structuring social, political and economic life. 
As Latour (2005), Kaufmann and Rottenburg (2012) and theorists of globaliza-
tion like Appadurai (1996) and Hannerz (2002) have underlined, such travelling 
models are translated in ways that fi t the local sociocultural contexts into which 
they are integrated, a process Robertson (1995) termed ‘glocalization’ (cf. Knörr 
2002, 2009a, 2010a, 2014).
Increasing criticism of the failure of many development projects that came to 
be known as ‘white elephants’ clearly illustrated that models that had succeeded 
in the Global North could not simply be applied one-to-one in African contexts. 
Th e exacerbation of debt crisis and the resulting Washington Consensus in the 
1980s2 exposed the Upper Guinea Coast region to even more economic and fi scal 
interventions by supranational institutions like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, which pushed economic reforms that in many cases 
led to deregulation policies and aggravated socioeconomic disparities.
Joanna Davidson’s chapter presents an example of nontranslation of Global 
North concepts. On the basis of her fi eld research in Northern Guinea-Bissau, 
she discusses the sociocultural, political, economic and ecological dimensions 
of insuffi  cient rice cultivation among the Diola against the backdrop of climate 
change. Besides telling the story of international actors’ neglect and disregard of 
the sociocultural and political embedding of rice cultivation, Davidson points 
to the nontranslation of technology, that is, to development research schemes 
oriented to social engineering (see Scott 1998). Her chapter on the global warm-
ing-induced changes in rice growing contributes to the understanding of how 
international professionals’ planning largely ignores local sociocultural patterns, 
expectations and demands while employing large-scale Global North technolo-
gies believed to be superior and in no need of adaptation to local contexts.
Following the model set by the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission since the mid 1990s, ‘local’ solutions to resolve postconfl ict situ-
ations and reconcile off enders and victims have come into vogue, in line with 
international norm-setting agencies’ (e.g. the UN’s and OECD’s) demands for 
increased ‘local ownership’ (see Donais 2009). Th is global discourse and its local 
manifestation are tackled by William P. Murphy in this volume. Dealing with 
the return of refugees and internally displaced people in postconfl ict Liberia and 
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Sierra Leone, he confronts the international discourse of postconfl ict reconcil-
iation with confl icting local expectations and ideas of social justice. Murphy 
points to the problematic fact that both the Sierra Leone Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission3 and international law more generally tend to identify 
individuals as those responsible for war crimes without addressing the existing 
neopatrimonial institutional structures of injustice as a whole. Again, interna-
tional reconciliatory approaches, discourses and practices do not seem to be well 
translated into local contexts. Similar observations pertain to other realms of 
Sierra Leone’s postwar society. Supra- and transnational actors engaged in sup-
porting the country’s media sector with an eye to strengthening civic rights often 
fail to adequately take local conditions into consideration and ‘translate’ their 
approaches and concepts accordingly, a topic dealt with by Sylvanus Spencer in 
this volume. Since the establishment of peace a decade ago, the right to freedom 
of expression has turned into a contested space, or even a ‘battleground’, in 
postwar Sierra Leone. Spencer shows that transnational organizations involved 
in the discourse focus on the formal legal system and fail to consider customary 
law in the interior, thereby ignoring the eff ects of the bifurcate legal system. 
Another translational weakness he identifi es is that civic education programmes 
promoting freedom of expression are unaware of cultural obstacles to talking 
freely, such as the culture of secrecy so prominent in most parts of the Upper 
Guinea Coast region (cf. King 2012).
Another issue that has drawn much attention from both scholars and devel-
opment workers is that of youth and warfare in Upper Guinea Coast societies. 
Following, amongst others, Ellis’ (1999) monograph on religious dimensions 
of youths’ involvement in the Liberian war and works by Utas (2003), Shepler 
(2005) and Coulter (2009) on former youth combatants, as well as Vigh’s (2006) 
publication on youth and soldiering in Guinea-Bissau’s ‘military confl ict’, Susan 
Shepler’s contribution examines the global fl ow of child protection models, chal-
lenging – as do Murphy and Spencer – the widely accepted view that expertise 
trickles from the top down, that is, from the Global North to various peripheries 
in the South, a view that implies that local agents are bound to their locations, 
as Merry (2006), for instance, assumed. Expertise, Shepler concludes, is mainly 
about introducing a new expert language that fi xes Sierra Leoneans in a hierarchi-
cal position, tacitly implying that they did not previously know how to take care 
of children. As in Murphy’s case, a North-South power asymmetry becomes ap-
parent where international NGOs seek ‘traditional’ child healing rituals that may 
well exist in other settings, but not in Sierra Leone. Such asymmetries also exist 
where child protection organizations commodify former child soldiers in order 
to attract funds. However, local Sierra Leoneans are not mere powerless objects 
of a top-down trickle of ideas. Th ey learn the ‘newspeak’ of child expertise to take 
advantage of project activities and build careers within the international ‘child 
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protection expertise’ sector as ‘locals’ assumed to be experts on ‘local contexts’ 
anywhere in the Global South.
Interregional Integration
State borders between West African countries are relatively young, dating back 
to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. People in the Upper Guinea Coast 
region have maintained contacts with their neighbours across these borders ever 
since they were drawn. Th ey often have much in common in terms of ethnic 
identities, cultural features and historical experience. However, identifi cation 
with the respective nation states has grown due to social, cultural, political and 
linguistic commonalities that developed out of specifi c colonial and postcolonial 
circumstances and experiences. Ethnic groups identify with ‘their’ nation-state 
to varying degrees, and some ethnic identities correspond to a given national 
identity more than others do (Højbjerg, Knörr and Kohl 2012; Knörr and Tra-
jano Filho 2010). Ethnic or local identities may also be situated in opposition 
to the nation-state, as in the case of the Casamançais, mentioned above. Th e 
Mandingos and the Fulas are examples of ethnic groups that are scattered over 
a handful of West African states and maintain particular, regionalized sub-iden-
tifi cations while also identifying with their respective nation-state. Research has 
demonstrated how colonially drawn interstate borders in West Africa have, in 
the long run, shaped perceptions of belonging (cf. Nugent 2008). Against these 
backgrounds, Christian K. Højbjerg investigates the role of Mandingo identity in 
local confl icts in the border triangle of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where, 
as he concludes, common war experiences have led to a simplifi cation of people’s 
consciousness of processes related to Mandingo identity. Outbreaks of violence 
in the respective countries have often been attributed to a strengthening of trans-
national Mandingo identity and Mandingo expansion into new areas where they 
come into confl ict with fi rst-come ethnic groups (cf. Kopytoff  1987). Th is makes 
ethnic loyalties and diff erences responsible for what are often designated as ‘eth-
nic clashes’ (against this view, see Schlee 2008; Donahoe et al. 2009). According 
to Højbjerg, however, (transnational) Mandingo identity has strengthened only 
during the protracted wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, which prompted ‘tak-
ing sides’ and a stronger ethnic consciousness among Mandingos (and possibly 
other groups) on the one hand, and a coarsening and weakening of peaceful 
confl ict resolution mechanisms on the other. Colonization not only created new 
territory-related, protonational points of reference but also fostered transcolonial 
relationships that have given rise to specifi c transnational identifi cations and net-
works. For example, Sierra Leone and the Gambia were both British colonies. 
Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Liberia are linked by the settlement of diff erent 
groups of liberated slaves and also share their offi  cial language. Today, air links 
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between these three countries are relatively frequent, and connecting fl ights exist 
to other anglophone countries in West Africa, namely Ghana and Nigeria. Flying 
directly from Sierra Leone or Liberia to Guinea-Bissau, however, is impossible, 
despite the proximity. Flight schedules, it seems, refl ect the intensity of mutual 
contact and exchange among the inhabitants of the respective nation-states.
Th us, as this case exemplifi es, colonial boundaries have produced new (tran-
sethnic) identifi cations with the given colonial territory, laying the foundation 
for the postcolonial nation-states, but ethnic identifi cations and diff erences have 
nonetheless prevailed. Th e emerging identifi cations with newly created colonial 
territories were paralleled by emergent transcolonial identifi cations within the 
respective colonial empires that were based on shared (colonial) history and lan-
guage, family ties, educational backgrounds, cultural representations and so on.
Internal socioeconomic disparities as well as social and political exclusion 
were among the causes of the wars that broke out in diff erent countries within 
the region from the 1980s onwards (Richards 1996; Ellis 1999; Coulter 2009). 
However, these wars also had distinct regional and global dimensions. Th e Sierra 
Leonean Civil War was sparked by Charles Taylor’s rebels entering the country 
from Liberia and also aff ected neighbouring Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. Both the 
bordering Guinea-Bissau and Gambia have reportedly been involved in the Casa-
mance confl ict, and in 1998/99 Senegal, Guinea and France engaged in Guinea-
Bissau’s civil war (e.g. van der Drift 1999; Rodrigues and Guillerme 2005).
Th e societies of the Upper Guinea Coast were transnationally and globally 
connected well before and during the respective wars. In her contribution, Al-
ice Bellagamba uncovers mid-twentieth-century transnational trade relationships 
and the establishment of neopatrimonial networks both within the region and 
beyond by examining the life story of a Gambian diamond dealer – a scion of a 
precolonial Senegambian Mandingo trading elite of Malian origin. She describes 
how this entrepreneur became engaged in trading activities in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, making use of Jewish and Lebanese trading networks, amongst others, 
to later extend his trade to Congo, Europe and Israel before returning to the 
Upper Guinea Coast. Bellagamba underlines the common ground between Brit-
ish colonies, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, and networks of older, precolonially 
rooted Mande-speaking communities that facilitated the social and occupational 
integration of transnational traders. Bellagamba’s biographical account reveals 
how ethnic, genealogical and professional continuities across national boundaries 
helped to establish patrimonial relationships that functioned to smooth individ-
ual trading activities.
Th e illicit international trade with (‘blood’) diamonds and tropical woods in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in exchange for arms and ammunition, and the use of 
arms smuggled, inter alia, through Guinea-Bissau by Casamançais rebel fi ghters 
are abhorrent examples of the region’s global connectedness. However, as Bella-
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gamba’s and Peter Mark and José da Silva Horta’s contributions suggest, present-
day trade and migration models revert to some extent to a premodern state of 
transnational network patterns of the past. Th ey demonstrate how the Casa-
mance was integrated into a global web of trade in blade weapons that linked it 
not only with Europe but also with North Africa, Latin America and the Indian 
Ocean. In the early nineteenth century, a trade in fi rearms emerged in the Casa-
mance, involving both French and British trading posts along the Casamance 
and Gambia Rivers. Mark and da Silva Horta’s chapter depicts the changing 
trade pattern in the Casamance, indicating that trading activities were far more 
globalized and Africans were far more active agents within them than commonly 
thought. Representing early examples of ‘technoscapes’ (Appadurai 1996), these 
trading activities thereby substantiate the claim that one may speak of globaliza-
tion in the region well before the late twentieth century.
More recently, drug traffi  cking has turned parts of the Upper Guinea Coast 
– such as Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Guinea – into hubs for cocaine shipped 
from Latin America to Europe (Ellis 2009; Krech 2011). Other forms of glo-
balized transnational economic activities in the region have received less atten-
tion. Indian wholesale buyers, for instance, annually return to Guinea-Bissau and 
Senegal to purchase cashew harvests that are subsequently processed in South 
Asia before being marketed in the Global North (Kohl, observation based on re-
cent fi eld research). Over the past decades, Cape Verde, Gambia and Senegal have 
evolved as nascent tourist destinations, entailing the commodifi cation of culture 
through staged performances (de Jong 2007) and the attraction of young, urban, 
unemployed men and women who off er various services to tourists, including 
sex services. Th e more recent global entanglements of the Upper Guinea Coast 
include Mauritanian, Nigerian and Chinese migrants who settle in the region to 
serve various lines of business. By contrast, the settling of Lebanese shopkeepers 
and traders can be traced back more than a century. In many cases, long-estab-
lished intraregional trade routes coexist with new trade channels, linking main-
land Upper Guinea with Cape Verde and Brazil, for instance.
In political terms, the Upper Guinea Coast is well entrenched in regional or-
ganizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Th e region also continues to be integrated in transcontinental, intergovernmental 
organizations that function as successor institutions to former colonial empires, 
such as the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the Com-
monwealth of Nations and the International Organisation of La Francophonie 
(OIF).
To conclude, this anthology comes full circle, discussing the global connect-
edness of the Upper Guinea Coast from diff erent points of view to outline how 
the region has been part of global fl ows and exchanges stretching far beyond the 
context of a ‘Black Atlantic’.
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Notes
 1. Born in the four Franco-Senegalese towns of Gorée Island, Dakar, Rufi sque and Saint-
Louis, the African and métis inhabitants of these ‘four communes’ enjoyed – at least de 
jure – full French citizenship rights.
 2. ‘Washington Consensus’ denotes a set of policies promoted by the Bretton Wood insti-
tutions and the United States. Th ese policies encompass macroeconomic stabilization of 
national economies and their opening to foreign trade and investments, as well as privat-
ization of state assets and the unleashing of market forces.
 3. Th e commission was established following the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord. Installed by 
Sierra Leone and the international community, it aimed at an impartial coming to terms 
with abuses and violence committed during the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991–2002) 
and intended to reconcile the warring sides and prevent further violence.
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Towards a Defi nition 
of Transnational as 
a Family Construct
A Historical and Micro Perspective
Bruce L. Mouser
Defi nitions
Current literature amply demonstrates that ‘transnational’ is an imprecise and 
overused term. For the purpose of this study of trader families on the West African 
coast and their charter generations, transnational is used in two ways. Transna-
tional families contain a primary component on the African mainland. Th ey have 
family branches living and working in diff erent countries, and those branches 
interact with each other and are aware of each other’s existence. Th ey identify 
themselves as transnational or are identifi ed by others as transnational. Th eir 
more successful branches travel to distant places, study abroad, speak several lan-
guages, and are open to the pan-Atlantic market of products and ideas. Multi-
sitedness across national borders and group cohesion are critical components in 
this defi nition of the term.
Th e second defi nition is more complicated because it involves a self- or other-
imposed identity that may transcend or reject ethnic or national membership. 
In the African context, this may include any prominent cultural or physiological 
characteristic that separates a group from the majority population, stigmatizes its 
members for being diff erent, or denies them ethnic membership or even a path 
to membership. Intermarriage among members within such a group increases the 
group’s self-identity of separateness as well as the impression among others that 
the group is exclusive, closed, separate and hostile.
A manifestation of these two defi nitions is the emergence of a creolized 
group with character and genetic traits that it borrows or modifi es from many 
sources. Grey Gundaker (2000: 125) suggests that Europeans who arrived on 
the African coast as traders and who expected to remain and raise families there 
‘made the most of similarities’ between their own systems and those of their 
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hosts. Th ey either accommodated to the cultural norms of the majority popula-
tion or produced a self-identifi ed hybrid or creolized and multiethnic culture that 
was denied ethnic membership. To explain how some Europeans and their métis 
families were able to fuse with or accommodate to the dominant population 
and over time obtain membership and privilege as power-sharing newcomers, 
Donald Levine (1979) developed a typology that identifi ed stages through which 
strangers moved to acquire either newcomer status or marginality as a stigmatized 
and self-identifi ed hybrid and separate group.
Historical Background
Between 1750 and 1850 (the approximate date for the ‘eff ective’ end of slave 
trading from the Rio Pongo), more than seventy American and European slave 
traders had settled at the Rio Pongo and remained there long enough to produce 
off spring that carried their surnames. Th ey became a part of a fl uid ‘African-Euro-
pean frontier’ or zone of interconnectedness emerging upon the coast (Coifman 
1994; Hannerz 1997). Some of these traders died in their fi rst years, succumb-
ing to diseases, fevers and parasites of the coast, but many others survived and 
stayed to establish large families and create and join networks of trader families. 
A select number of these families or their most commercially successful branches 
became multi-sited, with units operating on the Nunez and Pongo Rivers and 
residences maintained in Liverpool, England; Charleston, South Carolina; Ha-
vana or Matanzas in Cuba; and in one case Boston, Massachusetts. In 1820, 
Commander Sir G. H. Collier of the Royal Navy described those in the Pongo as:
the surviving few of some hundreds of original [‘Company of Royal] 
Adventurers1 [Trading to Africa’], of hardy constitutions, rude habits, 
and little education, [who] were well calculated for the task they had 
undertaken; they assimilated themselves to the manners and customs of 
the Country, and soon became powerful as Chiefs. By marriages with the 
native Women they had large families, a guarantee for their respect to 
the customs of the Country, and a pledge for their personal continuance 
in it; thus consolidating their interest, and uniting their fate with that of 
the Country…Th eir children are of course mulattoes.2
Jehudi Ashmun (Gurley 1933: 347) wrote in 1827 simply that these traders had 
‘allied themselves, by something, which in Africa, passes as marriage, with the 
most powerful native families, and are the proprietors of slaves’. More than a cen-
tury later, Monsignor Raymond-René Lerouge (Congrégation du Société Esprit)3 
described such an arrangement in less fl attering terms, neglecting to indicate that 
his interpretation contained all that was necessary to establish marital legitimacy 
in the Pongo context:
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One day, we learn that the neighbouring chief sold him one of his 
daughters (girls) for several spans of Guinea cloth, a few bottles of rum, 
[and] a few pounds of gunpowder. Th is woman, with great fanfare, is 
introduced into the stranger’s bedchamber. After a few months, a child is 
born of this stranger’s house. Th is is the ‘mixed race’, the true métis of the 
fi rst generation: father white, mother native. A [new] species is founded.
To be sure, the founders of transnational families in the Pongo lacked sophis-
tication and decorum, for they were engaged in the lowest of commerces – slave 
trading. Moreover, according to Meneses (1987: 231–33), they were operating 
in an environment of ‘a good deal of real hostility’. Th ey represented a threat 
of potential enslavement and were ‘at best disliked and at worst hated’ by the 
majority population. As a minority, they were ‘freed from the usual obligation of 
generosity and kindness’. Some came to establish factories and become business-
men on the coast; some arrived seeking only employment in factories established 
by others. Nearly all arrived at the Pongo without relatives or a spouse, and they 
sought – as did their hosts – to remedy that defi ciency as quickly as possible. 
Whatever their motives for remaining in the Pongo, they had to follow local cus-
tom if they intended to obtain a wife or partner. One method was to purchase a 
slave outright and use her as a mistress (Flezar 2009: 67; Brooks 2010: 95). But 
although that was permitted, it removed the river’s ‘land kings’ (who regulated 
the use of land) and ‘political kings’ (involved in social and political interactions) 
from the ‘wifegiving’ process. It also created a problem for stigmatized off spring, 
Map 1.1. Rio Pongo
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who in addition to being descendants ‘of the Saxon race’ were also descendants 
of slave mothers and therefore did not have locally recognized succession and 
inheritance rights (Conneau 1976: 107; Th ayer 1978). Partnering with a slave 
woman also produced diffi  culties in the global or pan-Atlantic context, where a 
person classifi ed as a slave was ineligible to inherit property (Kennedy-Hafl ett 
1996; Flezar 2009: 67–68).
Th e preferred pattern involved a marriage linked to a comprehensive un-
derstanding between parties in landlord/stranger or uncle/nephew relationships 
(Sarró 2009: 51–55; Diallo 1970; Mouser 1975). Marriage was advantageous to 
both parties: it permitted the host to tap into his stranger’s market while opening 
his own to the guest (Ballard 2001: 6–8). As host of a European or American, 
a landholder, especially if he also had political authority, expected any guest to 
accept a contractual arrangement that stipulated, among many things economic, 
how a stranger might interact with the host’s other subjects. Th ese included 
women, who were bargaining chips to be used within patron/client relation-
ships, whether those involved Europeans from the Atlantic or Africans from the 
interior.
A stranger sealed his trading contract with money or a marriage, and likely 
both (Conneau 1976: 107–11; Mouser 1975). Upon entering the river’s com-
merce, protocol required the stranger to approach the local headman and ask 
permission to visit his town and territory (Harrell-Bond and Rijnsdorp 1976: 26; 
Almada 1984 [1594]). Small gifts were exchanged. After an appropriate interval, 
the topic of trading would be raised; now the discussion assumed a more formal 
character because land use was involved. Land and political headmen and even 
elders in secret societies would need to be consulted and compensated for the 
stranger’s privilege to operate within a regional context (Conneau 1976: 109). 
Eventually an agreement was reached between hosts and guest, with obligations 
clearly stipulated for all parties. Th e money part of the arrangement included the 
semblance of a purchase or lease of land upon which the stranger built his trad-
ing factory. Only the buildings and improvements belonged to the trader. Th e 
contract set rents for land use and fees for wharf usage, water rights, burial duties 
and import and export taxes. Other provisions defi ned a range of allowed activ-
ities and mobility, as well as requirements (gunpowder and warriors) the guest/
stranger provided his host/landlord in case the latter was attacked by an enemy 
or a rival family (CMS CAI/E3/99; CMS CAI/E4/127; Mouser 1996: 88–89; 
Mouser and Mouser 2003: 56).
Th ese arrangements affi  rmed that land could not be alienated through sale, 
that strangers and their descendants could never become newcomers, and that the 
only ruling authority belonged to landlords/hosts or those holding land rights, as 
permitted by secret societies (Sarró 2009: 54–59). As long as the arriving stranger 
recognized those principles and accepted a subalternated position within the in-
digenous society, he could expect that his person, property and family would be 
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protected, that he would be governed by his own rules within his household, 
and that his host or hosts would not interfere in his business, unless his contract 
permitted it.
A disadvantage of this arrangement for the stranger was the lack of choice. 
Th e landlord, as ‘wifegiver’, presented his guest with a daughter or ‘girl’ that the 
stranger was obliged to accept, for to refuse would challenge the wifegiver’s status 
and authority and identify the stranger as an intruder or outsider who had little 
interest in sharing his fortune with his host or hosts (Conneau 1976: 68, 107; 
Chauveau and Richards 2008: 519). By gifting a classifi catory sister or daughter, 
the wifegiver also positioned a spy in the house of his stranger and produced 
a set of obligations something like those of an uncle/nephew relationship. Th e 
only decision falling to the ‘wifetaker’ was the scale of ceremony attached to the 
marriage. Th e higher the station of the wife, the more expensive would be the 
marriage ritual (Conneau 1976: 108; Graf 1998: 16, 35).
Th eophilus Conneau, a French trader who worked at a factory in the upper 
Pongo in the 1830s, claimed that his Euro-African employer maintained a sera-
glio of more than thirty wives and mistresses, some of whom made themselves 
available to strangers visiting the river (Conneau 1976: 64). Nearly two and a 
half centuries earlier, André Álvares de Almada (1594) reported that a visiting 
stranger in the Pongo was asked to pick one female from his host’s harem and 
leave the rest of his host’s wives alone for the duration of his visit. In eff ect this 
was an attempt to minimize negative consequences and métis children that might 
result from contact with a person with less desirable racial traits (Goff man 1963; 
Kivel 2002: 122–23; Johnson 2005: 33). And children did result: others reported 
that there always were ‘masterless’ and free métis eager to attach themselves to a pa-
tron (Th ayer 1981b: 15, 20; Mouser and Mouser 2003: 27, 82, 86). Still another 
variant involved companionship as a benefi t a trader provided to those Europeans 
who took jobs in his factory. Conneau reported that he received wages of one 
slave per month, meals from the kitchens of his employer’s wives and ‘a private 
establishment with the accessories not necessary to mention’ (Conneau 1976: 66).
Whatever the form of marriage or union, children inevitably appeared. Th ese 
were the métis of the charter generation. When a trader succeeded fi nancially, 
other of his hosts noticed the advantages of proximity and gifted daughters of their 
own to seal arrangements with this successful stranger. Family size could quickly 
become large, depending on how many wives the guest received and particular 
rules governing child-rearing and breastfeeding. Benjamin Curtis Sr. at Kissing, 
for instance, was reported to have produced more than fi fty children during the 
twenty-three years he lived in the Pongo (Foreign Offi  ce 1830: 8:848). Th is fi rst 
generation of mixed European and African children – the Euro-Africans – was 
perhaps least problematic, except those fathered by strangers who died during the 
fi rst rainy season. Th eir mothers were African, and some may have been ‘royals’ 
or the free daughters of headmen and landholders. If wives were Susu, who were 
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patrilineal and patrilocal, they would look to their husband’s lineage to fi nd their 
‘refuge’ when catastrophe struck, but since in these cases there typically was no 
lineage belonging to such a husband, a wife could appeal only to her father, to a 
fi ctive lineage composed of non-Africans similar to her husband, or to the factory 
operator (Conneau 1976: 67–68; Harrell-Bond and Rijnsorp 1976: 7–9; Th ayer 
1981a: 41–42; Th ayer 1983: 119; McLachlan 1999: 15).
As in most cultures, fi rst-generation children grew up in houses kept by their 
mothers (Harrell-Bond and Rijnsorp 1976: 21–22). Th eir close kinship cousins 
were those belonging to their mother’s side, for in this instance their fathers’ rel-
atives were absent. Th e identity of siblings, cousins, uncles, aunts and relations 
became complicated by defi nitions that were imprecise and set by proximity and 
local practice. Th ey spoke the language(s) of their mother(s) on the playground 
and that of their father in the marketplace, especially when dealing with Euro-
peans. Some from the more commercially successful branches of trader families 
attended European schools (at Freetown, London, Liverpool, Havana, Matanzas, 
Charleston or – when the Pongo began to slip into a French sphere of infl uence 
after 1850 – Gorée or Saint Louis in Senegal), and they obtained self-identifi ed 
membership in those worlds or were stigmatized by others as belonging to those 
less desirable worlds. Th eir principal playmates were the sons and daughters of 
other traders, for it was with them that they shared the most time, proximity 
and characteristics. Th ose of the fi rst generations were light-skinned and carried 
European features. Th ey had stakes in three civilizations: that of their fathers, 
that of their mothers and the civilization of the métis. In 1821, for instance, 
Brian O’Beirne of Freetown described William Lawrence of Domingia, who was 
at least a third-generation Euro-African descendent, as ‘a person dressed in Nan-
keen Jacket and Trowsers and who, although nearly as dark as many around him, 
had the features of a good looking European’ (O’Beirne 1979: 224–25).
Many strangers died during the fi rst rainy season. If children and a wife were 
left behind, the mother might take their off spring to her father’s compound, or 
she might seek an alliance or marital relationship with another trader. Th at hap-
pened with Phenda, who married John Fraser at the Îles de Los in 1799 (Schafer 
1999). Another possibility was to continue her former husband’s enterprise, with 
the considerable help of friends or kin (Th ayer 1983). Any widow might avail 
herself of this option, but there had to be a male protector (husband’s brother 
or son) to whom she was ultimately responsible, at least nominally. She might 
acquire ‘Big Man’ status and command respect and authority, but only so long 
as she was able to maintain discipline within her husband’s extended family, of 
which she might be the senior or most respected member (Th ayer 1979: 63–64). 
Th at happened with the widow of John Ormond Sr., who remained a powerful 
voice within Ormond family interests in the upper Pongo for nearly two decades 
after her husband’s death until her son John Ormond Jr. returned from London 
to reclaim his father’s position in river commerce (Conneau 1976).
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Some of these children found themselves further isolated by colour, physical 
features and European fi rst names. Th eir hue stigmatized them as European by lo-
cals and as African by traders. Th e Rev. Peter Hartwig, who lived in Freetown and 
Sumbuya from 1804 to 1815, described the dilemma encountered by a widowed 
mother of métis children, suggesting that she ‘is often so circumstanced [and her 
children so stigmatized] that she is forced to leave them [off spring] at the factory’ 
(Mouser and Mouser 2003: 86). Inevitably, some of these children found attach-
ment and employment with European traders or with others of mixed race, such 
as the Luso-Africans. Almada (1594) wrote simply that ‘if one [child] happens to 
be begotten by a white, he [the host] gives it to the father who takes it away’.
Th e above description of marriage practice and kinship, however, relates only 
to newly arriving strangers. Not all strangers arrived at the same time or even 
during the same decades. Documentation of arriving traders is best for the last 
decade of the eighteenth century and the fi rst two decades of the nineteenth. In 
that thirty-year span it is fi rst possible to observe the characteristics of a separate 
transnational community of traders and families moving through stages of accep-
tance or denial. Of the two families sampled in this study, one founder arrived in 
the Rio Pongo in the mid-1760s and the other in the fi rst decade of the 1800s. 
In that forty-year span, the evidence suggests that founders, unless they came as 
employees of factors, conformed to the pattern of mandatory marriage linked 
to landlord/stranger agreements. Only in the second and following generations 
did the issue of creole identity appear, a consequence of increasing numbers of 
Euro-African descendants who claimed membership in trader families, who were 
identifi ed as ‘mulattoes’ by missionaries operating schools in the river and as per-
sons lacking ethnically assigned rights by locals, and had reached diff erent levels 
of assimilation or acculturation with the host society.
Th e problem of self-identity was less acute among elite branches of trader 
families that owned and operated factories, prodigiously intermarried and ob-
tained education in religious and foreign schools. Th is group also travelled abroad, 
maintained pan-Atlantic residences and held economic infl uence and resources 
unimagined by local political and land kings. Being transnational granted this 
elite group a degree of independence from local customs and rituals, but it was ob-
tained at a price. Th is included a ‘formal’ subordinate relationship with hosts and 
an understanding that descendants neither might nor could ever aspire to author-
ity, even though they often exercised as much relative power as did hosts, or more.
Th e level of education attained and travels undertaken by métis family mem-
bers were important variables infl uencing the growth of their transnational or 
hybrid identity in a world characterized by ‘zones where cultures meet’ (Hannerz 
1997: 3). In the 1780s, British companies operating from Bance Island in Sierra 
Leone and at the Îles de Los had sent upwards of seventy sons and daughters of 
headmen and traders to Liverpool, expecting them ‘to learn Sense and get a good 
Head’4 and to return to the African coast as agents of Atlantic and European 
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commerce (Graf 1998: 15; Brooks 2003: 298). Among those attending school in 
Liverpool from the Pongo were John Holman Jr., Emmanuel Gomez and Wil-
liam Jellorum Fernandez. Elizabeth Cleveland of Banana Islands at Sierra Leone, 
whose brother John also had studied in Liverpool, migrated to Charleston. Th ere, 
with money from her brother, she purchased a plantation and opened a school 
for African youths (Koger 2006: 54; Montgomery 2007). John Ormond Jr. lived 
in London for more than a decade before being impressed for fi ve years into the 
British navy, during which time he travelled in the Mediterranean and among the 
Caribbean islands. In 1799, Governor Zachary Macaulay took twenty-one chil-
dren – fi ve of them from the Pongo – to London, where they attended a school 
at Clapham Common (Mouser 2004: 96–99). When the British established a 
colony at Sierra Leone, traders from the Pongo and Nunez sent children to board 
there for their education.
Opportunities for travel and education abroad for métis from the Pongo con-
tinued in the nineteenth century. Jellorum Harrison of Fallangia spent several 
years in Edinburgh, Scotland, where he helped Henry Brunton produce the fi rst 
Susu grammar and dictionary (Brunton 1802) before travelling through Cen-
tral Asia for more than a decade, after which he travelled in the Americas (Hair 
1962). In 1812, James Fraser was attending school in Charleston, South Car-
olina, while his sister Margaret was living with the Powell family in Liverpool. 
Traders sent children to schools to study Spanish in Matanzas and Havana in 
Cuba, as Spanish-speaking slave markets then dominated the trade in the Amer-
icas. In 1817, a French captain visited the Pongo, recruiting students to a newly 
opened school for African youths in the West Indies; one headman sent two of 
his sons (Mouser 2000). Th ese lengthy encounters with other cultures inclined 
family members who experienced them to adopt a fl exible notion of citizenship 
(Ong 1999) which, while widening their world view, may also have narrowed 
their recognition of their own membership in any group.
Between 1808 and 1817, the presence in the Pongo itself of schools founded 
by missionaries and teachers of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) had a ma-
jor, immediate impact upon trader families’ transition to a separate and hybrid 
status. Th ese schools created a ‘social [and physical] space’ (Drotbohm 2009: 
133; Góis 2005: 265–66) in which another type of membership might develop 
and accelerated changes already occurring among elite groups of traders’ chil-
dren. In Butscher’s list of fi fty-two children attending the CMS’s Bashia School 
in 1811, for instance, thirty-six were described as mulattoes and forty-four car-
ried European surnames.5 Th irty were males. Ages ranged from 5 to 18, although 
eighteen students in 1811 were among the group aged 12 to 16 (CMS CAI/E2/
103). When schools began in 1808, missionaries required students to use only 
the Susu language, but in 1809 they changed to English instruction, largely at the 
insistence of traders, who were paying tuition and expected schools to provide a 
foundation useful in Atlantic commerce.
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In these schools students boarded together for extended periods, forming 
lasting friendships. Th e schools reinforced the European view that whites were 
superior to blacks and that métis children were a mongrel race, thus adding to 
their stigma. Th ey were separated from siblings and relatives who remained in 
family compounds. If they remained in school long enough, their world view be-
came at least partly that held by missionaries, their role models. Th at world view 
could expand to encompass pan-Atlantic commerce and business techniques, 
travel to foreign places (especially following the introduction of regular packet 
services), study of foreign languages and use of foreign manufactures (Coifman 
1994; Mouser 2009). Many if not most converted to Christianity, which further 
separated them from their indigenous relatives and from family members born 
to less successful branches. Many of them married classmates, resulting in an 
intermarried generation with the CMS and the Anglican Church as their social 
and cultural base. Some married in the ‘country fashion’ and without church 
sanction, but others fulfi lled both requirements (CMS CAI/E4/19).
Th e CMS schools also provided a foundation for an attitude of study, inte-
gration and separation that carried over to schools abroad, whether located in 
Freetown, London, Liverpool, Matanzas, Havana or Charleston. Among these 
venues, the Freetown connection was the closest and most available, and the 
creole identity emerging there, while separate and diff erent in origin from that 
occurring in the Pongo, further reinforced the transnational status of mixed-race 
children relative to children in the Pongo’s majority population. It also tied them 
more closely to mixed-race children in the diaspora.
Peter Mark (1999), in his essay on the evolution of Luso-African identity, 
noted that cultural markers that produced a separate identity within charter gen-
erations eroded over time as succeeding generations intermarried with indige-
nous groups, indigenous peoples changed to meet challenges arriving from the 
Atlantic, and strangers lost physical traits that had separated them from the ma-
jority population. Th at certainly occurred, but unfortunately the surviving record 
of the charter generations in the Pongo tells us only about their most successful 
or noteworthy members, off ering almost nothing about those that lacked noto-
riety. Nor does the record provide details about the impact of travel, education 
and broadening world view or ‘ethnic shifts’ (Keese 2010: 191) upon sons and 
daughters of African headmen who also attended schools and participated in the 
Atlantic Exchange. Th at impact was likely considerable, especially if they contin-
ued to intermarry with families descended from American and European traders. 
Data shows that indigenous leaders were able to shift ethnic identity depending 
upon circumstance by situationally using a language or dialect, a personal name, 
or a cultural pattern (‘badge’ or ‘label’) as a cultural marker to designate group 
membership (Moerman 1965; Mouser 2002).
Fortunately, priests and teachers associated with the mission of the Spiritan 
(Holy Ghost) Fathers (Archives Générales du Congrégation du Saint-Esprit) in 
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the 1930s and 1940s kept records that contain elaborate genealogies of more 
than twenty infl uential families in the Pongo, nine of which were founded by 
slave traders who had arrived on the coast by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.6 Th e mission’s records also provide details about educational opportu-
nities made available to both headmen and traders during the French colonial 
period, which produced another ‘social space’ that further reduced diff erences 
between leadership groups within the Pongo.
Unfortunately, no sophisticated attempt has been made to correlate genea-
logical data collected by the Spiritan Fathers and data found in letters and reports 
sent to London by CMS missionaries. Records are, however, suffi  cient to con-
fi rm that elite branches of trader families and those of river headmen intermar-
ried, and that they continued to play prominent roles in Pongo commerce and 
society into the twenty-fi rst century. For example, Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo 
(Tchidimbo 1987: 22), Roman Catholic Archbishop of Conakry from 1961 to 
1979 and a Spiritan Father who died on 15 August 2011, was able to trace his 
American ancestry through his mother, whom he identifi ed as a métis, to Benja-
min Curtis, who arrived in the Pongo from Boston in 1794. Th rough the Curtis 
family, Tchidimbo also traced his descent to the Pongo’s royal Kati family, with 
which Curtis had intermarried. Using information from Tchidimbo’s autobiog-
raphy, data from CMS records and reports found in the Archives Générales du 
Sénégal, Coifman (1994) produced an important but incomplete genealogy of 
Archbishop Tchidimbo that details the fusion of Curtis and Kati political inter-
ests in the Pongo and the critical role played by the Curtis family into the late 
twentieth century. In her concluding sentence, Coifman (1994: 289) noted that 
‘when Raymond-Marie Tchidimbo returned home [from abroad] in 1952, he 
was met at Conakry by a tribe of kin and relations, Christian and Muslim, of 
Curtis, Katty, Turpin, Fernandez, Litburn [Lightbourn], Wilkinson and Tchi-
dimbo’, with at least fi ve of those dating their origins to the eighteenth century.
At the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, 
the number of transnational families who counted their residences in the Rio 
Pongo as primary, and whose charter generations either maintained residences in 
America or sent their children to America or abroad for education, was signifi -
cant. Two examples – the Holman and Fraser families – with primary branches 
in the Rio Pongo are used here to illustrate the transnational nature of these new 
families. Both were multi-sited, with links in Africa, America and England. Both 
engaged in the slave trade and operated plantations on both sides of the Atlantic.
Holman Family
John Holman Sr. was from London, where his brothers were innkeepers and a 
pewterer but also investors in his African commerce.7 By 1768, Holman was al-
ready established in the Pongo and Dembia river trades, with commercial ties to 
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London-based traders at Bance Island in Sierra Leone and to Liverpool interests 
at the nearby Îles de Los (Hancock 1995: 177–220). Holman also maintained 
close commercial ties with the most important slave merchants in Charleston, 
South Carolina (Koger 1995: 110–11).
Holman had several wives in the Pongo, none of whom were identifi ed as 
free persons. His principal wife, Elizabeth, was listed in offi  cial documents as a 
‘slave’ who bore him at least fi ve children (John II, Samuel, Esther, Elizabeth and 
Margaret). By another wife he had sons Richard and William. Yet another wife 
bore him a son known in the Nunez trade as John Coleman. No other children 
or wives were reported in documents. John Sr. sent John II to study in Liverpool, 
but by 1785 John II, Samuel and their half-brother William were already operat-
ing trading enterprises of their own in the Rio Pongo.
Holman remained active in the Rio Pongo until 1790, when he moved his 
wife Elizabeth, their children and their slaves to South Carolina. In 1783 an 
insurrection of slaves and subalterns had broken out in the state of Moria, less 
than a hundred kilometres south-east of the Pongo, encouraging slave rebellions 
throughout the region (Mouser 2007: 27–41). Holman, then the second wealth-
iest trader in Pongo commerce, began to look abroad, where he might better pro-
tect his investments and his family, and in 1787 he travelled to Charleston, where 
he arranged to purchase Blessing Plantation (Koger 1995: 111). Th ree years later 
he left the Pongo with his family and slaves, and after a brief detour to Savannah, 
Georgia, he established his family at Blessing Plantation in 1791.8
Much is known about the Holman family, partly because inheritance prob-
lems after Holman’s death soon after his arrival in South Carolina produced re-
cords that contained particulars about the family’s investments in both Africa and 
America. British documents also detailed the family’s activities in the Rio Pongo. 
William Holman and his family had remained in the Pongo, taking possession of 
John Sr.’s interests at Bashia in the upper Pongo and continuing to ship slaves to 
the Charleston market in the following years (Corry 1807: 92; Knutsford 1900: 
126; Afzelius 1967: 105–9). In his last will and testament, John Sr. freed his wife 
Elizabeth and assigned management of his property in South Carolina to his sons 
John II and Samuel.
Within three generations, John Sr.’s descendants had become models of 
transnational families – and of the tensions that occurred within these families. 
John II, who had studied in Liverpool, moved his family and slaves to South 
Carolina in 1790. Following the death of his father in 1791, he purchased a 
plantation near Blessing Plantation where he used his and his father’s slaves, who 
would have comprised a large slave workforce numbering nearly a hundred. He 
also travelled often to the Pongo, as he still had economic interests in Africa and 
there were still enormous profi ts to be obtained in the slave trade. Eventually, 
having grown dissatisfi ed with his life in South Carolina and the type of hybrid, 
segregated African American society that had developed there, he returned to the 
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Rio Pongo, though he meanwhile continued to operate a plantation in South 
Carolina under the management of his brother Samuel. Koger (1995: 116–17) 
described John II as ‘probably the fi rst and only African-born entrepreneur who 
resided in Africa as an absentee planter in the New World’. He married a ‘mu-
latto’ woman from ‘America’ who bore him at least four children (Margaret, 
Betsy, Elizabeth and John III). All his children attended CMS schools estab-
lished in the Rio Pongo between 1808 and 1817. His brother Samuel remained 
in South Carolina and married a ‘free person of colour’ from Charleston. Both 
Elizabeth and Margaret married Collins brothers, described as ‘persons of colour’ 
and owners of rice growing plantations. Esther also remained in South Carolina 
and married James Anderson, whose uncle, Richard Oswald, had operated fac-
tories in the Rio Pongo in the mid-eighteenth century (Koger 2006: 119–24).9 
Essentially the American branch assumed characteristics that were American and 
married within the Euro-African group, although the latter was located in South 
Carolina rather than in the Pongo.
Th e African branch of the family, or at least the one descended from John II, 
identifi ed itself as more African than the branch located in South Carolina, likely a 
response to the types of creolization that had occurred in both places. John II was 
particularly disappointed that Samuel and his sisters had devoted little attention to 
his property in South Carolina, which he lost through their mismanagement. In 
1816 his daughter Margaret married Jellorum Harrison, who had lived in Scotland 
and Central Asia and visited America (Hair 1962: 45–47). Harrison later served as 
a catechist at Bashia School, where Margaret was a student. Harrison’s uncle was 
William Fernandez, headman at Bouramaya, who had studied in Liverpool in his 
youth (CMS CAI/E5/18 and CAI/E4/100). Harrison also was a cousin to John 
Ormond Jr. (a trader at Bangalan who travelled often to Havana), to Elizabeth 
Lightbourn (a trader at Farenya whose husband’s brother was a lawyer in Charles-
ton) and to Richard Wilkinson of Fallangia on the Little Pongo. Wilkinson, who 
had studied as a catechist in London in 1815 and 1816, spoke Baga, Susu, Fula, 
English and a bit of Portuguese. In 1821, Wilkinson sailed to Baltimore, Mary-
land, to purchase trade goods for the Pongo market and, while there, became an 
offi  cial interpreter for the U.S. government in a case involving slaves who had ac-
cidentally illegally entered the United States as crewmen on board a trading vessel 
(Mouser 2000). Margaret’s sister Betsy married William Lawrence, who was fl uent 
in English, Portuguese, Baga, Susu and Fula, and who was well enough respected 
in Freetown to purchase property there in the late 1820s. Both sisters’ marriages 
were performed as church ceremonies, but Betsy and William Lawrence were also 
wedded in the ‘country fashion’, indicating a fusion of European and African cus-
toms. Like his father, John III studied in Liverpool.
Interestingly, the Holman name largely disappeared in South Carolina, where 
it was subsumed into the Collins and Anderson families. Still, Koger (1995: 
127) was able to write in 1995 that ‘the colored rice planters of Charleston and 
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Georgetown counties can be traced to the Holman family’. Th e Holman name 
is also rare in later Pongo history, whereas the names Lawrence, Wilkinson and 
Harrison featured prominently into the twentieth century.
Fraser Family
John Fraser, born in Scotland in 1769, entered Pongo commerce as a slave trader 
before 1799, lived in the river region until 1807 and remained active there until 
his death in 1813. He married Phenda, the widow of a prominent British trader 
who had operated a successful Liverpool-linked factory at the Îles de Los. Fraser 
established his principal centres of commerce in the Pongo at Bangara, Bashia 
and Bangalan (Valley Sunday Star-Monitor-Herald [Brownsville, Texas], 9, 16 and 
23 January 1938). Between 1799 and 1807, he and Phenda, described in mar-
riage documents as a free person and no doubt the heir to her previous husband’s 
investments in the river trade, had fi ve children. When South Carolina reopened 
the slave trade in 1803, Fraser expanded his commercial enterprise by establish-
ing an offi  ce in Charleston, moving there along with a large number of people 
from the Pongo. He left Phenda and his three youngest children at Bashia, where 
the children would attend school and Phenda would manage his and her consid-
erable economic interests (CMS CAI/E4/19; Schafer 1999: 1–2).
By 1812, Phenda had moved the centre of her operations in the Pongo to the 
Bangalan branch of the river. Son James was sent to Charleston and enrolled in 
school there (Koger 2006). Daughter Margaret was taken to Liverpool at age four 
to live with Th omas Powell, who maintained additional residences in Charleston 
and the Îles de Los (Schafer 1999: 4). When the slave trade became illegal for 
British and American citizens in 1808, Fraser moved his Charleston-based op-
erations to East Florida, which was then still a Spanish colony. He died there in 
1813 in a shipwreck. His holdings in the Pongo, until the time of his death, were 
administered by his wife Phenda and by Zebulon Miller, George Cooke, Samuel 
Gale (all Americans) and Samuel Samo (a Dutch subject).
Fraser’s holdings and his last will and testament reveal much about the op-
eration of this family. Th e value of his Florida plantations alone stood at USD 
56,744 in 1813 (USD 780,000 at 2010 purchasing power). In a lawsuit against 
the British government for damages to his property caused by a British squadron 
raid directed against American traders in the Bangalan branch of the Pongo in 
1812, Fraser claimed that the British, assuming he was an American citizen, had 
destroyed property worth USD 40,000. His daughters Mary Ann, Eleanor and 
Elizabeth, who in 1813 were students at the CMS school at Bashia, were sub-
sequently sent to England and France for training (Valley Sunday Star-Monitor-
Herald, 9, 16 and 23 January 1938; Schafer 1999: 4–6).
According to Fraser’s will, his children would inherit only upon reaching the 
age of twenty-one. Th at Fraser freed Phenda (who was already free) in his will 
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also complicated the distribution of his property, for persons identifi ed as slave 
in Spanish Florida could not be freed in a will or inherit property. Executors paid 
the educational expenses of Fraser’s children in Europe, but legal challenges and 
court and legal costs attached to administration of his estate multiplied (Schafer 
1999: 6). Elizabeth and Mary Ann, who by 1826 had returned to the Pongo and 
married William Skelton Jr. and Th omas Gaff ery Curtis of Kissing, appointed 
their husbands to negotiate distribution of their inheritances. Th eir husbands 
turned for assistance to Styles Lightbourn in the upper Pongo, whose brother 
was a Charleston attorney. Th e fi nal settlement was not reached for yet another 
quarter century, when Elizabeth (now the only living heir) received USD 33,000 
(USD 955,000 in 2009 dollars) (Schafer 1999: 3). In 1851, Elizabeth and her 
husband were then principal traders at Victoria, located in the lower Nunez River 
(Coifman 2000: 501–2).
Conclusions
A study of these two families suggests that several constructs had developed 
within the fi rst, founding generations. In each case, the founder came to the coast 
as a stranger without a lineage to provide protection to himself or the wife he 
acquired when he settled there. Th e common cultural marker was the marriage of 
a lineage-less stranger to a local woman who was either a free person or a person 
of slave background. Th e kinship model – that of the dominant Susu group – 
was patrilineal and patrilocal. In this arrangement, widowed or abandoned wives 
could appeal only to their father’s family for support, though widows also had 
the option of marrying another stranger (Butscher 2000 [1815]: 10). A widow 
might otherwise obtain ‘Big Man’ status either through her children or through 
property or the control of property she or her children may have inherited.
But there also was a construct that was new, at least to a degree. Marriage 
alliances were common, whether involving indigenous unions or only strangers. 
Characteristics among the charter generations of strangers (‘mulatto’ features, 
Western dress, religious observance, language use, fi rst names and surnames, ed-
ucation, occupation, travel, location, mobility), however, were commonly held 
attributes that stigmatized and marginalized them, and also encouraged fam-
ily alliances among elite branches and development of a self-identifi ed hybrid 
culture, similar to the ‘creolization’ described by Knörr (2010: 733). Th e most 
successful and best travelled branches of these families intermarried prodigiously 
and produced an expatriate/hybrid community that, to a degree, was outside the 
bounds of uncle/nephew obligations.
Th is community enjoyed liberties and opportunities that others more closely 
tied to traditional patterns did not have. Its members needed to follow some rules 
to remain infl uential and protected within the Rio Pongo context, as the dom-
inant indigenous group recognized and stigmatized them as persons having less 
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desirable characteristics and separate origins with their own customs and rules. 
Th e stigma attached to these families, however, was diff erent from that attached 
to the creole community of Sierra Leone. All Pongo-based families mentioned in 
this study trace their origins to the slave trade and to landlord/stranger relation-
ships that involved wifegiving and wifetaking.
Th ese examples suggest that accommodation and acculturation did occur, 
but only to a degree in the early generations. Th at changed signifi cantly once 
the ‘social space’ changed during the French period that began in the 1850s. 
Th e basic notion of patrilineal descent was like that practised in the West, except 
that the wife lost claims upon her father’s lineage. What mattered most was ‘free’ 
status, which defi ned who could inherit and claim authority within an extended 
family.
Sir George Collier suggested in 1820 that large family size guaranteed re-
spect for the customs of the country. Th at may indeed have occurred, but our 
knowledge of the size of a family is limited to records kept by its elite members 
who found it worthwhile to do so, or to outside resources that identify certain 
persons meriting inclusion in reports. Th e emergence of large families – especially 
those connected through marriage alliances – and of the mobility and trans-
national connections evidenced in the charter generations of the Holman and 
Fraser families, reduced their compliance with customs that challenged their own 
economic and social interests. Meanwhile, with the passage of time and inter-
marriage outside the trader alliances, especially during the French period, their 
ties to local kinship groups and to obligations linked to traditional uncle/nephew 
relationships increased rather than decreased, as was so for the Curtis family of 
Archbishop Tchidimbo. Th eir mobility and access to wealth, education and co-
lonial authorities who established agencies on the river further strengthened their 
own infl uence relative to traditional authority and custom.
Bruce L. Mouser, emeritus professor of history at the University of Wiscon-
sin-La Crosse, is author of American Colony on the Rio Pongo: Th e War of 1812, 
Continuing Slave Trade, and Plans for a Settlement of African Americans, 1810-
1830 (Africa World Press, 2014) and numerous items in the Papers on Africa 
Series of the University of Leipzig and occasional papers of the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. He has published widely on the slave trade and on trading 
families of coastal Guinea.
Notes
 1. Th e Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa was the original name of the Royal 
African Company.
 2. ‘Second Annual Report upon the Settlements on the Coast of Africa, by Commodore 
Sir G.R. Collier, 16th September 1820’ (Foreign Offi  ce 1830: 8:847–48). Surnames of 
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traders in the Pongo before 1840 include: Andrews, Anthony, Bearing, Botefere, Brodie, 
Brody, Dunbar, Bull, Carr, Cockelshell, Coffi  n, Cook, Cooke, Cooper, Conneau, Cum-
mings, Curtis, Dickson, Dunbar, East, Ellis, Faber, Fist, Fraser, Gaff rey, Gale, Gardner, 
Garrett, Gilton, Gomez, Gray, Grey, Griggs, Harrison, Hickson, Holman, Irving, Irwin, 
Jeff rys, Johnson, Josiff e, Lancaster, Lawrence, Lightbourn, Lorial, Maguire, Miller, Mis-
gan, Nelson, Nevel, Ormond, Pearce, Pendleton, Perry, Peters, Quail, Rhodes, Richards, 
Richardson, Samo, Skelton, Sparratt, Spearce, Sterne, Talboard, Tavel, Th omas, Tilling-
hast, Tool, Tryon, Varing, Welsh, White, Wilkinson, Wilson, Wood.
 3. R. Lerouge, ‘Quand la Guinée s’appelait “Rivières du Sud” (Miettes d’histoire),’ Archive 
Générales Congrégation du Saint-Esprit, Boite 269, A-I, page 28. Th is is an unpublished 
typescript. Lerouge had few kind words for the founders of families, describing them as 
arrived ‘as poor as Job’ (32). He also described the fi rst generation of métis children as ‘the 
fi rst degeneration’ (32).
 4. Quoted in Great Britain, Privy Council, ‘Report of the Lords of the Committee of Coun-
cil…relating to Trade and Foreign Plantations, 1789’ (enclosed letter, John Matthews, 
James Penny and Robert Norris to John Tarleton, 16 April 1788).
 5. Caulker, Cummings, Curtis, Jeff rys, Lancaster, Lawrence, Quail, Rhode, Wilkinson, An-
thony, Botefere, Cockleshell, Fraser, Garrett, Gilton, Hickson and Peters.
 6. I am greatly indebted to V.B. Coifman (University of Minnesota), G.E. Brooks (Indiana 
University) and R. Sarrò Maluquer (Oxford University), who made their photocopies 
of genealogical material from the Archives Générales, Congregation du Saint-Esprit, 
Chevilly-Larue, available for this research.
 7. I am indebted to R. Chaney of Lyndonville, New York, for crucial information about the 
Holman family. His wife is a descendant of John Holman through the Collins family of 
South Carolina. Chaney relished the process of discovery, and we communicated often 
about his fi ndings. He was an enthusiastic researcher but a reluctant writer. In 2008, I 
asked his permission to use his fi ndings for a summary of Holman activities in the United 
States, and Chaney supplied me with several documents that he considered most helpful. 
We were at that stage of collaboration when I learned of his death in 2009. His papers 
relating to the Holman family were not kept following his death.
 8. Petition of John Holman to the Speaker and Members of the South Carolina House of 
Representatives, 13 January 1791, Records of the General Assembly, #123, South Caro-
lina Department of Archives and History.
 9. Th ere is some disagreement whether this James Anderson was the same as the person 
identifi ed by Koger.
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Th e Upper Guinea Coast is a special case, where processes of creolization in con-
nection to Portugal’s expansion are concerned. Colonial ideology used to depict 
Guinea-Bissau as the ‘fi rst Portuguese possession’, ‘cradle’ (Reis Torgal 2005: 64), 
and ‘dawn’ (Governo da Guiné 1952) of the Portuguese empire. Th e Portuguese 
called at the Upper Guinea Coast on their way to Asia and Brazil. Portuguese 
culture, having ‘disembarked’ there fi rst, has been appropriated, integrated and 
transformed by local populations there since the late fi fteenth century. Hence, 
the Upper Guinea Coast was the fi rst region where creolization occurred in con-
nection to (Portuguese) colonialism (Vale de Almeida 2007). Processes of cultural 
and particularly linguistic creolization in Africa and Asia have been the subject 
of several ‘mono-sited’ studies. However, very few (e.g. Knörr 2008, 2010) in-
volve a comparative look at such processes and their social impact. Generally 
speaking, fi ndings concerning linguistic connections are linked to connections 
beyond language – where people speak, they interact (and vice versa); and where 
they interact, new culture and new identifi cations are likely to emerge. Research 
has, however, led to a number of studies on creole groups and culture, which I 
term ‘Luso-Creole’. Th is notion alludes to a network of ‘continued identities’ and 
cultural representations that started emerging during the Portuguese expansion 
that began in the fi fteenth century and have since acquired specifi c complexities 
and dynamics (Pina Cabral 2010).
Historical links between the Luso-Creole language varieties in Guinea-Bissau, 
the Casamance and Cape Verde, and between Upper Guinea, the Gulf of Guinea 
islands and the Caribbean (Martinus 1996; Jacobs 2009) are not disputed, but 
early connections between the Upper Guinea Coast and Asia (cf. Kohl 2011c; cf. 
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Cardoso 2010) are somewhat more controversial. According to the monogenetic 
hypothesis – based on historico-linguistic data put forward by Th omp son (1961a, 
1961b) and Valkhoff  (1966, 1972) but contested by authors like Ferraz (1987), 
amongst others – a Luso-Creole language served as the fi rst global lingua franca, 
connecting the Indian Ocean basin with Africa. Hancock (1975) claimed that 
Asian Luso-Creole languages generally seem to be marginally connected to the 
Upper Guinea Coast. Cardoso (2010) recently suggested that ships’ passengers 
journeying from Africa to Asia may have acted as transmitters of Luso-Pidgin 
elements, leaving unmentioned the possibility that Africans who (were) settled in 
parts of Asia may have contributed to the spread of Luso-Creole languages there.
Against this background, this chapter sets out to compare some of the dy-
namics at play in processes of cultural creolization – namely, creole identity con-
struction, creole boundary maintenance and creole infl uences on postcolonial 
nation-building – in Guinea-Bissau and Sri Lanka. In doing so, it aims to disclose 
similarities and diff erences of the processes and results of creolization, and ex-
plain how these resemblances and diff erences are related to the social make-up of 
the respective societies in which they occur.1
Lusocreolization in Cross-Cultural Research
Th e carrying out of a comparative survey has to rely substantially on existing 
scholarly literature, not just because no researcher alone can study all the diff er-
ent creole groups to be examined, but also because comparisons may well profi t 
from a historical perspective based on historical sources. Meanwhile, cross-cul-
tural analyses may have to rely on fairly diverse, disparate ethnographic data from 
the respective geographic settings, which complicates comparisons – as is the case 
with this study. If we choose to look at (Luso-)Creole culture and identity in a 
comparative, cross-cultural perspective, then we need to conceptualize ‘creole’ as 
an analytical term, since attributes like ‘creole’ and its cognates in other European 
languages (‘créole’, ‘crioulo’, ‘criollo’, etc.) ‘have meant lots of diff erent things at 
diff erent times’ (Stewart 2007: 5).
Th e creole case is further complicated by the fact that some creole groups are 
– by reason of their heterogeneous origins within colonial contexts – identifi ed 
as ‘creoles’ by third parties yet do not employ the adjective ‘creole’ (or its coun-
terpart in any other language) as part of their ethnonym or self-description. Th is 
applies, for example, to the Kristons de Geba in Guinea-Bissau (Kohl 2009a, 
2009b) as well as the Portuguese Burghers and so-called Kaffi  rs in Sri Lanka – 
cases to be studied in this chapter. Furthermore, a creole language does not nec-
essarily exist in all locations where creole groups live, as shown by the examples 
of the Agudás and Tabom in Ghana, Benin, Togo and Nigeria, who, although 
they do not speak a creole language, are nevertheless regarded as creoles by histo-
rians and social anthropologists. Th e fact that analytical and actor perspectives on 
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‘creoleness’ can diff er (Knörr 2010) is thus important for comparisons. In Sierra 
Leone and Guinea-Bissau, moreover, creole languages initially spoken mainly by 
members of small creole groups spread across ethnic boundaries and turned into 
major lingua francas. As a result, a small number of ‘creoles’ serve a large number 
of creole speakers.
How, then, can diff erent meanings of ‘creole’ and ‘creolization’ be conceived 
in ways that make them appropriate tools for cross-cultural research? ‘Creoliza-
tion’ in an anthropological sense may be conceived as an intergenerational pro-
cess in which old group boundaries are increasingly dissolved and replaced by 
new ones. Th is process is accompanied by the recontextualization of both iden-
tity and culture (Knörr 2010) and may result in strongly or weakly ethnicized 
new identities (cf. Kohl 2009b). Creolization is thus linked to indigenization, 
in that a newly emerging creole group increasingly identifi es with its new local, 
cultural and social environment and refers to the latter and to a specifi c shared 
history as markers of group identity (Knörr 2010). At this juncture, new set-
tlers can become ‘fi rstcomers’ to certain localities, as opposed to the ‘latecomers’ 
who follow thereafter (Kopytoff  1987). In several cases, creole groups have sur-
rounded themselves with a mystique of exclusiveness (Cohen 1981; Roberts, Re-
heem and Colin-Th omé 1989), portraying themselves as ‘bringers of civilization’ 
and thereby distancing themselves from the autochthonous, ‘noncivilized’ pop-
ulation. Historical processes of creolization often occurred in societies that were 
shaped by rather fi xed boundaries along social, physical and ancestral criteria, 
constraining socially upward and downward mobility (Knörr 2010). However, 
creole identity is not a priori linked to phenotypical and class-related character-
istics (notably elite status; see Knörr 2010), and its emergence is not restricted to 
locations that were subject to European colonization. Rather, creolization occurs 
in settings marked by cultural and identitarian heterogeneity and social hierar-
chies. Th erefore, creolization can also occur in settings untouched by European 
colonialism, such as (precolonial) East Africa (e.g. Walker 2005; Bryceson 2010), 
where a distinct Swahili identity emerged in some coastal settings.
Cultural creolization is not to be equated with processes of urbanization or 
‘detribalization’. Indeed, it has often occurred in rural settings like the plantation 
societies of the Caribbean. Likewise, urbanization may entail indigenization but 
does not necessarily involve creolization. Detribalization – a term often used to 
denote processes in which people become estranged from their ‘traditional’ cul-
ture upon coming into contact with ‘modern’ ways of life, often in multiethnic 
and urban settings – however, constitutes one aspect of cultural creolization in 
that the forging of a new common identity among people of various origins 
necessitates the de-ethnicization of the diff erent original identities in support of 
the newly emerging common identity (Knörr 2010). Processes of cultural creo-
lization are distinct from processes of cultural transethnicization (which Knörr 
[2010] termed ‘pidginization’): although in both cases a new common identity 
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evolves, in the course of transethnicization the heterogeneous original identities 
stay intact and are not substituted by the newly emerging identity.
What might comparative analyses of Luso-Creole culture and identity look 
like, and how can ‘Luso-Creole’ be conceptualized? Here, Luso-Creole refers to 
a ‘travel of ideas’ (Czarniawska and Joerges 1996; Kaufmann and Rottenburg 
2012), alluding to long-term impacts of Portugal’s maritime interactions and 
interchanges that continue to unfold their potentials to the present day, as ev-
idenced by now-current narratives, cultural representations and identity con-
structions that ex post refer to past times of Portuguese colonization. In fact, 
many Luso-Creole communities continue to refer to Portuguese legacies, such as 
the Catholic faith and Luso-Creole languages, that are often employed as ethnic 
markers. However, these markers are insuffi  cient to defi ne a ‘Luso-Creole’ (Pina 
Cabral 2010), or to delineate a ‘Portuguese’ space, as proponents of ‘lusotropi-
calism’ have suggested. Lusotropicalism was Portugal’s colonial ideology before 
1974. Taking a Eurocentric and essentialist perspective, this ideology attributed 
to the Portuguese the exceptional ability to acclimatize to the tropics and socio-
culturally fraternize with the colonized people, thus attempting to underline the 
Iberian country’s greatness and peculiarity (Castelo 1999). Th e doctrine therefore 
implied that a number of groups colonized or infl uenced by Portugal since the 
fi fteenth century shared a Portuguese cultural ‘essence’ that suggested a specifi c 
cultural reciprocity with Portugal yet never existed in social practice. 
Analytically, Luso-Creole markers are not fi xed cultural essences. Rather, they 
are subject to continuous reinterpretations, recontextualizations and even reifi ca-
tions that serve to maintain and redraw cultural and identitarian boundaries vis-
à-vis other groups. During Portugal’s colonial expansion, the encounter between 
Eurocentric ideas and diverse, locally specifi c thought-worlds led to the un-
planned translation of ideas, turning them into diff erent substances (Czarniawska 
and Joerges 1996). In the long run, sociocultural values, norms and features were 
often selectively appropriated by emerging Luso-Creole groups – both inten-
tionally and unintentionally – that subsequently integrated and adjusted them 
to their own needs and cultural structures: ‘those social innovations that were in-
compatible with local social structures were rejected, but useful or unthreatening 
characteristics were embraced, particularly if such moves were likely to be seen as 
positive attributes’ (Walker 2005: 195).
A Luso-Creole ‘travel of ideas’ can attest to the power of the colonized sub-
jects who, as agents, creatively and selectively appropriated specifi c ‘Portuguese’ 
sociocultural values and representations, combining them with their own ideas 
or those borrowed from third parties, and thereby underscoring intercultural in-
teractions of various kinds. Th us, the imitation and appropriation of ideas was 
by no means unilateral (as lusotropicalism suggested); rather, the ‘travel of ideas’ 
has always gone back and forth. Europe in general, like Portugal in particular, has 
proved to be only one disseminator of ideas, albeit quite a powerful one. Once 
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appropriated, ideas of heterogeneous origins were integrated, intermingled and 
transformed over generations, sometimes to such an extent that their origins are 
no longer traceable. Nevertheless, in various geographic settings references to 
Portugal can be quite strong, serving as markers of diff erence in mutual bound-
ary construction. In African, American and Asian creole contexts, ‘Portuguese’ 
may often be interpreted diff erently from European understandings of the term. 
Furthermore, many who refer to ‘Portuguese’ or Christian-Catholic features may 
not at all identify themselves as ‘Portuguese’. References to ‘Portuguese’ change 
over time and are always related to context and place (cf. Fabian 1983). A Luso-
Creole space can be conceived as an intersubjective network of contacts that owes 
its existence to distinct markers – sociocultural concepts, styles, ideas, features, 
patterns of cognition – that in various localities have passed through manifold 
complex and creative dynamics (Pina Cabral 2010).
In the following discussion of Luso-Creole culture and identity I will con-
centrate on two objects of comparison. Using my fi ndings from Guinea-Bissau 
and data extracted from scholarly literature on Sri Lanka, I will address (1) the 
construction of creole identities and the strategies employed to maintain bound-
aries in the interaction with other, non-creole groups; and (2) creole groups’ 
contributions to postcolonial nation-building, both top-down and from below. 
Given the dissimilarity and incompleteness of data, this can only be done in a 
preliminary fashion at this point.
Guinea-Bissau versus Sri Lanka
In the second half of the fi fteenth century, the Portuguese started establishing 
trading posts along the West African coast. Th ere, Europeans, Cape Verdeans 
and Africans came to interact and intermingle, increasingly developing distinct 
identities and lifestyles that exist up to the present day. Guinea-Bissau remained 
a Portuguese colony until 1973/74, when it achieved independence after more 
than a decade of armed struggle. Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, was 
‘discovered’ by the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. Portugal had to 
cede this territory to the Netherlands in 1658, and the Dutch were themselves 
supplanted by the British in 1796. In any case, one result of Portugal’s presence 
was the emergence of small Luso-Creole communities along the island’s east 
coast and in its north-west. Sri Lanka became independent from British rule in 
1948.
Identity Construction and Interethnic Relations
In Guinea-Bissau, various creole categories of people have long coexisted. Th ese 
include descendants of immigrants from Cape Verde, who can be distinguished 
from people of Kriston (literally ‘Christian’) origin (cf. Havik 2004, 2007; Kohl 
2009a, 2009b). Creoles number only a few thousand people. Th e early emer-
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gence of Kriston identity is strongly connected with the European-African colo-
nial encounter along the Upper Guinea Coast, as numerous scholars have shown 
(e.g. Mark 2002; Brooks 2003; Havik 2004; Mark and da Silva Horta 2011). 
Portuguese navigators began exploring the coastal and riverine regions of present-
day Guinea-Bissau in the mid-fi fteenth century. Subsequently, European adven-
turers, delinquents and merchants settled in the area and began to work as com-
mercial middlemen between Africans in the hinterland and European and Cape 
Verdean businessmen. Th is turned praças – small, isolated Portuguese trading 
posts connected by maritime links – into exchange hubs for commodities and 
slaves that served as locations for European-African cultural encounters. 
Apart from the Portuguese offi  cials and militaries, Catholic clergymen estab-
lished themselves in the trading posts with a view to proselytize Africans. Within 
these praças, high levels of interethnic mixture and intermarriages (i.e. a process of 
cultural creolization) produced new cultural representations and a new common 
creole identity. Identity among the Kriston communities was ultimately defi ned 
by language (a Portuguese-based creole vernacular, nowadays known as Kriol), 
a distinctive architecture (rectangular houses with verandas) and the Catholic 
religion (Mark 2002). For instance, manjuandadis – predominantly female asso-
ciations that provide for sociability and mutual solidarity (Trajano Filho 1998, 
2001a, 2001b, 2010; cf. Kohl 2009b, 2012a, 2012b) – have apparently inte-
grated features of both European Christian lay brotherhoods and African age-set 
organizations (see below). Likewise integrating Portuguese and African features 
is carnival, which used to be celebrated annually in the former trade settlements 
(Kohl 2009b). Th e Kristons, who served as economic, cultural and political bro-
kers for Europeans engaged in commerce, regarded themselves as fi rstcomers to 
these trading posts and are widely recognized as such. In the early days, several 
terms to denote Kristons emerged, some of them persisting until at least the early 
twentieth century. In use for a long time was the term grumete (literally, ‘cabin 
boy’), implying a relation of servitude, whereas tangomão – referring to outcasts 
and renegades involved in riverine trade – had largely disappeared by the late 
nineteenth century (Havik 2004). Other widely used terms ascribed to Kristons 
were fi lhos da terra (literally, ‘sons of the land’) and cristãos da terra or ‘Christians 
of the land’ (Mark 2002). Historically, Kristons also identifi ed themselves also as 
‘Portuguese’, as they connoted their Catholic faith and fl uency in Portuguese or 
Kriol respectively with ‘Portugueseness’.
One strategy Kristons use even nowadays to emphasize their creole descent is 
toponymical references, by which they associate themselves with one of the for-
mer trading posts to indicate their origin, for example by adding di Bissau (‘from 
Bissau’) or di Cacheu (‘from Cacheu’). Th us, although Christianity at present is 
no longer the preserve of creoles, the additive Kriston di Bolama (‘Christian of 
Bolama’) highlights the individual’s or family’s creole background in one or sev-
eral of the former praças.
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Kriston identity has been transethnic: Kristons have identifi ed with one or 
another ethnic group inasmuch as Kriston identity served as an additional or 
umbrella identifi cation for members of other ethnic groups. My recent fi eld re-
search found that creole members of the middle and lower classes who identifi ed 
with one of the various ‘ordinary’ ethnic groups inhabiting Guinea-Bissau (nota-
bly Pepels, Manjacos, Balantas, Bijagós, Felupes or Mancanhas) simultaneously 
identifi ed themselves as Kristons or used such expressions as di Cacheu or Kris-
ton di Farim, mentioned above. By contrast, members of the upper class often 
tended to negate any ethnic affi  liation, thus continuing the colonial practice of 
negating ethnic affi  liation while stressing nationality (formerly ‘Portuguese’, at 
present ‘Bissau-Guinean’). Nonetheless, fellow citizens (pretend to) know these 
individuals’ or families’ ethnic background. Th e identity of those Kristons who 
mixed with Cape Verdeans, Europeans and – since the early twentieth century – 
newly arrived Lebanese is only weakly ethnicized. Th e Kristons may be described 
as a category of people rather than a group with a pronounced ‘we-consciousness’ 
or ‘groupness’ (cf. Brubaker 2004) – in contrast to both Bissau-Guinean Cape 
Verdeans and Kristons de Geba.
Scholars sometimes ignore Kriston identity, considering only Cape Verdean 
descendants residing in Guinea-Bissau to be creoles (see Schiefer 2002; Ellery 
Mourão 2009). Historically, Cape Verdeans’ identity indeed evolved through a 
process of cultural creolization in the archipelago off  the West African coast. 
Th ey have settled in Guinea-Bissau for centuries. Whereas members of recently 
migrated families often keep in touch with their families in the archipelago, other 
individuals in Cape Verdean families that have resided in the country for gen-
erations no longer maintain any familial ties to the islands (Kohl 2009a, forth-
coming). Cape Verdean immigration to continental West Africa dates back to 
the early times of Portugal’s presence. Cape Verdean clergymen, traders, soldiers 
and, in the twentieth century, administrative staff  and commercial clerks came 
to Guinea-Bissau. Th ey often used to intermingle especially with Kristons, but 
since the late nineteenth century Cape Verdeans have increasingly put emphasis 
on their distinctiveness (Havik 2004). To this day, many creoles of Cape Verdean 
descent claim to be more Portuguese, more European and hence more civilized 
than other inhabitants of Guinea-Bissau, including Kriston descendants, proudly 
depicting their ‘home country’ as closer to Europe in terms of sociocultural and 
economic indicators as well as political stability. To support their claims, some 
interviewees in Bissau, for example, referred to the Cape Verdean fl ag, which 
slightly resembles that of the European Union. To give another example, some 
of my neighbours of Cape Verdean origin in Guinea-Bissau accused their fellow 
Bissau-Guineans of being involved in magic and witchcraft, distancing them-
selves from such practices. However, in numerous informal conversations I found 
out that many of them themselves engaged in ‘superstitious’ beliefs and practices 
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that they publicly rejected. Politically, the Portuguese historically sought to por-
tray Cape Verdeans as their allies, trying to divide the independence movement 
that engaged many Cape Verdeans. After independence, Cape Verdean politi-
cians were criticized for their strong role in Bissau-Guinean politics, leading to 
the fi rst successful coup in 1980 (Kohl forthcoming).
As in the Cape Verdean case, the identity of the Kristons de Geba is strongly 
ethnicized – the ethnonym refers to the now decayed former trading post of Geba 
in central Guinea-Bissau. Th e Kristons de Geba regard Geba as their ancestral 
home, although most of them now reside either in nearby Bafatá or in Bissau. 
Having traditionally settled in an area populated predominantly by Muslims, they 
developed a quite strong, non-transethnic ethnic identity, stressing their nominal 
Christian faith. Unlike other Kristons’ identifi cation, their ethnic ascription and 
self-identifi cation are congruent, and their group cohesion is very pronounced 
(see Kohl 2009a, 2011a).
Despite these diff erences, many creoles in Guinea-Bissau continue to stress 
their historical roles as brokers for the Portuguese, emphasizing their part-Euro-
pean genealogies, urban residence and Christian beliefs and often, in doing so, 
drawing a boundary between them and the ‘uncivilized’ (religiously and socially) 
rural population (Kohl 2009b). Kristons and Cape Verdeans are united by their 
common fl uency in the Luso-Creole Kriol language that emerged along the Up-
per Guinea Coast in the sixteenth century and has turned into the country’s 
lingua franca in the past forty years (do Couto 1994).2
Th e example of Sri Lanka resembles the Bissau-Guinean case insofar as Sri 
Lanka is inhabited by various creole groups that refer to diff erent European her-
itages. Today, they account for less than 1 per cent of the total population and 
live predominantly in urban environments along the coast. Th eir origins can be 
traced back to the times of colonization by the Portuguese, Dutch and British, 
whose consecutive presence entailed settlement by Europeans, Africans and In-
dians and, henceforth, the emergence of several coexisting creole communities. 
Th e Dutch Burghers were a small but infl uential minority before losing ground 
to Sinhalese and Tamils after independence in 1948 (cf. McGilvray 1982; Henry 
1986; Roberts, Reheem and Colin-Th omé 1989; Roberts 1994). Th ey pointed 
extensively to their part-Dutch ancestry and bear mention here only so far as 
their case facilitates the understanding of the relationship between creoles on the 
one hand and colonialism and nationalism on the other. My main focus will in-
stead be the Portuguese Burghers (McGilvray 1982, 2007, 2008; Jackson 1990) 
and the so-called Kaffi  rs (Jackson 1990; de Silva Jayasuriya 2001, 2003, 2006), 
as these groups refer to a Luso-Creole space, conceiving of themselves as parts 
of an intersubjective network. Th is Luso-Creole space is based on what these 
groups perceive, style, reinterpret, recontextualize and reify – both consciously 
and unconsciously – as ‘Portuguese’, putting forward their Catholic faith, a Luso-
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Creole language, a music style known as Baila (derived from the Portuguese term 
for ‘dance’) and Luso-Creole folk songs and narrations (cf. Jackson 1990, 2005; 
Sheeran 1997; de Mel 2006).
Once the Portuguese had established commercial contacts with Sri Lanka 
at the beginning of the sixteenth century, they did not mix solely with the local 
Sri Lankan population. From about 1630 they also relied on the military and 
auxiliary assistance of mercenary African soldier-slaves – most of them probably 
originating from South-Eastern Africa, Madagascar and Ethiopia – whom they 
supposedly introduced to the island via the Indo-Portuguese settlement of Goa 
(Boxer 1977; de Mel 2006). While the Portuguese were, for military and imperial 
ends, open to miscegenation, ‘unoffi  cial prejudice … ran much deeper’ (Boxer 
1977: 303). Eventually, the mixing led to the emergence of diverse mestiço (Eu-
ropean father and Sri Lankan mother), castiço (European father and Eurasian 
mother), mulato (European father and African mother) and lançado strata – the 
latter, Africans, at the bottom of society (Jackson 1990). In this regard, subse-
quent Dutch and British colonial policies diff ered much from the Portuguese 
approach: both Dutch and British took off ence to the Portuguese’s ‘indiscrimi-
nately mixing with natives and Africans to eff ectively inject “inferior” elements of 
primitivism into the superior and pristine European racial stock and cultural le-
gitimacy’, making them responsible for ‘producing “degenerate” mixed off spring’ 
(de Mel 2006: 4). 
After the British had replaced the Dutch colonial power, the Dutch term 
burgher (‘citizen’, ‘urbanite’) – originally limited to those serving the Dutch East 
India Company – started to denote any people of mixed origin in the island (de 
Mel 2006). Th e separation of Dutch from Portuguese Burghers can be located 
in the nineteenth century. Whereas the Dutch Burghers exposed a ‘specifi cally 
Anglo, that is, a non-Iberian European pride of race’ (Sheeran 1997: 64), those 
individuals that were to ‘become’ Portuguese Burghers were believed to lack an 
‘Anglo-European collective consciousness’ (de Mel 2006: 100). Underlining their 
lower social status, they have been also called ‘Mechanics’ or ‘Mico-Burghers’ in 
reference to their blue-collar professions (as opposed to the white-collar jobs al-
legedly reserved for the Dutch Burgher group) (McGilvray 1982; de Mel 2006). 
Nowadays, the Portuguese Burghers are mostly Roman Catholics and are con-
centrated along the island’s east coast around Batticaloa and Trincomalee (Mc-
Gilvray 1982). 
So far, no ethnographic research has been conducted on recent modes and 
dimensions of interethnic conviviality between the Portuguese Burghers and the 
rest of Sri Lanka’s population, including other creole groups. Th is lack of research 
may have to do with the 2004 tsunami disaster – some Portuguese Burgher com-
munities had to resettle in the aftermath of the natural catastrophe – (McGilvray 
2007, 2008) and the prolonged civil war that ended only in 2009. In the 1970s, 
research on the Dutch Burghers revealed that they portrayed themselves as so-
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cially more advanced than the Portuguese Burghers, ascribing origins as liberated 
slaves to the latter and regarding them as ‘poorer, darker, more numerous and less 
European (than themselves)’ (McGilvray 1982; cf. Roberts 1994; de Mel 2006). 
Nevertheless, fi ndings from the early 1970s suggest that ‘a strict division between 
the Dutch and Portuguese Burghers was impossible to sustain’ (McGilvray 1982: 
237) in social practice. Despite a trend towards endogamy in the 1970s, about 
a third of the Portuguese Burghers had either a Tamil or Sinhalese partner (Mc-
Gilvray 1982) and appeared to speak Sinhalese and Tamil in daily life (cf. Smith 
1977). As a result of this integrative pattern, the Portuguese Burghers were to 
some extent included in the caste ranking, mostly as members of middle-class 
craftsmen castes (McGilvray 1982). However, while descent, religion and profes-
sion appeared to serve as criteria for this ranking, they were nonetheless believed 
to be an ethnic group rather than a caste (McGilvray 2008). Given the limited 
ethnographic data, it is not clear how other ethnic groups, notably the Tamils 
and the dominant Singhalese, currently – after a bloody, politically ethnicized 
civil war that lasted more than twenty-fi ve years – position against the Portu-
guese Burghers. Certainly the Buddhist, conservative-traditionalist Singhalese or 
so-called Arya Sinhala elite take a negative attitude towards creole cultural repre-
sentations, particularly music, which they condescendingly call tuppahi (de Mel 
2006) – a term apparently derived from the notion topazes, which used to refer 
to darker skinned people who claimed Portuguese, Christian descent (de Silva 
1972).
Well-known Kaffi  r communities have existed in Puttalam district, about 160 
km north of the country’s capital of Colombo, along the west coast. Other com-
munities have disappeared, owing to the increasing relocation of Kaffi  rs to other 
parts of Sri Lanka over the past hundred years. Moreover, ‘exogamy has made 
the descendants of Afro-Sri Lankans less conspicuous’ (de Silva Jayasuriya 2008: 
162–63). At present, in terms of professional background, the Kaffi  rs do not dif-
fer from other ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, though the ethnographies on Kaffi  rs 
generally leave a non-elite impression. Th e ethnonym Kaffi  r derives from terms 
denoting Africans in various languages, including Portuguese and English, going 
back to the Arab kafi r, which was generally applied to ‘nonbelievers’, that is, 
non-Muslims. Although the Portuguese had started to transplant Africans to Sri 
Lanka in the early seventeenth century, present-day Kaffi  r oral histories rather lo-
cate their ancestors’ arrival in Sri Lanka in the early nineteenth, when the British 
reportedly transferred them from South Africa to the island to serve as military 
auxiliaries. Th ese narratives are partly confi rmed by scholarly historical accounts. 
Altogether, the diverse information suggests various waves of Africans migrating 
to Sri Lanka for an extended period of time. Having themselves largely integrated 
into the dominant Sinhalese culture, the Kaffi  rs continue to stick to Christianity, 
and the elders particularly are still fl uent in the island’s Luso-Creole language. 
Similar to the stereotypes imposed on the Portuguese Burghers, British colonial 
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prejudices and mostly negative othering used to target Kaffi  rs due to their dark 
skin colour (de Mel 2006; de Silva Jayasuriya 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008).
As in the case of Guinea-Bissau among Kristons and Cape Verdeans alike, 
religion and descent appear to continue to be powerful markers of boundary 
drawing. Conversely, whereas profession has largely ceased to be a signifi cant 
marker of diff erence for Luso-Creole communities in Guinea-Bissau, occupation 
and social status – at least in the case of the Portuguese Burghers – seemingly 
continues to play a role in Sri Lanka. However, the sequence of diff erent colonial 
powers and practices in the case of Sri Lanka – in contrast to the continuous, 
albeit limited and weak, colonial presence of the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau – 
appears to have fostered the separation between Portuguese Burghers and Dutch 
Burghers. Particularly Victorian othering on phenotypical, ‘racial’ grounds facil-
itated the emergence of elite Sinhala rejection of foreign infl uences and, conse-
quently, creole representations, whereas in Guinea-Bissau the Kristons are, given 
their transethnic identity, well connected to ‘ordinary’ ethnic groups. Although 
Cape Verdean ‘superior’ attitudes and distancing from other Bissau-Guineans has 
been politically instrumentalized since late colonial times, the politicization and 
polarization of ethnicity is much more pronounced in Sri Lanka, aff ecting also 
creole culture and identity.
Contributions to National Integration
Th is essay now turns to the contribution of creole culture and identity to pro-
cesses of postcolonial nation-building. In Guinea-Bissau, both creole individuals 
and creole culture and identity as a whole contributed signifi cantly to the strug-
gle for independence and the nation-building that followed independence. Both 
Cape Verdean and Kriston creoles fi gured prominently in leadership positions 
in the independence movement led by the African Party for the Independence 
of Guinea [-Bissau] and Cape Verde (PAIGC), and they dominated the armed 
struggle for independent state- and nationhood, as various authors have shown 
(e.g., Rudebeck 1974; Galli and Jones 1987; Forrest 1992; Dhada 1993). Fur-
thermore, the PAIGC – led by Amílcar Cabral, himself a creole of Cape Verdean 
ancestry – crafted a powerful, effi  cient and integrative state ideology. Political 
frictions, facilitated by the Portuguese to weaken the independence movement, 
built on the antagonism between Cape Verdeans and the ‘native’ Bissau-Guinean 
population, including Kristons. Creoles (and noncreoles as well) were politically 
divided: many Cape Verdean (and other Bissau-Guinean) activists demanded an 
independent binational Cape Verdean-Bissau-Guinean state, whereas others ve-
hemently opposed a binational solution; another cluster rather favoured auton-
omy within Portugal’s empire. 
After independence, the above-mentioned transethnic character of Kriston 
identity and culture led the women’s organization of the victorious PAIGC to 
use selected representations of creole culture, such as manjuandadis, to mobilize 
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the female population. In colonial times, manjuandadis were found only at the 
former trading posts, fostering conviviality and mutuality among their predomi-
nantly female members. Nowadays, the diversifi ed character of these institutions 
is underlined by the highly visible music performances of some manjuanda-
dis in particular. Ranging from formalized associations to less institutionalized 
networks of coworkers, neighbours, kin and friends, manjuandadis have since 
the 1960s also spread to the Muslim population – albeit some elite (Christian) 
cultural activists do not regard the latter as manjuandadis but rather as mere 
‘groups’. Manjuandadis are often associated with specifi c ethnic groups, as they 
frequently recruit members from family or neighbourhood networks dominated 
by a specifi c ethnicity; nevertheless, most of them are multiethnic. Numerous 
manjuandadis share characteristics with commercially popular rotating credits 
and savings associations. Semantically, meanwhile, the age-set organizations that 
are common in rural, agriculture-dominated communities are also increasingly 
referred to as manjuandadis. 
In the long run, these representations have contributed to interethnic in-
tegration – transethnicization – by fostering nation-building ‘from below’. Th e 
postcolonial state that envisioned a new, integrated national culture developed 
‘from above’ has in fact ignited a ‘bottom-up’ nation-building process. Political 
and economic liberalization since the late 1980s has led to the commodifi cation 
of manjuandadis, some of which have become professional bands for hire. Th e 
popularity of the manjuandadi music genre and the associations’ mutuality ac-
celerated their further spread throughout the country (for detailed ethnographic 
elaborations, see Trajano Filho 1998; Kohl 2009b, 2012b). Similarly, the Luso-
Creole language Kriol, hitherto spoken only by small, largely creole communi-
ties in the praças, began to spread country-wide from the 1920s in an expansion 
unsuccessfully countered by the colonial authorities. Th is process was likewise 
accelerated by the independence movement, which used Kriol as the language 
of instruction and command. Since independence Kriol has transformed into 
the country’s lingua franca, fostered by the state and its representatives across the 
country and in the audio media (cf. Kohl 2009b, 2011b, 2012b). According to 
the latest census, conducted in 2009, about 90 per cent of Guinea-Bissau’s pop-
ulation is fl uent in Kriol.
Data on Sri Lanka is limited. Most Dutch Burghers opposed Ceylon’s inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom, but nothing is known about the attitudes 
of Portuguese Burghers and Kaffi  rs. Dutch Burghers feared marginalization, 
given the power of exclusive Sinhala nationalism. Indeed, once independence 
was achieved, the Dutch Burghers’ exposure to the ‘Sinhala Only’ policy and 
its excluding measures led some of them to migrate to Australia, Canada and 
the United Kingdom (Henry 1986; Brohier 1998). However, this process appar-
ently also led to a redrawing of intercreole boundaries, resulting in a temporary 
and partial closing of ranks between Dutch and Portuguese Burghers. As regards 
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nation-building ‘from below’, the Portuguese Burghers and Kaffi  rs of Sri Lanka 
are widely believed to be the founders of Baila, which has been one of the most 
popular music styles in Sri Lanka since the 1950s (Sheeran 1997; de Mel 2006). 
Th e origins of modern Baila can be located in Kafi rinha and Chicothi, orig-
inally cultivated by Portuguese Burghers. Kafi rinha in particular was a style of 
music and dance that in the nineteenth century was closely associated with poor 
working-class people in urban settings, including Portuguese Burghers and Kaf-
fi rs. Because these groups were of mixed ancestry, Kafi rinha was subject to ‘ra-
cialization’ and stigmatization by the traditionalist Sri Lankan elite, who tended 
to identify with Europe. Th ey continue to ascribe African origins to Kafi rinha 
today, associating it with ‘savageness’ and ‘brutishness’ (Jackson 1990; Sheeran 
1997), even though Kafi rinha is – despite its name – predominantly an ‘Iberi-
an-infl uenced vocal and dance music’ expression (de Mel 2006: 101). However, 
Sri Lankans seldom acknowledge African infl uences in contemporary Sri Lankan 
culture (Alpers 2012: 72). However, while Kafi rinha continues to be cultivated 
among Portuguese Burgher and Kaffi  r communities, it also emerged as Sri Lan-
ka’s popular Baila music more generally (Jackson 1990; Sheeran 1997). 
Following the introduction of radio broadcasting in the 1930s, the mar-
ginalized Luso-Creole music experienced a revival that was also infl uenced by 
the popularization of ‘Western’, ‘Latin’-tinged music on the radio, especially Ca-
lypso. Infl uenced by the West, urbanized Sinhalese known as Samkara Sinhala 
became fans of Portuguese Burgher music that subsequently transformed into 
Waade (or Debate Baila) and the even more popular Chorus Baila, integrating 
infl uences from Calypso and Global North rock and pop music ‘while retaining 
traditional elements of verbal repartee from Chikothi and … Kaff ringna’ (de 
Mel 2006: 240). Diff erent from Calypso, amongst others, creole music was not 
considered ‘foreign’, at least not by the Samkara Sinhala – in contrast to the Arya 
Sinhala elite, who considered this supposedly tuppahi and insipid music a vestige 
of colonialism and racial miscegenation that betrayed Sri Lankan cultural values 
(de Mel 2006). Although Baila is nowadays considered an apolitical, ‘light’ music 
style, some Bailas of the 1950s also ‘covered a variety of topics that served the 
Sinhala nationalist cause’ (Sheeran 1997: 126). Likewise, some interpreters com-
posed Bailas as war songs in the 1990s, when the island was increasingly drawn 
into a civil war that has often been characterized as an ‘ethnic confl ict’ between 
the dominant Sinhalese majority and the Tamils. Since the 1970s, Baila has been 
increasingly sung in Sinhalese and has spread across the country, taking on char-
acteristics of commodifi cation. Despite rejections by the elite, Burghers, Samkara 
Sinhala and the Sri Lankan diaspora widely regard modern Baila as ‘an emblem 
of intra-cultural cohesion’ (de Mel 2006: 241). 
As for the Luso-Creole language, it long ago lost its role as a countrywide 
lingua franca, which it held up to the nineteenth century. It was replaced by Sin-
halese as the island’s dominant language, followed by Tamil in the early twentieth 
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century; meanwhile, English continues to play an important role as a language 
of education and trade. Today the Luso-Creole language, relegated to a niche 
existence even among Portuguese Burghers along the east coast and Kaffi  r com-
munities in Puttalam district, runs the risk of disappearing.
Conclusion
Th e research on Luso-Creole identities’ signifi cance in processes of interethnic 
and national integration is still in its infancy. I have examined how ‘creole’ and 
‘creolization’ can be conceptualized as analytical tools serving comparative pur-
poses and framed the notion ‘Luso-Creole’ as a cross-cultural analytical term. 
However, the comparison remains incomplete because historical data and ethno-
graphic fi ndings are still disparate and fragmentary in both historical and con-
temporary perspectives.
Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions may be drawn concerning the 
evolution, appropriation and transformation of the Luso-Creole heritage in dif-
ferent settings, illustrated by the examples of Guinea-Bissau and Sri Lanka. Both 
countries are characterized by the hierarchical coexistence of creole groups who 
have manifested their supposedly higher social status by alluding to ‘European 
civilization’ and ‘manners’. Whereas many Cape Verdeans continue to distance 
themselves from other Bissau-Guineans, including even Kristons, the latter simi-
larly draw a line between the noncreole population and themselves, portrayed as 
more European, that is, ‘Portuguese’. In Sri Lanka, Dutch Burghers look down 
on both Portuguese Burghers and Kaffi  rs, ascribing them a socioculturally infe-
rior status due to their ‘Iberian-ness’, whereas the country’s Singhalese elite regard 
creoles of any kind as ‘alien’ and subordinate. Sri Lankan society thus appears to 
be much more stratifi ed and polarized: creoles are relegated to a second row while 
creole identities are comparatively manifest (contrary to the complex Kriston 
case) owing to Dutch and British colonialism that favoured sociocultural closure 
and distinction more than did the Portuguese variety. 
Politically, diff erences are apparent: in the case of Guinea-Bissau, Luso-
Creole groups tended to welcome independence, whereas Dutch and probably 
Portuguese Burghers in Sri Lanka took a critical stance towards independent state-
hood, fearing social marginalization. Despite their numerical inferiority, creole 
groups have, as the examples of Guinea-Bissau and Sri Lanka illustrate, con-
tributed various cultural representations to national popular culture. In Guinea-
Bissau, these include manjuandadi associations, amongst other features that used 
to be restricted to tiny Luso-Creole groups but have, since the eve of indepen-
dence, transcended ethnic and religious boundaries and spread nationwide. Th is 
process was facilitated by the transethnic, inclusive character of Kriston identity 
and fuelled by the post-independence one-party socialist state, which sought mass 
mobilization of the population. Guinea-Bissau has been characterized by an inte-
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grative state ideology that conceives of the nation as an umbrella covering various 
ethnic groups. Th e Sri Lankan case is quite diff erent. Baila has contributed to 
national culture, but other creole infl uences remain marginal and have added 
little to postcolonial nation-building, not least because Sri Lanka is marked by an 
exclusive and militant pro-Sinhalese nation-and-state ideology emanating from 
political and intellectual representatives of a Sinhala majority that strictly seeks to 
diff er ‘genuine’ Sri Lankan from ‘imported’ tuppahi traditions.
Further research, especially in Sri Lanka, may reveal how ‘micro-politics’ 
and ‘policies’ infl uence Luso-Creole identity construction and maintenance, how 
interethnic conviviality is practised in everyday life, and how creoles actively con-
textualize and reify their supposed ‘Portugueseness’. In this regard, comparative 
ethnographic bottom-up research may improve understanding of which factors 
allow for creole boundary drawing and conceptualization of ‘Portugueseness’.
Christoph Kohl is a research fellow in the research group ‘Th e Cultural Dynam-
ics of Political Globalisation’ at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), 
Germany. He was a doctoral fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthro-
pology in Halle (Saale) and received his Ph.D. from the Martin Luther University 
Halle-Wittenberg in 2010 (‘Creole Identity, Interethnic Relations, and Postcolo-
nial Nation-Building in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa.’ Ph.D. thesis. Halle (Saale): 
Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg (2009)). His publications include 
‘Diverse Unity: Creole Contributions to Interethnic Integration in Guinea-
Bissau’, which appeared in Nations and Nationalism (2012).
Notes
 1. Findings for Guinea-Bissau are based on both ethnographic fi ndings (of research con-
ducted in 2006–07 and 2013) and literature research. Data on Sri Lanka have been ex-
tracted from existing scholarly literature.
 2. Th e Cape Verdean Windward variety of Kriol diff ers only slightly from the one spoken in 
Guinea-Bissau.
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Chapter 3
Freetown’s Yoruba-Modelled 
Secret Societies as Transnational 




Sierra Leone’s history supplies the basis for understanding the geographical, psy-
chological, emotional and political macro- and micro-fi elds on which the current 
signifi cance of Freetown’s secret societies is being played out. Some of the con-
texts are divided by centuries, but all these periods are swathed in enduring issues 
of identity, integration and power, among others, that are still relevant today.
In 1787, a humanitarian organization, Society for the Black Poor, mobilized 
resources and the British government’s approval for the fi rst repatriation of a 
group of ex-slaves to Africa. Th e eff orts aimed not at returning them to their 
specifi c geographical homelands in West Central Africa, Bights of Benin, Bights 
of Biafra and the Gold Coast but at settling them in places considered similar to 
the settlements from which they and their ancestors had been uprooted by the 
slave trade. Th e current territory of Freetown was that chosen settlement, and 
the fi rst set of repatriated slaves was called the Original Settlers (Peterson 1969; 
Alie 1990).
Although Britain had pronounced an offi  cial end to the trade in slaves and 
slavery in 1807 and 1833, respectively (Ashcroft, Griffi  ths and Tiffi  n 2000), abo-
lition was not generally enforced in all the areas where these practices were active. 
Britain accepted control of the coastal area where Freetown currently sits and 
declared it a Crown Colony in 1808.
On the waters of the new colony, Britain intercepted ships that fl outed the 
abolition orders, redirected them to the colony and freed the intended slaves 
into the community of already resettled ex-slaves. Th e fi rst members of this later 
group, known as the Recaptives or Liberated Africans, including many captives 
from Nigeria, were brought in in 1808. On their resettlement in Sierra Leone, 
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the Recaptives maintained their original identities and practices, largely unadul-
terated (Peterson 1969: 162; Fyfe 1993 [1962]: 184–87, 292). Th e communing 
of these settlers from various parts of Africa – people with similar but also varied 
experiences – led to a fusion of identities ‘through a process of creolization’ (Knörr 
2010: 206) and the formation of a new community, the Creole community.
An important aspect of that early Freetown Creole community was its secret 
societies and one of their public realizations, masquerades.1 Peterson (1969), who 
chronicled Freetown’s early history, notes that upon its introduction to the col-
ony around 1850, Agugu, a secret society with roots in Nigeria, was embraced by 
Creoles and other ethnic groups of Sierra Leone, and by Moslems and Christians 
alike (Peterson 1969: 267). He contends that it gained traction because of its 
‘apparent effi  cacy’ (ibid.: 266–67). Yet that easy acceptance can also be explained 
by the fact that the Agugu fi tted with already existing practices of both the com-
posite groups of resettled slaves and other Sierra Leone ethnic groups. Th e ap-
parent Agugu-created unity lasted as long as it was the only secret society of the 
new community’s members. Once another secret society with Nigerian bases, 
the Hunters secret society (formed mainly to hunt wild animals) had emerged, 
the latter and the Agugu entered into contestations about which was more rep-
resentative of members of the new community (ibid.: 268–69). As a result, both 
societies increasingly leaned towards exclusivity. Th at tendency meant that large 
sections of the Freetown community, Creole and non-Creole, were unable to 
become members of either the Agugu or the Hunters. Th e latter’s members pro-
gressively portrayed themselves as superior and their society as their answer to 
Masonic Lodges (ibid.: 269).
Th ose contested claims catalysed reconstructions of ‘we’ and ‘they’ group-
ness, even in non-secret-society matters.2 Th ey also had implications for the 
formation of a new secret society, a cross between the two older societies that 
enfolded those they had rejected and marginalized: the Odelay. Th e fi rst Odelay, 
a term that translates as ‘Lord a Mercy’, was formed between 1950 and 1952. It 
became the secret society of poor men, women and young people – long-term 
urban residents and migrants from Sierra Leone’s interior, members of the Creole 
group and members of other ethnic groups – who lacked the qualifi cations to 
become members of the then exclusive Agugu and Hunters. Today, more than 
150 Odelays modelled on that fi rst Odelay operate as independent organizations 
with their own executives. Odelays are still meeting places for the poor and mar-
ginalized in society, but they are now distinct from the fi rst Odelay in that socio-
economically and politically powerful Sierra Leoneans and non-Sierra Leoneans 
have become members.
In Sierra Leone, secret societies are organizations whose internal workings 
and activities tend to be closed to nonmembers. Members often say that their 
secrets are accessible only to members, and threaten harm to nonmembers who 
try to learn their secrets by stealth. Sierra Leone’s secret societies can be classifi ed 
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into old urban societies (e.g. the Agugu and Hunters), new urban societies (like 
Odelays) and traditional secret societies. Except for Odelays, all of them are, for 
the most part, specifi c to a single sex. Some of them focus their activities on en-
tertainment, some on medicine, some on prestige, and so on. However, many of 
these sodalities, at diff erent times and to varying degrees, combine two or more 
such emphases. Odelays are mostly urban phenomena, peculiar to Freetown and 
the big towns of Sierra Leone’s interior. While membership of traditional secret 
societies in the hinterland is compulsory, membership of Freetown’s old and new 
urban secret societies is not compulsory; rather, it is a matter of strategic or tac-
tical choice.
All Freetown-based secret societies with historical links to Yorubaland in Ni-
geria, notwithstanding their secrets-embedded core, have a public side in the 
form of their public masquerade performances. In this context, a ‘masquerade’ 
is a mask-wearing fi gure that symbolizes the spirit and essence of a secret society 
and leads its public performance. Th at masked fi gure is normally called a ‘devil’.3 
In addition, all members of Yoruba-based urban secret societies publicize their 
masquerades as embodying the medicine mystique. Th erefore, masquerades are 
a nexus of visible and invisible powers and urban secret societies’ public perfor-
mances. As agreed between the providers of the information I discuss here and 
myself, I do not present pictures of these masquerades.4
Th e Formation of Odelays and the Linguistic Nigerian Connections
All of Freetown’s older urban secret societies set minimal thresholds of socioeco-
nomic attainment and appropriate family connections for aspiring members.5 
When some of the urban poor succeeded in gaining membership in the Agugu 
and Hunters, their mobility within them was often limited by their un-illustrious 
backgrounds because placement and progress within those sodalities were eff ec-
tively elitist (i.e. determined by affl  uence and family ties). Freetown’s new secret 
societies responded to this exclusion and limitation by opening their membership 
to Freetown’s disadvantaged, irrespective of geographical background, socioeco-
nomic standing or family pedigree. Odelays are the most important of these so-
dalities. All of Freetown’s Odelays share a common history of earlier exclusion 
and historical connection to the fi rst Odelay, whose emergence I will recount 
below.
Modelled on the Agugu and Hunters societies, an Odelay is a cross between 
the two. In fact, my informants clarifi ed that the term Odelay means ‘small Ode’: 
‘Ode’ is the name of the Hunters’ masquerade, and ‘-lay’ is a diminutive suffi  x 
in the Yoruba argot that typifi es Freetown’s secret societies. Nunley asserts that 
Odelays came into being in mid-twentieth-century Freetown as a response to the 
demands of the time (Nunley 1987: 60). He goes on to present the realities of 
overpopulation in Freetown at the time due to a surge of migrants from Sierra Le-
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one’s interior, and the resulting poor economic and health conditions and vices. 
He also notes the rootlessness those migrants experienced and the need they felt 
for some sort of urban belonging. Abdullah Honwana and de Boeck (2005), ac-
knowledging Nunley (1987: 176), say that ‘the exclusionary cultural landscape in 
Freetown’ occasioned the emergence of the Odelay as an alternative urban space 
to occupy and perform in.
Urban secret societies’ role in granting social integration to Freetown’s dis-
advantaged was attractive to prospective members of these newer secret societies. 
Odelays therefore developed into receptacles – as they still are – for (potential) 
rejects and marginalized members of the older Agugu and Hunters societies. Per-
tinently, as Low (1996: 384), discussing the signifi cance of cities for diff ering 
claimants, points out, ‘Th e city as a site for everyday practices provides valuable 
insights into the linkages of the macroprocesses with the texture and fabric of 
human experience’.
A major confl ict sprang up between older urban secret societies and newer 
Odelays over active claims the latter’s members made that their masquerades were 
‘devils’. Many members of the Agugu and Hunters were united in their view of 
Odelays as mere pretenders to secret society status, challengers to their secret 
society hegemony. Th ese rhetorical, sometimes real confl icts persisted during my 
research.
Despite these confl icts, members of Agugu, Hunters and Odelay societies share 
a functional commonality: they all use a version of the (Nigerian) Yoruba lan-
guage in both secret and nonsecret societal activities. (Yoruba are not one of Si-
erra Leone’s ethnic groups, but words and expressions from the Yoruba language, 
traceable to the Recaptives, still exist in Sierra Leone’s lingua franca, Creole.) My 
research showed that the use of Yoruba, often selective, increased the mystique of 
the new societies and was also a strategy that gave immediacy to their claims to 
have Nigerian origins. Th ese selected words, phrases and expressions are diff erent 
from the familiar ones in Sierra Leone’s Creole language. Secret society members 
often – apparently consciously – switch from the easily understandable Creole to 
the Yoruba-charged variety in a purpose-dictated diglossia.6 I found out that the 
key possession was not knowledge of Yoruba (the donor language) itself, but rather 
mastery of important expressions used to index secret society exclusivity. I also 
noted that the secret society members within my study areas used Yoruba argot-
laden Creole to make a social statement and maintain their group’s boundary.
On balance, knowledge and use of Yoruba or some expressions and words 
from it, and claims to the Yoruba connection seem to give members of Odelay 
organizations a sense of rootedness in both Sierra Leone and one of the biggest 
ethnic groups in the ‘big brother’, Nigeria. It came across during my interviews 
that membership of these Yoruba-based organizations made up for defi cits in in-
dividual members’ social standing and relative lack of in-country socioeconomic 
success. Nigeria’s comparative prosperity in the West Africa subregion seemingly 
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provides them with not only the roots of respectability, but, by default, a distant 
but present canopy of care. It is also important to note that the use of Yoruba 
makes the workings of these secret societies inscrutable to nonmembers, and that 
they found their esoteric medicinal power on those grounds. Yet, arguably, this 
ever-present possibility of  establishing prestigious external roots through mem-
bership of these organizations is related to diff ering conceptualizations of Sierra 
Leone nationhood, which I examine next.
Th e Bifurcated Sierra Leone Nation(s)
Nationhood in Sierra Leone is an artefact of the country’s history and present 
realities. Until 1896, the term Sierra Leone referred only to the area currently 
known as Freetown. From the late nineteenth century on, however, Sierra Leone 
consisted of two de facto nations: the colony and the hinterland. Today, member-
ship of Odelays has become a bridge across these two ‘nations’.
Th e organization that took over the running of the colony of ex-slaves and 
Recaptives from the humanitarians was called the Sierra Leone Company. Its 
main responsibility was to make the new settlement viable and the settler com-
munity self-sustaining in the long run. Th e Crown Colony declared by the Brit-
ish in 1808 lay over what is currently Freetown. One of the reasons given for the 
declaration was that the Sierra Leone Company ‘could not succeed as a commer-
cial venture’ (Peterson 1969: 34). Th e declaration of the Crown Colony meant 
that the inhabitants of the colony were British subjects while the interior was a 
diff erent sovereign sphere, with its own people and leaders. In reality, though, 
the interior functioned as an appendage to the declared Crown Colony. Th e hin-
terland’s natural resources, like groundnuts, eff ectively fi nanced the running of 
the smaller Crown Colony (Fyfe 1993 [1962]). Th at larger interior then was 
a nominal ‘Protectorate’, loosely and insidiously policed by the Frontier Police 
Force, which was charged with keeping watch over the British frontier in Sierra 
Leone. As Fyfe notes, ‘Th e protected area, sometimes called the “Protectorate”, 
though as yet no Protectorate was offi  cially proclaimed, was not subject to British 
jurisdiction’ (Fyfe 1993[1962]: 487). 
Britain’s formalization of control over the Protectorate was given impetus by 
France’s hot pursuit of the warrior Samori Touré and his troops in the area that is 
present-day Guinea, after the marauding troops had entered an area of nominal 
British control. Th e wording of the resulting formalization points to the bifurca-
tion of nation or nations referred to in the heading of this sub-section, arguing:
Th e Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, consolidating a series of earlier 
acts, empowered the Crown to exercise any jurisdiction as if by right of 
cession or conquest. An Order-in-Council of August the 28th 1895 de-
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clared that the Crown had acquired jurisdiction in foreign countries ad-
joining the Colony. On August the 31st 1896 a Protectorate was formally 
proclaimed, as ‘being best for the people’… (Fyfe 1993 [1962]: 541)
Th is shows that the distinction between Freetown on the one hand and Sierra 
Leone beyond Freetown on the other is a geopolitical and sociocultural division 
rooted in colonial history. Th is division informed realizations and constructions 
of exclusion, marginality and margins – with Sierra Leone’s interior being at the 
margins imaginary of the Sierra Leone nation (Richards 1996). Vivek Srivastava 
and Marco Larizza (2011), referring to Hanlon (2005) and Kieh (2005), have 
also observed that ‘the areas outside Freetown had traditionally been excluded 
and marginalized’.
Th e bifurcated nation not only shaped relationships between people in the 
city and people in (or from) the interior for a long time, but also tellingly bred 
discourses of ‘Freetonians’ versus ‘people from “up country”’ or ‘those who were 
here [Freetown]’ and ‘those who came’ (i.e. migrants from the interior). My re-
search indicates that membership of an Odelay was a means for ‘people from up 
country’ to become ‘Freetonians’, and for marginal actors to identify as members 
of a Sierra Leonean nation. Freetown’s ‘secret society belt’ is and has been an area 
where these twin happenings occur.
Th e foregoing demonstrates that histories, offi  cial policies, lived realities and 
actors’ determination to exert their social relevance against many odds shaped the 
conceptions of and reactions to Sierra Leone’s nation imaginary. Th ey also created 
stages where these issues were played out. Because resettled ex-slaves, Recaptives, 
migrants from the Sierra Leone’s interior and poor Freetown residents found it 
hard to succeed in broader society, I argue, they built backstage secret societies to 
gain a foothold on the frontstage of broader Freetown society. Th erefore, we can 
understand the enduring signifi cance of Yoruba-based secret societies, especially 
Odelays, by situating them in Goff man’s frame of stages.7
Abolition of the slave trade and slavery worked together with British colonial 
policy to bring people from many parts of Africa to what later became the Sierra 
Leone Colony. A shared history enabled them to draw on Yoruba-based secret so-
cieties as joint possessions (inherited common backstages). Yet, as time went on, 
these organizations’ inclusivity metamorphosed into exclusivity, prompting the 
formation of perceivably more inclusive ‘grass-roots’ organizations like Odelays. 
Many of Freetown’s poor and mainly migrant populations who lacked the back-
stages of family pedigree and bequeathed wealth, for example, became members 
of Odelay organizations and used them as backstages, fortifi ed by secrets, to give 
themselves relevance on Freetown’s front stages. But actors on the newer urban 
secret society backstages also made use of other backstages of shared history and 
Yoruba origins to (re)connect with older urban secret societies such as the Agugu 
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and Hunters. Th at hindmost backstage, as we shall see in the next sections, gave 
members of the fi rst Odelay grounds to contest the older secret societies.
Freetown’s Secret Society Belt and 
the ‘Lord a Mercy’ Odelay Prototype Story
Th e area I refer to as the secret society belt covers some of the most heavily popu-
lated communities in Freetown, such as Fourah Bay, Kroo Bay and Foulah Town. 
Many of the belt’s residents are migrants from other areas, including Sierra Leone’s 
interior. It is instructive that these migrant-heavy areas have the highest concentra-
tion of Yoruba-modelled secret societies, especially Odelay organizations.
Many poor migrants from Sierra Leone’s interior and less well-off  Freetoni-
ans such as those marginalized in or from older urban secret societies used mem-
bership of Odelay secret societies jointly for urban social integration. It was also 
instrumental in generating fear-born respect and acceptance from other Sierra 
Leoneans whose status derived from sources other than Odelay secret societies. 
Membership of these societies off ers places of abode, jobs, job promotions and 
support in times of pressing need. Now, the entertainment value of Odelays is 
becoming merely incidental.
Nunley (1987) refers to the post-World War II years as the period of Odelays’ 
conception. Old members of Odelay societies and nonmembers alike corrobo-
rated this in my interviews. Nunley further regards Alikalis as the prototype of 
Odelays (Nunley 1987: 51). Alikalis were ragtag Freetown boys’ societies of the 
1940s and 1950s. Th eir members were noted for their proclivity for violence 
and crime, including theft. My informants held that Alikalis’ defi ning image was 
that of their typically jobless members stealing from onlookers and residents in 
the areas their masquerades passed through. Nunley’s (ibid.) observation that 
members of Alikalis were called ‘wharf rats’ illustrates the perceived general crim-
inality of these groups’ members. One of my informants summed up the Alikalis’ 
objectives as ‘wanting to mount a one-day show which raised eyebrows and some 
cash, mainly illicitly’. Importantly, old Alikali members whom I spoke to did 
not claim Alikalis were secret societies. I further learned that Alikalis never rose 
above being mainly disparate juvenile groups. Th erefore, many of my informants 
argued against the view that Alikalis were potentially Odelays’ prototype, as their 
objectives diff ered from the goals driving what evolved into Odelays. Alikalis 
were really forerunners to Odelays, not their prototype.
From my fi ndings, I can deduce that the emergence of ‘Lord a Mercy’ was 
a summary of the issues, actions and actors that engendered the Odelay phe-
nomenon. Formed in the 1950s, Lord a Mercy had a membership like that of 
the Alikalis: mainly unemployed young people and others living in precarious 
situations.8 Although Lord a Mercy had some ‘wharf rats’, it was a shade above 
Alikalis because its chief characteristic was not crime but its members’ aspiration 
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to make it a creditable alternative to Agugu and Hunters societies in Freetown’s 
secret society landscape. It was like an Alikali without the overt criminal content.
At its founding, Lord a Mercy was led by a Christian Creole who was a 
member of both Hunters and Agugu secret societies but came from a poor family 
and thus had little chance of attaining a controlling role in them. Th at Creole 
leader had the respect of many young men, especially non-Creole migrants from 
the country’s interior who hoped to become members of a secret society in Free-
town. Th e majority of these young men were unqualifi ed for membership into 
the two older Yoruba-modelled societies because they were poor and jobless, and 
lacked reputable backgrounds or the requisite metaphorical backstages. Some 
carried the baggage of being past members of the hugely discreditable Alikalis. 
Th ey therefore rallied around the Christian Creole man to ‘build their own devil’ 
in the Brookfi elds and Saint John areas of central Freetown. Th e Lord a Mercy 
masquerade’s maiden public appearance by itself contested the established order 
and was thus a source of tension between the members of this group and those of 
the Agugu and Hunters societies.
Th is fi rst Lord a Mercy public performance took place on a public holiday 
when other established urban secret societies also performed.9 More challeng-
ingly, the Lord a Mercy masquerade looked just like the older Hunters’ mas-
querade. Members had themselves composed most of their songs for that fi rst 
public outing, but they also sang some Yoruba songs more commonly associated 
with the Hunters. More, the group incensed the older societies by calling their 
masquerade a ‘devil’. Clearly, the new group was tapping the resources of a Cre-
ole secret society insider (their leader), albeit a marginalized one, to make itself 
recognized. Members of the Agugu and Hunters saw this new reality as an aff ront 
to their medicine-mystique hegemony. Consequently, they made a stand to chas-
ten the perceived dangerous idlers and discourage Lord a Mercy’s continuance. 
It is rumoured that during that fi rst performance, members of the Agugu and 
Hunters, drawing on their common Yoruba origins, united and used magical 
powers to unsettle the new masquerade and its followers; but the Creole leader of 
the group, who stood in front of the masquerade drawing on that same Yoruba 
backstage, rendered the assaulting powers ineff ectual on the frontstage of social 
contestation for urban recognition. Subsequently the challenge became physical, 
as young members of the older societies fought with those of the new group.
Lord a Mercy was not the group’s original name. One informant said it had 
carried the name of its Creole founder. Two others said the group had not had a 
name, adding that its name came from the physical violence of the street fi ghts 
in that fi rst outing, in which members of both sides sustained serious injuries. 
Reportedly, supporters of the older secret societies came off  worse. Reprisals con-
tinued throughout central Freetown as members of the new group attacked the 
older sodalities’ perceived members and sympathizers with sticks and broken 
bottles. It was reported that during the fi ghting, some Freetown residents who 
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had been traumatized by the just-ended Second World War and the many vio-
lent economic-stringency-related strikes in Freetown shouted in desperation and 
resignation from their verandas and behind trellised windows, ‘Lord a mercy! 
Lord a mercy O!’ (i.e. May the Lord have mercy on us!). Th at was how the group 
got its name – which it maintained, because of the fear and attendant forced 
recognition that accidental moniker had generated.
Lord a Mercy’s story shows that violence is a resource used by claimants of 
rights to space in the city, especially when other means are obviated. Th is gives 
credence to Holston’s view that ‘people use violence to make claims on the city 
and use the city to make violent claims’ (1999: 16). On today’s Freetown secret 
societies stage, Lord a Mercy is not one of the fi ve largest Odelay organizations. 
Still, many of its members and members of other Odelay organizations believe 
that Lord a Mercy, by mounting an alternative trans-secret societal outfi t, aes-
thetically so similar yet compositionally so diff erent from the established secret 
societies in the city, was seminal to the now fl ourishing Odelay phenomenon.
I argue that widespread poverty among society’s disadvantaged had weakened 
the national embrace. Th is informed the formation of Odelays and inspired the 
disadvantaged to draw on backstages of secret societies and transnational connec-
tions to succeed on the frontstage of open society in Freetown and even Sierra 
Leone. Th e thesis of the weak national embrace could be linked to what I consider 
to be a community of shared lived realities and circumstances, considered next.
Urban Secret Societies and the Community of Shared Lived Realities
Guided by my fi ndings, I analyse nationhood from a perspective of shared lived 
realities and circumstances. A community of shared lived realities and circum-
stances, I maintain, bonded members of the early Creole community that evolved 
from freed slaves. Odelays emerged in the 1950s, when the divide between the 
interior and the capital had not yet been bridged. Since Sierra Leone was still 
putatively understood as Freetown, I argue that the emergence of Odelays was 
a route to the nation imaginary.10 Young migrants from the provinces and the 
urban unemployed and unemployable became members of Odelays. Pointedly, 
many of the fi rst executive members of Freetown Odelays were not Creoles but 
came from ethnic groups of the hinterland.11
Sometimes, membership of Odelays has been a platform from which some 
members launched bids to be inducted into the relatively high-standing Agugu 
and Hunters societies. Currently, all three sodalities share complementarities of 
mutual memberships, aesthetics and songs, and use the same Yoruba argot. In 
addition, all three organizations’ members refer to their societies using the Yoruba 
generic term Awo, which has two meanings: (1) an esoteric-medicinal broth-
erhood/community, and (2) the spirit that all Yoruba-modelled secret societies 
jointly lay claim to.
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A community of shared lived realities and circumstances feeds on, and is in 
turn fed by, a community of history. Th e resulting mutual reinforcements inform 
the fellow-feeling that Odelay members show to one another and to members of 
other Yoruba-modelled secret societies like the Agugu and Hunters. Th is fellow-
feeling for a secret society member, I maintain, cuts across political party and 
ethnic sensibilities in Freetown in particular and Sierra Leone in general. Awo is 
thus the transnational, invoked to valorize the Sierra Leonean. Yoruba-modelled 
secret society fellow-feeling is thus an infrastructure that could be argued to (1) 
promote nationhood, (2) undermine nationhood or (3) (re)present an alternative 
to nationhood.
Because membership of Yoruba-modelled urban secret societies binds Sierra 
Leoneans from across varied divides, this membership summons a fervour that 
the offi  cial nation does not necessarily muster. To test the strength of an urban 
secret society’s fellow-feeling for its own members in relation to others, I asked 
fi fty-fi ve members of Odelays the following question: ‘If you were in a public 
position of trust and you had a job to off er, whom would you give it to: a mem-
ber of your secret society or a non-member?’ All of the respondents answered 
that they would give the job to a fellow Yoruba-based secret society member. Th e 
responses to follow-up questions were also remarkable. I asked, ‘If you found 
out that two people came forward for this same job and that the person who was 
not a member of your secret society was qualifi ed, while your fellow secret so-
ciety member was not, whom would you give the job to?’ Forty-seven said they 
would give the job to the unqualifi ed secret society member – male or female. 
Many of them clarifi ed that they would feel safe(r) working with a fellow secret 
society member, adding that they saw it as a moral imperative ‘to help a society 
brother or sister’. Respondents also said that they ‘would qualify’ the fellow 
secret society member once he or she got the job. All of this shows that shared 
secret society memberships substitute other considerations like merit, ability 
and ethnic background.
An Odelay elder told me the following story, which could explain the fastness 
of the bond. In the 1960s a highly placed member of the then ruling political 
party in Sierra Leone was fi nding it diffi  cult to gain enough support for his party 
in the secret society belt. Th ough he was a member of the exclusive Agugu, he was 
not a member of any Odelay. Still, though, the politician calculatedly sought to 
gain the support his party badly needed in that contested, votes-rich area through 
Odelays and other Yoruba-modelled secret societies by liberally preaching the 
common histories of the secret societies and the mutually possessed Awo.
Th e relative ease of gaining membership of Odelays – which is not based 
on socioeconomic or family status – meant that this politician would benefi t 
from the huge ‘vote banks’ (Das and Poole 2005) in the secret society belt. Th e 
government offi  cial’s political party was not, according to the elder who nar-
rated this story to me, the party that many members of the Odelay had been 
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supporting. But he and his fellow members of Odelays eventually supported the 
highly-placed government offi  cial, the elder explained, summarizing why Odelay 
and cognate Yoruba societies had made common cause with fellow secret society 
members: ‘We supported the “highly-placed offi  cial” because Awo does not know 
diff erence in party or tribe; it demands that we support a fellow secret society 
brother and fi ght for him as a body. Everywhere he cries, we cry with him [when-
ever he has a need of whatever sort, we rush to his aid]’.
Th is ‘common cause with kind’ feature of urban secret societies marks a 
strand of association that transcends the generally recognized group identities of 
ethnic group and nationality in Freetown. Importantly, the strength and utility 
of that bond go against the state’s refrain of the nation being the prime source of 
mobilization. Members of Odelays do not eschew the nation; they craft mech-
anisms below the level of the nation to invigorate their claim to nationhood 
in Sierra Leone. Because Odelays are transethnic, trans-social and transnational 
groups in both their origins and their current standings, they embrace members 
across countries and across nationalities as well. Odelays’ pastiche-like character 
gives the organizations roots, trunks and branches in many places and makes 
them simultaneously a local and global phenomenon. Th ey are resources that bear 
fruit as well.
How the Transnational Awo Aff ects Family Ties 
and Unifi es Perceived Enemies
How does the Awo bond aff ect the biological family? To fi nd answers, I asked 
relatives of diasporans who had returned to Sierra Leone in 2008 for public per-
formances of their Odelay organizations for their views on diasporans’ relation-
ship with the Odelays they belonged to. Th is view, from a sister of one of the 
diasporans, was typical:12 ‘My brother has been with his Odelay [meaning, the 
organization and/or its masquerade] since he was a boy. So, when he went over-
seas he never forgot about it. He supports his Odelay. From what I understand, 
his Odelay brothers helped him to become strong [successful] over there [in the 
United States]’.13
However, some relatives of diasporans expressed concern that their relatives in 
the diaspora paid more attention to their Odelays than they did to their families 
in Sierra Leone. One respondent could not hide his distress and pointed to his and 
his younger brother’s poverty. Calling that younger brother forward so that I could 
see him, he said, ‘Just look at us. He does not pay attention to us. When he comes 
to Sierra Leone, he gives all his money to his “devil”’. Th e younger brother nodded 
his head in agreement, interjecting, ‘Th at is how he treats us, his own blood’. At 
the end of my interview, I asked the older brother whether he and his indigent 
brother planned to become members of the Odelay organization their brother in 
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the diaspora belonged to. After some refl ection, he concluded, ‘Maybe. We will 
think about it. Maybe that is the way we can benefi t from our brother.’
Th e discussions above show that in Freetown and even in Sierra Leone at 
large, membership of secret societies, including Odelays, is increasingly the basis 
on which material and nonmaterial resources are mobilized, negotiated and allo-
cated. It is below the nation, but it shapes the offi  cial nation and the traditionally 
familial.
Because Odelay memberships are mainly founded on shared lived experi-
ences and informed spaces, Odelays can also be spaces of transnational inter-
action, where similarity can be fabricated out of or in spite of diff erence, even 
diff erence from perceived enemies. In the following I examine how an Odelay 
performance became a platform on which allies in Sierra Leone’s civil war, in-
cluding Nigerian soldiers, ‘danced devil’ with their adversaries – rebels they had 
been fi ghting against for years.
Th e Sierra Leonean Foday Sankoh was head of the Revolutionary United 
Front rebels that launched Sierra Leone’s civil war from Liberia in 1991. Decades 
before he started the war, Sankoh reportedly became a member of a Freetown 
Odelay, Civili Rule, though apparently not a very active member. In the mid 
1990s, when Sierra Leone’s soldiers proved incapable of thwarting the rebels’ 
advance, the government requested help from a regional West African body, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Th e majority of sol-
diers in that intervention force were Nigerian. Many of the Nigerian contingent 
of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) became members of Free-
town’s Yoruba-modelled secret societies like the Agugu, Hunters and Odelays, 
including Civili Rule. I was told that the Yoruba soldiers had been impressed by 
some of the urban secret society members’ use of Yoruba words and expressions, 
and actually spoke pidgin Yoruba, so to speak, with them.
On 27 April 2000, Foday Sankoh paid to carry the Civili Rule Odelay’s sym-
bolic gun – the bila gun – just outside the Odelay’s headquarters.14 Informants 
told me that Sankoh eff ectively played the socioeconomic youth card to carry 
the gun, arguing that he had started the civil war to empower youth and now 
wanted to use a mass youth phenomenon, the Civili Rule Odelay masquerade’s 
performance, to announce his intentions to end the civil war.15
During that Civili Rule public performance, soldiers of Sierra Leone’s na-
tional army and the regional fi ghting group wore coloured clothes – a secret 
society requirement for taking part in the masquerade’s public performance. In 
this festive atmosphere, the soldiers mixed with the chief protagonist of the war, 
Sankoh, and his fi ghters – with whom they were technically still at war. Th e 
masquerade’s dance was a national ceasefi re dance performed on urban grounds 
to make a statement to the nation. Foday Sankoh made use of the magnetism 
of a youth performance-based occasion to appeal to Sierra Leoneans as a man 
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of peace. It could have been mere theatrics, but followers of that masquerade 
performance recalled that while handling the shotgun, he announced, ‘Young 
people of Sierra Leone, we are all one; the fi ghting is over’. Th e onlookers and the 
followers of the masquerade performance shouted and clapped, in anticipation 
of the prolonged war’s end.
Sankoh had sensed the ethnic diversity and size of the masquerade’s follow-
ing and attempted to rally the nation – from the grassroots up – to the peaceful 
intentions he advertised on that platform. Th e drama could not have been lost on 
some Sierra Leoneans. Th e day of the masquerade’s performance, 27 April 2000, 
was the country’s Independence Day, a national holiday. Th e then president of 
Sierra Leone, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan-Kabbah, had made his Independence Day 
speech on national radio that morning, assuring all that he was working towards 
the consolidation of peace. His was a call to the offi  cial nation; Sankoh’s was an 
attempt to speak to the nation from below with a multiform Odelay licence. But 
after the ‘devil dance’ later that evening, the ECOWAS and Sierra Leone Army 
soldiers returned to their battalions, regiments and companies; and some rebel 
fi ghters who had come to town for the masquerade’s performance returned to 
their temporarily abandoned bastions. Th e war was back on. Brothers and sisters 
in performance once more became adversaries on the bigger national stage. When 
the civil war offi  cially ended in 2002, many Nigerian Yoruba soldiers reportedly 
danced a farewell ‘devil dance’ before departing for the Nigerian homeland. Some 
still support the Nigerian/Yoruba secret society diaspora in Sierra Leone.
Conclusions
Odelay secret societies serve as interethnic, transethnic and transnational links 
as well as encapsulations of perceived enemies. Th ese organizations’ relevance 
traverses Sierra Leone’s history – from slavery and the slave trade to the prewar 
era, war years and postwar period.
Memberships of and across Yoruba-modelled secret societies and the exca-
vation of the Nigerian connection in an urban fi eld of ways and means have 
become roots and routes to the Freetown cityscape and Sierra Leone, at large. 
Because the offi  cial nation is a weak and ineff ective enfolding, a large group of the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged has been situationally fused in a community 
of shared lived experiences and circumstances that substitutes the offi  cial nation 
in everyday interactions and calculations. Th at community has history as a key 
dimension, making it possible for Freetown’s new secret societies to cultivate, tap 
and uncover their Nigerian Yoruba origins.
Odelays and allied secret societies are living transnational, transethnic and, 
increasingly, trans-status transactional organisms with roots, trunks, shoots and 
branches – all nurtured by water from (trans)Atlantic history and the fertilizer of 
current circumstances.
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Notes
 1. Th ese are diff erent from Brazilian masquerades, which tend to be related to carnival. Un-
fortunately, the secret society members who provided the bulk of the information I discuss 
and analyse here did not permit me to take or reproduce pictures of their masquerades.
 2. On ‘we’ and ‘they’ groupness, see Elwert (1997).
 3. ‘Devil’ here refers to a secret society’s masquerades. Nunley (1987: xv), writing about the 
aesthetics of Odelays, points out that the ‘devil’ characterization goes back to early mis-
sionary activities in Sierra Leone. Christian missionaries wanted to present masquerades 
to new converts as symbols of Satan, the antithesis of the Almighty God. Th is was meant 
to discourage them from becoming members of sodalities that had/have masquerades as 
one of their manifestations. Secret societies use(d) this negative appellation to their ad-
vantage to generate fear among nonmembers. Th e term ‘devil’ is now also used to mean 
the secret societies themselves.
 4. Like other secret sodalities, Freetown’s secret societies, including Odelays, privilege their 
secrets. I noticed this in the organized isolation of one elderly member of an Odelay or-
ganization who was deemed to have been too cooperative with a foreign researcher. Th e 
man informed me that his status in the society had been signifi cantly reduced because 
he had given information and pictures to the researcher, who went on to publish a book 
containing the disclosed information and images. Other older members, he said, had ac-
cused him of speaking and showing too much, especially to a white man: ‘Th ey said that 
I had brought the inside to the outside; but I know I did not say or give anything to the 
researcher which would have made our society less-respected or less-feared. God forbid’, 
he concluded. Yet his relative isolation, based on that perceived indiscretion from about 
thirty years ago, persists unto the present.
 5. Th ose preclusions, this study found, were the primary reason for the formation of Odelays, 
though it is popularly thought instead to be that some disrespectful young people in Free-
town felt a need to challenge older secret societies’ status quo.
 6. Ottenheimer (2012: 317) defi nes diglossia as occurring ‘when the varieties of language 
that coexist are diff erent versions of the same language than diff erent languages … [and] 
a situation in which two or more varieties of the same language [are used] by speakers in 
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diff erent kinds of settings … for diff erential access to power and prestige, or intimacy and 
authenticity’.
 7. See Goff man (1994 [1959]: 107–14).
 8. My informants, some of whom were not members of Lord a Mercy, supplied the dates 
1950, around 1951 and 1952. Th ere did not seem to be a record of Lord a Mercy com-
ing into being. Th is is probably the reason it is not considered the fi rst Odelay. Paddle 
Odelay’s members contend that Paddle was the fi rst. Some of Paddle’s older members de-
scribe Paddle as the fi rst approved and registered Odelay. Many older non-Lord a Mercy 
interviewees argued that Lord a Mercy was a mere imitation, an unruly challenge to the 
secret society status quo.
 9. One of my insider informants said Boxing Day; two others said Easter Monday.
10. Faulks observes that ‘poverty, discrimination and exclusion can all undermine the benefi ts 
of citizenship. Th us a consideration of citizenship must also involve an examination of the 
conditions that make it meaningful’ (Faulks 2000: 3).
11. Recently, the trend has been that Creoles feature prominently in the executives.
12. From interviews carried out from 16 December 2008 to 8 February 2009.
13. Th e use of ‘brother’ here is metaphorical.
14. A bila is a hunting gun, symbolically used by its carrier to shepherd the masquerade 
and its followers during public performances. Informants told me that bila was a Yoruba 
argot word for the imperative ‘go away’ (by implication driving enemies away from the 
masquerade) or the verb ‘to shepherd’. In an exemplifi cation of what Højbjerg (2005: 
148) calls ‘the political use of symbolism’, politicians believe that carrying the bila gun is 
equal to marshalling and controlling the support of participants in masquerades’ public 
performances, and is hence a prized political statement. People already in politics and 
those intending to go into it thus clamour to wield it.
15. I distinguish between youth in age terms and socioeconomic youth in King (2007) and 
King (2012).
References
Alie, Joe A. D. 1990. A New History of Sierra Leone. Hong Kong: Macmillan.
Ashcroft, B., G. Griffi  ths and H. Tiffi  n. 2000. Post-colonial Studies: Th e Key Concepts. London: 
Routledge
Das, V., and D. Poole (eds). 2005. Anthropology in the Margins of the State. Santa Fe: School of 
American Research Press.
Elwert, G. 1997. ‘Switching of We-Group Identities: Th e Alevis as a Case among Others’, in 
K. Kehl-Bodrogi, B. Kellner-Heinkele and A. Otter-Beaujean (eds), Syncretistic Religious 
Communities in the Near East. Leiden: Brill, pp. 65–85.
Faulks, K. 2000. Citizenship. London: Routledge.
Fyfe, C. 1993 [1962]. A History of Sierra Leone. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goff man, E. 1994 [1959]. Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin.
Hanlon, J. 2005. ‘Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions for 
War in Sierra Leone?’, Th e Round Table: Th e Commonwealth Journal of International Aff airs 
94(381): 459–72.
Højbjerg, C. 2005. ‘Masked Violence: Ritual Action and the Perception of Violence in an Up-
per Guinea Ethnic Confl ict’, in N. Kasfelt (ed.), Religion and African Civil Wars. London: 
Hurst, pp. 147–71.
Holston, J. 1999. Cities and Citizenship. Durham: Duke University Press.
Secret Societies as Mechanisms for Social Integration  73
Honwana, A., and Filip De Boeck (eds). 2005. Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Post 
Colonial Africa. Oxford: James Currey.
Kieh, G. 2005. ‘State-Building in Post-Civil War Sierra Leone’, African and Asian Studies 
4(1–2): 163–85.
King, N. 2007. Confl ict as Integration: Youth Aspiration to Personhood in the Teleology of Sierra 
Leone’s Senseless War. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet.
———. 2012. ‘Contested Spaces in Post-War Society: “Th e Devil Business” in Freetown Sierra 
Leone Africa’, Ph.D. thesis. Halle (Saale): Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg.
Knörr, J. 2010. ‘Out of Hiding? Strategies of Empowering the Past and Reconstruction of Krio 
Identity’, in J. Knörr and W. Trajano Filho (eds), Th e Powerful Presence of the Past: Integra-
tion and Confl ict along the Upper Guinea Coast. Leiden: Brill, pp. 205–30.
Low, S.M. 1996. ‘Th e Anthropology of Cities: Imagining and Th eorizing the City’, Annual 
Review of Anthropology 25: 383–409.
Nunley, J.W. 1987. Moving with the Face of the Devil. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Ottenheimer, H. 2012. Th e Anthropology of Language: An Introduction to Linguistic Anthropol-
ogy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Peterson, J. 1969. Province of Freedom: A History of Sierra Leone 1787–1870. London: Faber 
& Faber.
Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: 
James Currey.
Srivastava, V., and M. Larizza. 2011. ‘Decentralization in Postconfl ict Sierra Leone: Th e Genie 
Is out of the Bottle’, i n P. Chuhan-Pole and M. Angwafo (eds), Yes Africa Can: Success 







Debating Emigrants’ Citizenship 
and Role in Guinean Politics
Anita Schroven
Introduction
Th ey have no idea what they are talking about – they have no right to 
speak to us like that. Th ey are not Guineans! (Forécariah, February 2007)
Such comments were commonly heard in Guinea during February 2007, when a 
wave of national strikes brought the country to a standstill and, once again, to the 
verge of a national crisis. ‘Th ey’ referred to Guineans living abroad and voicing 
their opinions over the radio concerning recent events in their country of origin. 
In Forécariah, a small town in coastal Guinea, ‘they’ were usually referred to as 
ressortissants Guinéens – Guineans living abroad. Th e word ressortissant indicates 
someone who has left his or her place of origin to make a living in the capital 
city or elsewhere, and in this specifi c context, someone who went abroad. ‘Us’, 
on the other hand, were the local listeners, people assembled around a radio at 
home or in a street-side cafe – and implicitly all Guineans in a country that had 
experienced increasing economic hardship and political turmoil throughout the 
last decade.
Th e debates over the rights and duties of Guineans living abroad took place 
against a background of mounting political tension between Guinea’s govern-
ment and trade unions. Th e unions were protesting against declining living con-
ditions due to failing economic policies and gross economic mismanagement of 
the country’s abundant resources. From 2006 to early 2007, these economically 
motivated demonstrations evolved into demands for a personnel change in gov-
ernment and profound reforms of economic and political policy.1 In a context of 
heated local debates about the national strikes and rising tensions countrywide, a 
growing perception of a dichotomy between the local population and Guineans 
living abroad could clearly be detected. Th e people discussing such matters even 
accepted and promoted the idea of denying ‘them’ Guinean citizenship.
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What were the motivations and implications of this demand? What were the 
commentators truly saying when they asserted that Guineans abroad did not pos-
sess the right to express opinions on the political situation of their home country? 
Th ese leading questions guide this chapter’s investigation into the transnational 
public space that Guineans have created between their country of origin and new 
places of settlement. While the contested domain in this example is the right and 
duty of political participation, it is also an integral part of the larger transnational 
space created by migrants from and local communities within Guinea. Th ere-
fore, the political debates on the participation of ressortissants and their particular 
responsibilities are based on the general negotiations concerning the actual and 
desired relations between the local population and those living abroad.
After briefl y considering the Guinean transnational community’s establish-
ment and its increased possibilities for participation in the political life of its 
country of origin, I will examine how one particular community in that home 
country reacted to such outside participation. Most studies of transnational com-
munities focus on the political activities of emigrants, but here I am interested 
in how those ‘at home’ debated issues related to the political opinions and de-
mands of migrants abroad. I present three diff erent phases of this debate that 
spanned several months and focused on various aspects of political engagement: 
(1) notions of the ressortissants as the Guinean people’s ambassadors to the inter-
national community; (2) the question of whether being absent from the country 
constitutes a negation of the ressortissants’ Guinean nationality; and (3) the per-
ception that those who live abroad dominate national politics to the detriment 
of those living in Guinea. Th ough I separate these three phases for the purposes 
of analysis, they are in fact highly interdependent. Taken together, they reveal the 
ambiguous stance that Guineans living at home take towards the Guinean trans-
national community in general and towards their rights and duties as political 
actors, and hence as citizens, in particular.
A Transnational Community’s Political Participation: 
Considerations for Guinea
Th e term ‘transnational community’ has gained prominence in the social sciences 
since advances in the globalization of technology, mobility, migration and polit-
ical discourse have established an ever evolving web of connections transcending 
the borders and boundaries of the nation state. In the analysis, some have been 
identifi ed as diasporas – collectives of people residing outside of their country of 
origin due to forced migration, establishing new lives in new places but using the 
country of origin as the main reference for their individual and collective iden-
tities. Such foundations may lead to a permanent politicization of the collective 
identity into a diaspora.
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Aihwa Ong (2003) and Rogers Brubaker (2005) warn against the analytical 
confl ation of ‘transnational communities’ and ‘diaspora’ that is largely due to 
the expanding use of the latter term. ‘Diaspora’ is used to designate a politically 
motivated community in exile, whereas ‘transnational’ denotes communities 
that originate from increased mobility and migration more extensive than an 
expulsion of one particular group. I support Ong’s contention that these diverse 
transnational communities should not be identifi ed collectively as politically mo-
tivated and also, implicitly, as dissidents opposed to the government of their 
country of origin.
Processes termed ‘transnational’ are not new today, nor were they new when 
countries such as Guinea became independent. Many authors argue that the in-
tensity of the migratory, social, economic and political processes occurring across 
and beyond national spaces should be distinguished from previous processes 
of migration (see Appadurai 1991; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Faist 2000). In 
recent years, these heterogeneous groups, subsumed under the collective term 
‘transnational communities’, have come under scientifi c scrutiny with regard to 
their economic ties to their places of origin, for example in national or hometown 
(development) associations. Th at research has laid the groundwork for the consid-
eration of their political (and advocacy) engagement in both the hosting societies 
and the countries of origin (M. Smith 1994; Portes 1996; Smith and Guarnizo 
1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Bauböck 2003). Transnational communities’ confl ict-fuel-
ling or peace-building activities and infl uences in countries suff ering war and civil 
strife have been studied (Sheff er 2003; Prikkalainen and Abdile 2009; Hoehne et 
al. 2010; Schlee and Schlee 2012). Such examples highlight collective activities by 
otherwise potentially unconnected people, all engaged in creating a transnational 
political space that links communities abroad with their home country. Just as 
hometown associations are established in communities abroad, so too are chap-
ters of political parties, with party politics and election campaigns taking place in 
several countries at once. In response, the ‘sending countries’ attempt to infl uence 
their emigrants living permanently abroad by extending citizenship, electoral and 
other sociopolitical benefi ts to them (see Wang 1993; R. Smith 2003;). Itzigsohn 
(2000: 1127) claims that this highly institutionalized political space where mi-
grants engage is what shapes the present-day era of migration as a whole.
Th is proclaimed new era of transnational migration does not mean that po-
litical engagement beyond the borders of a given country is a recent phenome-
non. Th e colonial period established important institutional ties in this context. 
In the Guinean colony, direct political representation in the French parliament 
began with the Fourth Republic, whose constitution had been drafted in col-
laboration with political leaders in France’s West African colonies between 1944 
(the Brazzaville Declaration) and 1946, when the constitution went into eff ect. 
At the same time, the colony also established territorial councils, to which some 
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members were appointed by the governor and others elected by select groups of 
colonial subjects (Chafer 2002: 55ff .).2 Although political participation during 
the end of the colonial period may have been reserved for the elites and taken 
place only in colonial centres or in Paris, these eff orts were closely observed and 
discussed among the broader population (cf. Schmidt 2005).
Colonies, the métropole and regional institutions such as the Afrique Occi-
dentale Française (AOF) struggled to deal with the mobility of politicians and 
the electorate, elections being the only form of political participation that was 
possible until political parties were founded starting in 1948. Some members 
of parliament or the territorial council represented a constituency from which 
they did not originate. Questions about whether voters who were eligible to vote 
within Guinea could participate in elections while residing in other colonies – 
and whether they would vote for their Guinean council member or that of their 
colony of current residence – cannot be easily answered, given the many trans-
formations of the AOF after World War II. Additionally, with respect to the 
mobility of people in administration and politics at the time, Charles concludes 
that by 1954, just four years before the country’s independence, Guinean colo-
nial politics had been delocalized and ‘gravitated’ around the centres of Conakry, 
Dakar and Paris (Charles 1997: 103–104).
Th e movement of Guinean politicians, traders and other professionals within 
West Africa and beyond did not stop with independence. In fact, during the 
so-called First Republic (1958–84) Guinea experienced several waves of emi-
gration caused by the lack of economic prospects and political suppression that 
sometimes assumed an ethnic character, particularly targeting members of the 
demographically largest ethnic group, the FulBe, called Peul in Guinea.3 From 
this period a network of Guineans emerged across West Africa and beyond, held 
together by shared experiences and sometimes engaging in oppositional politics, 
such as founding political parties – a forbidden activity in Guinea at that time. 
Th e government publicly shunned emigrants and offi  cially limited their rights 
to political participation. Extended family networks were maintained, however, 
enabling Guineans at home to profi t from the earnings of those living abroad. 
Kaba (1977: 40) suggests that in the 1970s, basic medical services that typically 
were available only abroad were domestically aff ordable only to those Guineans 
who had fi nancial connections to migrant family members. Th us, economic ties 
and political engagement between home and abroad are by no means a new phe-
nomenon. However, new technologies of travel and communication have con-
siderably intensifi ed and strengthened the ties between Guineans living in the 
country and the ressortissants.
Th e ressortissants Guinéens are a very heterogeneous group. Some of them 
have their roots in political exile: they or their parents were forced to leave the 
country due following political prosecution during the First Republic under 
Guinea’s fi rst post-independence government. In later years, during the Second 
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Republic (1984–2008), economic (and educational) reasons seem to have been 
what motivated many Guineans to move abroad even as some of the earlier ex-
iles were returning. Most recently, economic hardship and the search for greater 
sociopolitical stability have pushed many to emigrate. Th ese are people from het-
erogeneous backgrounds, with or without formal education, substantial capital 
or international (family) connections.4 Taken together, Guineans abroad do not 
represent a coherent group from any perspective. Some stay in touch with their 
family and friends in Guinea and can aff ord to provide a certain level of eco-
nomic support. Some take an active interest in politics and even become engaged 
in political parties that have functioning chapters abroad. Th ough the latter are 
certainly not the largest group of Guineans abroad, their activities become highly 
visible in various media outlets, as will be discussed here.
Many studies of migrants establishing transnational communities foreground 
the intricate role these communities can play in local, regional or international 
politics, usually framing migrants’ ties to their countries of origin in a political 
context in the form of motivation for migration, questions of legal status in the 
host country and so on. Th ese migrants can become further politicized in times 
of crisis and prompt a new engagement with the country as a whole, the na-
tional government or other migrants of the same origin. Opposition to politics 
in the home country may prompt such revived political engagement. Indeed, op-
pressive practices of governance can create an atmosphere that allows dissenting 
parties to thrive abroad, as members of the transnational community fundraise 
and organize public events to initiate political communication with counterparts 
in the sending country. Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004: 1026) argue that it is 
migrants’ experiences with multiple legal and political cultures that frame their 
points of reference and result in demands for political or legal changes in their 
countries of origin, thus giving the impression that their engagement is usually 
critical of, if not overtly oppositional to, the government in place.
Studies by Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003), Ong (1996) and M. Smith 
(1994) indicate that migrants’ political engagement, whether directed at host 
governments or at their countries of origin, is very heterogeneous and not nec-
essarily counterhegemonic or oppositional. Strong supporters of the home gov-
ernment can be found among politically active segments of the transnational 
community. In 2006/07, both the major opposition parties of Guinea and the 
then ruling Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès had party chapters in cities abroad 
that hosted large groups of Guinean ressortissants. Because of their great diversity, 
their political engagements require context-specifi c examination. Th e discussion 
of such political engagements presupposes that these activities are recognized by 
the government and the local populations, and appreciated or contested from a 
position of political (party) convictions. 
In Guinea, popular knowledge has it that about one third of the country’s 
population emigrated during the First Republic. After the death of Sékou Touré 
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in 1984, the new government under President Lansana Conté – realizing the 
potential that lay in the migrant community – urged Guineans to return and 
help rebuild the country (Bah, Keita and Lootvoet 1989). While it is unclear 
how many Guineans emigrated where, or when they returned, the successive 
governments in Conakry were and are interested in integrating them into ‘na-
tional development eff orts’. Th e constitution of 1992, which is still in eff ect, 
stipulates that Guinean nationals living abroad have the right to participate in 
national elections and should be represented in parliament. However, it off ers 
no specifi cations on how this direct representation should take place. Th e future 
constitution, in preparation since 2010, intends to clarify this issue, potentially 
granting the transnational community a fi xed number of parliamentary seats by 
direct vote.
In this specifi c context it becomes evident that domestic sociopolitical con-
ditions aff ect how governments deal with members of ‘their’ transnational com-
munity. Although parliamentary representation could be ensured in several ways, 
the direct election of a fi xed number of candidates by all Guineans living abroad 
could lead to fears that certain particularly politically active subgroups of the 
transnational community have inadvertently been granted preference. Th e com-
paratively high number of ethnic Peul in Guinea’s transnational community is an 
implicit argument against such reserved seats in parliament. Some members of 
this group recall experiences of political exile resulting from prosecution from the 
First Republic onwards. Th is group is well organized, compared to other associ-
ations (ethnic and non-ethnic) of Guineans abroad. Its mobilization with regard 
to political parties and fundraising is also comparatively strong.5 Th us, a direct 
voting procedure for reserved parliamentary seats could give additional weight 
to those political parties that draw on ethnic (i.e. Peul) electoral support. Th is 
issue touches on popular fears in Guinea that the Peul could gain political power, 
something populist voices abusing ethnic stereotypes raise as a threat to all other 
ethnic groups in Guinea. Th e confl icts surrounding elections from the 1990s up 
to the latest parliamentary elections in 2013 reveal both the devastating conse-
quences that can result from ethnicization of politics, and the way these tensions 
are quickly mirrored in Guinea’s transnational community. Members of this com-
munity have in fact expressed doubts that direct representation could be enacted.
Th e political considerations concerning the electoral rights of the Guinean 
transnational community do not end with negotiations between that community 
and the ‘home’ government, for the local population is involved in the discussion 
as well. Studies on transnational communities do not often address whether local 
people accept emigrants as relevant partners in political discourse and then grant 
the necessary space for them to voice their opinions. Gerharz (2010: 161–62) 
points out that negotiations between groups of ‘migrants’ and ‘locals’ are essen-
tial to both parties because they redraw the boundaries between local and trans-
national spaces, similar to the way identities are mutually negotiated in these 
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encounters. Power relations between the groups remain complicated. Due to the 
resourcefulness of some members of the transnational communities, their en-
gagement in the evolving relations within the transnational community may ap-
pear to dominate the expression of a country’s public life or a particular political 
debate – the ‘transnational public space’. In some cases, this space itself becomes 
the object of contestation between transnational and local groups negotiating 
politics (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002: 769).
Th is essay examines the negotiations of transnational public space using the 
example of Guineans debating political rights and duties of the ressortissants. Th e 
debate focused on whether migrants did indeed deserve the political space they 
were demanding for themselves, and whether they were entitled to voice a polit-
ical opinion when only the local population experienced the oppression by the 
government  – in other words, whether emigrants possessed the necessary political 
citizenship to have a say.
Guinean Politics Debated Between 
Local and Transnational Communities
In the highly fl uid political situation of Guinea in 2006 and 2007, strikes against 
the national government occurred repeatedly. Popular call-in shows on interna-
tional radio stations such as RFI (Radio France International) and the BBC (Brit-
ish Broadcasting Corporation) drew wide attention. Internet access was largely 
confi ned to the largest cities, so radio was sometimes the only source of infor-
mation, particularly in rural areas – especially after the government inhibited 
the dispensation of mobile phone top-up cards and later disabled text  messaging 
as well.6 Fuel shortages kept the generators that supplied electricity to mobile 
phone antennas from being recharged, further limiting the already patchy mobile 
phone coverage in rural Guinea. Th e few private radio stations were forced to 
close down or limit their operations, while the public radio station RTG (Radio 
Télévision Guinéen) broadcast traditional music and heavily censored news. In 
this situation, international radio stations were instrumental, granting airtime for 
news on current events and allowing callers to debate the way out of the political 
deadlock. Many of the contributors identifi ed themselves as Guineans calling 
from West African capitals, Europe or North America. Th ey often called upon 
the local population to act: to strike longer and more effi  ciently, and to make 
certain demands of the government, labour unions and other national leaders.
In the local arena of Forécariah, much debate surrounded the personal back-
ground, Guinean town of origin, and family ties of these callers. Ethnicity played 
a part, but the speculation revolved primarily around extended family ties. ‘Don’t 
you have a cousin who is in [name of city]?’ was an oft-heard remark after the 
popular RFI discussion programme Appel sur l’actualité. As many fi rst and family 
names closely resemble one another, this question was quite common; one invari-
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ably knew that one’s interlocutor indeed had a relative of that name somewhere 
abroad. While the tone may have sounded accusatory, the enquiry was chiefl y 
intended to validate an unknown caller’s identity as a fellow Guinean before 
assessing the signifi cance of the opinion voiced.
In this Guinean debate, the political fi gure of the ‘stranger’ is closely inter-
linked with the attempt to familiarize this fi gure and integrate him or her into 
personalized networks. In diff erent periods of the country’s past, foreigners were 
stylized as potential threats to the country who sought to disrupt the population’s 
unity in order to weaken the country and make it more vulnerable to outside in-
tervention. Th is public attitude may have begun before 1958, when the colonial 
administration tried to manipulate elections to limit the independence drive, 
or with independence, when the departing French colonial administration was 
accused of destroying infrastructure with the intention of hampering the new 
country’s evolution (Rivière 1977; Diallo 1990; Straker 2007). Former Presi-
dents Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté both utilized this image of the suspicious 
foreigner in contexts of regional instability to impress upon the population the 
necessity to stand united as Guineans. In early 2007, rumours spread that Libe-
rian ex-rebels had reached the capital along with mercenaries from neighbouring 
Guinea-Bissau. Th ese well-known spectres of the invading stranger built upon 
actual past threats and sought to connect them to the present (Kaba 1978; Ko-
bélé Kéita 2002; McGovern 2002; Arieff  and McGovern 2013). Beyond a call 
for national unity, identifying a foreign scapegoat implied that the current threat 
was not made by the ideal Guinean citizens, who were implicitly peaceful, law-
abiding people faithfully supporting their government in trying times.
In the generally tense political atmosphere of late 2006 and early 2007, it was 
therefore important to establish that the speaker was not in fact a stranger aiming 
to sow dissension but rather a Guinean voicing a genuinely felt opinion. Th e idea 
of a distant cousin being potentially able to verify the identity of the caller from 
outside the country was a common and reassuring rhetorical move – and a typical 
practice with regard to newcomers from anywhere within Guinea as well. Once 
this symbolic familiarity had been established, the opinion voiced by the caller 
could be heard as valid – in the sense of ‘He has the right to say that’7 – even if 
the local discussants did not agree with the opinion and perhaps suspected that 
the caller had a specifi c political party affi  liation or personal tie to a well-known 
political fi gure. Whatever the case, the callers’ demands for space in the tense 
political arena of Guinea were granted, at fi rst.
Referring to other people’s political views rather than expressing controversial 
opinions oneself, breaking with the usual public ‘culture of silence and guarded-
ness’ (Dave 2014: 2), could also represent a rhetorical move for self-preservation. 
In Guinea’s not-so-distant past, particularly during the First Republic, express-
ing controversial political opinions could be dangerous in certain circumstances. 
People remember it as a time when
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one could not talk. Everyone could be a spy, your neighbour, even your 
family could report you had said something against the government, 
then you were in real trouble. Even your life could be in danger. Here in 
Forécariah everyone has family members who disappeared during that 
time. (Forécariah, November 2006)
With this historical experience in mind, it is understandable that people pre-
ferred to discuss politics using other people’s words, quoting radio comments to 
voice opinions and to participate in discussions. Th is strategy served as protec-
tion: should government agents enquire later, no one could be pressed to own up 
to a particular opinion.
Demand for Transnational Action
Th e perception of opinions coming from abroad, propagated by way of the me-
dia, changed over time in Forécariah. With the concurrent breakdown of political 
negotiations in the capital and rising cost of food staples, local commentators’ 
attitudes towards members of the Guinean transnational community changed, 
aff ecting the communication space that they shared. To understand the circum-
stances that led to this change, it is necessary to consider what was happening 
in Guinea. Th e military had cracked down on protesting trade unions and other 
critical voices that had united under a loose civil society umbrella, often referred 
to in Guinea as forces vives, in June and December 2006. Th e negotiations – that 
is, the limited negotiations that had been allowed at all – had not eff ectively im-
proved living conditions, curbed the climbing infl ation or halted the high-level 
embezzlement of the country’s resources by the president’s entourage.8 Demon-
strations and negotiations had failed to yield results. Th us, local commentators 
called upon the Guinean transnational community9 to function as ambassadors 
for the local population and organize protest marches to impress upon powerful 
actors, such as the United Nations and the governments of the United States and 
France, the extent of political repression and economic suff ering in their home 
country.
Th e news of the demonstrations that resulted in front of key embassies in 
Washington, Brussels and Paris was well received in Forécariah, despite the chal-
lenges to gaining access to news at all. Private Guinean Internet sites documented 
images and speeches from the protest marches, and when private radio was rein-
stated some of these reports were read out – again, closely listened to and accom-
panied by speculations as to who might have been there and what kinds of details 
this friend or that relative could have reported had there been a mobile phone 
connection at the given time. Th ese websites preserved the ‘transnational public’ 
that had been created for later perusal and refl ection by people who did not have 
access to the information during the period of strikes.10
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In such a situation, the politically active Guinean communities abroad came 
to be perceived as the acting arm of a people whose majority could not engage 
in protests themselves. Locally, this was sometimes framed as ‘the ressortissants’ 
duty’:
Th ey have to help us, they owe us that much. We look after their proper-
ties here, after their old parents. We welcome them and host them when 
they come to visit. Now it is their task as Guineans to help us! (Foré-
cariah, January 2007)11
Comments such as this were based on the argument of shared citizenship. At 
certain moments transnational and local populations shared tasks, such as build-
ing of houses and then keeping them up, caring for older family members, per-
forming rituals and holding religious festivals, and fi nancing school or medical 
bills. In this way they remained closely bound as members of the same extended 
community. In other words, this sharing of tasks and benefi ts may initially have 
been based on family ties, but it eff ectively became a community occupation, 
particularly on the local side.
Th e above quote frames the sharing of tasks within the context of shared 
citizenship: all of the addressed are being united by the fact that they are Guin-
ean citizens engaged in the political evolution of the country. Belonging to this 
community of people was automatically associated with shared obligations. Peo-
ple within the country were looking for a way to connect to the outside as the 
domestic situation grew desperate; hence, outside support was sought. Whereas 
the optimal projected result of the emigrants’ demonstrations was action taken 
by foreign governments that would directly intervene on behalf of the powerless 
population in Guinea itself, in the meantime the transnational community was 
an audience that listened and commiserated, providing at least a sense of relief 
and security. Such an attentive audience outside of Guinea also meant that the 
government and security forces could not pursue a policy of violence with impu-
nity but would have to answer at some point. Such ideas and reassurances became 
a kind of solace in Forécariah. Th e transnational community, conceptualized as a 
homogenous whole by the local audience, was unable to share the experience of 
those in Forécariah directly yet remained an integral part of the process, and the 
resultant bond was not a matter of belonging to a particular extended family or 
ethnic group but rather that they were all Guineans.
Denying Political Space
Th e situation changed no less than a few weeks later. In February 2007 the mili-
tary had violently squashed more demonstrations in the larger cities, and as nego-
tiations for a change of government were haltingly under way in Conakry, callers 
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from abroad received a cooler welcome. Even when callers’ Guinean descent or 
nationality was not necessarily doubted, their entitlement to (publicly) voice an 
opinion was questioned. Th e callers often urged the local population to present 
demands to the political leaders so as to ‘improve negotiations’ regarding govern-
mental changes and achieve a ‘true democratic turn’ in the country. One of their 
main arguments is summarized in this message from a U.S.-based caller to RFI:
It is now that pressure must be applied, it is now that people have to risk 
everything and maybe even strike again and lose their lives – otherwise 
our children will not live in a better country.
Th is and similar opinions voiced by Guineans calling from abroad stirred many 
responses among the population of Forécariah. While the possibility hung in the 
air that the current negotiations would fail, just as they had in 2006, and with 
new rounds of demonstrations being cautiously considered locally, hearing such 
demands from abroad aroused loud and emotional reactions. Replies came in 
many forms:
Let him speak, he is far away [in Philadelphia], he does not matter! 
(Forécariah, February 2007)
It is not him who will be shot; it is not his children who have died in 
January [2007]. He has no idea what he is talking about! (Ibid.)
Our children? His children are safe, well-fed, healthy, going to good 
schools, they have a future. Th ey have nothing in common with our 
children here who are dying every day of diarrhoea or malaria. We are 
not the same; he has no right to make demands like that! (Ibid.)
Th rough such reactions, local discussants negated the political space that callers 
had demanded for themselves. Th eir entitlement to contribute to the debate of 
the future Guinea was revoked on the grounds that they did not share the same 
everyday concerns of the local population.
Th e shared experience of (personal and collective) suff ering constitutes an 
important part of the Guinean national consciousness (Kohl and Schroven 
2014). It draws on memories of the colonial experience, strongly infl uenced by 
the redefi nition of that period as promoted by the anti-imperial ideology of the 
First Republic. Today, the period of the First Republic itself has been redefi ned as 
a period of suff ering under an authoritarian regime and failing economic system. 
Yet this period is not simply dismissed summarily due to the negative experiences; 
rather, it is also lauded as one that lastingly shaped the people in Guinea into a 
nation and made them modern citizens. According to popular observations, the 
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Guinean level of national identifi cation surpasses that of neighbouring countries, 
where ethnicity remains more important in everyday life than national belonging 
(Rivière 1977, 1978; Straker 2008). Even against the background of an acknowl-
edged diffi  cult past, Guineans take great pride in this pervasive national aware-
ness and present it as one reason why the country has not experienced civil war, 
though many of its neighbours have.12 Today, the shared experience of suff ering 
under a (distant centralized) government – in both the past and present – forms 
a key part of being Guinean and therefore excludes those migrants who do not 
share this experience in their current lives.
Contesting the Political Rights of Guineans Abroad
Th e local population’s increasing reluctance to liberally grant political space to 
the ressortissants became even more pronounced in mid 2007 when the political 
parties resumed activities, prompted by the successive installation of new prime 
ministers and promised preparations for long-overdue parliamentary elections. 
Many parties held meetings for members and even political rallies, asserting 
their intentions for the upcoming elections. Th ese activities took place outside of 
Guinea. Many local commentators criticized the party leaders for paying more 
attention to the electorate abroad than to the ‘real Guineans’ who lived in the 
country:
It’s the money, they [opposition party leaders] know that they get their 
money from the ressortissants, so they are going shopping [ fait la course, 
collecting campaign contributions] now, even before the real election-
run begins. (Forécariah, July 2007)
Other local commentators were more pointedly critical of the fact that many party 
leaders and politicians had spent considerable time abroad, either in actual politi-
cal exile or as a cautious move in light of the unpredictability of the government:
It’s the same all over again. When in 1993 [legislative] elections were 
coming, politicians turned up from all over Europe, from the U.S. Th ey 
never even lived here for decades. Th ey had no idea what life was about 
here. … Th ey stirred up things, and when at the demonstrations people 
were shot, they were far away … running to the airport and off  to their 
big villas in Europe. (Ibid.)
Another chimed in:
Let them just do their thing now in Conakry. Th is politics business is for 
rich people from abroad, it serves the interests of the people abroad, not 
of real Guineans. (Ibid.)
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Whereas people in Forécariah often construed national politics as a distant 
aff air for ‘politicians’ in the capital (Schroven 2010: 137 ff .), in this case it was 
depicted as the provenance of the Guineans living abroad. Many opposition lead-
ers were closely associated or even equated with the ressortissants, as they and their 
immediate family spent signifi cant parts of their lives abroad, accumulating con-
siderable wealth and fi tting the general image of successful migrants. Th ey were 
portrayed as visiting home occasionally, demonstrating their success abroad with 
conspicuous displays of wealth in the face of a poor population and demanding 
gratitude or allegiance in return for small gifts, without much consideration of 
the lives the local people were leading. ‘Th ey lack respect for the family! As Guin-
eans they should know better’, was an often-heard summary of the behaviour of 
such visitors.
In mid 2007, commentators in Forécariah argued that Guinea’s political 
space, where the ressortissants were very much present, was a space that the com-
mon people in Guinea did not share. Th ey conceptualized the ressortissants as 
taking part in an elite discourse of ‘politicians’ – a term popularly used to describe 
easily corruptible, politically unrooted opportunists without links to the lives of 
ordinary Guineans. Th e transnational space that had been shared by the politi-
cally active ressortissants and the local population at the beginning of 2007 was 
now separate spaces – to the perceived disadvantage of the local population. Th ey 
now saw the migrants as intruders usurping a political space that seemed to have 
opened up briefl y to participation after the national strikes and was very precious 
after nearly fi fty years of authoritarian rule. As a consequence, the popular mood 
turned against the party leaders and their entourages from abroad, as well as 
against ressortissants’ general claims of participating in a shared political space. 
Politics now happened not only far away in Conakry, but even farther away in 
emigration centres abroad.
In the eyes of local commentators, shared nationality – with its ‘constituents’ 
of collective ancestry and history, and the mutual feeling of belonging and striv-
ing towards a joint future – was thus not enough to link these groups of people 
separated by physical distance. Th e crucial missing ingredient was the struggles of 
everyday life that the ressortissants did not share. Full political citizenship for the 
ressortissants, in the sense of the possibility of participating in Guinean politics, 
was at the least questioned, if not denied, by the local commentators.
Conclusions: Who Is a Guinean Citizen?
Th e accusation contained in the opening quote – ‘Th ey are not Guineans!’ – orig-
inates from a debate about ressortissants’ right to participate in Guinean politics 
during a phase of both great hope and great insecurity concerning the country’s 
future. It reveals a particular notion of citizenship that goes beyond the mere 
demand for shared origin or nationality. According to this notion, the rights to 
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vote for presidents or parliament and to make political demands of the Guinean 
people are linked to the experience of shared suff ering. Th us, such rights are 
not simply granted by one’s Guinean nationality. Th e lack of participation in 
everyday life in Guinea with all of its attendant socioeconomic hardships and 
political insecurity thus invalidated any claims Guinean emigrants made to legit-
imately enter into political debates following the 2007 strikes – at least from the 
perspective of the local population. While the ressortissants demanded space on 
a national level, at the local level they were deemed unqualifi ed to participate in 
decision-making processes for the future because they lacked experience of every-
day life. Th e pervasive visibility of the transnational public space, which by mid 
2007 was dominated by (opposition) party politics and ‘their’ politicians, limited 
the space the local population was willing to grant the ressortissants. In Forécariah, 
the ressortissants’ visibility suggested to the local population that they would not 
have political space for themselves in a future Guinea.
Th is stands in contrast to an earlier phase of the ongoing debate, when Guin-
eans living abroad had been envisioned as spokespersons or ambassadors of the 
local population. In that inclusive phase, the idea of solidarity was invoked based 
on an implicit agreement to share tasks and responsibilities between the ressor-
tissants and local Guineans. Exchanges between the two groups were not always 
harmonious, but the local population emphasized common belonging, shared 
interests and mutual responsibilities to justify the demands they placed on emi-
grants, who in turn were expected to send remittances, participate in community 
life even from abroad and assist in situations of need – such those resulting from 
suppression and violence experienced at the hands of government forces.
Th is particular notion of solidarity eventually gave rise to criticism of the 
ressortissants, who, it was said, had not complied with the expectations placed 
upon them. Furthermore, the emigrants’ demands – voiced over the radio – for 
more demonstrations in Guinean cities, more pressure to be exerted on the gov-
ernment and therefore more sacrifi ces to be endured by the local population were 
met with dismay by the local audience in Forécariah. At that moment the diff er-
ences between the two groups came to the fore – so much so that the local popu-
lation even began to question the ressortissants’ right to their Guinean citizenship.
Th e varying emphases of the above debate are part of wider negotiations 
about the public space that emigrants are to be granted. From a local perspec-
tive, the recognition that ressortissants receive from the government and political 
leaders is undeservedly dominant in the debate and thus needs to be challenged. 
More generally, however, the question arises as to how local populations perceive 
a politically active emigrant population and what space they wish to grant it un-
der changing conditions within the shared home country.
Nationality and citizenship form a basic part of the local debate. Th roughout 
the period discussed in this chapter, people in Forécariah did not necessarily spe-
cifi cally question the nationality of the ressortissants, but they did question the po-
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litical space the ressortissants were occupying – as citizens actively engaged in the 
debating and decision-making of Guinean politics. From the local perspective, 
even though a common past and heritage amounted to a common nationality, 
emigrants’ nonparticipation in the everyday struggles within Guinea disqualifi ed 
them from political citizenship.
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Notes
 1. Ethnographic fi eldwork in Guinea was conducted between April 2006 and July 2007 in 
the context of the project ‘Local Authorities and Oral History in Processes of Confl ict and 
Integration in Guinea’ at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale). 
I thank the conference participants, the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their 
constructive engagement and valuable comments on previous drafts.
 2. Initially popular suff rage was not practised, but village and canton chiefs, war veterans 
and high-ranking clerks were among those who formed the core group that expanded 
over time to include other groups of people. Only with the passage of the Loi Cadre of 
1956 was popular suff rage (extended to all adults, regardless of status, employment or sex) 
formally achieved (de Benoist 1982).
 3. Th e so-called Complot Peul with its violent aftermath in 1976 is one example of the 
political targeting of ethnic Peul during the First Republic (Sow 1989; Groelsema 1998). 
When multiparty elections fi rst took place in the 1990s, Peul leaders demanded repa-
rations and equal opportunities in the political and administrative arenas (Groelsema 
1998).
 4. Yaguine Koita and Fodé Tounkara, two Guinean youths who froze to death while trav-
elling clandestinely on a Europe-bound plane, have become symbols for the youth, pre-
dominantly male, who try to make their fortune abroad.
 5. Th e Guinean migration and transnational community has not yet been researched. Th e 
above considerations are based on personal communications with Guinean migrants liv-
ing in Germany, Belgium and the United States.
 6. In the context of limited funds and the restricted availability of top-up phone credit, 
(bulk) text messaging was a convenient way to share information and mobilize politically. 
Disabling this means of communication forced people to make phone calls, which were 
signifi cantly more expensive and reached a much smaller audience. With one state-owned 
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phone company (SOTELGUI) and a single commercial competitor at the time, the gov-
ernment was able to eff ectively manipulate mobile phone communication and curb al-
ready fragile Internet capacities in January 2007.
 7. Most commonly, both callers and commentators were male. Women discuss their politi-
cal opinions, but usually in a setting more private than street-side bars or neighbourhood 
courtyards.
 8. For more details of the events see ICG (2008) and McGovern (2007).
 9. For the sake of the current argument and in order to emphasize the locally perceived 
diff erences, I follow the emic nomenclature of grouping Guineans abroad together into a 
single entity, the ressortissants.
10. Th roughout January and much of February 2007 the very limited Internet infrastructure 
in Guinea was further curbed by the government-ordered shutdown of Internet cafés. 
Private or offi  ce Internet access – very limited to begin with – was blocked in February 
2007, when martial law was declared for two weeks (IFEX 2007).
11. Th e following excerpts originate from conversations with established interlocutors and 
from conversations in the semipublic setting of a roadside café frequented daily by a fairly 
closed circle of male customers.
12. One might argue that in Mali and Senegal, long-lasting confl icts with internal rebellions 
and secessionist movements did not constitute civil war. However, many Guineans see 
these events as evidence of failed nation-building processes.
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Chapter 5
Identity Beyond ID 
Diaspora within the Nation
Markus Rudolf
‘You cannot have two ID cards, you know’, Daouda explains.1 Sitting on the 
porch of one of the numerous mud-built tin-roofed houses on the periphery of 
the city of Ziguinchor, in Casamance, southern Senegal, he has come from Gam-
bia to participate in a funeral in his native town in Bandial, an hour’s drive from 
the regional capital. He shows his Gambian ID card. It is new and fancy, looks 
like a debit card, and has a built-in chip. Th e card states: ‘Born in Serrekunda, 
Gambian national.’ Asked whether he is a national only of Gambia – the nation 
in which he lives – or also of Senegal – the nation in which he was born – he 
replies: ‘Th ey will think you are a criminal if they catch you with two ID cards’. 
Confronted with the fact that nevertheless numerous people hold both national-
ities, he clarifi es: ‘You have to keep them [the IDs] apart’. Daouda left his home 
village in the heart of the Casamance as a young man. Illnesses had plagued him 
for too long: ‘You know in the village there is a lot of witchcraft’, he explains, 
‘so I followed a friend who had been to Gambia and I stayed’. Asked how he 
had obtained Gambian nationality and, moreover, why his birthplace had been 
changed to a Gambian town, he said: ‘You know that is how it is done’, adding: 
‘But they ask you a lot of questions. Th ey want to know everything now. A lot of 
questions. It is not easy’.2
Daouda stays overnight at his sister’s place before he goes to the ceremony 
the next day. He explains that he almost always comes for funerals, rarely for 
occasions such as weddings or other life-cycle festivities. Th e ancestors are impor-
tant, he points out. But apart from that, his life seems to be in Gambia. When 
visited in Gambia he seems to be well integrated there. His children do not speak 
French; he does not have parallel households. None of his children are sent away 
to attend school, work or live in Senegal. Th is level of integration is nevertheless 
not the rule in the region. Many people are frontier runners: cases abound where 
individuals cross borders whenever a better opportunity emerges on the other 
side. In this case, opportunities refer to such things as better prices for consumer 
goods, a more developed public infrastructure, more plentiful job opportunities 
and so on (cf. Højbjerg et al. 2012).3
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Diasporas or Autochthons?
How much is the cohesion and functionality of a nation-state aff ected by dif-
ferent individual trajectories, such as Daouda’s described above? In other words, 
regarding whether people commit themselves to one nationality rather than 
remain frontier runners with multiple national identities,4 what diff erence do 
their choices make with respect to nation-building? According to Fox and Miller-
Idriss (2008), the fact that people have to be made national to make the nation’ 
has been somehow neglected. It is interesting to examine how the identifi cation 
marker of nationality has come to overrule all others at the actor’s level. How did 
this marker become so important that people have sacrifi ced their lives for it? 
And what role does the distinctive feature of European nation-building play in 
the making of those models? Examining the less successful examples of nation-
building and describing exceptions to the rules can produce a detailed explana-
tion of the actual set of rules. Th e issue of national integration is truly mirrored 
by alienated, exiled, discriminated groups. To ask why and how these excluded 
groups retain loyalties and networks beyond the prioritized national identifi ca-
tion sheds light on the question of national integration in general.
Th is chapter asks whether ‘diaspora’5 can be used, beyond the classic under-
standing of the term, as an analytical concept to isolate transnational markers 
of national integration. It furthermore argues that a study of diaspora groups 
reveals the qualities of national identifi cation and the distinctive features of the 
we-group’s majority that are necessary assets to be integrated. To test this idea, 
this essay compares the integration of one regional group in diff erent locations. 
Th ese locations stretch from what is usually understood as a typical immigrant 
diaspora destination, that is, overseas somewhere, to what is considered a clas-
sical homeland – the birthplace of its natives everywhere. Th e case of interest is 
the Casamançais, those people originating from the Casamance.6 Among other 
places they are found in other parts of Senegal, in Gambia and in France. Th e 
fi ndings indicate that transcending the nation-state framework of classical dias-
pora studies can help to better understand characteristic features of nation-build-
ing in Senegal and elsewhere: looking at the subjects who are excluded makes 
clearly evident which national subjects are integrated into the nation and how.
Before using the term diaspora as a tool of analysis it helps to diff erentiate 
three contexts of meaning. First, diaspora is used to identify and describe a cer-
tain transnational group diff erent from the current national majority within the 
nation-state. Second, it is used as a category of self-description and belonging 
that transcends time and space for certain individuals. In both of these cases di-
aspora ascribes special characteristics to a group. Th ird, there is the analytical use 
of the term, which diff erentiates it from the everyday uses above. Th is analytical 
meaning can be delineated by considering the historical origin of the term and 
then isolating and making explicit its constitutive features and comparing them 
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in various contexts to determine what makes a group a diaspora in one place 
and not in another. In short, this means the term can be used as an analytical 
category, regardless of its self-ascribed and ascribed uses in diff erent national con-
texts. Consequently this essay is not about groups that are referred to generally as 
comprising a diaspora, but about the integration and exclusion of groups that are 
analytically diff erentiated as diasporas.
Nation-State Role Models
Could Daouda, the Bandial native introduced above, be labelled as an example of 
a diasporic individual? Certain typical features are evident. An international bor-
der separates Gambia from Senegal. Th e Senegalese living in Gambia are there-
fore part of an immigrant group, and the Casamançais are Senegalese citizens 
as well. Yet the quality of integration for Casamançais in Gambia diff ers from 
other groups of immigrants. Th is might seem natural in frontier areas – where, 
for example, immigration from Senegal to Gambia can mean going no farther 
than next door to stay with your neighbour, as many villages are indeed divided 
by the border. But also in the Gambian capital and the entire Banjul-Serrekunda 
region, Casamançais are mostly well integrated, or at least more integrated than 
other groups, and are never explicitly labelled as a diaspora. A possible explana-
tion might be that the Casamançais are not a category involved in the struggle for 
primacy in Gambia. Th e autocratic president of Gambia is a Diola. In public dis-
course (manifest in everyday discrimination practice) Gambia remains a Mande 
country. Th e Diola and Mande are also autochthons in the Casamance.7
Other groups, such as the Wolof from Senegal and the Peul from the Fouta 
Djallon, are not considered autochthons.8 Ousmane, a Peul whose father came 
from the Fouta Djallon on foot in colonial times, explains:
Th e police control the fair-skinned ones. Th ey just control them [and 
nobody else]. When a policeman asked me to step out of the bus, I told 
him – ‘Why? Because of my skin colour? I am a Gambian like you. I was 
born here.’ Th ey are stupid. It is always the same. 
He complains that people are discriminated against because they are considered 
to have come from somewhere other than the immediate vicinity of Gambia 
(Casamance in the south and Sine Saloum in the north). ‘My brother Yellowman, 
you know him, they control him all the time. Th ey [the Mande] think they own 
the country. But it was the Diola who were here fi rst – you know.’
Th is diff erentiation between who belongs to the nation – who is indigenous 
and who is not – constitutes the nation. As the dividing line between nation A 
and nation B, its existence complicates the ability of nation A/B to exist. How 
to integrate people from diff erent national backgrounds into a single society has 
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therefore remained a question that haunts nation-states. Public debate in the 
West (Washington Post 2010) centres on the question of immigrants’ varying 
points of reference with respect to values, traditions and behaviour. Th ere appears 
to be a serious eff ort to defi ne a framework by which to judge whether or not 
immigrants comply with the ideal conception of a citizen of the given nation-
state. Th e question of belonging is also debated in migrants’ countries of origin, 
but from a diff erent perspective. A country like Senegal tries to profi t from its 
migrant communities worldwide, and politicians plead for investment by the 
international diaspora (africa-eu-partnership 2010; Fleury 2012; Red Mangrove 
Development Advisors 2012).
Th is last example illustrates two points that commonly arise in the debate 
concerning integration. First, the administrative answer to the question of be-
longing in general is often infl uenced by economic considerations. Second, the 
question of whether a diaspora is ignored or courted, and whether migrants are 
integrated or rejected, is answered from within the prevailing logic of the nation-
state. Such a perspective becomes clearly problematic when diaspora commu-
nities produce claims to a homeland that is not included in the landscape of 
modern nation-states.9 After all, diasporas are transnational. Th erefore it seems 
worthwhile to refl ect on their role in nation-building. During the last decades the 
goal for studies of nation-building has been to explain how this construct – the 
nation-state – has become the supreme form of political organization world-
wide.10 It is also interesting to analyse how this social construction became the 
most important manner of identifi cation for individuals as well.
Transformation of the Term Diaspora
For the purposes of this essay ‘Diaspora’ is analysed as a counterexample, and 
thus the term must fi rst be clearly defi ned. Diaspora studies show that the African 
and Jewish Diasporas are paradigmatic in both popular and scientifi c discourse 
(Cohen 2008; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). Historically the Jewish Diaspora es-
sentially created the term. It stems from the scattering of the Jews by the Bab-
ylonians (sixth century bc) and the Romans (ad 70).11 It also has been used to 
describe the consequences of the later transatlantic slave trade (fi fteenth to nine-
teenth centuries). Today it can be argued that it has become an undiff erentiated 
word of identifi cation with various meanings for diff erent circumstances. Never-
theless, the classical defi nition of Diaspora goes back to the Greek term meaning 
‘dispersion’. And because it is historically defi ned fi rst and foremost by Jewish his-
tory, the meaning goes beyond a mere synonym for dispersion. Th e features that 
are most important to keep in mind for a working defi nition are the following: 
Th e historic case is characterized by a homeland, which defi nes a common point 
of reference for people scattered by force, who in consequence migrate, hold a 
minority status abroad, and establish a transnational community that persists over 
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time and space.12 Today the term diaspora is ever expanding – Chinese, Lebanese 
and Armenian diasporas are joined by countless others. One might come to the 
conclusion that the meaning of the term itself has become so ‘dispersed’ that its 
actual analytical value is doubtful (Brubaker 2005). But to keep matters simple, 
here the analysis of diaspora groups is used only to make possible a broad com-
parison of the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Th e concept is employed to 
assess the modes of belonging of group members from both the majority and the 
minority. Th is chapter therefore proposes to look at diaspora on diff erent levels. 
Th e concept shall be applied to a well-known international case as well as to ex-
amples within a nation in order to approach the concept of everyday nationalism 
and the prioritization of identifi cations from diff erent perspectives.
To start with an example of a classical migration group overseas: Senegalese 
are well known for their workforce diaspora. Senegalese people will tell you that 
a young man generally is expected to seek out his fortune abroad.13 Th ere are 
Senegalese communities in Gabon and other oil-producing countries of Africa 
and the Middle East, but the destination of choice is Europe – particularly 
France – and French-speaking Canada.14 It is most of all the French diaspora 
that is ever present in Senegalese media, politics and family networks: it would 
be hard to fi nd any (extended) Senegalese family without relatives in France. But 
while in Senegal ethnic diff erentiation stratifi es society and overrules national 
identifi cation, Senegalese abroad reach a common national identifi cation that 
overrides such diff erences. According to the label attached to them by outsiders 
who are unaware of any regional diff erentiation, the Senegalese diaspora to a 
certain degree is labelled, and perceives itself, as a homogeneous group.15 As a 
member of the diaspora in Paris stated: Once Senegalese arrive in France they 
become the same. He also said that no other sub-Senegalese community – such 
as a Casamançais or any other regional diaspora – was visible and recognizable 
in France.
Shifting of Boundaries
In diff erent circumstances markers of distinctions might diff er. Th e same person 
identifi ed as a Senegalese in France may have a last name that is rather uncom-
mon in his region of origin, the Casamance.16 One such person explained how 
he had to convince people that he truly was a native to the region when he was 
still living there.
Les gens ont dit que je suis Nordiste. On connaît que ça [the last names 
common in the region]. Je disais – Tu es malade, je suis d’ici, grandi ici. 
Il fallait que je m’explique. … [Abbé] Diamacoune a raconté d’un grand 
guerrier au temps [who was from the Casamance and bore the same last 
name].17
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In other words, he had to defend his status as an autochthon by pointing out 
his and his family’s origin, stretching the latter back in time and supporting his 
story with an account of the political leader (Abbé Diamacoune) of the secession 
movement. Th e discrepancy between how an individual’s markers become rele-
vant for his social placement in his region of origin and how they are relevant in 
his exile in the diaspora seems odd at fi rst. But the mechanisms underlying this 
discrepancy will crystallize more clearly when the comparison is expanded. Spe-
cifi cally, the international (France) / regional (Casamance) case will be contrasted 
with the transnational (Gambia) / national (Dakar/Ziguinchor) cases.
First, though, it is necessary to explain the label Nordiste, mentioned above. 
A divide exists between people from Senegal’s north and south (namely the Casa-
mance). Th ere are many other points of rupture within Senegal, but this north/
south division has been the source of a low-grade civil war since 1982.18 A seces-
sion movement in the Casamance has violently challenged the nation-building 
project of Senegal. In consequence the Casamançais are stereotyped as conspira-
torial rebels and regarded as outsiders from and within Senegal. For this reason, 
the Casamançais are an apt group through which to determine whether the ana-
lytical tool at issue in this chapter can be applied, and whether our understanding 
benefi ts by analysing the Casamançais as a diaspora. Applying the concept allows 
elaboration on certain peculiarities of the Casamance confl ict: for example, that 
the Diola are said to be both the fi ercest supporters of secession (for an overview 
of the debate see Barbier-Wiesser 1994) and one of the best integrated groups in 
Senegal (Foucher 2002) appears contradictory. However, this contradiction can 
be resolved by placing a spotlight on groups that are not integrated and using the 
concept of diaspora. Such an approach reveals how individuals’ belonging to a 
regional (Casamançais) or national (Senegalese) project is related to the confl ict. 
It is indeed a dialectical relation: the former are shaped and reifi ed by the latter 
and vice versa: ‘Les nordistes, ce sont des racistes. Ce n’est pas comment chez 
nous’, was the experience of Diatta, a Casamançais in northern Senegal. ‘Ils te 
disent rebelle. Tous les Casaçais pour eux sont des rebelles. On te insulte. Ils ne 
connaissent pas Cabrousse – ou est-il. Le confl it ce sont les nordistes. … Ils di-
rigent tout. On ne peut rien faire.’ When questioned about how he is identifi ed 
and labelled as a Casamançais, Diatta said: ‘Moi, je parle mieux Wolof qu’eux. 
Mais quand ils entendent [que tu parle] Diola…’ here he paused, then summa-
rized: ‘… c’est mieux chez moi’.19 After years of working in the north, Diatta 
fi nally returned to his hometown for economic reasons and apparently also be-
cause he had been unable to integrate on a personal level in the north.20
Diaspora within the Nation
Is the case of the Diola above a singular case, or is it representative of a common 
pattern? To answer this question we asked Casamançais in Dakar (N = 133) 
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whether they socialize mostly with other Casamançais, and how they appraise 
the relations between northerners and Casamançais. We were interested in the 
length of time the interviewees had been in Dakar and the level of integration 
they experienced in their jobs, religious practices and daily lives, always keeping 
in mind that there are no apartheid-like ghettoes in Dakar that separate the dif-
ferent ethnic groups.
Th e relative unanimity of opinions was extraordinary.21 Th e interviewees 
pointed out that most of the non-Casamançais in Dakar stereotyped the Casa-
mançais as rebels. Th erefore the Casamançais kept mostly to themselves, con-
fi ning interactions with northerners to professional life. On the one hand, the 
Casamançais appear well integrated into modern Senegalese society. In general 
they have been integrated into certain professions (housework, security, mili-
tary) more successfully than most other groups (see Foucher 2002), as is espe-
cially visible in Dakar.22 On the other hand, the people who were questioned 
clearly felt they had not managed to fi t in. Th is self-perception is characterized 
by the attributes of diaspora: a people migrate from home; they are identifi ed 
as diff erent and classifi ed into a certain group; and even though they have been 
dispersed, their community transcends space and national identifi cation (Söke-
feld 2006).
Another question arises: To what extent is diaspora necessarily about dis-
tance? Of course dispersion as such necessarily includes being distant from one 
another. But an often-implied prerequisite to qualify as a diaspora – that is, that 
an ocean or similar great distance has to separate people from their homeland 
– does not even hold true for the Jewish Diaspora.23 No studies have as yet high-
lighted the Casamançais/Diola24 diaspora in Dakar. Th is might be due to the 
fact that this label does not appear to be verifi able – there is no such thing as a 
fi xed minority status. Th ere are, on the contrary, many examples of individuals 
activating diff erent layers to fl exibly alter their transnational and regional iden-
tity according to the circumstances (de Jong 2002). Further, neither personal 
observation nor previous research shows that the Diola are more marginalized 
than any other ethnic group in Senegal (Diouf 1994).25 Finally, even if diaspora 
is not about long-distance dispersion in theory, it might not be applicable as an 
analytical tool for short-distance diaspora in practice.
Nobody Is from Here
Th e above doubts seem justifi ed after a closer look at a short-distance diaspora. 
Shifting focus from the national to the regional level to consider how individuals 
are identifi ed in Ziguinchor, diaspora suddenly seems omnipresent. Ziguinchor 
is the capital of the region of the same name and is also the old capital of the Cas-
amance (a region that has been divided to undercut the separatism cause linked 
to the old name). Th e city was founded by the Portuguese, who were the fi rst 
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Europeans to colonize along the Casamance River. Th e Portuguese were never 
active administrators in the region, so present-day Ziguinchor is a relatively new 
city that has only recently experienced tremendous growth. Still, it began as a 
Portuguese settlement in a region where founding families are traditionally the 
landowners, who function as the hosts of whomever is a latecomer. Just as it is 
acknowledged that the Portuguese were the founders, it is common knowledge 
that the original population was Bainouk, who once maintained rice fi elds on the 
land now occupied by the Casamance capital. Th erefore the Bainouk and their 
Creole descendants are considered the landowners.
‘Ici, personne n’est d’ici’,26 a young man explained in Boudoudi, a neigh-
bourhood in Ziguinchor.27 ‘Chacun a son village, c’est un rencontre, c’est le ca-
pital’.28 All respondents to a survey in Boudoudi stated that they were from other 
villages.29 A young man born in Dakar and bearing a common Bainouk name 
(patronym) declares himself to be from Brin, the next village. He visits his offi  cial 
home village ‘régulièrement’, but even though it is only a few kilometres away, 
‘c’est ici que je connais plus’.30 Boudoudi was among the original settlements, 
and one of its peculiarities is that after Senegalese independence, it was displaced 
to build government housing for ‘fonctionnaires’ [civil servants]. Displacement in 
this case actually meant moving as little as two blocks – a hundred metres – back 
from the river into the rice paddies. Th e tiny neighbourhood of Boudoudi con-
sists of two paved streets with modern apartment buildings between them, and 
a few dozen rather unstable houses behind the modern block. In other words, 
in Boudoudi the expropriated landowners live next to the land titleholders who 
profi t from this displacement. Th is is especially interesting, considering that peo-
ple continue to regard a northern governor’s expropriation of Bainouk/Diola rice 
fi elds as the root cause of the confl ict. It is said he gave the land to his compatriots 
from northern Senegal. Th e rice paddies were on the river, in swampland on both 
sides of the colonial harbour. Th e western side, right next to the governor’s seat, 
is the neighbourhood of Boudoudi.
According to a common line of argumentation that classifi es the confl ict 
in the Casamance as a clash of interests between landlords and intruders, the 
antagonism between the two groups in Boudoudi is the confl ict’s fl ashpoint.31 
Boudoudi, in other words, is an open wound, a constant reminder of the prob-
lem underlying the Casamance confl ict. But our survey in the neighbourhood 
showed that on both sides, people refer to their original villages outside Bou-
doudi in identifying themselves. Th at is, neither side feels as though it comes 
‘from there’ – from Boudoudi. It is true that the ‘northerners’ are found only in 
the new part, but Creole/Bainouk/Diola as ‘originaires du Ziguinchor’ live along-
side them and with other original Casamançais in the new blocks as well. In other 
words, the very confl ict that has cast the Diola in the role of conspirators, rebels, 
challengers of nation-building – and thus the very reason they are isolated as a 
de facto diaspora in Dakar – is said to be rooted in the expropriation perceptible 
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in Boudoudi; yet the division between Casamançais and northerners is far from 
visible in the very neighbourhood itself.
Diaspora or Latecomers?
If being amongst foreigners means being in a diaspora, then there could be a 
diaspora ‘around every corner’: a scattering from one’s homeland might only be 
as far as the next village. Quaintly enough, in the Casamance, ‘foreigner’ essen-
tially means anyone who does not belong to the same quartier or neighbour-
hood. ‘When my father went to the next village [a stone’s throw away] he took 
his arms with him’32 was a common description of the hostile – and above all, 
isolated – situation that characterized villages in the region. By pointing to this 
oral history, to narratives of historic rivalries, to diff erences in the language and 
to specifi c customs separating one village (and often each quartier) from another, 
distinctions of exclusion can be claimed. In a similar matter but to a converse 
end, integration can be emphasized: by pointing to a common descent (from a 
village, or a region from which forefathers immigrated) or to a common resist-
ance against outsiders (slave traders [Baum 1999] or French colonizers [Mark 
1985: 66–67]), historic ties can be stressed in order to establish similarities and 
union with others. Depending on the specifi c context, the identifi cation changes 
and expands, presenting a series of nesting categories: quartier (e.g. Djibonker) 
– village (e.g. Youtou) – kingdom (e.g. Bayot) – region (e.g. Kasa) – department 
(e.g. Ziguinchor) – nation (e.g. Casamance) – state (e.g. Senegal). It may appear 
complicated, but it is also the basic answer to the most common greeting: ‘Kasu-
may (Peace), what is your name? Where are you from?’ As to the effi  cacy of the 
label ‘internal diaspora’, one might argue that it makes little sense to speak of a 
migration next door, but in fact many internally displaced people live next door 
to one another in the Casamance, and they have in fact been dispersed by force. 
In the end it seems a matter of choice whether both characteristics are counted 
as a given or not.33 Here violence is seen as a crucial element of the working 
defi nition, whereas a minimal distance (e.g. in kilometres) or a certain quality of 
distance (across an ocean) is not regarded as a prerequisite. Violence is counted as 
an element if it is perceived as such by the individuals concerned. Th e objective 
criterion for distance becomes a self-defi ned remoteness.
But what are the advantages to analysing a given situation relying on the 
categories of diaspora? Where does it make the picture sharper rather than more 
blurry to speak of diasporas? Landlord/stranger relations seem the more appro-
priate term in many cases. Th erefore, applying the analytical term diaspora de-
pends on which social condition you want to label.34 Historically, Diaspora is 
about forced displacement and permanent migration from home.35 And of course 
other terms might cover all of these conditions just as well. But diaspora is also 
characterized as a social materialization of a perceived/ascribed common point of 
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reference for identifi cation. Th is point of reference provides a transnational mode 
of belonging, but at the same time it hinders the group from embracing the local 
identity.36 Th is does not mean that the minority has no say in the label that is 
applied to them. But having been excluded from the majority’s we-group, indi-
viduals have a big incentive to integrate themselves into the other-group in which 
they are categorized. For instance, your counterpart in the north might simply 
ignore your point of reference, say, Cabrousse, and insist on another label, say, 
Diola, Casaçais, or rebel.37 You do not fi t into his group; furthermore, you are in-
tegrated into another group – a negative of his, an ‘other’ group contrasted to ‘us’.
Individuals react diff erently. Th ey can accept and embrace their ascribed sta-
tus as ‘other’, they can accept but still seek to alter this ‘other’ status, or they can 
seek to escape it. Th e escape option works in one of two ways. Individuals can lay 
claim to the ‘we’ group – a process observable, for example, in assimilation via 
assertion of common historic or ethnic affi  liation by individuals among both the 
Diola and Wolof, who now claim to have emigrated from Egypt. Or individuals 
may seek to enter a diff erent ‘other’ group – for example, to be identifi ed as a 
(regional) Casamançais, or as a (transnationally orientated) youngster rather than 
accepting an (ethnic) identifi cation as a Diola. Th e frame of reference and the sit-
uation defi ne who you are. Th e question is to whom you are speaking, and under 
what circumstances. Th e same man may speak of the Senegalese as ‘us’ when he 
talks about himself as part of a Senegalese diaspora in France, but then refer to 
the Senegalese as ‘them’ (‘who will never understand us [the Casamançais]’) when 
discussing the confl ict in the Casamance; then again, he may even refer to other 
Casamançais as ‘them’ when explaining the problem of being accepted as a true 
originaire (an autochthon) de la Casamance because of his untypical family name.
Diff erentiation of Otherness
Consideration of similarities to other diasporas and systematic comparison with 
the working defi nition of diaspora can aid the analysis of the situation and its 
consequences. Th is perspective might lead to an understanding of how identifi ca-
tions are prioritized. Let us keep in mind that migration does not lead automati-
cally to the formation of a diaspora. Even if the stipulations of forced migration, 
subsequent minority status, anchors in the homeland and rudimentary trans-
national networks are met, assimilation is not impossible. Th e fi rst benefi t of 
focusing on the diaspora is the insight gained into a given society’s capacity to ac-
cept integration. Th e question then becomes how fl exible culturally constructed 
diff erences are.38 Describing the ascribed and perceived attributes separating di-
aspora from the majority provides clues to the answer. On one hand are markers 
that are perceived to be essential for the majority (through a negative image of 
what constitutes group membership); on the other hand are the features of iden-
tifi cation that bind the diaspora together. Looking at a diaspora such as that of 
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the Casamançais in Dakar, furthermore, makes diff erentiation markers salient 
when they otherwise would not be detectable. Simmel pointed out an often over-
looked quality of strangers: Th e stranger is diff erent by defi nition – he is strange, 
not like ‘us’, his ‘otherness’ is evident. But if the ‘other’ is similar and close, then 
distance and diff erence (in discourse) have to be reifi ed more assertively. A self 
is established by boundaries that distinguish a similar other – not a complete 
stranger (Simmel 1992 [1908]). In sum, the less obvious the diff erences are, the 
more strongly they have to be affi  rmed. In other words, the less distinguishable 
the markers of diff erences are, the more explicit they must be.
Th e cases in the Casamance frontier zone seem to contradict this last point. 
Here we return to the observation of Daouda, the Casamançais living in Gambia 
who was quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Historically, the Diola popu-
lation of Gambia has lived in the Brikama and Fogni region of Gambia – not in 
Banjul and Serrekunda. In the last decades the latter areas have seen a large infl ux 
of Gambian and Senegalese Diola migrants who nevertheless are not seen as for-
eigners – unlike migrants from Northern Senegal who also moved to these urban 
areas. Here one might reconsider the earlier quote describing the Gambian Diola 
as the ‘fi rst’ historical natives – that is, as the true ancestors of Gambia. Even as 
the ‘other’ is a necessary asset to establish a self, the question of who is consid-
ered the ‘other’ obviously depends on the circumstances. Th e Gambian and the 
Senegalese Diola are not diff erentiated in the lines of argumentation observed. 
Rather, it seems that especially in the metropolitan area of Serrekunda, the di-
viding line does not run between national groups but between the ‘indigenous’ 
and the ‘others’.39 In this case the ‘others’ are usually ‘Freetonians’ or ‘Nigerians’. 
But the national and linguistic markers of distinctions are subject to situational 
shifts: in one instance it is them the Francophones versus us the Anglophones, 
with Nigerians and Freetonians included in the latter group. But in another in-
stance it is us ‘the locals’ or ‘the indigenous’ versus them the ‘foreigners’, assigning 
Mande, Diola and Wolof to the fi rst group and the non-Gambian Anglophone 
population to the other. 
Th e point is that the Casamançais groups do not fi gure as prominent ‘other’ 
groups. On the contrary, they are mostly subsumed into one’s own group in order 
to prove autochthony. Th e Mande will stress that many Diola are often already 
considered Mande (e.g. in the Karon region), as they have adapted Mande tradi-
tions and language. Th is reference seemingly serves to substantiate the narrative 
of glorious Mande kingdoms of the past civilizing the region. Th e same pattern 
of autochthonization is observable within other ethnic groups: Peul who arrived 
from the Fouta Djallon highlands of Guinea-Conakry refer to the Casamançais 
Peul from the Fuladou region of Senegal to stress their autochthonous status, 
arguing that those Casamançais groups are more indigenous than the Mande, 
as indicated in Ousmane’s statement earlier. Ultimately this is seen as proof that 
the Peul are more indigenous than the Mande. Th at is, there is a tendency to 
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integrate and co-opt the Casamançais in order to establish an autochthony that 
is recognized in Gambia.
How Firstcomers in the Casamance Become Latecomers in Senegal
Th e diff ering levels of integration in similar conditions (as in the region Sene-
gambia, which is often regarded as a single historical and sociocultural entity) 
show how circumstances can be decisive. In such situations relatively slight dis-
similarities may be highlighted to stress diff erence (Dakar), whereas in other 
situations (frontier Casamance) these same dissimilarities would be considered 
quite minor. In sum, it is obvious that the process of identifi cation is diff erent 
for migrants overseas, migrants within the nation, internally displaced people in-
side the homeland and transnational short-distance migrants (see below). People 
living across the border as refugees showed many parallels with people living in 
Dakar in diaspora, but the Diola living in exile across the border in Gambia and 
Guinea-Bissau showed more integrative qualities than members of the diaspora 
in Dakar. Th e hypothesis is that they embody transnational ties, because they are 
the majority and ‘at home’. Another observation underlines how surrounding 
conditions, rather than the features themselves, defi ne the quality of a marker: if 
virtually everywhere ‘nobody comes from here’, then a factor that sets you apart 
from the majority in Dakar binds you together in Ziguinchor. In both cities a 
majority of residents are immigrants, but obviously the identifi cation as a Casa-
mançais and a Senegalese is diff erent. In Dakar it was much harder to speak about 
the Casamance in the fi rst place. People were much more suspicious and unwill-
ing to talk about their identifi cation. But diff erences with the north were hardly 
ever mentioned in the Casamance, even though it is the place where people suff er 
from the confl ict (said to be caused by those very diff erences). In Dakar it was 
much easier to get an idea of what binds the Casamançais together and to isolate 
their respective markers (beyond a common fate through an external threat). Dif-
ferent groups in Dakar were set apart (and assimilated them into smaller units, 
sometimes even antagonistic ones) by the same condition that brought them 
together in Ziguinchor – namely, not being from the place they lived in.
Th e research fi ndings encircle what appears to be the crucial element for 
analysis: the identifi cation Casamançais, a category that has unquestionably been 
used. Currently, this category is closely linked to the Casamance confl ict. Th e 
political wing of the Casamance rebels always claim to have been fi ghting for 
the values that the Senegalese nation inherited from the French: Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité! Even though the population has been subjected to discrimination on 
an ethnic base, the rebels have not played the ethnic card – for example to draft 
or to ‘motivate’ combatants.40 Instead they have chosen to criticize the state for 
betraying these values and failing to fully integrate its citizens. But how, then, 
are the ranks of the rebels fi lled, if not on an ethnic, religious, generation, class 
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or clan basis? What actually ties individuals together? Who claims autonomy 
or independence? Th e research found a common denominator: identifi cation as 
Casamançais (Rudolf 2013). In this case then – to grasp the markers – the study 
of the diaspora in Dakar turned out to be the most rewarding. Th e identifi cation 
Casamançais proved to be based on common cultural practices, similar sociopo-
litical systems, a common ascribed label and a common self-identifi cation em-
bracing this label.41
Th e hypothesis shows that this Casamançais identity sustains itself – apart 
from exclusion and discrimination – by performances, especially initiation rit-
uals through which the community is united and reifi ed (Mark, de Jong and 
Chupin 1998; de Jong 2007; Mark 1992, 1994). To do so, Casamançais from 
every part of their diaspora must make an eff ort to return to their village of origin 
in the Casamance in order to participate; in this way the entire extended family 
is able to contribute. Extended family members then live together for a time, 
whereby the community becomes visible, graspable and enacted repeatedly. Casa-
mançais themselves often point to participation in life-cycle rituals, even those 
co-organized with diff erent ethnic groups, as a strong identifi cation marker. Such 
opinions should be accepted as valid, for the performance – the joint experience 
of community, of singing, dancing and eating together and being a part of the 
organization team – should not be underestimated.42 Identity is by and large 
performed; it is both reifi ed and recognized in performances.43
Conclusion: Diaspora as an Analytical Tool
Studying the various levels of integration experienced in diff ering contexts in 
diasporas has proven to be fruitful, with social mechanisms becoming salient and 
underlying structures being revealed. Examples in the region at issue indicate that 
diaspora is not the opposite of integration; rather, carrying out research in a dias-
pora is an outstanding approach for understanding the conditions that do or do 
not exist for integration. For its recent nation-building, Sierra Leone has deployed 
a Krio-diaspora identity and language to unify people (Knörr 2010). Th e role of 
the Creole in Guinea-Bissau has been similar. Even though the creole identity 
has never been proclaimed as a unifying model in this case, it has nonetheless 
played an implicitly decisive role in nation-building (Trajano Filho 2010). As a 
clearly formulated category, diaspora as an analytical term can be used to assess 
social identifi cations across neighbourhoods and the Seven Seas alike.44 In analys-
ing identifi cation, its advantage over other categories is that diaspora captures a 
trans(across/beyond)-national/regional/local dimension, whether as a tacit or ex-
plicit identifi cation, that in regard to the prioritized national identity provides its 
group members with an exit option that would not have been apparent otherwise.
Looking only at how genealogies, language, religion, ethnicity and so on 
diff er among the Diola, Peul, Balanta and Manjacos in Dakar, one cannot grasp 
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their common reference of regional identifi cation and subsequently cannot com-
prehend the grounds on which individuals refer to this identity. How many of 
the Casamançais actually identify themselves with this marker? How many are 
identifi ed as such, and by whom and for how long? Whether living in the region 
or in the diaspora, how many of them oppose, ignore, sympathize or support the 
secession movement? Many answers to these questions depend on the circum-
stances in which markers are identifi ed and appropriated by actors to include 
members in a group or exclude them from it (Donahoe et al. 2009). But the sine 
qua non for an analytical understanding in this regard is to identify what it is 
that qualifi es an individual for, or disqualifi es an individual from, membership.45
Th e genesis of social groups and their boundaries, markers, and identifi ca-
tion of actors, or in other words their dynamic evolution, is central to anthropo-
logical research and analysis. Periods of rapid social change have been identifi ed 
as especially suitable for discerning group boundary mechanisms (Schlee 2004, 
2010). Th e analysis of diaspora holds similar promise for facilitating understand-
ing of the relative importance that actors attribute to diff erent identifi cations. 
Th e examples presented herein furthermore should make clear that a case study 
of instances where nation-building fails to integrate its subjects (and make them 
national) has wider implications for diffi  culties that the ‘nation-state’ model faces 
today, not only in postcolonial nations but virtually everywhere.
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Notes
 1. All names are changed to guarantee anonymity. Interview Ziguinchor, 2009.
 2. Th e English translations provided here are based on recollections of conversations that 
were recorded in writing later. Th e French quotes are as faithful to the original structure 
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and style of the spoken word as possible, even though the language used may not be 
grammatically correct.
 3. Gambia is completely contained within Senegalese territory, except for its short western 
border where it meets the Atlantic Ocean. Th e Senegalese territory south of Gambia, 
stretching to the border with Guinea-Bissau and cut off  from the north of Senegal by 
Gambia, is the region of Casamance. It comprises the greatest density of ethnic groups in 
Senegal, of which the Diola is the dominant ethnicity. Th e north in turn has a diff erent 
ethnic, religious, climatic and social mosaic, and here the Wolof are the most prominent. 
A low-grade confl ict between those two parts of Senegal has plagued the country since 
1982, occasionally aff ecting and involving the neighbouring countries of Gambia and 
Guinea-Bissau.
 4. Identifi cation here points to a process. Th e term ‘identity’ in turn is understood as the 
result of this process. As a social fact both the process and the result are seen as fl uid, 
dynamic and situational (for a deeper discussion of this issue, see Richard Jenkins 2000; 
Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Donahoe et al. 2009).
 5. Th e uppercase ‘Diaspora’ is used here for the paradigmatic cases, while the lowercase 
‘diaspora(s)’ is used elsewhere.
 6. In other words, the Casamançais include those who refer to villages in the Casamance as 
their places of origin.
 7. Th e terms ‘autochthon’ and ‘native’ are used synonymously here; both are rarely used 
in the Casamance. Usually the diff erentiation is made through labels: ‘we/them’; ‘from 
here/not from here’; ‘they come from …’, ‘they originate in …’. In Gambia the term 
‘indigenous’ is used, while generally in Senegal (outside of the Casamance) ‘autochthon’ is 
used. In both cases it is assumed everybody knows who is native and who is not. Yet, the 
fl exibility of boundaries is astonishing.
 8. Both the Wolof and the Peul are not uncommon in the region. Th ere are Wolof villages 
(such as Loudia Wolof ) in the Casamance, and the Wolof are numerous in Gambia. Th e 
Peul (also called the Fula) are the majority in the Fulada region of Casamance, and since 
this region is between Gambia and Guinea-Conakry, the Peul/Fula from the area are 
considered in-between as well: as Casamançais, they are autochthons to the Senegambia 
region and are diff erentiated from the more ‘fair-skinned’ Peul/Fula from Guinea-Co-
nakry, mostly traders who are considered foreigners. It is interesting to note that many 
complaints about Wolofi zation – that is, the ever increasing infl uence of the Wolof people 
and Wolof language – are also linked to their position in trade.
 9. Th e best-known example of a diaspora claiming its own nation-state is the Kurds. Th eir 
relation to the homeland and self-image is considerably diff erent from other examples 
(Wahlbeck 2002; Alinia 2004; Curtis 2005). Other, less prominent cases, such as the Parsi 
and Ismaili communities, are equally interesting for comparison regarding the concept of 
homeland and transnational nationalism (Hinnells 1994; Kassam-Remtulla 1999; Falzon 
2003).
10. Hobsbawm, Anderson and others have shown how nation-building is grounded in a pri-
mordial, essentialist and ex post explanation (discourse) of the status quo: A rigid national 
history is constructed from the present ex post: natural national identity stretches back 
through time (Kohn 1967; Hobsbawm 1992; Tilly 1992; Anderson 1999).
11. From the Oxford Dictionaries Online (2010): 
   diaspora(dias|pora), Pronunciation:/diasp(ə)rə. Noun (often the Diaspora): Jews liv-
ing outside Israel. Th e dispersion of the Jews beyond Israel. Th e dispersion or spread 
of any people from their original homeland. People who have spread or been dispersed 
from their homeland. 
110  Markus Rudolf
   Th e main diaspora began in the 8th–6th centuries bc, and even before the sack of 
Jerusalem in ad 70, the number of Jews dispersed by the diaspora was greater than that 
living in Israel. …
   Origin: Greek, from diaspeirein ‘disperse’, from dia ‘across’ + speirein ‘scatter’. Th e 
term originated in the Septuagint (Deuteronomy 28:25) in the phrase esē diaspora en 
pasais basileias tēs gēs ‘thou shalt be a dispersion in all kingdoms of the earth’.
12. Th e four characteristics chosen are both specifi c enough to distinguish diasporas from 
other transnational groups and broad enough not to be confi ned to a single case, as to 
a certain extent are Safran’s (1991) often-cited six points. Th is essay intends to show 
whether this working defi nition is of any value for comparative analysis.
13. Whether an immigrant should take his bride and consequently establish his family 
abroad, too, is a matter of discussion among Senegalese. Most men nowadays feel that 
women become ‘uncontrollable’ once they live in Europe or North America. Th erefore 
the preferred model is to build a house and leave the spouse(s) and children in the country 
of origin. Female migration diff ers: It is virtually confi ned to seasonal work in the region 
or to ‘follow a Toubab’ (a white man). In the fi rst case the immigrant is without children, 
and the second entails the question of establishing a family, predating migration, and 
guarantees its permanency (Fleischer 2008).
14. For a better understanding of the context in Senegal see Lambert (2002) and Wabgou 
(2008); for the role of remittances see Jettinger (2005); and for Italy see Sinatti (2006).
15. Th is of course is a stereotype not shared by or valid for all individuals.
16. Whoever has been to Senegal has observed the greeting ceremony in which, after ques-
tions on well-being, there inevitably follow questions on name, last name and origin. 
Th ese are the coordinates used to position the communication partner and eventually 
discover links to individual networks.
17. ‘People said I am a Nordiste. Th ey do not know anything. I told them you are mad, I am 
from here. I grew up here. I had to explain myself. … Diamacoune told about a great 
warrior once upon time’ (interview, Paris, September 2009).
18. Evans and Foucher, among others, off er brief summaries of the complex Casamance con-
fl ict (Evans 2003; Foucher 2007).
19. ‘Th e Nordistes, they are racists. It is not like here. Th ey call you a rebel. All the Casaçais 
are rebels for them. You are insulted. Th ey do not know Cabrousse – where it is. Th e 
confl ict, that are the northerners … they direct everything. You cannot do anything … I 
speak Wolof better than they do. But if they hear Diola … It is better at home’ (Diatta, 
interview in Cabrousse, March 2011). 
20. Th is decision was reached a year after participating in his home village’s Bukut, a Diola 
initiation ritual that plays a central role in the process of identifi cation as Casamançais 
(Rudolf 2014).
21. Nevertheless, the Diola are far from unanimous in their approach to living in Dakar. 
Many in fact do try to mingle and become less noticeable. Th is might cause biased results: 
the individual identifi cation depends on the circumstances, and the survey was not rep-
resentative. But the issue here is not whether all Diola feel and act as a tightly organized 
diaspora, but whether the conditions are such that they are encouraged to do so, and how 
much individuals are aware of it.
22. It might be argued that an already high level of integration into the modern system of 
education and public work is a precondition for individuals to perceive themselves as 
lagging behind. Playing according to the rules sets the ground for aspirations that in the 
end cause individuals to feel alienated and consequently to distance themselves.
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23. What tends to be overlooked in the classical defi nitions closely attached to the historic 
Jewish case is that even Jews who were living in the homeland, e.g., in Jerusalem, could be 
considered part of the Diaspora because they were not living in a Jewish state. Th e same 
could be said for the Orthodox to this very day; only the Messiah can lead them out of 
the Diaspora.
24. For a number of reasons Diola and Casamançais are often equated. First, as has been 
shown, outsiders tend to equate the Diola and Casamançais in everyday practice. Numer-
ous people outside the Casamance, especially in the north of Senegal, affi  rmed this ste-
reotype: ʻCasamançais? – the Diola. Like here in Fatick people are called Fatickois. Here 
everybody is Serer. Th ere they are Diola’ (interview, Fatick, February 2011). Second, on 
a political level the government demonized the secession movement as an ethnic uprising 
and blamed the Diola along with the Casamançais: according to the government’s logic 
the two groups are essentially the same, so if one group is labelled as rebels, the other is 
too. Th ird, no research has been done exclusively on the Casamançais as such. Th e vast 
majority of the comparative studies in what now is the Département de Ziguinchor are 
mostly fi led under the label Diola.
25. Studies have shown that the Diola are better educated and better integrated into the state 
apparatus than other ethnic groups in many aspects, but there are no studies focusing 
on other Casamance ethnic groups such as the Balanta, Manjacos and so on, which are 
usually subsumed under Guinea-Bissau.
26. ‘Here [in Ziguinchor] nobody is from here’.
27. Sagna, Boudoudi – various interviews, February–September 2008.
28. ‘Everybody has his village, this is a meeting point, it is the capital’.
29. Survey conducted in Boudoudi households in 2008.
30. ‘Regularly’/ ‘It is here I know better’.
31. Th e landlord/stranger relation in general (Mouser 1975), as in a diachronic analysis, is of 
particular interest in the Casamance – especially with regard to the question of who owns 
land. During its history the region has seen many invasions (Mark 1985). Many regional 
inhabitants fl ed to remote backwater islands and often ended up settling there. Current 
points of contention are land issues regarding hotels (Cabrousse), the question of national 
borders for the purposes of farming rights (along the southern border) and the previously 
mentioned claim that the northerners had taken land from the southerners. Furthermore, 
fi erce disputes between villages revolve around whether land was loaned or given away 
permanently, based on historical founder/latecomer claims. A thorough historical study 
of these cases, as they play out in modern courtrooms, would prove illuminating.
32. Interview with a villager from Edioungou, August 2008.
33. Diaspora is not solely about being dispersed over a great distance, as has been pointed out. 
Nevertheless distance might well be the most crucial element of dispersion to consider 
in the future. Modern means of communication have made distance more relative than 
ever. Isolation of minorities who have migrated from their homelands is therefore greatly 
reduced. In the global village, the sheer abundance of means of transnational commu-
nication aff ects integration more than anything else. Whereas transnational orientation 
among migrants (often already in the second and third generations) used to be the excep-
tion – and mostly was due to religious beliefs – it could become the rule, simply because 
distance from the homeland has shrunk in manifold ways.
34. Migrant is the encompassing entity, and landlord/stranger the encompassing relationship. 
Both are preconditions but do not necessarily produce conditions for a diaspora – the 
question is how and when these conditions are met.
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35. Consequences of the transatlantic slave trade have been studied in this region, but the 
role of the Diola diaspora has drawn comparatively less attention in the social sciences. 
Focusing on transregional or transnational ties, however, furthers understanding of the 
mechanisms of group boundaries, their construction and their origins. Discussion of the 
ties between the diaspora and the rebellion has been quite heated in Senegal (see arti-
cles on the extradition of Nkrumah in the newspaper WalFadjri: http://www.walf.sn/poli
tique/suite.php?rub=2&id_art=63020).
36. It is important to keep in mind that reifi cation of identifi cation markers depends on 
established categories of self and others according to the situation (Elwert 2002).
37. ‘Casaçais’ is the colloquial form for Casamançais, while ‘rebel’ is a derogatory label that 
politicians, military and police affi  x to individuals who refer to themselves as combatants. 
While Casaçais and Diola are categories of identifi cation for both members and outsiders, 
rebel is simply a discriminatory label that excludes individuals from the community.
38. Social reality is understood here to be constructed, which does not imply any judgement 
about reality, that is, about the basis of the constructs. It simply acknowledges that our 
access is a culturally defi ned one, and therefore that no insights into anything outside 
of social reality can be off ered (Searle 1995; Berger and Luckmann 2003). But even if 
social reality in general and the consequent specifi c identifi cations are always subjectively 
constructed, this does not imply that identifi cations as ‘we’ and ‘others’ cannot rise to the 
level of great importance – or even become a matter of death or life – for the individuals 
involved.
39. In his diachronic analysis of this region, Nugent (2007) showed how its transborder qual-
ity has always been a decisive historical feature for its inhabitants.
40. Given the record of ethnic clashes in modern Africa, this seems extraordinary, and all the 
more so as there was a concerted policy to discriminate against the Diola – virtually all 
Diola have such experiences to relate.
41. Th e four (fl uid) markers for identifi cation identifi ed thus far include the following: (1) 
place of origin – marked by the quartiers’ oral history of the origin of ancestors; (2) com-
mon cultural events such as rituals – which the whole neighbourhood usually attends or 
follows; (3) common suff ering – grievances caused by livelihood, historical geopolitics, the 
current confl ict and so on; and (4) identifi cation imposed by outsiders that assigns some-
one to a particular ethnic or regional group such as the Diola and later the Casamançais.
42. Actually the hypothesis is that performance is the point where Identifi zierung –inter-
personal identifi cation marking (being identifi able due to markers) – and Identifi kation 
– intrapersonal self-identifi cation (identifying oneself with markers) – can occur (Leary 
2003). Th e relation and interaction between Identifi zierung and Identifi kation, in a dia-
lectical relation with imposed social restrictions, is decisive for individuals’ fl exibility to 
choose, alter and switch identifi cation.
43. While such an opinion can be accepted as valid, its propagated qualities have to be diff er-
entiated: even though these markers are often explicitly called traditions, they nevertheless 
are fl exible and fl uid (cf. de Jong 2002).
44. Th e analysis of diasporas evidently helps to answer certain questions of nation-building. Is 
it possible for individuals to live in a certain nation-state and yet retain diff erent loyalties? 
When does the prioritized national identifi cation become relevant to such an extent that 
it becomes problematic for those who do not accept it? Which circumstances favour a 
diaspora’s upholding of its status instead of assimilating?
45. To provide another example relative to the Diaspora from which the word originates: 
if one had considered the diff erent ethnic or clan-based identifi cations in Ethiopia to 
assess the alternatives of individuals and predict possible confl ict lines and alliances in the 
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1980s and 1990s, one would have been surprised to fi nd that the exit option for some 
individuals was to claim an identity enabling them to immigrate to Israel (Abbink 1990). 
Specifi cally, the Falasha claimed to belong to Israel tribes that have been considered ‘lost’ 
because the Bible does not mention them after the Babylonian captivity. Th e interesting 
twist concluding this chapter is that they were able to pursue their exit option by referring 
to the original Diaspora narrative.
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Chapter 6
Th e African ‘Other’ 
in the Cape Verde Islands
Interaction, Integration and 
the Forging of an Immigration Policy
Pedro F. Marcelino
Why Cape Verde?
Irregular immigration and its root causes have become a political concern in the 
Cape Verde Islands. One might be inclined to ask why migrants come. Th e sim-
ple answer is that they come because the islands are there. It is a matter of geog-
raphy. After 9/11, the paradigm of migration shifted, not only in North America 
but also, crucially, in Europe. Th rough a wide array of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, individual European Union countries and the EU as a whole have 
managed to export their own migratory pressures to a belt of buff er nations in 
their immediate (and remote) vicinity: countries like Morocco, Libya, Turkey 
and, more recently, Mauritania and the Cape Verde Islands.
Europe’s increasingly securitized and externalized immigration policies, 
along with the consequent pushing of its southernmost border farther south 
to North Africa, have caused trans-Saharan migration routes and networks to 
gradually shift westwards towards Morocco and Algeria, then southwards to the 
Western Sahara and Mauritania, and increasingly also to the Cape Verde Islands. 
Continental African migrants are today a conspicuous sight in Cape Verde’s main 
urban and tourist areas, part of a fl uid ethnoscape facilitated by a new geopolit-
ical nexus encompassing West Africa, the Mediterranean and the Maghreb, and 
perhaps justifying the assertion that Europe’s de facto southern borders have now 
been pushed to Africa, making Cape Verde (among other countries) a rather in-
complete proxy to – and a tool of – its own extemporaneous immigration policies.
Th is chapter attempts to map out a pivotal contemporary moment in na-
tional discourse as the country changes from being a net exporter of migrants to a 
net receiver, or at least a trans-shipment centre for transit migrants. Many among 
them indeed enter the country legally under existing open-borders agreements 
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within the regional body ECOWAS.1 Unable to reach Europe from the islands, 
however, a majority eventually overstay their legal welcome. Th us becoming ir-
regular aliens after entering the country, they are locked into a permanent state of 
legal limbo, informal incorporation and a bare life of sorts.
Some choose to return home, while some cannot. Th e remaining ratio con-
stitutes a group of increasingly disenfranchised denizens who are eff ectively – 
albeit inadvertently – challenging national self-concepts and even the idea of 
a unique ‘Capeverdeanness’ (Marcelino 2009: 56–62). Th e confl uence of the 
socioeconomic and ethno-racial dimensions is, this chapter argues, a primary 
reason for exclusion. Exclusion, however, will not prevent destitute but entrepre-
neurial foreigners (particularly not those from nearby nations) from entering the 
country, legally or illegally, and thereafter asserting their own identities, engaging 
in a fl uid renegotiation of what becomes an ongoing hybridization of themselves 
and of Capeverdeanness itself. Once they are in the islands, the integration pro-
cess is already underway. Cecil Foster notes that
each time an immigrant arrives … at least two things happen: [fi rst] [s]
he seeks to re-open and even restructure the compact that is the existing 
social order. Consensus, no matter how long it had taken to achieve, is 
threatened. And if there are many of them and the state is truly dem-
ocratic, the new arrivals should be able to undo, rewrite, to change the 
constitution and the social order. … Second, the immigrant revitalizes 
older communities within the state by daily reinserting them into a Di-
aspora of some kind, so that links with a motherland or fatherland that 
might atrophy with time are constantly renewed and re-freshened. … So 
through immigration, [national identity] is always in the state of becom-
ing [and] the culture statewide is never settled. (Foster 2010)
Th is chapter attempts to debunk some of the myths related to Cape Verde’s 
‘traditional’ racial blindness,2 and to what could be termed ‘hybridism’ (Marcelino 
2009: 61) or an ideology of migration and innate tolerance and hospitality (mo-
rabeza) that often appears to be used in key Cape Verdean opinion-making circles 
as a justifi cation to deny the existence of any racist undertones in current events 
in the islands while still enabling or excusing racialized discourses on ‘other-
ness’, ‘invasion’, and ‘crime’. Th ese challenges strengthen the vitality of the Cape 
Verdean case study as a liminal and transitional space where the dynamics and 
interconnectedness of migration, economic development and economic aspira-
tions, integration, exclusion and xenophobia are representative of the struggles 
elsewhere in the world. In the words of Jason DeParle (2007) ‘the intensity of the 
national experience makes this barren archipelago the Galapagos of migration, a 
microcosm of the forces straining … politics and remaking societies across the 
globe.’
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Debunking Migrant Typologies
Discussing migrant integration in Cape Verde requires the defi nition of a theoret-
ical framework of migrant categories to explain why migrants elicit one reaction 
over another. It is paramount to underline that despite the existence of informally 
organized – and only insuffi  ciently studied – cooperation circles among sub-
Saharan migrants in Cape Verde, this remains an inchoately connected trans-
national community immersed in what Pedro Góis (2005) characterized as the 
practice of ‘low intensity transnationalism’ and Gina Sánchez Gibau (2008: 
260–65) called a ‘dispersed nation’ and a ‘fractured diaspora’. In other words, 
this community is an ensemble of various diasporic nodes closely knit with their 
respective home communities, bound by a migration project represented by one 
of their own, and interacting across its diff erent nodes – perhaps a friend or 
relative in Rome, Paris, or Madrid – but with limited access to and contact with 
the host communities. Th e latter characteristic reduces the potential for integra-
tion, inclusion and vertical mobility, curbing the ability for upwards movement 
through hierarchies and statuses.
Of course this does not mean that social ascension is not an objective of 
sub-Saharan migrants. Indeed, social prestige is an often overlooked but increas-
ingly salient and signifi cant force in perpetuating migration. ‘Social prestige’ 
in sending communities is a signifi cant component of increasing aspirations to 
migrate, while ‘social expectations’ function as one of the most cited reasons 
to maintain one’s migration and continue one’s journey, geographically and so-
cially, usually across several years in transit. As migratory routes and strategies for 
reaching their destinations become increasingly complex and costly, migration 
pressure may decline in sending communities. However, the one-dimensional 
presumption of exclusively economic reasons for the departure/arrival of labour 
migrants is insuffi  cient to describe a complex portfolio of motivations and aspi-
rations. Further, this assumption obfuscates the fi nding that, grosso modo, those 
who migrate are not the poorest of the poor (e.g. Nieswand 2011), as it often 
fails to consider ‘social meanings’ of migration that go well beyond economic 
motivations.3 Th is is perhaps not lost on Cape Verdeans, who are newly a host 
community and still a nation of migrants that continues to export its own (albeit 
to a lesser extent). Th e motivations of sub-Saharan migrants are thus easier to 
grasp and identify with. Th e hardship of the migratory experience is a common 
ordeal understood by locals, who often have friends and relatives abroad and 
are therefore acquainted with unspoken but easily comprehended narratives of 
sacrifi ce and endurance.
A certain level of understanding should not, however, be mistaken with the 
unconditional acceptance of the migrants’ presence. Sub-Saharans in Cape Verde 
are often exposed to a paradox of cooperation and competition with locals. Th is 
nexus of solidarity and animosity, collaboration and competition, inclusion and 
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exclusion urges a closer look at the typologies of migrants arriving in Cape Verde. 
It is apparent, for instance, that there is an almost complete absence of a discourse 
on refuge. Formally and informally, everyone is branded as an economic migrant 
and thus assumed to be in the country illegally.4 Th is lack of understanding of the 
realities aff ecting those who factually are already part of the national ethnoscape is 
indicative of the level of formal disengagement still existing in the country at the 
levels of policy and the public. Th e absence of a public discourse on refuge and 
asylum to counterbalance that of simple migration is perhaps attributable to the 
country’s geographic isolation, but the same does not apply to categorizations of 
‘clandestine’, ‘undocumented’, ‘irregular’ and ‘illegal’ immigrants. Cape Verdeans 
themselves have rarely abandoned the country in these latter circumstances, but 
they certainly have an understanding of their tremendous liminality. Why, then, 
the hesitation? Might it be related to the stress induced by a transformation from 
a net sender to a net receiver?
Th e Migration Dilemma: From Emigration to Immigration
How do microstates respond to migration? How do they address and cope with 
the complex eff ects of migration on development, and how do they address the 
multiple consequences of immigration, economic struggles and identity? Th ese 
are some of the dilemmas facing the tiny insular republic of Cape Verde. Th ese 
questions, already deeply embedded in Cape Verdean history, came into sharper 
focus in 1991, when the archipelago was among the encouraging cluster of 
sub-Saharan African nations holding free elections for the fi rst time. A new gov-
ernment was elected on a platform that promised to push through a series of 
democratizing bills and introduce neoliberal economic reforms conducive to a 
business-friendly environment. Over the following decade, direct foreign invest-
ment and development aid packages poured in – at fi rst from Europe, the United 
States and supranational organizations, and later from China, Japan, Brazil and 
even Angola – often branded as technical cooperation packages. Twenty years 
later the quality of the country’s democracy compares favourably with that of 
most of its African peers, and a sizeable section of the population has been lifted 
out of the most abject poverty and is living comfortably by regional standards, 
with a substantially higher yearly income per capita (see e.g. Economist Intelli-
gence Unit 2008; Afrobarometer 2004). 
Whereas neoliberal economic reforms modelled after Europe’s eff ectively 
brought about immediate economic growth, they also partially alienated the so-
cial democracy drive of the early years of independence under the African Party 
for the Independence of Cape Verde (Davidson 1989: 127–201). Chronically 
high unemployment levels associated with rural poverty continue to be the archi-
pelago’s Achilles’ heel, disproportionably aff ecting the country’s peasant majority. 
Unequal income distribution has become increasingly apparent, even conspicu-
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ous, in the suburbs of Cape Verde’s main urban areas in the last few years (Inter-
national Fund for Agricultural Development 2006). Th ese examples of uneven 
development are reinforced by the booming tourism and real estate industries, 
which feed an economy with above-average growth rates – even at a time of 
global economic crisis – aff ording the impression that in this little nation, life is 
indeed slowly becoming easier than in many of the neighbouring countries.
Indeed, it is not simply institutional partners that are complimentary about 
the stability and unlikely success of this tiny nation. Th e narrative has also been 
fed to, or picked up and widely disseminated by, European and world media. 
Among migrant networks in West Africa, word seems to have spread that Cape 
Verde is a desirable temporary destination, or perhaps a preferable transit option 
in the long journey north, at a time when the Mediterranean border, staunchly 
patrolled by FRONTEX and other European outfi ts, is slowly closing, increas-
ingly militarized and openly hostile. Consequently, besides enduring the growing 
pains that attend any major economic restructuring, Cape Verde has had to learn 
how to cope with a fast infl ow of migrants, many of them waiting to set off  to the 
Canaries. Some have now waited so long that they might eventually be accom-
modating to a quasi-permanent state of temporary settlement.
Many Cape Verdeans see the newcomers as living off  expedientes or shady 
business, whether it is street selling (a contentious image issue in tourist-rich 
islands), sex work or worse. Th ese have become stereotypes by which African 
migrants are identifi ed, and a narrative that is often reproduced across all levels 
of society, though few Cape Verdeans encounter any migrants beyond the occa-
sional bargaining with them in the market or the street. In reality, many West Af-
rican migrants sell commodities. Others market African cultural goods to Cape 
Verdeans and tourists alike in the streets of Praia (Santiago) and Mindelo (São 
Vicente) and in the sandy hotspots of Sal and Boa Vista Islands, and many others 
work across a wide spectrum of economic activities. Despite their diff erent char-
acteristics, none of the islands has a simple path to recognition or any easy route 
towards integration.
Senegalese migrants might occupy an ever-so-slightly advantageous posi-
tion in Cape Verde. Some were or are frontrunners of the successful Senegalese 
merchant diaspora, who have become de facto cultural brokers between the two 
neighbouring countries. Still others work in menial or occasional jobs in con-
struction or cleaning, and in an array of other activities in the informal sector. 
Most of these jobs are precarious and quickly vanish in a weak economy, either 
because a large construction project is halted, or because a cleaning job previously 
held by an African woman is suddenly given to an unemployed Cape Verdean, 
upholding long-standing ties of solidarity. Covert and even overt xenophobia 
(with clear ethnic contours) aimed at mainland Africans is on the rise and is 
perhaps, as Bruce Baker posits, a notorious exception to Cape Verde’s apparent 
ethnic harmony (Baker 2006: 503–4). Interestingly, among educated or affl  uent 
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Africans with access to visible fi nancial resources, the path to acceptance as a 
‘worthy’ member of society seems to be eased. Th ese generally enter with higher 
social positions and are gradually integrated into local social networks. Th is ap-
plies to Angolans, for example, who share a common language and colonial past 
with Cape Verdeans and often arrive as skilled professionals. It does not, however, 
extend to Bissauans, whose country shares similar ethnic markers and even a 
former political union with Cape Verde. In this case, the ethno-racial indicator 
seems to play a strong role in determining the speed and level of acceptance and 
integration,5 but this role is a function of the socioeconomic indicator.
Th ere seems to be little correlation between Cape Verde’s migratory narrative 
– an ideology of migration so central to the social fabric that it has become the 
national community’s central grammar (e.g. Carling and Åkesson 2009) – and 
its receptivity and tolerance towards immigrants. Th e country’s fabled hospital-
ity towards strangers and foreigners, called morabeza, appears to be reserved for 
selected groups of people, reifying the idea that migrants’ physical appearance 
and perceived social class, entrance status and socioeconomic entry level are key 
indicators in defi ning ethnic integration, refl ecting a kind of migrant pedigree 
attributed to them and begetting diff erent degrees of receptivity.
Th is fundamental discrepancy – between an ongoing renegotiation of na-
tional and ethnic identities on the one hand and the processes of material inclu-
sion and exclusion on the other – highlights Cape Verde’s interest as a case study. 
Unlike other newcomers to the islands, Africans force the debate on identity – on 
what Cape Verde is and what it is not. Although Europeans carry the cultural load 
of a colonial past and have imported gentrifi cation and ‘space war’ issues to all 
four islands mentioned above – Santiago, São Vicente, Sal and Boa Vista –, their 
presence is equally aspirational, pushing the envelope of self-identifi cation with 
European habits and European economic success that have historically stomped 
Africanity out of the equation, at the symbolic level at least. Evidence suggests 
that, while quintessentially syncretic as a society, Cape Verdeans might tacitly 
regard their country as ‘more civilized’ than others on the mainland. Th e dimen-
sions of this understanding are political, economic and social, but undoubtedly 
carry an ethno-racial undertone as well. Th us the European component of mi-
grant stock is seen as familiar while the infl ow of African migrants is seen as alien.
Ghettos of Diff erence, Illegality and (Not Much) Understanding
Th e task of stopping undocumented immigration in Cape Verde will not be eas-
ier – or cheaper, for that matter – than it is in Europe, even when new resources 
are regularly added to the arsenal accessible to the state. It is, however, a funda-
mental predicament. At this juncture, Cape Verdean society is deeply divided 
between pan-African ideals of solidarity and somewhat understandable but un-
justifi ed apprehension.
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Although the powerful imagery of rickety boats loaded with frightened, ex-
hausted faces is as pervasive in local popular discourse as it is on international 
media, this is certainly not the only, and possibly not the most common, method 
of accessing the islands. Boats have, however, been intercepted or known to arrive 
at the islands of Sal, Boa Vista, and Maio (the three closest to the continent), 
while others are reported to have landed at São Vicente – the main transit hub 
for migrants attempting to reach the Canaries – and at the largely inaccessible 
and recessed Santo Antão.
Th e desperation and bravery of these voyages does not go unnoticed by the 
average Cape Verdean. In almost every interview conducted in the streets of Min-
delo, the country’s second largest city, Cape Verdeans of both genders, young and 
old, employed and unemployed, showed that they understood why African mi-
grants seek the islands, as epitomized in this interviewee’s empathetic statement: 
‘Th eir countries are in constant disarray, and that’s why they come to Cape Verde. 
We’re not rich, but at least life is peaceful here’. Yet because Africans follow the 
same internal migration routes that Cape Verdeans do, pressure inevitably falls on 
the same locations (see Figure 6.1).
Boa Vista is a prime example of the dire consequences of these unregulated 
fl ows and of the lack or preparation of local authorities. On this island, para-
disiacal luxury hotels and affl  uent residential developments are surrounded by 
Figure 6.1. (1) Internal migration routes and internal migration incentives; (2) irregular mi-
gration ship/zodiac routes from West Africa.
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pristine sand dunes peppered with date trees. Once paraded as the country’s 
crown jewel, Boa Vista today boasts one of the highest costs of living in the coun-
try – fuelled by its tourism industry6 – and is beginning to exhibit ‘unexpected’ 
symptoms of social confl ict. Nowhere in the archipelago is the disparity between 
rich and poor as shocking as in this large, sparsely populated island. Almost every 
African who has landed, directly or indirectly, at Boa Vista has ended up segre-
gated in the outlying shantytown of Barraca (which means ‘shanty’). Offi  cial 
estimates in 2008 put the local population at over 3,000 and growing daily, but 
the actual number was thought to be closer to 4,000–4,500, mostly African mi-
grants of undefi ned provenance and rural islanders from Santiago. In February 
2010 a study ordered by the Ministry of Housing and Territorial Planning and 
conducted by the Cape Verdean consultancy fi rm AfroSondagem and the Labo-
ratory for Civil Engineering revealed that the number of inhabitants was proba-
bly just around 2,800, dispelling fears that the migrant population was about to 
outnumber locals. Still, faced with few possibilities, the community is rife with 
unemployment, malnourishment, infectious diseases, alcoholism, drug abuse 
and drug traffi  cking, as well as petty and violent criminality. Worryingly, and 
predictably, as the economic crisis settled in, violent criminality overfl owed the 
boundaries of this isolated ghetto into the island’s main urban centre, the small 
town of Sal-Rei, ‘risking’, according to local inhabitants, ‘spoiling Boa Vista’s 
positive image and damaging its tourism potential’ (Frederico 2010). Municipal 
authorities confess to not having the capability to resolve this urban time bomb 
– a fl agship case of immigration mismanagement. Meanwhile, much of the pub-
lic discourse on Barraca to date seems to revolve around the consequences of 
negative projections to the exterior rather than focus on ongoing integration and 
exclusion processes.
All African, But Not So Fast: Contrasting Voices of Acceptance
Since accurate fi gures on legal and illegal migrants are hard to obtain, it might 
be productive to step back from these limitations and observe the phenomenon 
from a diff erent vantage point to gain a better comparative understanding of the 
social landscape. Th e probabilistic framework I am thus proposing is admittedly 
based on a combination of partial statistical information, empirical observation 
and soft data from diff erent sources and time periods. Th is data, though surely 
stronger for some issues than for others, is suffi  ciently compelling to put forward 
a tentative model. It does not constitute any type of defi nitive conclusion on the 
subject but rather serves as a preliminary graphic layout of these early fi ndings, 
intended to open up the debate on an issue that has not been adequately explored 
in this context. Th e model will require further proofi ng pending the availability 
of solid data, whether absolute numbers or feasible and methodologically sound 
statistical projections. Considering the attention both the Cape Verdean govern-
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ment and the EU are now aff ording to the issue of immigration, greater precision 
is expected and necessary from the extensive Population Census 2010, with re-
sults available later in the year.
Th e integration/exclusion model (see Figure 6.2) suggests that there is a cor-
relation between migrants’ occupation – or stereotyped (perceived) occupation – 
and nationality/ethnicity, and the level of acceptance, interaction, and tolerance 
of migrants in Cape Verdean society. Th e central part of the chart indicates the 
history of the community in Cape Verde, its main (perceived) occupation(s) and 
the relative social standing associated with it. Th e column on the right indicates 
diff erent levels of integration in the Cape Verdean social fabric. Th is is a fl uid 
continuum, variable across communities, even within each of them, and possibly 
across time periods, as there are always individuals who do not fi t a model, and 
must therefore be assumed to be exceptions that confi rm the rule.
Following this model, some patterns emerge: positive perceptions of non-
European foreigners appear to be stronger for communities that either are very 
small and thus not noticeable (e.g. Cubans) or have a long history of interaction 
and settlement in Cape Verde (e.g. Lebanese). Ethnicity does not seem to deter 
integration, although the case of continental African migrants appears to be an 
exception. Still, newcomers with a high professional status or substantial capital 
might be directly inducted into higher levels of acceptance, regardless of their 
ethnicity (e.g. Angolans). Education can, in fact, trump race, as the signifi cance 
of ‘black’ and ‘white’ in Creole as social rather than racial tropes suggests. Th ose 
coming from some Portuguese-speaking nations appear to have easier access to 
a ‘fast-track’ integration process. Hence, Angolans (despite their ethnicity) are 
fairly well integrated. Conversely, other African migrants – Bissauans perhaps ex-
cluded – generally have little personal contact with Cape Verdeans beyond simple 
interaction in a commercial setting. Th is establishes a strong nexus between their 
ethnicity and the petty occupations many take up while waiting for an opportu-
nity to move towards Europe.
Models based on interaction and occupation are not new, but they have not, 
to my knowledge, been applied to the Cape Verde case study. John W. Berry 
(2005) discusses social and psychological acculturation and the diff erent ways in 
which a group of newcomers negotiate their inclusion according to the nature of 
the migrant community’s relationship with the host community (he calls these 
‘acculturation strategies’) (see also Berry 2010). More recently, Dennis Cordell 
(2008) discussed the paradoxes of the incorporation of Nigerians in the United 
States, resorting to a list of descriptors that include status, education, income and 
employment as relevant in the process of social exclusion.
While Berry selects a vocabulary related to ‘acculturation stress’, Alejandro 
Portes (1995: 1–39) refers to categories of ‘hostile’, ‘non-hostile’ and ‘poorly in-
tegrated’ interaction. Tony Richmond (1994: 117–20) attempts a similar dia-
gram of incorporation in his book Global Apartheid, proposing an operational 
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model of migration and occupational status. Th is builds on John Porter’s (1965: 
68–91) earlier work on immigrants in post-World War II Canada, where he pro-
posed the categories of ‘behavioural assimilation’ and ‘structural assimilation’, 
speaking of a correlation between ethnicity, entrance status, occupational roles 
and segregation. Th e present model instead puts forward a tentative vocabulary 
that might be more suitable to the Cape Verdean case: acceptance/integration; 
widespread interaction; limited interaction; no interaction/ostracism.
In explaining this model, the particular case of Nigerians requires special 
mention. While most African migrants are subject to overt or covert discrimi-
nation in some fashion, public opinion on the subject appears to be dispropor-
tionally negative towards Nigerian nationals. Not only did this initial study fi nd 
an abnormal reaction to the presence of Nigerians, their perceived dishonesty 
and their insinuated lack of a moral compass (Nigerians are often referred to as 
‘traffi  ckers’, ‘smugglers’ and ‘criminals’, as happens in much of Africa), but it also 
worryingly confi rmed the fi ndings of broader studies about Nigerian immigrant 
communities in both South Africa and the United States (Cordell 2008). Public 
perception thus currently appears to place Nigerians at the bottom of the migrant 
hierarchy.
Senegal is the closest continental neighbour, and Guinea-Bissau an old polit-
ical ally in the independence struggle, so unsurprisingly Senegalese and Bissauans 
are by far the largest foreign communities currently present in the country.7 Al-
though the phrases those Senegalese and those Mandjako(s)8 are occasionally used 
pejoratively to refer to Africans in general – including Senegalese and Bissauans 
– a special acceptance seems to be reserved for these two national groups, partic-
ularly when compared to others, especially Nigerians. Th e following abundantly 
demonstrate this:
We don’t get much with Nigerians in our land. Th ey do not work and 
only bring trouble. We should defi nitely revise the [protocol for the] free 
movement of people within ECOWAS. Th e best would be to sign a pro-
tocol with Guinea Bissau and Senegal, with whom we have a common 
past, and get rid of those Nigerians.9
Fifteen out of ten Nigerians living here are traffi  ckers. We usually gen-
eralize and call the continental migrants Mandjakos, but the truth is 
that those Nigerians have nothing to do with the Bissauans or even the 
Senegalese. Th ose coming from Nigeria are here with the express intent 
of developing the powerful Nigerian mafi a.10
A woman from Mali, a man from Nigeria, others from Ghana, and else-
where in ECOWAS, are caught every day in Cape Verde and taken to 
court for criminal acts. Is it not time to opt out of that treaty and forbid 
the entrance of these Muslim, criminal strangers…?11
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If Nigerians [denounce criminal elements within their national com-
munity] they will all end up in jail. Amokaki denounces Ammuneke, 
Ammuneke denounces Yekkiki, Yekkiki denounces Amokaki and so on. 
We would need a (really) big jail for Nigerians alone.12
Interestingly, Senegalese interviewees in the streets of Praia and Mindelo cau-
tiously detached themselves from Nigerian migrants in their own statements, 
claiming that they ‘look for confusion’ and thus Senegalese must not be seen as 
socializing with them. When asked about criminality among the African com-
munity, a male Senegalese interviewee in Mindelo vehemently stated that ‘Sene-
galese are diff erent from Nigerians’, making sure this separation was clear to the 
author/interviewer.
It is diffi  cult to speculate on the reasons for these and many similar comments. 
Regional grievances, such as Nigeria’s size, affl  uence and political and economic 
dominance in Upper Guinea, as well as its proactive intervention in political af-
fairs across the region, could perhaps explain some suspiciousness towards Nige-
rian nationals, transplanted to a new geography. Yet the scope of these comments 
suggests that Senegalese either genuinely assume that Nigerians in Cape Verde 
are involved in informal and illegal activities, or simply that they understand and 
have appropriated the mistrust for Nigerians among Cape Verdeans. If the latter 
is true, then this eagerness to adapt and conform to the host society’s rules would 
appear to be happening in the interest of self-preservation. I suggest both aspects, 
and possibly more, play a role.
Assembling a collection of ideas that capture common perceptions of and 
suspicions about continental African migrants in Cape Verde becomes a reveal-
ing exercise, once underlying assumptions have been teased out. Th ree key issues 
stood out in interviews with Cape Verdeans on possible reasons for these negative 
perceptions: language barriers, extreme cultural diff erences and the vast increase 
in urban criminality (particularly in Praia and Mindelo but also, as noted be-
fore, in Boa Vista). Th ese arguments can be deconstructed fairly simply. First, al-
though language is factually a communication barrier with some Africans, many 
urban Cape Verdeans speak enough French or English to ensure that minimal ex-
changes happen. Moreover, the fact that a migrant learns the language of the host 
does not automatically open the door to integration. Second, many cultural traits 
are indeed profoundly diff erent – despite the proximity, they are mostly new to 
a majority of Cape Verdeans, which could explain a skewed perception based on 
lack of contact and knowledge. Finally, although criminality rates are certainly 
rapidly increasing, there seems to be little to no correlation between crime and 
foreign population. Still, whenever the media run a story on a drug bust involv-
ing an African, the discourse on online comment boards quickly veers towards 
the xenophobic, often ignoring the case at hand and generalizing to other cases 
and the African community at large. 
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Some Cape Verdeans, however, have started to react against this situation, 
broadening the debate on identity, pan-Africanism, immigration and criminality, 
as the following statements show:
Foreigners in Cape Verde must be counted … identifi ed [and] remain 
in Cape Verde following the approval of immigration authorities. … If 
we start marginalizing foreign residents like this, we will aggravate the 
situation.13
It’s high time Cape Verdean people stopped with these racist comments. 
Th ose of us who live abroad feel discrimination in our skin, [but] I am 
proud of my colour. Th is is what is happening to our African brothers in 
Cape Verde. … Why would a people who suff ered and suff ers so much 
discrimination discriminate against its own brothers?14
What’s this [behaviour] all about? Why assume that every Nigerian is a 
traffi  cker? We should not be closing our eyes to what is in front of us: we 
have youth delinquents that need to be punished. Let’s not pretend it’s 
not there just because the victim is Nigerian and the perpetrator Cape 
Verdean.15
Th ese statements in online comment boards were, with few exceptions, matched 
by statements heard in interviews in several cities in Cape Verde, particularly 
among younger citizens. Older Cape Verdeans seemed less inclined to support 
the presence of continental African immigrants, but this study was not broad 
enough to extrapolate to the generality of the national population. It is likely, I 
argue, that the dominant, agglutinating nature of a Creole culture that has assim-
ilated and synthesized others in the past simply met, in Upper Guinea Africans, 
an obstacle that it cannot quite cope with or process in the way it was used to 
doing. Lacking recent experience in dealing with large migrant groups from Af-
rica, it is possible that Cape Verdeans are simply at a loss. Perhaps time will settle 
the dust – or perhaps not.
Conclusions
Cape Verde’s identity and sovereignty challenges are currently introducing a 
unique precedent in its history. Social issues resulting from irregular immigration 
and the pressure of being at the forefront of the ‘new’ European border refl ect 
symptoms parallel to those in southern European countries in the context of 
similar transformations in the 1970s and 1980s. Th is chapter concludes that 
the increasingly extemporaneous nature of European external policy not only 
constitutes a reassembly and reconstruction of the whole Mediterranean region, 
technically testing the extension of its borders towards the western edge of the 
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African continent, but is also simultaneously transferring many of the political 
predicaments and social disturbances of the borderland to buff er countries such 
as Cape Verde.
In assigning the security of its own territorial waters to foreign powers, Cape 
Verde is complying with a foreign immigration policy in which it has no say. 
However, it is also, perhaps strategically, ensuring a direct line of contact with 
EU. Given that it has been involuntarily transformed into a buff er zone, one 
could also cynically suggest that local authorities might take a veiled interest in 
maintaining a semi-continuous stream of migrants, a sine qua non condition to 
guaranteeing the continuation and reinforcement of its close connection and in-
dispensability to the EU, particularly its southern states. At a time of substantial 
diffi  culties with border and visa control enforcements, it remains unknown what 
the future of Cape Verde’s engagement with ECOWAS and the EU will be, and 
how will the two interact. Geopolitically, the West African coast between Mo-
rocco and the Cape Verde islands might now be understood as en extension of 
the Mediterranean Sea directly under the EU’s sphere of infl uence. Cape Verde’s 
recently announced state-of-the-art radar system, fi nanced by Spain and geo-
graphically oriented to protect its interests, seems to suggest as much.
A crucial need, however, subsists: regularizing and integrating resident mi-
grants is an urgent matter requiring policymaking that tackles questions of in-
clusion and exclusion as well as social issues exported by Europe’s external policy 
and proxy maritime borderland in Cape Verdean waters. Internally, the problem 
lies in maintaining social peace at a time when the country has started to feel the 
pinch of fast economic development unaccompanied by a gradual shoring up of 
social democracy.
Th e ongoing ghettoization of continental African migrancy in Cape Verde, as 
exemplifi ed by the shantytown of Barraca, follows multiple processes of gentrifi -
cation, diff erentiation and exclusion that constrain individuals’ mental transition 
from self-declared ‘understanding’ to ‘tolerance’ or ‘acceptance’.16 Pinpointing 
where Cape Verdeans’ feelings about immigration truly lie is a challenge, without 
a wide-scope opinion survey. Still, the available data might permit one to conjec-
ture, after Arjun Appadurai, that the answer might lie somewhere between the 
two linked co-factors of globalization and extreme resentment of minorities. I 
argue that two fears might join this line of thought within a common nexus: the 
fear of dilution of identity, and the fear of socioeconomic subalternization and loss. 
Appadurai (2006: 83) notes that ‘majorities can always be mobilized to think 
that they are in danger of becoming minor (culturally or numerically) and to 
fear that minorities, conversely, can easily become major.’ Th e fear of dilution 
of identity illustrated by this statement is perhaps equally compounded by cur-
rent events across Europe and on Cape Verde’s own shores, where the occasional 
boatload of undocumented migrants moors, building on ideas of ‘invasion by 
boat’. At the other end of the spectrum, and consistent with Appadurai’s thought 
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that ‘globalization intensifi es the possibility of this volatile morphing’ (Appadurai 
2006: 83), the fear of socioeconomic loss is clearly intersected by multiple vari-
ables, namely the growing diffi  culty of emigrating from Cape Verde, associated 
with the global economic crisis and the general aggravation of the cost of living 
in the country. Appadurai perhaps captures it best when he implies that the root 
of the tension ‘has much to do with the strange inner reciprocity of the categories 
of “majority” and “minority” in liberal social thought, which produces what Ap-
padurai (2006: 8) calls the anxiety of incompleteness.
Perhaps there is, then, an ongoing dialogue between sociocultural and so-
cioeconomic factors, although the threat of raw xenophobia and possibly even 
discrimination based on ethno-racial identities cannot be discounted as contrib-
utors to this debate.17 Here we are reminded of how the overall fabric of a so-
ciety suff ers long-term eff ects from a type of colonialism that Ashis Nandy has 
claimed colonizes the mind (Nandy 2006: xi), as well as spatiality, discrimination 
and structures of inequality, through forms of segregation. Th e Nigerian scholar 
Claude Aké notes that ‘it is one of the problems of the state-building project in 
multinational societies of Africa that in seeking to integrate it has instead pro-
duced disintegration’ by creating a ‘multiplicity of interpretative communities 
which, despite their subordination to central power, remain sharply and con-
sciously diff erentiated by their cognitive maps, political practice and political 
morality’ (Aké 1995: 72).
In this manner, arguably, the ghettos described earlier become as normalized 
as they are feared. Th e ghetto, wrote Albert Memmi (2006: 84), ‘is both a rejec-
tion and a reaction to rejections, real or imagined, by the others. [It] supports and 
feeds the separation, but it is also its expression’. In extreme cases, fear might give 
way to the infamous suggestion that a form of segregation should be safeguarded. 
Th is is perhaps the case with the recently circulated idea that the shantytown of 
Barraca in Boa Vista ought to be fenced off  – allegedly following suggestions by 
the residents themselves (see e.g. Frederico 2008). 
Considering these acute tensions, the fast-changing ethnoscape of the coun-
try probably justifi es more aggressive measures to strengthen social justice. It 
also requires that the offi  cial approach to immigration move forward from its 
current single focus on Cape Verdeans living overseas to proactively develop a 
comprehensive and sovereign immigration policy. What the current context does 
not justify, however, are the exaggerated discourses of ‘invasion’, criminality and 
dilution of identity advanced by the media, articulated even by infl uential po-
litical and academic fi gures, and reproduced by many ordinary Cape Verdeans. 
Th is discourse currently seems to apply exclusively to African migrants (Angolans 
excepted), while Chinese, Europeans and even Brazilians are all generally seen as 
bringing technical and economic advantages to the country. Th is murky cocktail 
of ethno-racial and socioeconomic reasons suggests a hybrid type of discrimina-
tion that, being thus far unaddressed by the Cape Verdean government, is easily 
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fi nding resonance among Cape Verdean people based on the ‘fear of invasion’. 
Appadurai (2006) dubs this ‘the fear of small numbers’ – the majority’s irrational 
fear of becoming subjugated by a diminutive minority.
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Notes
 1. Th is contribution is based on a paper presented at the Upper Guinea Conference, Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, in Halle, Germany. As of 2010 the Cape 
Verdean government has – predictably – rethought the immigration, resettlement and 
free movement of people clauses in the guiding ECOWAS agreements, and eschewed 
the possibility of integrating the advance group of countries using the new ECOWAS 
biometric passports (backed by Ghana and set to gradually replace individual member 
states’ national passports). Interestingly, this policy-based distancing happened despite 
the current government’s pan-African stance and its continued involvement in regional 
politics (as epitomized by President Pedro Pires’ intervention in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis in 
late 2010).
 2. Th e subject of an idealized racial blindness in the Cape Verde islands has been explored in 
Deirdre Meintel’s (1984) work. She previously touched upon the subject in earlier works, 
including Meintel Machado (1981). 
 3. For a full set of studies on motivations for migration, refer to the joint project EUM-
AGINE: Imagining Europe from the Outside, run by the Centre of Sociological Research 
(CSR) in Ternopil, Ukraine; the Centre for Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) 
and the International Migration Institute (IMI), both in Oxford, United Kingdom; the 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in Norway; Koç University in Istanbul, Turkey; 
Université Checikh Anta Diop de Dakar (UCAD) in Senegal; Université Mohammed 
V-Agdal in Rabat, Morocco; and the Centre for Migration and Intercultural Studies (Ce-
MIS) in Antwerp, Belgium. Also see www.eumagine.org.
 4. It should be noted that Cape Verde’s immigration law was fi nally passed in 2012, as 
was a national strategy on migration. Th ese have established themselves as core docu-
ments among a portfolio that includes limited mobility treatises with both the EU and 
ECOWAS. Th e category of asylum continues to be unregulated by internal laws. No 
refugees are registered as such in offi  cial national statistics, although the country has on 
occasion agreed to receive individuals with sensitive politics (i.e. people accused of Basque 
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terrorism and former Guantanamo prisoners), in ad hoc negotiations. Temporary (or cir-
cular) migration of West Africans is theoretically possible in light of the ECOWAS agree-
ments, and business/investment travel or migration is facilitated by specifi c regulations. 
For lower-income migrants, opportunities to enter the country legally are scarce.
 5. For a complete discussion of the ethnic and racial dimensions of migration in Cape Verde, 
see especially Marcelino (2013).
 6. Th e country’s fi rst fi ve-star hotel, a 750-room mammoth, opened on the island in January 
2011.
 7. Independence leader Amílcar Cabral was a Bissau-Guinean of Cape Verdean stock.
 8. Referred to indistinctively of the specifi city of this mainland ethnic group.
 9. Reader comment (Acut) published in an online forum following the publication of an 
article about two Nigerian citizens detained in Sal Island for dealing crack (1 April 2009), 
in A Semana Online (www.asemana.publ.cv).
10. Reader comment (Mandjako Criolo), in A Semana Online, 01 April 2009.
11. Reader comment (Miss Universo), published in an online forum following the publi-
cation of an article about a Malian woman apprehended while traffi  cking cocaine (26 
February 2010), in A Semana Online.
12. Reader comment (CEDEAonde, or roughly ‘ECOwhat’), published in an online forum 
following the publication of an article on the arrest and trial in the Sal of the Nigerian 
national Onochie Francis Obaziek for drug traffi  c (10 March 2010), in A Semana Online.
13. Reader comment (Pedro António), published in an online forum, following the publica-
tion of an article about two Nigerian citizens detained in Sal Island for dealing crack (1 
April 2009). It is worth noting that all the positive comments are signed by readers iden-
tifi ed with a full name, rather than the anonymous, sheltering nickname that is generally 
the case with negative comments.
14. Reader comment (Madil), published in an online forum, following the publication of an 
article on a robbery in Sal (19 February 2010), in A Semana Online.
15. Reader comment (Aramis), in A Semana Online.
16. Th ough clearly not a feature unique to Cape Verde, this is as relevant as it is prolifi c. For 
other cases, see e.g. Min Sook Lee’s fi lm El Contrato (www.nfb.ca/fi lm/el_contrato), a 
2003 short documentary on Mexican contract workers in Canada, where southern On-
tario employers and residents employ similarly suggestive vocabulary, such as: ‘I under-
stand … but,’ or ‘I know they’re human too, and I’m not racist or anything, but…’.
17. Ultimately, such ‘colonial racism’ could be a sad remnant of Cape Verde’s past and its 
very prominent postcolonial present, as Franz Fanon (2006) implied about the typical 
post-colony, albeit in another geographical context that nonetheless shares the postcolo-
nial creolized subject with Cape Verde. On the issue of migrant ‘invasion’ or ‘fl ood’, see 
De Haas (2008).
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Chapter 7
Celebrating Asymmetries
Creole Stratifi cation and 
the Regrounding of Home in 




Se bem é doce,
Bai é maguado;
Mas, se ka bado,
Ka ta birado!
Se no morrê na despedida,
Nhor des na volta
Ta dano bida.
Time of Departure
If return is sweet
departure is bitter
but, who does not leave
cannot return 
if we die in the moment of goodbye
at the moment of our return
god will revive us.
—Eugenio Tavares1
Th is chapter deals with the ritualized event of return migration in the West Afri-
can island state of Cape Verde. Once a central node of transatlantic exchange and 
connectedness, this country has over time drifted to the margins of global inter-
est, particularly since the abolition of slavery. As in many other places that had 
been part of these transatlantic entanglements, this historical change resulted in 
the symbolic revaluation of return migration and in a fusion of mobility, identity 
and the status of a person. As is told in the Cape Verdean morna2 quoted above, 
only those who left can return and therewith become fully accepted members of 
this transnational society.
Despite the heterogeneity of the return migrants of the twenty-fi rst century, 
who return to their country of origin as tourists, successful investors, relaxed 
pensioners, disillusioned migrants or deportees, os retornados, as the returnees 
are called, by and large enjoy a good reputation. As will become clear in the fol-
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lowing, in countries considerably shaped by a transnational livelihood, diff erent 
types of diasporic return reveal various political, economic, symbolic and social 
motives. Above all, recent shifts in the global economy have caused an increase in 
return migration, and its impact has become highly visible in the countries most 
involved in international migration. Accordingly, remigration has received more 
and more scholarly attention (Duval 2004; Markowitz and Stefansson 2004; 
Conway 2005; Harper 2005; Tsuda 2009). Whereas these studies mainly deal 
with the social background and conditions of return migration, understood as 
voluntary and complete, this essay examines the ritualized event of migrant re-
turn visits and those encounters between visiting migrants and the nonmigrant 
island population.
In the following discussion I employ the concept of ‘home’ as an entry into 
the nexus between diff erent kinds of belonging, using it to frame the dynamics 
of social relations, identity and locality. I base my interpretation of return visits 
on the theoretical premise that ‘home’ is at once an idea and a social construc-
tion as well as a place. Seen this way, ‘home’ builds on experiences of social 
continuity and solidarity but also implies processes of diff erentiation, inequality 
and enforcement. In this regard I refer to the theoretical framework developed 
by Sara Ahmed and her colleagues in the introduction to their book Uprootings/
Regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration:
Uprootings and regroundings emerge from this collective work as si-
multaneously aff ective, embodied, cultural and political processes whose 
eff ects are not simply given. For example, regroundings – of identity, cul-
ture, nation, diaspora – can both resist and reproduce hegemonic forms 
of home and belonging. (Ahmed et al. 2003: 2)
I intend to show that this labour of ‘regrounding home’ is not only a dias-
poric project but also involves those who have never left Cape Verde yet nonethe-
less contribute in their own way to the meaning and reconstruction of ‘home’. I 
will examine this hypothesis by focusing on a particular kind of migrant return, 
that is, those returns prompted by patron saint festivities, which annually bring 
thousands of migrants to their country of origin. Despite the fact that this par-
ticular type of Cape Verdean return visit constitutes a crucial link within the 
transnational fi eld connecting the local peasant community to life in diff erent 
sites of the Cape Verdean diaspora, its content and meaning have not received 
suffi  cient scholarly attention.3 Here the banderona da Campanas de Baixo (here-
after banderona), a festivity carried out every year in the rural north of the Cape 
Verdean island of Fogo, will be analysed with respect to the interaction between 
groups of people who consider themselves part of the same social structure but 
live in diff erent places around the world and thus must negotiate diff erent inter-
ests, roles and positions.
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My observations are based on twelve months of anthropological fi eldwork, 
carried out between 2006 and 2008 on the islands of Fogo and Brava and in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts and in Lisbon, Portugal. Th is fi eldwork was conducted as part 
of a larger research project examining the quality of transnational family relations. 
In addition to conventional techniques of qualitative social research and network 
analysis, the integration of my own family life into the local community of Sao 
Filipe, interviews in transnational households, and visits to the other islands and 
to family members living in the diaspora were key to understanding divergent 
perspectives. To examine the social meaning of the banderona in this context, in 
2007 I participated in the course of events related to the banderona in the village 
of Campanas, which is part of the Concelo Galineiro in the north of Fogo. I further 
grounded my observations through a subsequent stay in the same village.
Mobility, Return and Social Stratifi cation in Cape Verdean History
Th e two islands of Fogo and Brava lie at the south-western tip of the Cape 
Verdean archipelago and belong to the group referred to as the Sotavento (‘under 
the wind’). With the larger neighbouring island of Santiago they are part of the 
so-called ‘plantation complex’ (Curtin 1990) that in the course of Portuguese co-
lonialism introduced a creole society on these nine formerly uninhabited islands 
(Carreira 1982). Although the arid climate precluded the establishment of an 
extensive sugar industry, Cape Verdean ethnogenesis is based on the asymmetric 
encounter and miscegenation of Portuguese traders and landowners (morgados) 
and Africans deported from the west coast of the continent. In this context Wil-
son Trajano Filho underlines the crucial signifi cance of the mobility of individual 
Cape Verdeans, who from the early phase of the archipelago’s settlement served 
to overcome challenges such as resource scarcity and political confl icts (Trajano 
Filho 2009: 524). Th ose individuals were responsible for integrating themselves 
as lançados (literally the thrown-out ones) into transatlantic trading networks and 
eventually gained economic capital, prestige and infl uence through traffi  cking in 
slaves, salt, rice, textiles and European-manufactured objects (Meintel 1984; Ro-
drigues 2003). As in other parts of the Senegambia, there gradually developed a 
creole social structure that even today is based on a discursive perception of ‘race’ 
and class as key markers of social diff erentiation.
By the end of the eighteenth century life on the islands, shaped by increasing 
overpopulation, supply crises and devastating famines, was managed by combin-
ing local subsistence farming and fi shing with strategic networking with coastal 
areas around the Atlantic Rim. More than in other areas of West Africa, national 
history in Cape Verde is shaped by collective eff orts of integration into global la-
bour market networks, much like what occurred in the islands of the Caribbean. 
In this phase migration became established as a family or household strategy to 
take advantage of the global inequality of diff erent economic systems. Men in 
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particular availed themselves of the opportunity to work in European or North 
American agriculture or industry in order to sustain the family members left be-
hind (Halter 1993; Rodrigues 2008: 354). From the beginning of the 1960s this 
option also became realistic for women, many of whom found jobs as domestic 
workers in Europe or the United States (Grassi 2007). Today, the Cape Verdean 
diaspora,4 which comprises more than fi ve hundred thousand people (Carling 
and Åkesson 2009), outnumbers the population remaining in the country of 
origin, and it seems impossible to fi nd a person in Cape Verde who does not have 
personal contacts beyond the islands.
However, a closer look at the inner consistency of this society reveals that 
it is not simply the contact itself, but the type and quality of the contact that 
factors decisively into the islanders’ livelihood. On Fogo and Brava, which due 
to their altitude receive more rain than the eastern islands and off er compara-
tively amenable conditions for farming, most households combine gardening and 
fi shing with seasonal wage labour and migrant remittances. Until the beginning 
of the twentieth century, agriculture had the greater signifi cance for local econ-
omies, and patron/client relations between local families were crucial to their 
position and economic survival. Today alliances between local households are 
still cultivated – for instance, in the form of foster relations, the daily mobility of 
children between poorer and wealthier households, or through the exchange of 
crops or prepared food. Yet it is the intensity of contacts with the diaspora that 
contributes to the local diff erentiation between a precarious and a comfortable 
way of life (Drotbohm 2009).
Although only a minority of the population receives money regularly, even 
intermittent amounts contribute to a higher quality of life, as they are used for 
irregular expenses that the poorer segments of society in particular can hardly 
aff ord otherwise (Åkesson 2009). Due to this established eff ect of the diaspora 
on local living conditions, social stratifi cation is shaped not only by the common 
patterns of creoleness but also by the dynamics and the transnationalization of 
social inequalities, which develop between those who are actively integrated into 
transnational networks and those whose connections are fragile.
As in many other regions shaped by transnational migration, return visits 
are an important means of articulating or strengthening the liveliness of social 
relations that transgress national boundaries. In addition to spiritual or religious 
rituals, life-cycle rituals such as baptism, marriage and funerals off er welcome occa-
sions to reconfi rm familial solidarity and reorder social belonging, which has been 
transformed due to great spatial and temporal distances (Fog Olwig 2002; Gard-
ner and Grillo 2002; Drotbohm 2010). Transnational studies on the meaning of 
return visits have mainly concentrated on the migrants while largely ignoring the 
interests of the communities of origin. In adopting a transnational perspective to 
understand social encounters in the context of the patron saint festivities, it seems 
appropriate to examine return visits and the joint realization of the banderona as 
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the collective endeavour to reconstruct a ‘home’. Th is endeavour may take on dif-
ferent shapes and meanings for diff erent groups of actors but nonetheless enacts 
‘the processes, modes and materialities of uprooting and regroundings’ (Ahmed 
et al. 2003: 2). Th e following sections therefore discuss temporality and processes 
within transnational social fi elds that not only recall social relations as they were 
(before departure) but revive the present (in the moment of the actual encounter) 
and try to envision a future that may still prove valuable for those involved.
Cartographies of Social and Mobile Diff erences
In this examination of patron saint festivities, the construction of two social groups 
– ‘migrants’ and ‘nonmigrant islanders’ – will be contrasted. Th is simplifying clas-
sifi cation refers to the ‘strategic essentialism’, as described by Gayatri Spivak5 for 
capturing the manoeuvring of actors who make strategic use of essentializing cat-
egories in moments of social diff erentiation. However, this does not intend to 
suggest that these categories refl ect fi xed and clear-cut social formations. Many 
individuals belonging to this transnational social fi eld would not fi t clearly into 
one of these categories: traders and businessmen, for instance, constantly travel 
but also cultivate a permanent presence on the islands. Pensioners are another 
example: because the right to re-entry is often linked to the length of stay abroad, 
some of them have lost their right to circular migration, but despite these mobility 
restrictions they still identify themselves as migrants. Th e two groups – ‘migrants’ 
and ‘nonmigrants’ – should rather be viewed as ‘social constructions and moral 
imaginations’ (Malkki 1996: 382) produced by social encounters with mobility.
In addition to this heterogeneity, migrants also belong to diff erent profes-
sional and status groups and foster diff erent kinds of attachments to their coun-
try of origin or to the diaspora. While some visitors return to the islands to 
strengthen their social bonds, update their knowledge and identify changes in the 
lives of their relatives, others see their stay on the islands as a kind of vacation, 
expressing the desire to relax at a distance from the everyday stresses of their 
diasporic existence and instead enjoy their diasporic achievements. Return visits 
also can be part of an ‘ethnic’ marriage market, inviting migrants to return and 
connect to those who intend to migrate but have not yet succeeded in doing so. 
Especially visitors who belong to the so-called second or third generation of Cape 
Verdean migrants living in the diaspora may use the occasion of a return jour-
ney to their parents’ or grandparents’ home country to acquaint or reacquaint 
themselves with it, improve their Cape Verdean creole, and simply enjoy days at 
the beach. According to Loretta Baldassar, members of the following generations 
often reorient themselves towards their migrant parents’ culture of origin in order 
to understand their own cultural and social background as territorially bounded. 
In these moments of return migration, a village can become a key place of cul-
tural identity (Baldassar 2001).
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Not all migrants return though. Some migrants have no interest in getting 
involved in their country of origin, perhaps even viewing any social ties to rel-
atives who stayed behind as burdensome. Others cannot return; they may lack 
the fi nancial wherewithal to do so, be unable to travel long distances, or have 
an undocumented residence status in the diaspora. Due to this heterogeneity, a 
return visit is always both an expression of capabilities and the result of individual 
decision making. Hence, both migrants and nonmigrants often perceive return 
visits as illuminating the intensity of migrant solidarities and the quality of their 
ties to the country of origin.
Re-membering Th ose Abroad
In current times the realization and performance of the banderona cannot be 
imagined without the involvement of the diaspora. It follows a ‘transnational 
division of ritual space’ (Salih 2002), connecting persons from both sides of the 
Atlantic who contribute to the preparation of the celebration. To understand the 
inner workings of this transnational ritual, one fi rst needs to know that being the 
festeiro, the banderona’s main sponsor, is perceived and expressed as an important 
privilege. Th ough a local festivities committee composed exclusively of nonmi-
grants chooses and announces the festeiro for the coming year at the end of the 
preceding banderona, over the last twenty years the position of festeiro has been 
delegated solely to migrants, and not, as one might expect, to wealthy locals. As 
a rule, requests from migrantes and their kin who have a legitimate interest in 
carrying out the banderona are suffi  cient. Th at said, the honour cannot be given 
to just anybody – a festeiro or his family is supposed to have descended from the 
village of Campanas and must also have the fi nancial resources to carry out the 
festivities appropriately. Disagreements usually arise during this selection, revolv-
ing around which family the next sponsor should belong to or whether the family 
relations between the candidate and the locality are considered acceptably close.
Th e festeiro of 2007 received the honour of ‘taking the fl ag’ after his name was 
submitted for the third time. He had strengthened his chances by way of friendly 
visits to Campanas, his active participation in the festivities over three consecu-
tive years and his ability to mobilize generous sums. Th e islanders are well aware 
that migrants have a strong interest in the position of the festeiro. Each year the 
local committee must assess who has a legitimate interest in the position and who 
articulates this interest the most eff ectively. As in the case of the festeiro of 2007, 
rejecting an aspirant’s request in one year does not preclude the same aspirant 
in subsequent years; rather, the rejected aspirant often intensifi es his eff orts by 
increasing his visits, collecting higher donation amounts and expanding his level 
of social networking. With regard to fi nancial expectations, the honour of festeiro 
goes hand in hand with the duty, while away from the islands, to organize several 
fundraising activities during the preparatory year, such as a tombola and several 
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sponsor dinners, with the aim of mobilizing additional sponsors and obtaining 
larger sums to send to Cape Verde.6
One may wonder at this point why migrants are willing to shoulder the costs, 
burdens and responsibilities of the banderona. Many Cape Verdean migrants, for 
diff erent reasons, value the festivities as an occasion for a return visit, yet many 
hesitate to become the festeiro due to the enormous fi nancial and organizational 
demands. However, when analysing this kind of prestige or merit festivity, one 
should not focus solely on the organizing participants. A closer look reveals that 
not only the returnees but also the island population articulate a clear interest 
and exert discernible pressure on their diasporic kin to carry out the banderona. 
Being related to a future festeiro fi rst of all alters the local position of the family 
to which the festeiro is connected, since the organization of the banderona is 
done on a family basis. In the course of the preparatory year, the festeiro remains 
in continuous contact with the committee as well as with his kin living on the 
island, who regularly are informed of the amount of money raised and are con-
sulted about the allocation of these sums. At the same time, the festeiro’s kin on 
the island are in charge of collecting money and food donations, planning and 
coordinating the preparation of the dishes, and deciding on the working groups 
(cooks, assistants, etc.) who will produce the feast.
In this preparatory phase it becomes obvious that the banderona, like similar 
celebrations in Latin American peasant communities, constitutes an important 
element in the design and confi rmation of local structures of solidarity and coop-
eration. Lynn Walter (1981), for instance, describes an equivalent procedure in 
Ecuador and illustrates the generalized reciprocity as it plays out over the course 
of the festivities, which can result in relations of cooperation but also exacerbate 
social hierarchies. Similarly, in Cape Verde the position of those households in 
close contact with the festeiro is heightened. Th eir members serve as local key per-
sons and enjoy the privilege of deciding upon and distributing diff erent functions 
and resources, which are also viewed as income-generating activities. Hence, those 
involved in the banderona’s execution foster local alliances that will be to their 
continued advantage beyond the event itself, for instance in the context of local 
politics or when hiring local labour forces. Comparable to the tabanca, a semireli-
gious network of solidarity on the neighbouring island of Santiago (Trajano Filho 
2009: 528), the banderona helps to lay the foundation for a cooperative structure 
that prescribes solidarity and support not only during labour-intensive periods 
of agriculture but also during life crises, such as diseases or funerals, as well as on 
such occasions as weddings or the construction of a house.
As the days of the banderona approach, charter fl ights and boats arrive from 
Lisbon, Porto, Paris, Rotterdam, Hamburg and Boston. In this way the festivities 
bring together Cape Verdeans from across the Cape Verdean diaspora, there-
fore constituting an occasion to meet not only relatives and friends living on 
the islands but also those living in other countries. For some migrants this is a 
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convenient alternative to making visits to several diff erent countries to meet rela-
tives living in other world areas, whereas others, due to fi nancial, political or visa 
constraints, lack access to the other countries and thus depend on such events in 
Cape Verde.
In these moments of arrival, it becomes clear that besides responding to ‘lo-
cal’ interests, as described above, the banderona also serves as an occasion for 
fostering transnational social relations. Th e island population makes eff orts to 
host as many visitors as possible, who arrive from neighbouring islands as well as 
foreign countries. Hosting guests from abroad is seen as an opportunity to foster 
or initiate social contacts, and hence becomes part of the fl ow of people, goods 
and information that connects the island with the rest of the archipelago and its 
surrounding world. Since these interests usually are communicated effi  ciently, 
visitors arriving from the diaspora are expected to bear the considerable cost of 
additional baggage in order to provide gifts such as clothes, table and bed linens, 
and whatever else is necessary to ensure their family and friends are well equipped 
during the feast days. Consequently, before and during the festivities, it is not 
only the migrants who stand out from the local island population  – the people 
related to migrants likewise set themselves apart by means of their newly received 
trendy clothes and jewellery. Th e younger generation in particular appreciates 
this practice: several times a day they return jointly to their houses, critically 
examining the new clothes, shoes and shawls before returning to the festival. 
Later, as they stroll through Campana’s small streets wearing their new attire, 
the visualization and ostentatious display of material abundance highlights the 
diff erences between those households that host friends and relatives during the 
festival days and those that lack any connection to the diaspora. Th ese diff erences 
exist throughout the year, but they become particularly obvious during the time 
of the festivities.
Negotiating Creole Asymmetries and Status Positions
In Campanas the three main days of the banderona are the festive highlight of the 
year. Just as on the other islands – where patron saint festivities are by contrast 
much more commercialized and more strongly shaped by political party affi  lia-
tion and connected to the international Cape Verdean music scene7 – a typically 
quiet village is transformed for a few days into a noisy party aff air. Th e quality 
of the party is measured by the infl ux of visitors, the head count of slaughtered 
animals, the number of pots fi lled with traditional Cape Verdean food, the quan-
tities of donated alcohol, and the size and beauty of São João Baptista’s altar.
Th e ritual chronology8 of the banderona is already centuries old. It begins 
with a Catholic mass for the feast’s patron saint on Friday evening. While the 
women pound corn for traditional corn meals such as xerem, catxupa and jagacida 
in huge mortars (pilões), the coladeiras9 (singers), accompanied by drummers 
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and young men on wooden hobbyhorses, move processionally back and forth 
through the village streets, which are lined by hundreds of spectators and connect 
the upper and lower parts of the village. Th eir return signals the start of one of 
the festival high points – the ritual slaughter of several bullocks, goats, pigs and 
poultry amid the shouts of spectators and the songs of the coladeiras. Another key 
event of the day is the appearance of masked thieves who show up, snatch a huge 
portion of meat and disappear before being caught by the youth and carried back 
to the village. At the end of the feast the bandeira, the feast’s fl ag, is blessed by the 
local priest and run up the feast’s pole (Figure 7.1). Together the kordidjeru (head 
of the deciding committee) and the juiz (a performer playing the fi gure of the 
judge) make the fi nal decision on who will be allowed to take the fl ag and hence 
receive the honour of sponsoring the following year’s banderona. As onlookers 
applaud, the next festeiro grabs the fl ag and runs jubilantly through the village. 
Later the fl ag will be placed on the altar of São João Baptista, where requests by 
those in need will be made.
An examination of the banderona’s historical background reveals continuities 
as well as transformations in the inherent creole social structure. Félix Monteiro, 
who studied the banderona of the island of Fogo during the 1940s, in his article 
‘Bandeiras da Ilha do Fogo’, subtitled ‘o senhor e o escravo divertem-se’ (‘the 
master and the slave entertain themselves’), describes the origins of the ritual as 
Figure 7.1. A bandeira, the feast’s fl ag, is run up the feast’s pole. (Photo by Heike Drotbohm, 
2007)
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an encounter between the white aristocratic upper class and African slaves. After 
slavery had ended in colonial Cape Verde, the festeiro, as the master or sponsor 
of the feast, likewise fulfi lled his obligation to celebrate his wealth, generously 
distributing it by hosting a costly, lavish festival. As is common in patron/client 
relationships, the demonstration of wealth and power simultaneously served to 
reaffi  rm the loyalty of his subordinates (Monteiro 1958: 10).
Returning migrants, even during the early stages of Cape Verdean colonial 
history, integrated themselves and their interests into this ritual festivity. In her 
ethnography on the early, nineteenth-century phase of Cape Verdean transatlan-
tic relations as they extended from the archipelago to North America, Marilyn 
Halter describes how Cape Verdean men worked in New England’s cranberry 
bogs and returned annually during the break in the growing season. Th roughout 
the weeks of their stay, their homecoming was celebrated in a prodigal manner. 
Baptisms and marriages were arranged, and the local patron saint was ritually 
thanked for their safe journeys (Halter 1993).
Th ese historical shifts reveal that over time, diff erent actors have used the 
banderona to revive the foundation of a (post)colonial nation. As the result of 
a historical dynamic between mobility and sedentariness, the festivities are oc-
casions for contemporary islanders and migrants to remind each other of their 
social positions, rights and duties. Certain roles are still celebrated in the festive 
moments in order to play out the historically grounded creole stratifi cation on 
stage: positions such as master, judge, horseman, singer and thief are revived in 
a performative manner. Th us the participants demonstrate that belonging to a 
certain social class, imagined in relation to variants of mobility, is the key marker 
of social diff erence. Th is needs to be seen as opposed to the mixing of cultures 
of origin, that is, a creole mode of imagining cultural encounters, or the ethnic 
identity that is the main marker in many other West African societies.
Th is class-related aspect is celebrated vividly during the ritual peak of the 
festivity, when the local saint, São João Baptista, is worshipped. Many migrants 
from the island of Fogo retain an intense connection to São João Baptista, who is 
believed to spread health, strength and success among his adherents. In this mo-
ment of worship the festeiro and certain others hold small-denomination Ameri-
can currency (one-, fi ve- and ten-dollar bills) high in the air and then, to the cheers 
of the crowd, deposit them bill by bill on the saint’s image (Figure 7.2). Th e sum 
collected in this manner is afterwards handed over to the local feast committee.
Th e spiritual motivations that are apparent at this juncture of the festivities 
also must be addressed. Far more than the islanders, the migrants use the occa-
sion of the banderona to address their personal saint. Many migrants, while in 
diaspora and particularly in times of crisis or disease, express a promesa (a solemn 
promise) to return to their home country and give thanks to their patron saint 
in the village of Campanas. Th ey understand tomar a bandeira (to take the fl ag) 
to be an act of faith and a public affi  rmation of their affi  liation to their ‘spiritual 
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home’. In this context Zlatko Skrbiš asserts that home visits usually interweave 
secular and spiritual aspects, and that these visits’ emotional density makes them 
comparable to pilgrimages. Drawing from his observations of the Croatian di-
aspora, he illustrates how the interplay of national and ethnic-diasporic identi-
ties creates a feeling of nostalgia directly connected to a certain sacralized place 
(Skrbiš 2007).
Spiritual and social motives are inextricably connected in this key moment 
of the ritual worship of São João Baptista. Th e migrants’ placing of dollar bills 
on the patron saint becomes a signifi cant manifestation of a symbolic exchange 
whereby money made by those migrants is rechanneled to the locality of origin. 
Hence, in this ritual the migrants enact their promise to the patron saint as well 
as their continued commitment to the local community. Additionally, this os-
tentatious display of the migrants’ powerful position serves to demonstrate and 
affi  rm the status shift that they achieved in the course of their migration and now 
uphold through sustained affi  liation to their former home country. In particular 
the sponsors of the banderona, who distinguish themselves from the other cele-
brants by wearing more formal attire, often a suit and tie, are those who provide 
the larger sums. Often they understand their migration-related successes in the 
context of a collective life-making and therefore feel a strong obligation to thank, 
recompense and symbolically redirect their revenues to their localities of origin. 
Figure 7.2. Coladreiras, drummers and the festeiro, donating small-denomination U.S. bills. 
(Photo by Heike Drotbohm, 2007)
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Hence, migrants fulfi lling their promesa to the patron saint express spiritual and 
social loyalty with their monetary contribution. One migrant interviewee, a 
woman in her sixties who returns to Fogo annually, expressed it this way:
For some it’s mainly practical things, they want to thank those who 
helped to organize the journey, who off ered information or things, or 
housing maybe. For others it’s the mental support, not to travel on your 
own, leaving, but also arriving within a network of people who accom-
pany you in their minds. When we refer to San Jon, this is what we are 
thankful for.
Several migrants directly attributed their social upward mobility and success-
ful integration into more than one society to the assistance they received from 
those kin who stayed behind. While some emphasized practical aspects of support 
in the organization of the journey or the arrival phase, others highlighted the 
moral backing they experienced at the moment of departure from the islands, 
which they valued as crucial to their success in the diaspora. Th erefore, celebrating 
with foreign currency (for instance, the U.S. dollars mentioned above) is a way 
to underscore the relation between the project of migration and their individual 
gains as well as the formation of new social asymmetries. In these moments, mi-
grants perform as the providers and those living on the islands as the receivers.
Beyond this, the charity expressed in this kind of donation can also be seen in 
relation to the status claims often articulated by return migrants. Luin Goldring 
has described the typical need of migrants to display their upward mobility at the 
moment of return by exhibiting consumer goods. Many migrants eagerly antici-
pate occasions during which they can transform the investments they have made 
over the course of migration into social recognition and prestige.
Th e community is not only a source, but a key context in which social 
and money capital can be deployed as status claims, and translated into 
status through appropriate valorization by a community who speaks the 
same language of stratifi cation. (Goldring 1997: 184).
Th is can refer to diff erent types of migrants – not only the successful returnee 
who wishes to celebrate his gains, but also those who have experienced a loss 
of social and economic status. Especially in the case of visitors who have not 
achieved a fi nancially comfortable position in the diaspora but instead must work 
several jobs to fulfi l their duties in both the country of settlement and the coun-
try of origin, the ritual moment can be an opportunity for regaining recognition, 
an example of the ‘status paradox of migration’ (Nieswand 2011). Th ese return-
ees, many of whom cannot aff ord to return to Cape Verde annually, appreciate 
their participation at the banderona as a moment of compensation.
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Taking into account the diverse motives and modes of return, it is important 
to discuss social asymmetries as they are enacted during the days of the ban-
derona, since these reveal an important ambivalence in these ludic encounters. 
Th e festeiro and other main sponsors accept their positions as patrons and are 
able to celebrate their duties, but not all visitors returning from the diaspora have 
the means to comfortably contribute so liberally. During their home visits, many 
migrants are confronted with the obligation to be generous and cover all even-
tual costs, even beyond the main days of the celebration. Th e idea that migrants 
are expected to demonstrate or confi rm their status position can result in direct 
requests by nonmigrants – be they family members, friends or others – who 
openly ask for or lay claim to gifts in the form of money, clothes or other kinds 
of support as if it were an assumed and expected exchange.
Especially during the three main days of the banderona, migrants can hardly 
distance themselves from these requests, since the islanders use the festivities as 
an occasion to remind the migrants of their (actually or allegedly) privileged po-
sition. Although most migrants are aware of their particular position and duties 
and, hence, accept that they are expected to demonstrate generosity, many com-
plain about the blatant manner in which their donor position is assigned. During 
the few weeks of their home visits, many of them go through their entire savings 
and leave the islands with empty suitcases, or as one person said, ‘half naked’. 
Otherwise, they have to endure being referred to as ‘cheap’ (the English term has 
been absorbed by Cape Verdean creole) or ingrót (unworthy).
Th e above-discussed historical background is relevant to understanding these 
tensions and their social constellation because it has created a particular moral 
economy in which relations of dependency between local families and the sup-
port of poorer by wealthier ones are common. However, only in certain very poor 
local households does the material aspect of the festivities and support strategies 
predominate. In such cases the feast above all serves to tackle these asymmetries, 
test loyalties and claim solidarities. Th e moral evaluation of material diff erences, 
as it surfaces during the banderona, reminds returnees that the success of their mi-
gration is based in part on the functioning of their transnational social networks 
and on the support by those left behind. Th erefore many are confronted with 
obligations of generalized reciprocity, comparable with those linked to the ‘moral 
economies’ of peasant societies (Th ompson 1963), which they must fulfi l during 
their home visits yet remain unable to dissolve in any fi nal way.
Home as a Contested Resource
Th e question of why Cape Verdeans living in the diaspora accept the above-as-
cribed roles has still not been answered completely. Are migrants for the most 
part satisfi ed that it has become expected of them to adequately support the kin 
they have left behind in the islands? Should moments of recognition and the 
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social compensation of their eff orts be considered one of the main motives for 
a return visit? In addition to the reasons and interests already illuminated, I in-
terpret the acceptance and the endurance of status ascriptions also as articulated 
claims for social integration and legitimized membership in these transnational 
social fi elds under circumstances of rapid economic transformation.
One the one hand, return visits are only temporary stopovers and therefore 
also only temporary negotiations over the integration and participation of some 
in the lives of others. On the other hand, however, short visits can also be related 
to the idea of an eventual fi nal return, which many migrants take into consider-
ation. For instance, a female migrant around sixty years old told me in a sponta-
neous conversation:
See, some years ago, we came here for visiting family, for enjoying some 
nice days, celebrating a big party and our patron, San Jon. Today all this 
is diff erent. Since our situation in the US became unclear, I try to come 
more often. Maybe I will live in Fogo, sooner or later, who knows how 
things will turn out over there [in the US].
I often heard similar comments connecting return visits with the idea of an even-
tual permanent return. Some migrants who spent their younger years in Cape 
Verde and left the islands as adults have enjoyed numerous achievements that 
stabilized and enriched their lives in the diaspora. But many migrants, partic-
ularly those who have not obtained U.S. citizenship, still consider conditions 
abroad to be uncertain and keep open the question of where they will spend their 
remaining years.
Financial and real estate crises, along with the resultant soaring liabilities, 
have troubled migrant populations in particular. Pension adjustments also have 
dampened the outlook on living out one’s ‘sunset years’ in Boston, New York or 
Lisbon. In some cases, the time limits on green cards and other temporary resi-
dence permits make a fi nal return after retirement probable. In addition, undoc-
umented migrants are threatened by the ever present possibility of deportation 
(Drotbohm 2011). All of these motivations combine to fuel ideas of an eventual 
permanent return. For these reasons many migrants may feel obliged to keep in 
touch with and maintain their social presence in their community of origin.
In this light, it becomes obvious that the social act of constituting or reviving 
‘home’ is profoundly shaped by life conditions in other places and is particularly 
meaningful to those persons and groups who are in a vulnerable position. In a 
comparable context, Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser state:
Despite the unsettling of previously rooted and fi xed notions of home, 
people engaged in transnational practices might express an uneasiness, a 
sense of fragmentation, tension and even pain. Everyday contestations of 
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negotiating the gravity of one’s home is particularly distressing for those 
who are vulnerable, for example the poor, women, illegal immigrants 
and refugees. (Al-Ali and Koser 2002: 7)
Th erefore, many visitors seize the occasion of their visits and their particular 
position during the banderona not just to demonstrate their fi nancial and social 
superiority, but also to confi rm their solidarity and willingness to support the 
islanders. In this way they control their local visibility, marking their position 
within these village communities and articulating their claims of social belonging. 
Simultaneously they examine the conditions for an eventual permanent return.
Th e island population also surveys these global transformations critically. 
Against this background they use the banderona to display their own particular 
power by highlighting the conditions of social integration and therefore also those 
of return. ‘Home’ in this context appears to be an increasingly contested resource 
that commemorates the contingencies of a successful life, which refers to more 
than one place of living but whose achievements remain ephemeral. Both the 
visitors who envision returning to stay and those who have remained behind and 
become receivers of transnational support make use of this resource: ‘home’. Th e 
latter demonstrate that communities of origin set up their own rules of social in-
tegration, which go along with high expectations and articulated conditionalities.
Conclusion
Whether viewed as a privilege, emotional need or obligation, return visits consti-
tute an important element in the confi guration and design of transatlantic Cape 
Verdean livelihoods. Especially the contingencies resulting from the most recent 
phase of globalization, as well as new inequalities that have evolved during this 
phase, have contributed to the social landscapes and national images in the coun-
tries of origin. As the above account illustrates, islanders and migrants alike use 
the banderona to foster their border-crossing networks and raise issues of trans-
national social asymmetries – not for the purpose of questioning such networks 
and asymmetries but rather to affi  rm and conserve them. In this particular case, 
the historical overview that has been presented contextualizes the origins of the 
banderona in a postslavery and postcolonial society. Accordingly, the contempo-
rary ritual reveals a historically grounded social stratifi cation that is both enacted 
and celebrated during the festivities.
Notwithstanding the historical particularities of Cape Verde, similar shifts 
can be observed in other world regions: the former ethos of return, which many 
migrants cultivate in a nostalgic romanticization of their country of origin, has in 
recent times yielded to real and sometimes enforced ideas of an eventual perma-
nent return. Against this background the festivities can be understood as a con-
tinuing desire to hold on to a ‘home’ and the regrounding as a particular kind of 
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cohesion at this particular place. Th is desire and cohesion inform Cape Verdeans’ 
attempts to adapt to the changing social conditions that arise from the physical, 
social and at times emotional distance caused by emigration.
Both the social constellations and the tensions that surface in the course 
of the banderona throw light on the challenges of the migrant/nonmigrant dy-
namic, which may increase in the future. In many countries shaped by a transna-
tional livelihood, the most recent diversifi cation of return migration needs to be 
considered, as the social diff erentiation among the actors coexists alongside new 
hierarchies and dependencies. If the trend of increasingly strict border regimes 
and rising deportation rates continues even as migrants’ exclusion from citizen-
ship rights becomes more common, the so-called ‘countries of origin’ will soon 
face new challenges.
Future transnational studies therefore need to answer several questions re-
sulting from these changes. What happens to families that have spread their 
livelihood and the allocation of tasks and duties across diff erent places and econ-
omies, and now, due to such changes, are obliged not only to rejoin their eco-
nomic forces, but also to do so in the face of a diff erentiated fabric of values and 
societal roles? What macroeconomic consequences can be detected in the case of 
societies that obtain large portions of their GNP via their diasporic affi  liations? 
In cases of the return of poor or forgotten migrants, how will their reintegration 
take place in societies that in fact rely on the fi nancial support of migrants? Lastly, 
what consequences do these kinds of conditionalities and transformations have 
for those in the diaspora who would like to return but cannot, due to their altered 
circumstances, comply with the expectations of their kin?
Considering these changes it becomes apparent that a return ‘home’, once 
valued and praised in many places along the Atlantic Rim, may soon be judged 
in a more critical manner. In a dramatic change from previous decades, it is no 
longer predictable whether societies of origin will consider returnees a benefi t or 
an economic burden. Th erefore, the question of whether a migrant’s return can 
continue to be regarded as the kind of rebirthing proclaimed in the morna that 
opened this chapter, and furthermore whether such a return will be able to main-
tain its validity, desirability and congenial acceptance by those who have never 
left the islands, remains open for future consideration.
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Notes
 1.  http://www1.umassd.edu/specialprograms/caboverde/etavares.html
 2.  Th e morna is a Cape Verdean song genre based on melancholic melodies and texts, draw-
ing from the Portuguese fado and Brazilian modinha. In Cape Verde, the elder generation 
especially enjoys these laments, which always contain an element of sodadi (longing) and 
sakrifi s (sacrifi ce, suff ering), and have been taken up by younger generations in the form 
of more recent music genres. Eugenio Tavares (1867–1930), originally from the island of 
Brava, is considered the most important composer of the Cape Verdean morna (Lobban 
and Lopes 1995: 55).
 3.  Félix Monteiro (1958), who published an early article on these festivities on the island of 
Fogo, did not mention external actors having a particular position within the feast’s social 
structure. In the context of the tabanca, semireligious solidarity networks on the Cape 
Verdean island of Santiago, comparable patron saint festivities are important because they 
include the possibility of uniting persons involved in the network once a year (Semedo 
and Turano n.d.; Trajano Filho 2009: 528).
 4.  Each of the nine inhabited Cape Verdean islands has a tendency towards specifi c migra-
tion destinations that is the result of historical migration patterns. For instance, the two 
eastern islands of Sal and Boa Vista have huge diaspora populations in Italy, while Sao 
Vicente, one of the northern islands, has a sizable migrant population in England and the 
Netherlands (Carling 2001: 7). In the United States, larger Cape Verdean migrant com-
munities can be found in the areas of Boston, Brockton and Long Island (Meintel 1984; 
Halter 1993).
 5.  For a summary of ‘strategic essentialism’ see Morton (2007: 126).
 6.  During such dinners, sympathizers and sponsors are invited to contribute to the project 
by means of either fi xed or voluntary amounts (usually USD 40–100). According to the 
main sponsor of the banderona in 2007, each of the sponsoring events raised a sum of 
approximately USD 2,000–3,000.
 7.  For the festa do primeiro de Maio in the town of Sao Filipe, or for the Cola San Jon on 
the neighbour island of Brava in mid June, thousands of migrants return each year via 
chartered fl ights and boats from diff erent places of the Cape Verdean diaspora. Unlike 
the banderona de Campanas de Baixo, these festivals charge visitors an entry fee and host 
beauty competitions, cockfi ghts, horse races and soccer matches.
 8.  Th e three main days of the banderona take place on the last weekend before Carnival.
 9.  Like the morna, the coladeira is a music or song genre associated with a certain rhythm 
and dancing style.
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Analysis of Semantic Fluctuations 
in the Atlantic World
Wilson Trajano Filho
In this chapter I examine how systematic intersocietal encounters set cultural 
elements in motion across time and space, generating semantic instabilities that 
aff ect the meanings of things and ideas in a nonrandom way. My attention will 
be directed to the connections (and the turbulences they bring about) between 
the ecumenes that arose from processes of cultural creolization along the Upper 
Guinea Coast before the arrival of Europeans in the fi fteenth century; the Luso-
African ecumene that developed in this portion of the African coast and the 
adjacent islands of Cape Verde; and the Caribbean ecumene, also the product of 
a long process of creolization involving Europeans of diff erent nationalities and 
Africans of various cultural and social provenance. I take each of these ecumenes 
as a vast fi eld of communication that provides actors with means to develop a 
sense of diff erence as well as a loosely disseminated feeling of sharing symbolic 
forms and social institutions.
Th e word tabanka1 is used today by speakers of fi ve diff erent languages. It 
has been widely used in the varieties of Portuguese spoken in Cape Verde and 
Guinea-Bissau, in the Portuguese-based Creoles spoken in these countries, in 
some Caribbean variations of English (Allsopp 2003) and in Trinidad’s English 
Creole (Winer 2009). One word, fi ve languages and at least three diff erent sur-
face meanings form a synchronic picture that I want to scrutinize in its most 
simple form. Th e complete picture is far more complicated, involving other 
cognate words belonging to several languages spoken along the Upper Guinea 
Coast and diachronic processes of semantic fl uctuation triggered by a long his-
tory of intersocietal encounters. As the term is largely unknown to most Brazil-
ian Portuguese speakers, I begin with our two major dictionaries. Th e word is 
absent in the Aurélio dictionary, but in Houaiss’s we fi nd the following glosses: 
(1) African village or locality, usually fortifi ed; (2) (Cape Verde) a kind of tra-
ditional fanfare on the Isle of Santiago (Houaiss 2001). Th e author adds that 
158  Wilson Trajano Filho
the fi rst entry in the Portuguese dictionaries appears in the 1881 Caldas Aulete 
dictionary.
In what follows, I will analyse the semantic fl uctuations of the word tabanka 
over its fi ve-century journey of thousands of kilometres from the west coast of 
Africa to Trinidad, with a strategic stop at the Cape Verde Islands. Etymological 
inquiry is traditionally a linguistics issue, somewhat distant from the usual con-
cerns of today’s anthropologists. Were we living at the time of the diff usionist 
debates in anthropology, with their main focus on the origins and dispersal of 
cultural artefacts, the present topic would hardly seem anachronistic and sense-
less. It is just as well that the diff usionist fad has to my relief been revisited of late 
under the guise of fl ows and counterfl ows of the globalized world system. Th is 
chapter presents my thus disguised ideas about the turbulences that have pro-
voked semantic shifts in the word tabanka during its journey across the Atlantic 
Ocean.
Th e challenge I face in this essay is to show how words have travelled in 
time and space from one society to another, and how their meanings have been 
changed during this journey to adjust to new conditions of use. Th is issue is 
to some extent similar to the one in Merry’s (2006) analysis of ideas of human 
rights: how they are appropriated by the vernaculars of various communities 
around the globe, have their core meanings changed and, thus transformed, are 
used to criticize everyday practices of violence. However, in comparison to the 
travelling terms treated by Merry, the appropriations and remakings I want to 
focus on diff er radically from those of the journey of human rights ideas in the 
contemporary world in terms of their temporal depth. Unlike the spread of hu-
man rights ideas, the semantic shifts I deal with do not emanate from a single 
hegemonic source but rather from myriad fl ows that can hardly be accurately 
retraced. Th ey are semantic changes that have been going on for centuries. Th us 
they bear a closer resemblance to certain changes in the moral ideas of the Sem-
ites as treated by Mauss (1985: 170). In his classic study on the gift, Mauss argues 
that the original meaning of the Arabic and Hebraic terms sadaka and zedaqa 
was related to the idea of justice. However, through centuries, the meanings of 
these words were gradually changed, eventually consolidating around the ideas of 
charity and alms. Th is chapter will examine something similar.
Like any etymological research, mine is riddled with guesses that can be very 
creative are but hardly ever open to the falsifi cation test. Th e path the term ta-
banka took in both time and in space cannot be fully retraced with the data 
now available. All I can do is revisit short stretches of its route and reach some 
conclusions as to the landscape it has covered, namely, the creolized social system 
that comprised the Atlantic World from the onset of European expansion in the 
mid-fi fteenth century, which I will depict as the intersection of several cultural 
ecumenes.
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Journey Inland: From Protection Against Violence 
to the Comforts of Home
In this section I focus on the semantic changes of terms that originate from the 
supposedly West Atlantic root *abank(?). Th ese terms originally conveyed the 
meaning of fortifi cation, which provided protection against violence brought about 
by confl icts between social groupings. For 300 years they went through semantic 
shifts, taking on new meanings referring to the inhabited space of the house, the 
kin group and the village.
Although tracing the routes of this word’s diff usion through these fi ve lan-
guages is not my main focus, the fi rst question to be asked concerns its origins. 
Of uncertain etymology, it seems to have sprung from the dozens of languages 
of the so-called West Atlantic family that are spoken on the African coast from 
Senegal to Sierra Leone – including Wolof, Fula/Peul, Diola, Balanta, Banyun, 
Pepel, Manjaco, Mancanha, Baga and Temne – and have great syntactic and mor-
phological similarities. In many of them, we fi nd a supposed root, *abank(?), that 
encompasses the semantic fi eld around ideas of locality, dwelling, protection, 
safety, defence, and (territorial) membership unit.
Among the contemporary Baga-Sitem of the Republic of Guinea, the word 
abanka (pl. cibanka) refers to a village section or common yard of a residence clus-
ter of three or four exogamous groups patrilineally descended (kor, ‘belly’) from a 
founding ancestor who came from elsewhere (a stranger). Th e Baga abanka refers 
to a corporate group and underlines a social identity that is often more impor-
tant than kor or kinship. Each abanka has a protector spirit (amanko) that brings 
prosperity, protection and well-being to its members (Sarró 2009: 35–38).2 It 
seems, however, that the word abanka exists only in the Baga-Sitem language. 
Other Baga groups have other words to express other territorial logic. Ramon 
Sarró informed me (personal communication) that in the Bulongic language the 
term ebene covers more or less the same meaning as abanka, but they do not seem 
to stem from the same root.
According to Walter Hawthorne (2003: 12), the Balanta people of Guin-
ea-Bissau call the compact village they live in tabanka. It is the most important 
unit of Balanta social organization. People living in the same village share com-
mon interests, and the most important rituals and collective work associated with 
agricultural activities are performed and organized at this local level. Key insti-
tutions of Balanta social organization, such as age grades, the council of elders, 
and marriages, function at the tabanka level, working to strengthen community 
bonds. However, the Balanta recognize that tabanka means more than a unit of 
cohesive nature. It is also the unit within which the major cleavages of society 
take place, along lines of kin, generation, and gender (2003: 120). As a mem-
bership unit, the Balanta tabanka is the stage where processes of integration and 
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confl ict occur − a stage that has a complex history. Hawthorne (2003: 121–23) 
explains that in precolonial times the Balanta lived in dispersed settlements in 
Guinea’s hinterland. Political upheaval caused by the Mande expansion since the 
thirteenth century and then by European expansion that intensifi ed the slave 
trade pushed them off  to the mangrove seeking refuge. In this new environment 
they learned how to grow wet rice and founded compact villages, the tabankas, 
better suited for protection from slave traders.3
I have consulted other specialists in Balanta culture and society, and they all 
agreed that the word tabanka is strange to Balanta language. Although they con-
cur with Hawthorne’s interpretation, they point out that his Balanta informants 
were using a Creole word to talk about some aspects of the group social organiza-
tion. In other words, they mean that if the term tabanka has been used by Balanta 
speakers, it is a recent borrowing from the Creole language of Guinea-Bissau.
Th e contemporary Mancanha in Guinea-Bissau use the same term to mean 
village, but it seems to be a loan word from the Creole language that emerged on 
Luso-African settlements, or from neighbouring peoples. According to linguist 
Jean-Louis Rougé (2004: 352; see also Buis 1990: 258), among the Manjaco 
the term N-tab (also untab) designates village. Th e resemblance to the Creole 
tabanka is crystalline, but it may be misleading to take them as cognate words. 
Th ey are more aptly a case of linguistic convergence (see below). In any case, one 
of the greatest ethnographers of this group informed me that the Manjaco word 
for village is ‘utchak; bolai is the term for hut, and kato is the word for house or 
dwelling (Eric Gable, personal communication).
Further north of the Manjaco territory, the Diola of Guinea-Bissau and Casa-
mance seem also to have words that stem from the root *abank(?). Th e southern 
Diola (Diola-Kassa) use the term hankahu to designate a lineage-based living area 
that comprises several houses. It is not a family house, which would be ellupai, 
but rather a lineage-based compound. Among the northern Diola (Diola-Fogny) 
the word would be funk, with the same meaning.4 Th e similarity of these Diola 
words indicates that both are derived from the West Atlantic root *abank(?). 
Moving north to Senegalese territory, we will fi nd that the Wolof tabakh now 
means ‘construction’, ‘wall’ or ‘building’ (usually with hard, durable materials 
like cement and bricks, as opposed to sampe, which is building with soft materials 
like wood or mud).
I now move from the contemporary crystallizations around the root *abank(?) 
in the West Atlantic language stock to examine how it was described by the fi rst 
Portuguese and Luso-African travellers to the Guinea coast. Th e fi rst written ref-
erence is by André Álvares de Almada (1964: 367), a Cape Verdean trader who, 
in describing the African coast in 1594, used the verbal form atabancar to re-
fer to Sierra Leonean Manes warriors’ custom of building fortifi cations within 
which they felt protected. He also used the noun form atabanca to designate 
the trenches the Manes dug (ibid.: 372). As a verb, the term seems to have been 
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incorporated into the Portuguese variant then spoken in Cape Verde and on 
the Guinea coast, and likely into the budding Portuguese-based Creole in the 
region. Th irty years later another Cape Verdean, André Donelha (1977 [1625]: 
102), used the term tabanka to refer to the fences and walls with very high 
watchtowers that surrounded the villages of Sierra Leonean coastal peoples.5 
Another Cape Verdean trader, Francisco de Lemos Coelho, refers to the word 
tabanca in his seventeenth-century description of Cacheu, a Luso-African village 
in Guinea-Bissau. According to him, Cacheu was ‘surrounded by a stockade 
formed of pointed stakes with sharp tips, fastened together with crossbars, and 
it has two gates which are closed at night. Th e fence is called the tabanca of 
Casa Forte’ (Coelho 1990 [1684]: 149; see also Coelho 1990 [1669]: 34; 1990 
[1684]: 151).
In his comment on Donelha’s account, historian Paul Hair (1977: 250) re-
ports that in the archaic forms of the Temne language, also in Sierra Leone, 
ka-baŋca meant fortifi cation or palisaded villages (see also Hair 1967: 46, 56). 
Coelho’s account of the use of the term tabanka in Cacheu leaves no doubt that 
this word entered the Creole language then spoken by the Luso-Africans as a 
loanword from Temne and other Mel languages spoken in Sierra Leone. Th e 
term was probably carried by coastal Sapi speakers (Temne, Bullom) who sought 
refuge and protection at Cacheu after the Mani invaded their territories in the 
mid-sixteenth century.6
Early evidence of a slight fl uctuation aff ecting the meaning of tabanka (or 
one of its West African cognates) came from a Scottish missionary named Henry 
Brunton in 1802. After a sojourn in the area that is presently Sierra Leone and 
Guinea, he published in Edinburgh a book containing a grammar and a vocabu-
lary of Susu language. His vocabulary list there contains the word bankhi, which 
he glossed as dwelling house (1802: 63) without any allusion to fortifi cation 
or palisade. Th is evidence presents a problem for the case I am trying to make. 
Susu is a Mande language, so it belongs to a language family of the Niger Congo 
stock, quite diff erent from the West Atlantic languages supposed to be the origin 
of the root *abank(?) (see note 5). How to explain this? Bruce Mouser (personal 
communication) allows that bankhi is truly a Susu word, although he asserts 
that Brunton collected it in Baga territory. Th us it might be a case of borrow-
ing from Baga language. According to Ramon Sarró (personal communication), 
words typically end with /i/ in Susu, especially when they are borrowings from 
other languages.
Irrespective of its origin, my point in this connection is that the Susu bankhi 
represents a fi rst step towards a semantic shift from protection against violence 
and warlike activities (clearly associated with the slave trade) to the feeling of 
warmth characteristic of the domestic domain, and the practice of sociability 
associated with activities taking place in family and neighbourhood circles. Th e 
paucity of available data impedes a fully satisfactory explanation of why this se-
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mantic shift occurred, somehow unexpectedly, among the Susu living in Baga 
territory at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a period of visceral vio-
lence linked to the slave trade and the growing instabilities and rearrangements 
of political boundaries in the area. Although left largely unexplained, the fact is 
that some decades later, this semantic fl uctuation came to full completion along 
the same lines I have just examined in the Creole Luso-African settlements of 
Guinea-Bissau.
Written sources suggest that in the Luso-African Creole spoken on the 
Guinea praças, up until the late nineteenth century, the term tabanka was used 
to mean a fortifi ed locality.7 A close look at the glossary (Portuguese-Creole) 
published by Barros (1902) suggests that the term tabanka was still undergoing 
a semantic shift at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Creole society 
of Guinea-Bissau. He translated Portuguese paliçada (palisade) as tabanca (1902: 
188); Portuguese aldeia (village) was aldya (ibid.: 85); and Portuguese murado 
(to be walled) was glossed as q’o ten tabanca (ibid.: 186) Th ese examples suggest 
that the meaning of tabanka in the Creole language was in conformity with the 
old usage. However, Barros also translated Portuguese povoação (settlement) as 
tabanca (ibid.: 270), a gloss that suggests the semantic fi eld of the Creole word 
was undergoing a process of lexical expansion similar to that of the word bankhi 
in the Susu language. From then on, it lost the semantic component of fortifi ca-
tion, defence and protection to mean simply village or settlement. It was certainly 
a gradual process. I fi rst came across this word meaning settlement or village 
in offi  cial Portuguese documents from 1850 and on. It referred to the quarters 
of the auxiliaries of Luso-African traders – newcomers to Creole settlements – 
located just outside Bissau. It was called tabanka dos grumetes (sailors’ village 
or quarter). Curiously, they were set apart from the Luso-African town, locally 
known as praça, by a wall built by the colonial governor that stood until 1913. 
Th e wall was not designed to protect the African village, but rather to assure that 
the Bissau Creole population had some security and control over the frequent 
abuses by auxiliaries of dubious loyalty. Only then – from 1850 on – did the term 
meaning settlement or village set in the Guinea Creole.
Th is semantic change is an example of lexical expansion that is quite com-
mon in Creole languages, as may be gauged by the central place the relexifi cation 
hypothesis has in creole studies. Hancock (1980) identifi es twelve categories of 
lexical progression in general. Th e case of tabanka is dubious: it might be ex-
plained as semantic extension – ‘a new interpretation for an item, in addition to, 
or in replacement of, its original use’ (Hancock 1980: 74); semantic shift – ‘the 
same as semantic extension, except that the original meaning has not survived’ 
(ibid.: 78); convergence –‘two forms originally distinct acquire the same pho-
nological surface form’ (ibid.: 79); or adoption – ‘the acquisition of items from 
other languages’ (ibid.: 81).8 I cannot advance much on this regard, but refer to 
Jean-Louis Rougé’s (2004: 352) argument for convergence, according to which 
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the current meaning of tabanka in Guinean Creole as ‘village’ comes from con-
vergence with Manjaco N-tab or untab.
I should mention, however, that the word’s use has an evident sociological 
connotation. In Guinea Creole, tabanka is not used to designate just any village, 
but only the villages of local indigenous peoples. Urban clusters inhabited by 
Portuguese and creolized Luso-Africans are called praças, regardless of size and 
location. Th is dichotomy is a clear manifestation of an opposition that is con-
stitutive of the Creole world, namely, the cultural cleavage between the space of 
‘Creoleness’ – the praças – and that of ‘Africanness’ – the tabancas, from where 
Creole society has historically recruited most of its members.
Journey to the Islands: From Territory to Conviviality
In this section I focus on the second stop of the long journey of the semantic 
fl uctuations of tabanka. Th is stop altered the route already taken, which had led 
to the idea of village, refl ecting a move towards the idea of conviviality.
In the word’s journey to the Creole of Santiago, I notice a semantic change 
that appears to be radical but in fact is deeply connected to the underlying mean-
ings it has on the Guinea coast.9 According to the Cape Verdean writer Félix 
Monteiro (1948: 14), in the remote past the word was also used in Santiago 
to mean settlement or village, but its original reference to a territorial unit was 
lost, and nowadays most Creole speakers in Cape Verde do not recognize it.10 
Interestingly, what Monteiro calls an old usage (tabanka as village) is in fact quite 
recent. Presently, Santiago people, especially the adults, take tabanka to mean a 
mutual aid association that is very important to the peasants in the interior and 
to the residents of poor neighbourhoods in the town of Praia. For the young 
people and those who come from the windward islands, however, this reference 
to mutual aid has been blurred: now the word is mostly used to designate a kind 
of popular feast unique to the islands of Santiago and Maio and, more recently, 
a mass-culture musical style derived from the music played during tabanka fes-
tivities. Th us, to speak of tabanka in Cape Verde is to speak of feasting and joy, 
of striking sounds and colours. Nevertheless, something of the original sense of 
village or settlement still remains, for if tabanka is festivity, it is always the festiv-
ity of a village, a neighbourhood or even a cluster of scattered houses. Th is is why 
one speaks of Tabanka of Várzea, of Achada Santo António, of Achada Grande 
(Praia neighbourhoods), of Chã de Tanque, Lém Cabral, and other places on the 
island. Hence, whether as an institution or as a feast, the word in Santiago Creole 
retains a metonymic relationship vis-à-vis the Guinean meaning of settlement, in 
the sense that the part suggests the whole.
Large-scale festivities cannot occur without social actors to organize complex 
activities and take on responsibility for the effi  cacy of the performance. In other 
words, if tabanka means festivity, it also means a type of institution that leads or 
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organizes the feast. Although less visible to the Cape Verdeans of the windward 
islands and the country’s larger urban centres, this institutional component con-
tinues to be the tabanka’s raison d’être. Put in this way, the Cape Verde tabanka 
is an institution with a complex structure that recruits members from a territorial 
base and works as a brotherhood, or a mutual aid association.
As an institutional association, the structure of the tabanka copies that of so-
ciety to create a miniature social system. Just like a society, tabankas have chiefs, 
law and order agents, crooks, prestigious personages, and values and symbols of 
their own. Th ey also have kings and queens, ministers, physicians, policemen and 
thieves, soldiers with guns and uniforms, distinguished people as counsellors and 
ambassadors, and regular, subordinate people who are called catibos (captives) 
and negas (black women). In a critical and ironic mode, their subordinate group 
mimics the slave society of the past and the inequalities of the present. In the vast 
majority of tabanka pageants, this group is classifi ed by the same categories that 
once referred to slaves. It is mostly made up of women.
Tabanka insignias are rated as values. Among them, the banner representing 
the patron saint has the highest value. It is starkly simple, a metaphoric rendition 
of the believers’ poverty and purity. Besides the patron saint’s banner, there are 
others of a diff erent nature. Extremely colourful, they display very diff erent de-
signs, revealing the workings of a syncretic mindset that voraciously assimilates 
everything that comes its way. Th ey lend life and colour to the brotherhood 
members’ long excursions towards the houses of the feast promoters, called reis 
(rainhas) de agasalho (shelter kings or queens), who always live in the neighbour-
ing villages. Th ese insignias of life and colour refl ect the Cape Verdeans’ particu-
lar way of reproducing their own society, which is based on emigration strategies. 
Only in a society of emigrants can we fi nd, as commonplace objects, banners of 
Turkish soccer teams, stylized national fl ags from various countries, and the typ-
ical admixture of mass culture in a globalized world, juxtaposing American and 
Jamaican colours and symbols, a black hero like Bob Marley and an icon of mass 
culture like Michael Jackson. Alongside fl ags and banners, musical instruments 
are also powerful symbols of the tabankas: two or three crude drums, a collection 
of three to six seashells (conches), and a military trumpet in some brotherhoods. 
Th e production and distribution of these goods do not satisfy local demand, and 
their consequent rarity lends prestige to the owner associations.
Also worth considering are the values that are transmitted by these feasts. I 
limit myself to those values that, with critical irony, attempt to reproduce an idea 
of order typical of the colonial society that serves as the tabanka’s model. Th ree 
elements are vigorously present at the brotherhood rituals, especially during long 
pageants for collecting gifts from the shelter kings. First, the value of order and 
discipline is materialized in the act of queuing up and in the general concern for 
a highly organized and orderly march. Th e pageant is more than a mere outing: it 
is framed as a Creolized rendition of military marches and pilgrimages (Trajano 
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Filho 2011). Th e catibos and negas must remain strictly in single fi le; there is even 
a character responsible for whipping them whenever they step out of it. A second 
feature representing order and social control, satirically lived out at the tabanka 
feast, is the organization of time. Treated in utter caricature, respect for schedule 
is often acted out in ritual games during the feast. A tabanka member who arrives 
late to any of his activities is punished severely. Taken to a corner that functions 
as a jail, he is tied up, a crown of thorns on his head, to endure the jeers of 
passers-by. Th us, with fi nes and arrests, outlandish rigour in the control of time, 
and a military-like obsession with queues, the tabankas ritually live through the 
order, discipline and hierarchy of the dominant society in both the present and in 
the past while also bringing vigour, rhythm and colour to the ritual.
Each tabanka has its own patron saint chosen from popular Catholicism 
with celebrations in June (Saint Anthony, Saint John and Saint Peter). Th eir 
image and that of the holy family are kept and venerated in chapels and courts 
erected in their honour. Th ese are also places for prayer and pleas for abundance, 
plenty of rain at the right time, good harvests in the coming months and har-
mony for the district and its residents. Under the protection of the patron saints, 
these chapels house, for their delight, the off erings of the tabanka’s members and 
its shelter kings and queens. Th e gifts are auctioned at the end of the common 
meals that begin on the saint’s day, which today last for four or fi ve days.
Despite surface diff erences in the meaning of the word tabanka in Cape 
Verde and in Guinea, I wish to emphasize some connections between them. In 
the fi rst place, whether an institution or a festivity, in Santiago Creole the word 
maintains a metonymic relationship with the idea of a living place, as a part that 
suggests the whole. Moreover, like cibanka among the Baga-Sitem and many 
other peoples of the Guinea coast, a Cape Verde tabanka has a patron saint as its 
protector spirit, a source of well-being, prosperity, fertility and abundance. Th e 
allegories, uniforms and musical instruments of the Cape Verde associations are 
called armamento, which I gloss as ‘weaponry’. Military and religious meaning 
pervades both role ascription in the processions towards the home of the shelter 
king and the form these pageants take. Commanders, soldiers, policemen and 
captives parade in a parody of order and discipline. After all, to leave one’s place 
of residence and march through valleys and riverbanks to other places is, cosmo-
logically speaking, to brave the dangers of a no-man’s land. Underlying all this 
are ingrained ideas of protection and defence against both mystical and human 
enemies in the deepest sense of the African palisaded tabankas. Lastly, the exist-
ence of these associations in Santiago and the perception the local Creole elites 
have of them also hint at a constitutive opposition in the Creole world analogous 
to that in Guinea-Bissau. Here, instead of a cultural cleavage between the spaces 
of Creoleness and Africanness, the social division is between, on the one hand, 
the peasants in the interior and the poor in the Praia urban periphery, and on the 
other, the educated elite of the plateau.
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Across the Ocean: Towards Aff ection
My analysis of the semantic changes of the word tabanka could end here, and 
the reader could go directly to my concluding remarks. However, I choose to 
take a more audacious stance and face the semantic turbulences that might have 
aff ected the core meaning of this word in its likely journey to the New World. 
Th e modal used to express probability or condition and the journey’s depiction 
as but a possibility indicate that we are navigating an ocean of speculations that 
are hardly falsifi able. Th ere is both ônus and bônus in such an endeavour. Th e 
price we risk paying is widely known: we might be facing a case of false cognate. 
I fi rmly believe, however, that we cannot be charged much for it, because one 
‘can never tell where a word comes from’ when dealing with language contact in 
a diff use setting (Le Page 1998: 66).11 On the other hand, two bonuses might 
await us at the fi nishing line. Th e fi rst would be the refutation of the allegation 
of false cognate, which would mean gaining an extra layer of knowledge about 
the historical fl ows from the African coast to the Caribbean Islands. Th e second 
is somewhat independent of the ônus and has to do with the general hypothesis 
of this work, namely, that intersocietal encounters (in our case, between creo-
lized ecumenes) stir up semantic turbulences in classifi catory categories, values 
and symbols. In the case of encounters between creolized ecumenes, semantic 
changes aff ecting a particular cultural category tend to preserve part of the previ-
ous meaning it had in its original setting.
Th e word tabanka’s journey from the Guinea coast to the Cape Verde is-
lands and the surface semantic shifts that occurred during its travels are related 
to the unremitting intercommunication between ecumenes (i.e. that of the Up-
per Guinea Coast, and the Luso-African ones) in the context of the creolization 
process that gave birth to a Creole society in Cape Verde. Th ese long-term in-
tersocietal encounters would likely have caused some kind of social and cultural 
turbulence powerful enough to shake the cultural kit of conceptual tools for 
thinking and conceiving sociability, conviviality, security and protection while 
still maintaining some degree of continuity with the deep semantic core of the 
root *abank(?).
I now turn, very briefl y, to a supposedly third moment of the tabanka trip, 
stopping strategically on the island of Trinidad off  the coast of Venezuela. Here 
the word means neither a village (fortifi ed or not) nor a mutual aid institution 
that manages reciprocity within and across villages. Revealing yet another seman-
tic transformation, the Trinidadian tabanka refers to a specifi c kind of suff ering 
and oppression, somewhat similar to a state biomedicine classifi es as a psycho-
pathology. According to anthropologist Roland Littlewood (1998: 121), it refers 
to ‘the inappropriate psychological response to desertion’. Th is is a working-class 
cultural category, unlike the idea of adultery, which is restricted to middle-class 
settings. It happens when a man’s wife abandons him, particularly for another 
Travelling Terms  167
man, and the abandoned husband succumbs to loss and misery rather than re-
sume life as usual. Disheartened, he begins to show signs of lethargy and anorexia 
and to lose interest in work. He wanders aimlessly through the streets or retires 
to the solitude of his house to nurture his hatred for the unfaithful woman. He 
drinks and smokes excessively, eats little or nothing, does not sleep and, in ex-
treme cases, dies of neglect or accident, or commits suicide (Littlewood 1993: 
47–52; 1998: 85–86, 117–19).
Th is kind of disorder, verging on madness, is not caused by the fact of being 
abandoned, but by the victim’s response to abandonment. Moreover, it should 
not be taken for lovesickness. It only occurs when the man and woman have had 
a sexual and economic relationship, especially when they were wedded in the 
Church. In Trinidad, the tabanka is basically a form of emotional expression that 
affl  icts men much more frequently than it does women, and appears among the 
Creole and rural populations as well as the tibourgs (petty bourgeoisie) and béke 
negres (black whites) who aspire to the white middle-class lifestyle (Littlewood 
1998: 117).12 Contrary to what one might expect, those unaff ected by it take it 
as an opportunity to heap scorn and irony upon the disgruntled husband. Th ey 
scoff  at his economic and psychological investment in another person in a world 
riddled with precariousness and individualism. As Littlewood (1998: 121–22) 
clearly perceived in regard to the humour of tabanka, this is not a criticism of the 
faithfulness and respectability inherent in Christian marriage, but rather of the 
somewhat snobbish aspirations of persons from the lower strata of society who 
emulate a lifestyle based on white or local middle-class values. Th e tabanka victim 
loses his reputation, an important value in the lower ranks of Creole society. He 
also loses the little respectability he so unsteadily won when he mimicked the 
bourgeois ethos by getting married, respectability being a central value for the 
middle strata of society.13
With such diff erent renderings in Trinidad, Cape Verde and Guinea, it would 
be unsurprising if the relationship between these words in Creole languages so 
far apart were mere homonymy with no common underlying meaning. My re-
search is still very inconclusive, if not negative. I consulted several specialists on 
Caribbean Creole languages but got no defi nite answer. Lise Winer told me that 
the term seems to have been introduced recently; the earliest written record she 
found dated from 1957. She also referred to vague and highly speculative inter-
pretations that the Trinidadian tabanka might come from tabaka in Kikongo, a 
language spoken in the Congo and Angola. Tabaka can be glossed as ‘sell out or 
buy up completely’ (Winer 2009: 871). In Trinidad (also in Guyana and Gre-
nada, according to Allsopp 2003) it would have acquired the meaning of loss of 
love. Other authors believe that in the Caribbean, the word comes from a term 
in Kituba, a ‘contact-based’ (Creole?) language variety spoken in Central Africa. 
It is worth noting that a variety of this Creole language, called Kikongo ya leta or 
Kikongo-matadi, emerged in late nineteenth century as a lingua franca and later 
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became the vernacular language of people living at administrative outposts in 
west, south and east Kinshasa. Th e expression Kikongo-matadi refers to a railroad 
that connects Matadi (a port town) to Kinshasa. It was built by workers brought 
in from Senegal and Sierra Leone (Mufwene 2009: 213) who spoke various lan-
guages of the West Atlantic stock, source of the root *abank(?).
Littlewood (1993: 266) also attempted to pinpoint the etymology of the 
Trinidadian tabanka but concluded that it is obscure and likely to be multiple. 
He suggests that it comes from a cognate of the French-based Creole ta banque, 
meaning bankruptcy or breach of contract, of the Creole ti blanc (little white) or 
even of the Jamaican bacha (little banana, in this case, lack of erection). Another 
possible origin would be tabanco, a Spanish Central American word referring to 
‘a place for castrated cocks’. Allsopp (2003) suggests it might have come from 
the cognate (or borrowed word) tabangke in Makushi (a Carib language), which 
means ‘wonder.’
In any case, many Africans who arrived in Trinidad as slaves came from the 
Upper Guinean coast, a region where a number of local languages share the root 
*abank(?), giving credence to the hunch that the term is of Guinean origin. Even 
if future linguistic research reveals that this is not the case, it seems that the sim-
ilarity between the Guinean, Cape Verdean and Trinidadian forms is not merely 
an accidental homonymy, because this part of the Caribbean has been an area 
of intersection between various cultural ecumenes that arose during creolization 
processes triggered by European expansion since the late fi fteenth century. To 
Trinidad converged people, language forms and items as well as a repertoire of 
values and ideas from continental America, other Caribbean Islands, the East 
Indies, Europe and Africa (including the Upper Guinea Coast). Th is conver-
gence may have produced a kind of semantic turbulence that altered the original 
meaning of the word that the Trinidadian tabanka derives so as to impregnate it 
with some connotations (or transformations of them) of the Cape Verdean and 
Guinean tabanka. 
Furthermore, the gap in meaning is not too wide; a semantic continuity in the 
use of the word is visible in the three Creole languages. First, there is a connotation 
of an intense but ambiguous feeling of security, protection and sociability. Th e 
Trinidadian case involves a clear structural inversion, where the positive signal 
associated with this feeling becomes negative. A second resemblance lies in the 
mode of parody, caricature and criticism in the tabanka of Cape Verde and Trini-
dad. Finally, in all three countries, the term indicates a basic opposition between 
social groups or cultural forms: in Guinea, between spaces of Creoleness and 
Africanness; in Cape Verde, between peasant social forms and the lowest strata 
of society on one hand, and the educated elite on the other; and in Trinidad, 
between the structural principles of reputation and respectability, quite similar to 
the Cape Verdean case. Figure 8.1 synthesizes the various steps taken by this word 
in its journey from the coast of African to the Caribbean.
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Concluding Remarks
Th ough I still have a long way to go, I will conclude by saying that a close look 
at the semantic fl uctuations of the term tabanka suggests a scenario of histor-
ical connections between various cultural ecumenes that, in turn, derive from 
cultural and linguistic creolization, and all overlap on the Caribbean Islands. I 
take up the idea of the ecumene from a long anthropological tradition that in-
cludes the work of Kroeber (1946), Kopytoff  (1987), Hannerz (1991) and Mintz 
(1996). Inspired by these authors, I take ecumene to mean a fi eld of intense com-
munication through both time and space, where social agents share, alongside a 
number of isolated traits – idiom, institutions, culinary habits, naming practices 
and symbolic forms – a deep sense of common history, maintained and repro-
duced regardless of spatial contiguity (see Mintz 1996: 297).
Kroeber’s ecumene is a ‘great historic unit … a frame within which a particu-
lar combination of processes happened to achieve certain unique results’ (1946: 
9). As I see it, though, what makes it unique is not the particular combination 
of processes or shared cultural traits, but the way its internal diff erences are acted 
out. It is bound together by a kind of relationship between alterities that is not 
based on the logic of distinctive oppositions between sociocentric categories of 
group identity (Pina Cabral 2010: 7–8), but upon the exercise of a ‘working 
acceptance’, in Goff man’s expression. Th is working acceptance, says Goff man 
(1967: 11), is the fundamental feature of any interaction, as it enables partic-
ipants in social encounters to deploy self-regulation. Working acceptance is a 
ritual act. It is in the minutest of interaction rites that we learn how to be percep-
tive; to have feelings related to the self, a self connected to a positive self-image 
Figure 8.1. Synoptic Chart of Semantic Shifts
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(the face); to be proud and dignifi ed when dealing with other people; to display 
consideration, sensitiveness, tact and demeanour. In short, these tiny rituals re-
quire a certain indulgence, a sort of ‘temporary truce’ that lets the interaction go 
on even amongst constant off enses.
In contexts of intersubjectivity, the ecumene becomes visible in everyday life 
when it assures social agents (not necessarily in terms of a refl exive awareness) 
that they have a shared history, especially regarding how diff erence is perceived 
and how persons are made. Th us objectifi ed by social agents, the ecumene whets 
our appetite for thinking far beyond the diff usion of cultural traits, acculturation 
or syncretism. As Pina Cabral (2010: 16) states, it makes us identify echoes that 
allow denizens of the same ecumene to recognize each other. Th ese echoes render 
their world more intelligible.
Th inking of tabanka’s long journey from the west coast of Africa to the Car-
ibbean islands as part of a process that linked various ecumenes frees us of the 
empiricist temptation to try to understand that world in terms of the diff usion 
of individual cultural traits. It also saves us from falling into lazy generic notions 
such as ‘the world in fl ux’, ‘Black Atlantic’ and others. It forces us to ask two 
questions I deem quite important. First, what happens when cultural ecumenes 
come to an intersection? Th is makes us ponder what sort of turbulence is behind 
the semantic fl uctuations I have just examined, and how strongly they disturb 
the conceptual kit of cultural categories that frame the experience of the social 
actors (ideas of protection, security, sociability and reciprocity, as well as the lack 
of them). Th e second question addresses the concrete object of my analysis. Al-
though I have focused on the semantic fl uctuations of a single lexical item, I hope 
I have shown that they are associated with continuities and discontinuities in 
ways of conceiving sociability and diff erence. True, I could have done this by fol-
lowing the journey of any other cultural object towards the intercommunication 
between ecumenes. But would I have been able to do so with any object? How 
do we choose the items we carry in our luggage on these trips that, after all, are 
no more or less than the expansion and contraction of ecumenes?
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Notes
 1. Th e spelling of this word varies a lot. In the Portuguese dictionaries, it is spelt tabanca, 
but Creole dictionaries spell it tabanka. In this essay I will adopt the latter form because 
it suggests a non-Portuguese origin.
 2. According to Hair (1967: 46), the Baga word is ke-baŋka, meaning ‘village’.
 3. See Horton (1976) for a dynamic model that relates state and stateless societies in West 
Africa. Th e pattern of settlement (dispersed and compact villages) plays a key role in this 
model.
 4. I should thank respectively Joanna Davidson and Peter Mark for this information.
 5. He also uses this word to refer to the stockade made of posts and pieces of trees that en-
circled the Mandingo village of Cação, on the River Gambia (1977: 150). Commenting 
on this passage, Teixeira da Mota (1977: 300–302) notes that other descriptions testify 
to the existence of palisades in Mandingo villages. However, this does not mean that the 
word has a Mande origin.
 6. It is interesting to note that the Temne word did not enter the English-based Creole 
spoken by the Krio in the Freetown peninsula, much closer to Temne traditional territory 
than to Cacheu.
 7. See Oliveira (1888–1889: 307): ‘Th e most important settlements are protected by strong 
tabancas … around the houses and huts of these villages is constructed a type of wall, with 
tall and thick trunks of trees’.
 8. See also Baptista (2007) for an analysis of congruence between substractal languages and 
Portuguese in creole formation.
 9. I leave unexplored a possible derivation of the Santiagoan Creole funco (poor housing, 
hut) from the West Atlantic root *abank(?). Th is word appears in several historical sources 
meaning house (Álvares 1990), granary (Álvares 1990 [1615]; Kup 1961: 102) chapel or 
shrine (Álvares 1990) and porch or balcony (Almada 1964: 348). Th ese authors use it in 
their descriptions of events taking place in the Isle of Bissau and in various parts of Sierra 
Leone. According to Hair (1977: 266), similar words exist in modern Temne: αη-fuηk 
(granary) and αη-puηkaη (balcony, porch). Th e similarity to the Diola funk is remarkable 
(see above).
10. See also Carreira (1964) and Rougé (2004) for the meanings of this word in the Luso-
African cultural universe.
11. Th e opposition between focused and diff use linguistic ideologies and practices has been 
discussed by Le Page & Tabouret-Keller (1985) and Le Page (1998).
12. Nowadays, the meaning of tabanka has been extended to designate bereavement and 
other losses (Littlewood (1998: 117). It has been employed, e.g., to refer to the feeling of 
loss related to political competition or disputes, especially after elections, which is called 
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‘political tabanka’ (cf. Winer 2009: 871). Heike Drotbohm (personal communication) 
informed me that in Trinidadian urban contexts, the word has been used in colloquial reg-
ister to express a feeling of longing or missing something precious. In addition, it seems 
that the word is going through a semantic extension in certain social circles, whereby it 
begins to play a new role in everyday discourses. Th e exact direction of this change is not 
yet clear, but the Trinidadian tabanka seems to be a good candidate to stand for the ethos 
of the country’s culture.
13. Littlewood borrows from Wilson (1995) the opposition between reputation and respect-
ability as the two primary principles of Caribbean social structures.
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Agrarian Life and Global Food Policy 
on the Upper Guinea Coast
Joanna Davidson
Introduction
Along the Upper Guinea Coast, rice has played a signifi cant role in shaping land 
and livelihoods, persons and population fl ows, desires, dreams, disappointments, 
spiritual and moral life, and interactions and transactions for many hundreds 
of years, or perhaps even a few thousand. For several centuries this area of West 
Africa was known to Europeans as the Grain or Rice Coast, signalling their rec-
ognition of the importance, abundance and defi ning aspect of rice in this region 
(or, more selfi shly, their own interest in securing this rice in their trade along the 
coast). But both before and after European dominance in this area, rice played 
a defi ning role in residents’ interactions with each other and with the various 
outsiders who traded, raided and invaded in their midst. Rice in this region has 
been linked to the rise of the great precolonial West African states of Ghana, Mali 
and Songhai (Grist 1959; Osseo-Asare 2005). Th e rice-growing landscape – es-
pecially the mangrove swamps – that evokes the topographical imaginary of this 
region has often served as a refuge from various external forces and foes, from 
centuries-old Islamic incursions (Paulme 1963; Linares 1981) to more recent 
iconoclasts (Sarró 2009), and from Atlantic slavers (Hawthorne 2003) to more 
recent civil strife (Richards 2006).
Th is chapter provides a broad view of the history and interpenetration of 
rice in social, political, religious and ecological domains across the Upper Guinea 
Coast, chronicling also the current diffi  culties of residents in this region who are 
no longer able to grow enough of it. I have divided the chapter into two parts. 
Part One, in addition to synthesizing the general history of rice in the region, 
focuses on a specifi c population of Upper Guinea Coast residents – the Diola 
of Guinea-Bissau – as they confront the challenges of a dramatically altered en-
vironmental and economic landscape. Th eir experiences are unfolding at a time 
of revitalized attention to agricultural development in Africa, particularly under 
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the auspices of the New Green Revolution for Africa. Part Two then examines 
this resuscitated eff ort to address the plight of African farmers. By fi rst setting the 
stage with an ethnographic portrayal of a rice-based society coming to terms with 
profound changes in its natural, social and religious world, I hope to give readers 
a sense of the severe limitations of high modernist and antipolitical development 
approaches to addressing the complexities of agrarian change and rural poverty 
in postcolonial Africa.1
Part One: Sacred Rice
After a few months of residency in a Diola village in north-western Guinea-Bissau, 
I was deeply immersed in a life where rice dominates one’s actions, preoccupa-
tions, even dreams. I had harvested ripe rice at the height of the dry season, 
lugged baskets laden with freshly cut rice from the paddies to the village, helped 
pound and winnow rice at my adopted family’s home, and cooked rice over wood 
fi res in large pots of heavily salted water. I had eaten rice at least three times a day, 
every day, sometimes served with small fi sh or a sauce of boiled hibiscus leaves, 
but mostly plain rice – kutangu, as it is called in Crioulo – morning, afternoon 
and night. I had eaten such rice not just in my daily meals but also in ceremo-
nial contexts, when it was prepared in enormous pots and distributed among 
participants who gathered in small groups around a shared tin bowl. I had seen 
unhusked rice used to decorate funeral grounds, strung on cords connecting gi-
gantic cottonwood trees and hung in bouquets around the central platform where 
the corpse was seated. Small sachets of rice often encircled a young girl’s waist 
at a neighbourhood dance, and celebrants at intervillage wrestling matches wore 
delicately balanced bundles as headdresses. I had discussed rice with my neigh-
bours and friends, or rather, listened as they spoke endlessly of rice, sometimes in 
technical terms (seed variations, irrigation methods, transplantation practices), 
sometimes in worried tones (‘there’s not enough rice to go around anymore’; ‘our 
granaries are empty’) and sometimes in metaphorical tropes (‘our money is rice’; 
‘rice is our life’). Rice is omnipresent in Diola economic, social and symbolic life. 
It is the centre of social gossip; people regularly discuss whose supply is abun-
dant and whose is depleted. Rice is the medium of exchange during life-cycle 
redistributive processes such as weddings, funerals and initiations. And rice is the 
ticket to ritual power, as spirit shine ceremonies require abundant expenditures of 
one’s crop. Diola lives, like those of most rice-growing people in this region, are 
permeated by rice. Growing, eating, displaying, wearing, discussing and revering 
rice. It was ubiquitous. When I closed my eyes at night, panicles of rice swayed 
behind my eyelids.
Scholars of the Diola have consistently off ered rich portrayals of this rice-
oriented society. Even when rice is not their intended subject, its presence still 
pervades their pages (see e.g. Almada 1964 [1594]; Baum 1999; Coelho 1953 
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[1669]; Lauer 1969; Linares 1970, 1981, 1985, 1992; Mark 1985; Pélissier 
1966; Th omas 1959, 1963). As Linares sums up, ‘Rice is the symbol of ethnicity, 
of continuity, of all that is traditionally Diola. … Rice keeps men tied to the 
land, village-bound, and wholeheartedly peasant’ (Linares 1970: 223). I myself 
did not go to the Diola region of northwest Guinea-Bissau to study rice. And yet, 
ten years after my fi rst Diola rice harvest, I still fi nd myself returning again and 
again to rice, not only as a central organizing feature of Diola social life but as the 
‘thing’ that mediates their encounters and exchanges with others, as well as their 
refl ections and reassessments of themselves.
Diola see rice as part of a covenant with their supreme deity, Emitai, in which 
they work hard to cultivate the crop and Emitai sends rain to nourish it (see Baum 
1999). Th roughout my fi eldwork in 2001–2003 and during my return visits over 
the past eight years, I saw this covenant in action in Diola farmers’ arduous eff orts 
in the rice paddies, their commitment to well-organized work groups at crucial 
moments in the agricultural cycle, their regular libations – and occasional costly 
sacrifi ces – at spirit shrines to propitiate their gods and bargain for rain, and their 
careful child-rearing practices that socialize young people into an ethical life of 
hard work and no theft (see Davidson 2007, 2009). I also heard these sentiments 
regularly expressed in anthropomorphic and deistic references to rice. ‘Th e rice is 
pregnant’, my work associates would note as we walked through a paddy. ‘Rice’, 
my neighbours would tell me, ‘is sacred’.2
Th is concept of sacred rice is the centrepiece of Senegalese fi lmmaker Ous-
mane Sembene’s portrayal of French colonial brutality in southern Senegal in 
his 1971 fi lm Emitai. After conscripting young Diola men to fi ght in the French 
army in World War II, colonial offi  cials demanded locally produced rice as a tax 
from the Casamance Diola villagers so adept at producing a surplus. Despite the 
otherwise caricatured portrayal of Diola religious life – elders sit amongst human 
skulls and sacrifi ce animal after animal in order to appease their gods, while their 
wives are held at gunpoint under a scorching sun until they hand over their rice 
– Sembene did, I think, capture a central dilemma in Diola (and probably other 
rice-cultivating peoples’) social and spiritual life. In addition to quite accurately 
portraying the physical rhythms of rice cultivation, Sembene shows Diola strug-
gling (and divided) over a thorny conundrum: How can they give away their rice, 
which is sacred to them? And how could their gods abandon them – the humans 
that propitiate them – for the sake of rice? Th is is encapsulated in perhaps the 
most problematic scene, when the dying ‘chief ’ argues with the gods about what 
is more valuable: Rice? Th e people? Th e gods themselves?
Th ese questions never get answered and might still be asked today, although 
under very diff erent circumstances. In Sembene’s fi lm, Diola were pressured to 
give their surplus rice to the French colonial authorities, which they insisted 
was a violation of their principle of ‘sacred rice’. In contemporary Diola-land in 
Guinea-Bissau, the main problem is that Diola can no longer grow enough rice – 
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not only to meet their ceremonial needs, or to have surplus for a potential tax, 
but even to feed their families. Diola villagers are on the frontlines of global 
climate change. Within the past thirty years, declining rainfall, desertifi cation 
and widespread erosion in northern Guinea-Bissau have increasingly challenged 
Diola villagers’ ability to provision themselves through the wet rice cultivation 
practices that have long defi ned them as a people. Th ese environmental fac-
tors have combined with neglectful and disadvantageous government policies 
and programmes regarding rural development, diffi  cult marketing conditions, 
and diminished labour capacity due to out-migration of youth, which all have 
worsened conditions in rural rice-growing regions of the country. By the time 
I arrived in Guinea-Bissau in 2001, most Diola villagers’ granaries were empty. 
Many people regularly told me ‘We used to be able to do this’, referring to the 
complex technical, social and ritual system by which Diola produce, consume 
and revere rice. ‘Now we cannot.’
Rice as a Total Social Phenomenon
Sacred rice is, above all, the idiom through which Diola talk about rice. Trans-
lated into anthropological terms, rice for Diola is a total social phenomenon in 
the classic Maussian sense. It mediates all social spheres and holds together the 
contradictions across them. It is the means through which people present them-
selves to themselves and others. In some senses, rice as a total social phenom-
enon could refl ect one of the hallmarks of African agriculture more generally: 
the ‘intense dependence of a people on a single crop’ whatever that crop may be 
(Harlan, De Wet and Stemler 1976). Th at is, whether it is yams, sorghum, mil-
let, or rice, the people cultivating these crops tend to be singularly and intensely 
focused on them.
African agriculture is characterized by a rather unusual number of dom-
inant crops. In Arabic ’aish means ‘life,’ and in the Sudanic savanna the 
word is applied to sorghum – the staff  of life, the source of sustenance. 
Life without sorghum is unthinkable. To the north in the Sahel, ’aish 
means ‘pearl millet.’ Life itself depends on pearl millet and pearl millet 
alone, in that ecological zone. To the west around the Bend of the Niger, 
the word may be applied to rice by some Arabic speakers. Certainly in 
West Africa, from Senegambia to central Ivory Coast, a meal without 
rice is considered no meal at all. Th e same intense dependence of a peo-
ple on a single crop is found in the yam zone. Existence itself depends 
on yams. In diff erent parts of the continent other dominant crops are 
ensete, tef, and fonio. … Th e current dependence of some people on 
maize and others on cassava indicates that dependence on single crops 
does not take long to establish. (Harlan et al. 1976: 14; see McCann 
2005 for more on maize in Africa)
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Diola villagers regularly invoke a recent past in which their mode of pro-
duction yielded an abundance of surplus paddy rice, often stored for decades 
and used in great quantities for ceremonial purposes. Th e decrease in rice stores 
has already had signifi cant consequences for Diola ritual activities. Most shrine 
ceremonies require copious paddy rice expenditures: ‘sack rice’ (as Diola call im-
ported rice), even if it could be purchased in suffi  cient quantities, would not be 
acceptable in most ritual contexts. Beyond its impact on ritual life, diminishing 
crop yield has led to changes in what might be called the Diola social security sys-
tem, particularly with regard to vulnerable segments of Diola society like widows. 
Given the already strained situation of monogamous households providing for 
their members, the levirate (botunabu) practice in which a widow and her chil-
dren are customarily absorbed into her husband’s brother’s household has all but 
disappeared, leaving increasing numbers of widows to fend for themselves on the 
margins of society.3 And at the most basic level, decreased rice in Diola-land has 
contributed to increased anxiety around sustenance, so that many Diola villagers 
face a worrisome quotidian experience and a more intense working life in what 
was already a taxing labour regime.
In some ways, questions about Diola and their dominant crop are in the 
same scholarly vein as other studies of the rise of particular crops and the way 
they shape desires and dramatically shift economic and political structures (Mintz 
1985; Kurlansky 2002; McCann 2005).4 Th ese writers focus on the role of a 
single crop and its power to transform social, economic and cultural conditions 
across vast and previously less connected parts of the globe.5 Other scholars have 
provided rich portrayals not just of sugar, salt and maize, but also of the power 
of rice in particular, both across the globe and within specifi c regions. Th e his-
tory of rice is often told with a focus on its abundance and adaptation across 
various ecological and political landscapes. Within West Africa too, scholars have 
focused on the importance and innovation of rice in enabling societies in this 
region to survive and often thrive (Carney 2001; Hawthorne 2003; Fields-Black 
2008). Such accounts solidify the historic roots of rice in the Upper Guinea 
Coast and attest to the sophisticated technology that supported its growth as 
the region’s dominant crop. Th ey are, for the most part, rice success stories. Th e 
Upper Guinea Coast is cast as a site of agricultural and social innovation, whether 
in Hawthorne’s (2003) account of how, in the face of the Atlantic slave trade, a 
stateless society had the resilience to develop the internal social institutions that 
enabled it to increase rice production; or in Carney’s (2001) epic portrayal of the 
contribution of West Africans – especially women – to the Americas through 
their ‘rice knowledge system.’
It is now well established that West Africans domesticated and cultivated 
rice for thousands of years, long before the arrival of the Europeans who were 
assumed to have brought both the seeds and know-how of rice agriculture to 
West African coastal peoples. Th e last several decades have seen a fl ourishing of 
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infl uential studies of rice in Africa and in Atlantic studies more broadly, rectifying 
many of the biased assumptions in previous understandings – both scholarly and 
popular – of rice’s origins and importance as located exclusively in Asia. A consid-
erable literature now attests to rice’s important role in shaping societies on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Th e weight of evidence – historical (Pélessier 1966; Lauer 
1969; Alpern 2008), botanical (Portères 1970, 1976; Harlan et al. 1976), clima-
tological (G. Brooks 1985), geographical (Cormier-Salem 1999), archaeological 
(Linares 1971, 2002), linguistic (Fields-Black 2008), political-ecological (Rich-
ards 1985, 1986) and genealogical (Carney 2001, 2004)  – restores rice history 
to its proper place in West Africa, even if the extension of such accounts across 
the Atlantic into New World systems continues to be debated (Eltis, Morgan and 
Richardson 2007). Th at rice was grown 3,500 years ago in the Niger delta; that it 
diff used to two secondary centres; that both the plant and the people adapted to 
particular saline, insalubrious, unpredictable conditions to thrive in a challenging 
landscape and develop a range of rice planting methods; that rice production 
even increased, in some cases, in spite of the ravages of the Atlantic slave trade 
(Hawthorne 2003) – all of this is now, unlike the semiaquatic rice plant itself, 
on terra fi rma.
Carney’s (2001) watershed study consolidates such evidence to demonstrate 
Africans’ roles in developing both the domesticated rice plant, Oryza glaberrima, 
and the highly sophisticated water management systems, cultivation techniques 
and trademark tools involved in successfully growing the crop in a tricky and 
unpredictable environment, long before European infl uence in the area. Building 
on Wood (1974) and Littlefi eld (1981), Carney breaks the narrative of African 
rice out of its relegated confi nement to West Africa as something of ‘local im-
portance and antiquarian interest’ (Sauer 1993), and provides African rice with a 
travel narrative as compelling as the more familiar accounts charted for the Asian 
cultigen. As in Asia, African people moving across the oceans to diff erent ecosys-
tems – whether of their own volition or not – brought with them both the seeds 
and the skills to transform environments, economies and societies anywhere they 
went (and anywhere they left behind).
Putting aside her more controversial extension of this argument, which fo-
cuses on the infl uence of this indigenous African ‘rice knowledge system’ in the 
Americas via the Atlantic slave trade,6 I want to take up a point emphasized by 
Carney and others writing in her wake regarding the development of rice ag-
riculture in West Africa, and ask about its implications today. Carney (2001), 
Hawthorne (2003) and Fields-Black (2008) each emphasize the innovative qual-
ities of rice cultivation in the Upper Guinea Coast as a technologically ingen-
ious approach in a challenging mangrove ecosystem, particularly in terms of its 
sophisticated crue/décrue method of water management (Carney 2001: 40–46; 
Fields-Black 2008), and its socially innovative responses to the pressures of the 
Atlantic slave trade (Hawthorne 2003). Whereas these authors aimed to establish 
180  Joanna Davidson
a solid historical basis for rice-oriented cultures and their continual adaptation 
to myriad challenges – Mandinga expansion, European slave raiding, colonially 
enforced cash cropping, shaky transitions to independence and throughout all, a 
fl uctuating set of environmental conditions and unpredictable pattern of rainfall 
– my experience as an ethnographer among Diola rice cultivators in postcolonial 
Guinea-Bissau leads me to ask: what now?
For the past ten years I have seen Diola respond to the decrease in rain and 
rice in varied, mostly highly individualized ways. Th e average household is able 
to produce only enough rice to last three months, and when you ask most Di-
ola how they get by, they respond by saying ‘kuji-kuji, son’, referring to what 
chickens do to fi nd insects and grubs for their day-to-day survival. Th ey scrape 
together what they can to buy a kilo of imported Asian rice, which, though it 
cannot be used for ceremonial purposes, has become acceptable to eat. Another 
common strategy among adult Diola – those with families to care for – is to work 
harder and to scold (and often punish) those who shift their primary allegiance 
away from rice cultivation and towards other livelihood strategies (see Davidson 
2009). Some Diola have invested in spirit shrine ceremonies to contract for more 
rain. Others have sought new religious identities and institutions – Catholic and 
Protestant are the two options available in the area – that enable both access to 
new resources and a religiously sanctioned opt-out from ‘traditional’ strictures 
that require exclusive devotion to rice. 
Increasingly, Diola families invest in schooling for their children and pin 
their hopes for the future on their children’s academic success. But in Guinea-
Bissau, school is a fragile thing to pin one’s hopes to. Some unexpected hurdles 
have complicated the practice of sending adolescent girls to schools outside the 
village: most have come back as pregnant drop-outs. Meanwhile, boys’ studies 
are often interrupted by political turmoil or lack of economic wherewithal, and 
as they wait around in the capital for a resumption they not only cannot con-
tribute their much-needed labour back home but also become far more likely to 
lead precarious lives, particularly in a nation where drug traffi  cking is ever more 
entrenched and off ers one of the only viable economic alternatives to an arduous 
(and food-insecure) rural life and a paralyzed (and unfulfi lled) postsecondary 
school urban life.
All of these strategies refl ect eff orts among the Diola to confront their collec-
tive dilemma: who are we without our rice? For now, Diola are hungry – some 
of them literally so, as they struggle to feed themselves and their families; oth-
ers more metaphorically, as they search for new paths to social security through 
schooling, new religious institutions and escape. Comprehending this hunger as 
it connects the physical body to the social body contributes to our understanding 
of the complex dynamics of agrarian life. But beyond a mere academic exercise, 
this understanding has implications for development policies and practices tar-
geted at Diola and other agrarian populations on the Upper Guinea Coast and 
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beyond. Th e interpenetration of rice across all social domains requires any devel-
opment response – particularly in increasingly food-insecure regions – to take 
into account the totalizing quality of rice agriculture. Th e concomitant challenge 
for scholars is not just to articulate this complexity, but to do so while pragmat-
ically engaging both the anxieties of present-day rice farmers and an agricul-
tural development discourse that is disproportionately focused on effi  ciency and 
quantity.
Part Two: Th e Institutional History of 
Rice Science and Agricultural Development
Th e outlook on the future of rice in West Africa must, of course, go hand in hand 
with a historical view of the decreasing self-suffi  ciency of what was once called 
the Rice Coast, which leads to an examination of the shift from staple to cash 
crops during the colonial era in Africa, and the continued de-emphasis on agri-
cultural development in the postcolonial period. Once defi ned by its abundant 
rice production, the Upper Guinea Coast has seen a dramatic increase in rice 
imports over the past half century. Colonial policies shifted African agricultural 
eff orts away from food crops for local sustenance towards cash crops for Euro-
pean consumption. Newly independent African nations in the 1960s and 1970s 
declared their intention to attain self-suffi  ciency in food production, framing 
such a goal as a pragmatic approach to meet the demands of population growth 
and address Africa’s marginal position in the international market on the one 
hand, and as a political and symbolic reversal of the colonial project on the other. 
But since independence, the increased infl uence of the cash economy, combined 
with rapid demographic shifts and a concomitant focus on urban development, 
have conspired to keep rural development eff orts in a marginalized position vis-
à-vis large-scale improvement schemes, and food imports have only increased. 
Th e trend of importing basic staples, especially rice, accelerated rapidly in the 
early 1970s owing to two main factors: the Sahelian drought, and the availability 
of cheaper rice on the international market due to surplus yields in Asia – the 
fruit of the new intensive approaches and high-yield seed varieties of the Green 
Revolution. Th us, in the independence era, ‘the amount of rice imported into 
West Africa increased from 276,000 tons/year in 1960–1964 to 496,000 tons/
year in 1970–1974, an increase of 80%, at a time when total world rice exports 
were unchanged’ (Aw 1978: 71). Despite Guinea-Bissau’s stated commitment to 
boost rice self-suffi  ciency (Da Silva 1978), its rice imports have steadily increased 
since independence (Temudo 2011).7
To answer post-independence Africa’s call for self-suffi  ciency in rice produc-
tion, the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), based in Mon-
rovia, Liberia, was established in 1971 and later joined the Consultative Group 
for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). WARDA, one of several agri-
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cultural research and development centres dedicated to improving the yields of 
African farmers, was the only one focused exclusively on rice. Since its establish-
ment in 1971, WARDA has been a moveable feast, relocating from Liberia to 
Côte d’Ivoire to Mali and fi nally to Benin in response to the eruption of violent 
confl icts across this swath of West Africa. In 2009 it offi  cially changed its name 
to Africa Rice Centre (AfricaRice). Tracing WARDA’s movements across West 
Africa, as well as its shifting position within the wider world of international ag-
ricultural development, would illuminate much about the politics of postcolonial 
development in West Africa, although such an exploration is beyond the scope 
of this chapter.
Th ough conscious of the particularities of the environmental, political and 
cultural factors that condition rural development work in West Africa, WARDA 
largely follows the model of other agricultural research and development entities 
by focusing on the technical aspects of growing rice. Th e characteristic approach 
of agricultural development since the Green Revolution, and even before, has 
been to apply the latest innovations in agricultural science – especially plant 
breeding, fertilizers and irrigation – to impoverished rural communities across 
the world, and move agricultural production from sustenance to surplus to sale. 
Generally couched in the development discourse of poverty eradication and food 
security, the goals are primarily quantitative – higher yields, more crop per drop – 
and even though the latest iteration of the Green Revolution for Africa has incor-
porated the language of sustainability and gender into its rhetoric, the creation of 
high-yield seeds continues to be the holy grail of rural development.
WARDA’s chief contribution in this vein has been the development of New 
Rice for Africa (NERICA) varieties – the fi rst successful hybrids of Oryza sativa 
and Oryza glaberrima – which are being distributed to rice cultivating popula-
tions across the continent. NERICA was fi rst named ‘wide crossing’ to high-
light the achievement of bringing together two rice species from widely divergent 
sources (Walsh 2001). It also refl ects a shift in attitudes towards African indige-
nous rice, long considered inferior and marginal by rice breeding programmes. 
As Walsh explains, looking back on several decades of rice breeding eff orts, 
WARDA scientists realized that their gains had been limited by the concentra-
tion on imported grains, so they began to ‘reclaim glaberrima’ – analysing the 
long-ignored indigenous rice species to see what could be learned from its long 
history and adaptation to West African conditions (Walsh 2001). A senior plant 
geneticist at WARDA described the process as ‘time consuming, but … worth 
doing because eventually we are going to get an interspecifi c hybrid that will 
combine important traits between glaberrima and sativa’ (Walsh 2001: 65). And 
it did indeed pay off , at least in terms of scientifi c recognition, when WARDA 
won the prestigious King Baudouin International Agriculture Research Award for 
NERICA in 2000. Hopes began to soar regarding the possibility of revitalizing 
rice production across the continent.
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In some senses, NERICA brings the epic journey of rice full circle. It is now 
generally accepted that Oryza sativa and Oryza glaberrima shared a common pro-
genitor, and that the genus Oryza originated on the Gondwanaland superconti-
nent before becoming widely distributed across the tropics. From this image of 
a common origin in a geologically conjoined world, followed by a long history 
of independent domestication and cultivation to the point of attempted crosses 
between the two species – O. sativa and O. glaberrima – that proved sterile, and 
to a subsequent ‘colonization’ of African rice by the Asian variety in glaberrima’s 
homeland, we have fi nally circled back to a conjoining (though of a diff erent 
kind, conjured in the laboratory) that brings Asia and Africa together again in 
the microcosm of a single grain, rhetorically touted as the ‘best of Africa mixed 
with the best of Asia’, on which hopes of feeding a hungry world are pinned. ‘Th e 
NERICA rice varieties,’ states a recent comprehensive publication on rice, ‘off er 
great hope to the next generation in Africa’ (Badawi et al. 2010: 404).
It is precisely this hope that is fuelling a major set of international devel-
opment initiatives directed squarely at rural Africa: the New Green Revolution 
for Africa. Th e remainder of this chapter will explore some of the premises, pro-
grammes and players that constitute this reincarnation of the Green Revolution.8 
Drawing on the previous sections that developed a Maussian understanding of 
rice in Diola and other agrarian societies, I will outline some of my concerns 
about this new – and rapidly expanding – trend in development policy and prac-
tice for postcolonial Africa.
Th e recent revitalized focus on agriculture is framed as a corrective to the 
largely failed urban-based rapid-modernization approach that has dominated in-
ternational donor policy and practice for many decades. Spearheaded by former 
UN Secretary General Kofi  Annan and funded by philanthropy giants such as 
the Gates Foundation, the architects and planners of the New Green Revolution 
for Africa seek to fulfi l Africa’s post-independence promise of self-suffi  ciency and 
turn Africa’s image around from a ‘basket case to a breadbasket’ (Cartridge and 
Leraand 2006: 109).
Gates programme offi  cers and Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA) offi  cials speak enthusiastically about this New Green Revolution’s po-
tential to succeed in Africa, where so many other development eff orts have failed 
(AGRA-Alliance 2014). In one AGRA plant geneticist’s recent summation: ‘For 
a long time, I don’t think we knew how to solve Africa’s agricultural problems. 
But the answer is a second green revolution’ (Rieff  2008: 30). African Green Rev-
olution planners have attended to some of the more egregious errors of the last 
Green Revolution and integrated some general changes in public consciousness 
and development practice since the 1960s and 1970s into its goals and methods. 
For instance, far more attention is paid to environmentally sustainable practices, 
the stated objective of focusing on women and the stated intention to ‘learn from 
farmers’. Almost every document and speech on the Green Revolution in Africa 
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is careful to point out the ‘specifi cally African’ challenges in undertaking such 
eff orts, often emphasizing Africa’s ‘diversity’ and ‘complexity’ of seeds, soil and 
climate. Other ‘uniquely African’ challenges are often compiled into a laundry 
list featuring drought, global warming, water shortages, lack of fi nance, local 
confl icts, political neglect, unfavourable trade conditions, unstable governments, 
fragile economies and infrastructure, technological stagnation, a weak private 
sector, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, a harsh and often inhospitable climate and en-
vironment, and low levels of foreign investment and aid. Despite this long (albeit 
incomplete) list and the repeated recognition that Africa’s challenges are ‘extraor-
dinarily complex and profoundly diff erent’ from those that confronted Asia and 
Latin America, the core principles and models of the previous Green Revolution 
remain intact for the ‘genuinely African’ Green Revolution: high-yield seeds, bet-
ter and more fertilizer, access to markets (AGRA-Alliance 2009).
I am concerned about this substantial investment in Green Revolution pro-
jects in Africa on a number of levels. On the surface, I am hopeful that renewed 
attention to rural Africans could be benefi cial, especially given the increasing 
challenges I presented at the beginning of this essay and the long-standing ne-
glect of African smallholders in national, international and NGO development 
priorities. But I am worried that much of the New Green Revolution rhetoric 
echoes some of the more problematic (and ultimately dangerous) assumptions of 
past Green Revolutions and other attempts at agricultural change in Africa and 
elsewhere.
At the most basic level, African Green Revolution documents tend to treat 
rural development in Africa as a tabula rasa and demonstrate very little concern 
with (or even knowledge of ) the abundant analyses and attempted (and largely 
failed) interventions into African rural poverty in the past. Only negligibly do 
they acknowledge the wealth of scholarship – concentrated in the 1980s – on 
how post-World War II Africa lost its capacity to feed itself, and more generally 
on how larger colonial and postcolonial international economic and political sys-
tems were among the causes of Africa’s current agricultural problems. Quite the 
contrary, leaders of the New Green Revolution come across as impatient with 
such ‘background information’. Jeff rey Sachs and Pedro Sanchez of the Earth 
Institute – called on by AGRA to develop some of the intellectual muscle for the 
African Green Revolution – have continually pressed for urgent action rather 
than deliberate and methodical discussion. Sachs emphasized recently that ‘Africa 
needs its Green Revolution and it can’t wait. Africa can feed itself if farmers get 
the inputs they need – what theory are we waiting for? … We have the tools to 
get the job done’ (Cartridge and Leraand 2006: 122).
Th is general impatience is reminiscent of an earlier era of agricultural devel-
opment work. Buttressed by the belief that rapid widespread action not bogged 
down by generative criticism or participatory methodologies was justifi ed, given 
the otherwise imminent starvation of a rapidly increasing population, previous 
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agricultural development experts were dismissive of the particularity and com-
plexity of farmers’ expressed needs and desires, often retorting that ‘beggars ought 
not to be choosers’ (Richards 1985: 124). But rural Africa is littered with the 
failed schemes of such hurried approaches to agricultural development.
Teleological Development, Again
Besides failing to do their homework and dismissing critical perspectives, African 
Green Revolution adherents repeat a faulty teleological understanding of devel-
opment. Th e premise behind Green Revolution programmes is that a productive 
agricultural sector will lead to national economic growth. Th is is often bolstered 
with historical evidence from eighteenth-century England, nineteenth-century 
Japan and twentieth-century India (Hazell and Diao 2005; Båge 2008). Kofi 
Annan emphasized this point in his speech to the delegates at the 2007 Afri-
can Green Revolution conference in Oslo: ‘Virtually no country in history has 
achieved economic progress and improved the lives of its people without fi rst 
advancing agriculture. Th at certainly applies to our continent’ (Annan 2007). 
Th e proceedings from the fi rst Oslo conference put it even more starkly: Africa 
is ‘Trapped’ (in poverty) and in ‘Trouble’ (cannot feed its people), and its ‘Time 
has come. After decades of failed attempts at economic and social development, 
agriculture has been declared the engine of economic growth and poverty reduc-
tion in Africa … Africa has no time to waste’ (Cartridge and Leraand 2006: 28; 
capital letters in original).
Th e argument, then, is that every successful society has had to pass through 
some kind of agricultural transformation, and that previous development eff orts 
in Africa failed because they played leapfrog over agriculture and attended to in-
dustrial and urban development before their time. In the 2006 Oslo proceedings, 
a caption underneath a photograph of two African men driving a tractor through 
a large cultivated fi eld reads: ‘Agriculture is commonly considered a locomotive 
for economic growth in Africa…’ (Cartridge and Leraand 2006: 42). Africa re-
mains ‘a predominantly agricultural continent’, and ‘neglecting this overarching 
importance of agriculture’ accounts for Africa’s status as the worst-off  continent 
on the planet (ibid.: 41). So, the thinking goes, if you get agriculture right, the 
rest (ending hunger and poverty, modernization, economic growth, etc.) will fol-
low. New Green Revolution advocates criticize previous development eff orts that 
have tried to ‘impose a post-agricultural revolution strategy on Africa before its 
own agricultural revolution has happened. … Th e lessons from Asia and else-
where seem clear: Africa needs a concerted eff ort to accelerate smallholder-led 
agricultural development … only then can the transition to industrialization be 
expected to succeed’ (Hazell and Diao 2005: 25).
Th is teleological approach reinforces an evolutionary development narra-
tive in which each society must pass through the phases that supposedly more 
‘advanced’ ones withstood on the road to progress. Not only is this historically 
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inaccurate, but it misrepresents Africa as an entire continent ‘not ready, not yet, 
not quite’ for other kinds of development eff orts. Instead of recognizing a ‘full 
house’ of variation (Ferguson 1999), New Green Revolution leaders insist that ‘as 
African countries develop and diversify, the other sectors will become important 
sources of tradables output and agriculture’s role as the primary engine of growth 
will diminish. But other sectors are not yet ready to play that role on the scale 
required’ (Hazell and Diao 2005: 29). Africa must therefore stick to the linear 
progression of social change: agriculture fi rst, then industry. ‘As countries develop 
and labor becomes scarcer relative to land and capital, [this leads to] a natural 
transition towards larger farms and an exodus of small farm workers to towns and 
nonfarm jobs’ (Hazell and Diao 2005: 29; emphasis added).
Th ere is nothing ‘natural’ about this transition. Such thinking not only re-
peats outmoded clichés of the move from traditional to modern, rural to urban, 
subsistence to monetized economy, but also ignores a recent trend in the so-called 
advanced or ‘post-agricultural’ societies that challenges this linear development 
model. Faced with increasing evidence that ‘natural’ transitions from small-scale 
farming to large-scale industrial and commercial agribusiness contribute signif-
icantly to environmental degradation, food scares and public health epidemics 
of obesity and other chronic diseases, Europeans and North Americans are ever 
more dissatisfi ed with large-scale food production. A spreading movement to 
return to alternative agriculture is visible in the growth of community-supported 
agriculture, the Slow Food movement, locavores, the celebrity-like popularity of 
Michael Pollan and other such trends. Perhaps this is an agricultural revolution in 
the other sense of the word; that is, coming full circle to an appreciation of local 
tastes and practices, environmentally sensitive farming and other characteristics 
that have long been prominent among the rural African peasantry.
Means and Ends; Techniques and Contexts
Another problematic aspect of the ‘agriculture-led economic development’ par-
adigm is that it subsumes agriculture as a means to a more desirable end, deni-
grating the value of agriculture in and of itself. A more productive agricultural 
sector supposedly paves the way to a post-agricultural world (as if such a thing 
could really exist). As a USAID offi  cial noted: ‘If a process like an agriculture 
revolution works, it explicitly gets people to leave agriculture. It does! You are 
creating jobs that are more attractive…’ (quoted in Cartridge and Leraand 2006: 
103). To be sure, many farmers in Africa and around the world have hopes for 
their children that include nonfarm jobs. But why preclude the possibility that 
agriculture itself can be desirable? Th e assumption that agriculture is something 
to be left behind on the road to progress – something you work your way out of 
– reinforces agriculture’s low status on the evolutionary ladder and recapitulates 
the very image that for so long made rural smallholder concerns look ‘unsexy’ to 
global development agendas (a view that New Green Revolution advocates claim 
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they are trying to reverse). From my own work among Diola rice cultivators, it is 
clear that although Diola farmers often complain about their declining capacity 
to sustain their households, they are proud of their continued hard work in the 
rice paddies. Even those with supposedly more desirable jobs, like teachers, iden-
tify fi rst and foremost (and proudly) as farmers. By regarding food production 
as ‘unspectacular’, Green Revolution proponents continue to ‘misunderstand the 
nature of both the agriculture and the politics of communities where food pro-
duction is a major interest’ (Richards 1985: 116).
Agriculture is not only devalued as a means to an end but reduced to a set 
of techniques, as something to be tinkered with and fi xed. Although not sexy 
to developers, agriculture is like sex in the Foucauldian sense of the care of the 
self: it is a practice that can be practised (i.e. improved). With the right inputs 
– science and technology, seeds and fertilizers – agriculture can be transformed. 
Th e overriding approach of the Green Revolution (past and present) is primarily 
biological and technological, and operates under the assumption that agricultural 
processes can be extracted from their political and social contexts. Th is view is 
encoded in Green Revolution discourse, institutions and practices. Most of its 
leaders – donors and practitioners alike – are economists or agricultural experts 
(or both); there are few if any social scientists (let alone anthropologists, let alone 
small-scale farmers) in their ranks.9 Th eir approach to agricultural transformation 
ignores the long history of social and political circumstances that help explain 
why African agriculture is experiencing diffi  culties, even as it occludes a picture 
of agriculture embedded in complex modes of social organization, moral econo-
mies, arrangements of power and religious beliefs and practices. As we have seen 
for Diola – and as has been documented for other agrarian groups – agricultural 
work is not simply a means of sustenance but is integrally tied to conceptions of 
personhood, social relations, ritual obligations and collective cultural identity. 
Tinkering with any piece of their cultivation practices has signifi cant ramifi ca-
tions for all of these realms.
Agriculture is necessarily a biological and social process, but the Green Revo-
lution’s exclusive emphasis on research and technology sets the social side of this 
equation aside. Th is bias is built into the elitist research culture of the Green Rev-
olution. In the Asian and Latin American iterations, International Agricultural 
Research Centers concentrated the brightest talents in a single place equipped 
with the best research facilities, and in so doing removed them from exactly the 
geographical and sociological contexts where they would be most connected to 
the needs and realities of farmers, and in which they were meant to implement 
their scientifi c discoveries. Such practices are replicated in Gates’s support of Cor-
nell and other seed research centres and even showcased on AGRA’s website in 
images of African scientists surrounded by the accoutrements of modern, high-
tech scientifi c legitimacy: white lab coats, safety goggles and pristine laborato-
ries lined with neatly labelled beakers. But these environments insulate Green 
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Revolution practitioners from the real-time agricultural environment and on-
farm knowledge, practice and experience (both biological and social). Th ey also 
obfuscate the social and political aspects of agrarian change (e.g. land reform, the 
social organization of labour and national price setting, to name just a few). Th is 
may have the unfortunate consequence of repeating the problems and failures of 
previous applications of ‘pure science’ to agricultural challenges.
Beyond seed science, one of the innovations New Green Revolution leaders 
are most excited about is the development of a corps of agro-dealers to bring 
high-yield seeds and improved fertilizer – what used to be called the biological 
package – to isolated, rural farmers.10 Replacing the infamous extension agent 
as the travelling salesman of the Green Revolution, these agro-dealers would be 
culled from the existing merchants who peddle their wares in outlying villages, 
thus solving (or at least circumventing) the problems presented by the lack of 
an African transportation infrastructure. But the assumption that the existing 
petty-merchant class can sell new seeds and other agricultural products (and even 
train farmers how to use them) exposes a serious misunderstanding of social and 
ethnic relations in parts of rural Africa. In the Upper Guinea Coast, farming 
populations generally regard the petty traders who would be recruited into the 
agro-dealer corps with deep misgivings and mistrust, and certainly do not rec-
ognize them for their knowledge of agriculture. I was often told a well-known 
rural legend about sneaky peddlers (they are always Fula in the Guinea-Bissau 
version of this story) who sold glass marbles to gullible rice cultivators, claiming 
that if they were planted and tended to, they would grow into coveted glass 
bottles after the rainy season. Th is anecdote is often told to highlight the naiveté 
of ‘traditional’ and ‘backward’ farmers, or to explain the roots of the enduring 
animosity between landowning farmers and itinerant merchants, or to prove that 
such merchants are inherently untrustworthy – or, usually, some combination of 
these. Many similar stories abound, testifying that relations between farmers and 
would-be agro-dealers are already tense. Any investment of funding and expecta-
tions in agro-dealers as the conduits through which newly developed high-yield 
seeds, fertilizer and agricultural know-how will reach rural farmers and transform 
agricultural productivity further exposes the naiveté – or at least the lack of atten-
tion to on-the-ground social relations – of Green Revolution architects.
Scientifi c and Indigenous Knowledge
One of the key resolutions of the fi rst African Green Revolution conference in 
Oslo is to ensure ‘targeted research and transfer of Science and Technology to 
farmers’ (Oslo Conference 2006; capital letters in original). Other resolutions, re-
dressing previous Green Revolution gaps, include commitments to crop diversity 
and the role of women in agriculture. But the emphasis is unmistakably on bring-
ing science and technology to the ‘unknowing’ African smallholder. Again, such 
an approach carries forward the perspective in which African farmers occupy 
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an earlier stage of evolutionary history, and claims that ‘the key to agricultural 
development in Africa lies in “technology transfer” – the importation of “appro-
priate” agricultural inputs from tropical regions held to be more “advanced” on 
the evolutionary scale’ (Richards 1985: 43).
Along with the prejudicial implications of such a view, the continued belief 
that laboratory science leads agricultural innovation is countered by countless 
examples of agricultural researchers reinventing traditional African agriculture 
by, for instance, ‘discovering’ the value of West African farming techniques like 
‘bush burning’, integrated use of valley and upland holdings, intercropping and 
land-rotation fallowing. Science has often followed such innovations rather than 
led them. As Paul Richards notes, ‘high technology’ initiatives throughout the 
colonial and postcolonial era had minimal and often counterproductive impact, 
and their failures were remedied – in numerous cases from Nigeria, Sierra Le-
one, Liberia, the Gambia and Senegal – by reinstating local cultivation practices 
(Richards 1985; see also Richards et al. 2009; Nuijten et al. 2009; Off ei et al. 
2010).
Th e reincarnation of the Green Revolution for Africa has attended to some 
of the previous biases against indigenous knowledge in its commitment to ‘listen 
to farmers’. As an AGRA programme offi  cer states,
Th ere is also a lot to be learned from the farmer. You develop ideas about 
what you think the farmer should do to solve their problem, but maybe 
that is not the farmer’s problem. … So, for us agriculturists, we may be 
telling the farmers what chemical to use or how to control the storage 
pests or how we can develop a resistant variety, but the farmers know 
what they have been doing and they may have abandoned a method that 
works. … So if you have an interaction between you and the farmer, you 
will come to learn what the farmer really wants. (AGRA-Alliance 2009)
While these lessons learned from the hubris of the previous Green Revolution 
refl ect what I believe are sincere intentions to incorporate indigenous knowl-
edge and smallholders’ concerns into agricultural development projects (even 
though, as mentioned above, other dynamics of Green Revolution culture and 
practice militate against this very process), such a bland and general intention to 
‘learn from farmers’ exposes yet another naïve assumption on the part of Green 
Revolution agro-economists: that indigenous knowledge is ripe for the picking, 
readily available to whichever plant geneticist or grant portfolio manager might 
ask about it. But one of the reasons behind the continuing stereotype and misrep-
resentation of the ‘conservative risk-averse farmer’ is that agrarian communities 
have ‘often misled outsiders into thinking that not much was going on’ (Richards 
1985: 111). It is often to farmers’ advantage to keep a low profi le and maintain 
the image of a subsistence backwater: such a projected image fends off  the tax 
190  Joanna Davidson
collector and others interested in taking a share of what is often a thriving trade 
in foodstuff s (see Richards 1985).
Even more so, some agrarian societies have deeply ingrained formal and in-
formal communicative strategies that make access to agricultural knowledge – 
or really any relevant knowledge regarding farmers’ circumstances – extremely 
diffi  cult to obtain. Various rice farming groups expend a great deal of time and 
energy managing knowledge about themselves and about the natural and super-
natural world (Ferme 2001; Sarró 2009; Davidson 2010). Th eir commitment to 
a particular scheme of information fl ow – based largely on secrecy, evasion and 
restraint – challenges even the most culturally sensitive development policies and 
practices, and certainly makes ‘learning from farmers’ more complicated than the 
AGRA programme offi  cer would lead us believe.
Conclusions
My goal in outlining some of my concerns with the New Green Revolution for 
Africa is not to dismiss eff orts to reach out to African farmers or, more broadly, 
address pressing problems of entrenched rural poverty in Africa. Rather, I want 
to point out some ways in which current well-funded, powerful eff orts to shape 
the agenda for accomplishing these aims might benefi t from a closer analysis of 
the assumptions underlying such endeavours, whether encased in the rhetori-
cal, institutional or programmatic aspects of African Green Revolution initia-
tives. Although the language is more sophisticated, these New Green Revolution 
approaches smuggle in many of the last Green Revolution’s teleological and 
evolutionary models of social change, and – despite regular references to ‘local 
knowledge’ and ‘political will’ – continue to treat agriculture as a set of tech-
niques outside complex social, political and religious contexts.
As Pedro Sanchez from the Earth Institute confi rmed: ‘Th e African Green 
Revolution is not a proposal, it’s on, it’s happening now. Agriculture is back on 
donors’ and governments’ agendas and it is being acknowledged as one of the key 
factors in Africa’s future’ (Cartridge and Leraand 2006: 109). Given that the train 
has already left the station, the question then becomes how anthropologists and 
others concerned about the more problematic aspects of Green Revolutionary 
practice can engage it constructively – particularly when interlocutors are resis-
tant to criticism and eager to claim the moral high ground of poverty eradication 
– without being either relegated to the role of naysayers or mired in the ‘ineff ec-
tive particularities of ethnographic detail’ that continue to make anthropologists 
‘bystanders in the wider arena of discussions about “Africa”’ (Ferguson 2006: 3). 
Will social scientists once again be consigned to the task of documenting the 
validity of indigenous knowledge for an audience that is enamoured with (and 
has the resources and power to bring about) change through technology, ‘pure 
science’ and market access? How can we best bring anthropological and historical 
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knowledge to bear on what will be signifi cant changes – and perhaps major op-
portunities or high-stakes follies – for rural Africans?
Th e story of rice and rice-oriented societies on the Upper Guinea Coast in-
vites us to take a very long view of historical change. Rice was domesticated 3,500 
years ago as an innovative response to a drying climate. Mangrove rice cultivation 
in particular represents an ingenious way to engineer an otherwise inhospitable 
landscape. Even the pressures of the Atlantic slave trade catalysed – in some cases 
– the consolidation of otherwise dispersed populations and led to an increase in 
output of rice. As Ohnuki-Tierney notes for the Japanese, ‘rice paddies objec-
tify time’ (1993: 133). Th ey evoke seasonality in the rhythms of planting and 
harvesting, they speak to cyclical patterns of rain and drought, and they express 
the history and memories of ancestors in their lineage-based tenure and their 
well-maintained ridges. What they will look like and represent in the future is 
unclear, especially given the odds of climate change, geopolitical marginality and 
a skewed globalized economy.
As stated above, one of the goals of the African Green Revolution is to turn 
Africa from a ‘basket case to a breadbasket’ (Cartridge and Leraand 2006: 109). 
Rather than being ‘genuinely African’, this aims to make Africa more like Iowa. 
An immediate countermeasure would involve shifting our attention away from 
old chestnuts like the impressive ‘adaptive’ strategies of rural smallholders and to-
wards a better understanding of the conditions in which agricultural innovation 
thrives, by building on Paul Richards’s call to ‘stimulate vigorous “indigenous sci-
ence” and “indigenous technology”’ (Richards 1985: 12). But a next step would 
involve moving beyond a science narrowly conceived on the basis of the origin 
of the scientist. A ‘genuinely African’ Green Revolution is not about enabling 
Africans to occupy positions in pristine laboratories, but it could be about recon-
ceptualizing the character of science itself. 
Th e nature of the science that has undergirded Green Revolutions from 
eighteenth-century Europe to 1970s Latin America and Asia is a classic example 
of Scott’s (1998) notion of high modernism in science. It is characterized not 
only by its constant confi dence that science and technology (and resolute reliance 
on the expertise of scientists and bureaucrats) will attend to problems in the nat-
ural and social world, but also by its indiff erence to cultural, historical and social 
complexities and particularities. By narrowly focusing on a single problem (ag-
ricultural production), black-boxing uncertainty and complexity, and generally 
overlooking or externalizing negative by-products, high-modernist science has 
continually shown itself to be irrelevant, inapplicable and ultimately resulting in 
failure more often than not (see S. Brooks 2010). It is also a deeply antipolitical 
approach to agricultural development (Ferguson 1994). If we opt not to follow 
that script for another chapter in Africa, perhaps Scott’s call for a ‘métis’ vision 
of practical knowledge points us in the right direction. Th e experiences of Diola 
rice farmers and the totalizing quality of rice in their societies remind us that Af-
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rican agricultural transformation requires a commitment to engage in agriculture 
not as a means to an end, but as a practice integrally linked to and informed by 
culture, ecology, politics, social organization and other dimensions of agrarian 
life not readily encapsulated by the tunnel-vision goals of a high-modernist and 
antipolitical approach to development.
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Notes
 1. Th is essay is a revised version of an article published in June 2012 as ‘Basket Cases and 
Breadbaskets: Sacred Rice and Agricultural Development in Postcolonial Africa’, Culture, 
Agriculture, Food and Environment (CAFÉ) 34(1): 15–32.
 2. Many rice-cultivating people consider rice sacred in diff erent ways (see Grist 1959; 
Ohnuki-Tierney 1993; United Nations Offi  ce at Geneva 2004).
 3. Th e dynamics around shifting levirate practices and the status of widows are quite com-
plex, and I do not have room in this chapter to detail them. For now, what is important 
is to acknowledge that decreasing rice supplies play an important part in the changes in 
social organization concerning widows.
 4. McCann’s (2005) study of maize provides further evidence in support of the observation 
that a hallmark feature of African agriculture is its loyalty to a single crop, even one of 
recent provenance.
 5. I am inspired by, and hopefully building upon, such works. But my similar focus on a sin-
gle crop – rice, in this case – does not lead me to the same type of dramatic, far-reaching 
arguments about the transformation of civilizations and geopolitical order across multiple 
continents. Although my background discussion of rice – its origins, travels, widespread 
use and future expectations – does touch upon some of these themes, my aims are perhaps 
less ambitious and more intimate by comparison.
 6. Eltis et al. argue against Judith Carney’s ‘black rice’ thesis (and against Peter Wood’s and 
Daniel Littlefi eld’s work, on which Carney’s builds) by insisting that ‘there is no compel-
ling evidence that African slaves transferred whole agricultural systems to the New World; 
nor were they the primary players in creating and maintaining rice regimes in the Amer-
icas.… Furthermore, a close look at the slave trade from an Atlantic perspective suggests 
no evidence that the rice culture of South Carolina, Georgia and Amazonia was any more 
dependent on skills imported from Africa than were its tobacco and sugar counterparts 
in the Chesapeake, the Caribbean, and Brazil. Th e evolving transatlantic connections, 
the age and sex composition of the slave trade, the broad shifts over time in transatlantic 
slaving patterns, and the structure of slave prices are all largely explained without refer-
ence to a supposed desire on the part of rice planters for slaves with rice-growing expertise 
developed in Africa’ (Eltis et al. 2007: 1335, 1357).
 7. As Temudo (2011: 309) notes, ‘In recent years, rice imports in the sub-region have been 
increasing from an annual growth rate of 5.54 per cent in 1991–2000 up to 10.51 per 
Rice and Revolution  193
cent in 2001–2005. Despite research and development eff orts focused on the selection 
and diff usion of modern varieties, rice consumption has been increasing faster than pro-
duction and the self-suffi  ciency ratio decreased from 0.78 in the 1990s to 0.58 from 2001 
to 2005’.
 8. Much of the agricultural research on tropical food crops for the Latin American and Asian 
Green Revolution was carried out under the auspices of an international research network 
coordinated by CGIAR and funded largely by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, 
with additional fi nancing from the World Bank and multinational corporations. Known 
as the CG System, it comprised ten International Agricultural Research Centers, some 
of which are continuing their work with new injections of fi nancing and purpose for the 
African Green Revolution.
 9. See Cernea (2005) for an excellent analysis of the ‘uphill battle for social research’ in 
CGIAR centres, as well as the lively discussion (‘Special Section’ 2006; Fernando 2007) 
in the wake of Cernea’s article.
10. See Koopman (2012) for another critique of this approach, as well as other problematic 
aspects of AGRA’s eff orts. See also Mittal and Moore (2009) for a report on African farm-
ers’ responses to AGRA.
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Chapter 10
Transnational and Local Models 
of Non-Refoulement
Youth and Women in the 
Moral Economy of Patronage in 
Postwar Liberia and Sierra Leone
William P. Murphy
Introduction
Survival and self-protection often require an acute recognition of the sociopolitical 
structures creating suff ering. Th is social fact is especially signifi cant for people dis-
placed during a war – that is, people displaced either within their country (IDPs) or 
outside the country (refugees).1 War-aff ected groups face the challenges of rebuild-
ing social lives when they return to exited communities, whether villages, towns 
and neighbourhoods or the national community as a whole. (E.g. a refugee might 
return to the national community but avoid her local community of origin be-
cause of the oppression of harsh patriarchy.) Returnees must confront the structural 
problems that led to the violent conditions precipitating their exit in the fi rst place.
‘Return’ produces a critical sociopolitical moment for scrutinizing social 
injustices existing before, during and after a war – thereby creating a special 
postconfl ict ‘public sphere’ in Habermas’s (1989 [1962], 1974) sense of citizen 
discourse and reasoning about political institutions and their consequences for 
socioeconomic inequality. Even as returnees face the constraints of an impover-
ished postwar social and economic infrastructure, hopeful possibilities arise for 
creating future institutions with greater fairness and opportunity. Alternatively, 
for the entrepreneurs of power and domination, the period of ‘return’ and the 
process of rebuilding the social fabric of a war-wracked country off er opportu-
nities to reimpose the political privileges and economic monopoly of a govern-
ing elite of local and national ‘big men’.2 Capturing international humanitarian 
resources for postconfl ict rehabilitation programmes, for example, is one core 
strategy for rebuilding patronage power and wealth (see Hoff man 2004 on the 
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eff ect of humanitarian aid on war strategies in the Liberian and Sierra Leone civil 
wars, and Fanthrope 2003 on postwar strategies; cf. Chambers 1979 for the eff ect 
of humanitarian aid on refugee strategies generally).
Th e logic of rebuilding ‘big man’ patronage structures can be described with 
a poignant phrase that Labonte (2011) used to summarize the social anxieties of 
returnees in the case of Sierra Leone, namely, the problem of ‘elite capture’ of post-
confl ict governance and wealth.3 Th e impoverishment of the postconfl ict political 
economy intensifi es social dependency on and subordination to ‘big man’ institu-
tional structures (including the reinforcing structures and ideologies of patriarchy 
and gerontocracy) and creates special incentives for ‘big man’ to build new pyra-
mids of patron domination and client dependency in the new spaces of postcon-
fl ict opportunity (on the theoretical logic of patronage pyramids see Martin 2009: 
Chap. 6). Christensen (2012), for example, in her study of patronage strategies in 
local postconfl ict government by former military commanders and their clients, 
concluded by off ering the important generalization that postconfl ict state forma-
tion and governance in Sierra Leone largely involves ‘the redirecting of milita-
rized patrimonial networks for post-war politico-economic purposes’ (Christensen 
2012: 74–75; see also Christensen and Utas 2007 and Utas 2012: 19).
Th is essay thus begins with a specifi c social anxiety about elite capture that 
is expressed in the local moral perspective on ‘non-refoulement’ – the right of 
not returning – and articulated by those worried about their vulnerability to 
injustices stemming from the patronage capture of resources when they return 
to postconfl ict communities. To illustrate this anxiety, consider a song recorded 
on cassette by a young Liberian band that I heard on the streets of Monrovia in 
2004, only a year after President Taylor had left for exile in Nigeria and during 
the beginning of the new interim government. Th e song poetically and musically 
critiqued the lived experience of the postconfl ict crisis of reasserted patronage 
power and privileges. A key phrase in it went ‘the only thing that has changed 
is the silence of the guns’ (to paraphrase what I heard). Th is referred to the end 
of the civil war in 2003 when two rebel groups were fi ghting President Charles 
Taylor, who himself had started the original, ‘fi rst’ civil war in December 1989 
against then President of Liberia Samuel Doe.
After the phrase, ‘the only thing that has changed is the silence of the guns’, 
the singer explains that big man politics hasn’t changed: the big men still have 
the fancy cars, fancy houses and beautiful girlfriends. Th e big men referred to 
were members of the interim government  – including former leaders of the rebel 
groups – who now were in positions of power. Th is song refl ects a central theme 
in postconfl ict discourse, namely, the danger that big man patronage politics will 
be reproduced in the postconfl ict period of social reconstruction, repeating old 
institutional problems of inequality and the suff ering they cause.
Th e relationship between social structure and suff ering is captured in the idea 
of ‘structural violence’ (Farmer 2003), but the broader methodological principle 
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is that the structural properties complicit in social suff ering, such as the institu-
tion of patronage, are mediated and identifi ed in the cultural vocabulary of social 
discourse, including the language of protest songs. Th is principle derives from 
social theory’s insistent task of trying to fi nd ‘a better way for the vocabulary of 
the actors to be heard loud and clear’, to borrow Latour’s (2005: 30) phrase. Th e 
analytical value of this ‘vocabulary’ in the study of social injustice rests on the 
ontological fact that morality and law are ‘situated in a linguistically structured 
form of life’ (Habermas 2003: 37).
Much of the cultural vocabulary of social injustice in postconfl ict Liberia and 
Sierra Leone focuses on failures in the moral economy of patronage reciprocity. 
Th ese failures, in turn, are seen by victims as justifying choices whether or not to 
return to, or to exit, particular local or national communities. In international law, 
these choices are interpreted in terms of the right of non-refoulement – one’s right 
not to be forced to return to a community one exited because of persecution. Th e 
argument here treats this international legal norm as a heuristic for thinking about 
local social injustices faced by postconfl ict returnees. Conversely, it also seeks to 
give ethnographic specifi city to this international ideal by analysing a specifi c in-
stitutional form producing those injustices, namely, ‘big man’ patronage.
Human Rights and Local Justice
Many scholars of this West African region have recognized the special political 
space of postconfl ict in Liberia and Sierra Leone as creating an intense inter-
action between human rights discourse and local moral idioms about injustice 
(e.g. Archibald and Richards 2002; Ferme and Hoff man 2004; Fanthrope 2005; 
Shaw 2005, 2010; Allie 2008; Boas and Hatloy 2008; Kelsall 2009; Sesay and 
Suma 2009; Anders 2012; Abramowitz and Moran 2012). Th is essay addresses 
similar questions, but in terms of a specifi c international legal norm: the right of 
non-refoulement, as well as the related right to exit a community.4 Having the 
‘right to exit’ a community because of various forms of persecution is the reverse 
of ‘non-refoulement,’ the right not to be forcibly returned to communities where 
persecution continues to be a danger.
It is characteristic of human rights thinking (as well as the anthropological 
imagination) to manifest concern for those who are politically vulnerable to per-
secution: ‘Human rights … articulate the relationship between individuals and 
groups within a community and their relationship with others, particularly those 
with power and authority’ (Clapham 2007: 161). A key diff erence, however, 
separates the transnational legal emphasis on crimes of individuals from local 
cultural assessments of unjust consequences of particular institutional and orga-
nizational forms. Kelsall makes a related point at the conclusion of his study of 
the war crimes tribunal of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: ‘international law 
doctrines were unable properly to capture the nature of authority in Sierra Le-
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one’ (Kelsall 2009: 260). Victims of social injustices are often better sociologists 
than international lawyers whose gaze is typically narrowed by legal doctrine to 
a focus on individual misdeeds. A lawyer cannot indict in court, or imprison, an 
institution. Th e transnational legal lens of focusing on individual accountability 
thus limits outsiders’ ability to ‘see’ institutional forms of local injustices relevant 
to the human rights of exiting and non-refoulement.5 Scott’s (1998) metaphor of 
‘seeing’ to represent a horizon of limited understanding arising from nation-state 
perspectives applies also to the transnational legal lens. 
In refugee law and policy, there are often ‘systematic reasons for igno-
rance’ in the form of oversights and biases towards refugees, for political 
or other reasons (e.g., urban bias towards rural refugees) – creating ‘what 
the eye does not see’ by overlooking the social strategies, institutional 
constraints and lived experience of those coping with forced migration. 
(Chambers 1979: 382)6
Nevertheless, in response to unfair aspects of postconfl ict social life, shared 
moral and intellectual sympathies can emerge to create a special form of ‘value 
generalization’ – between transnational human rights and local cultural idioms – 
that represents a mutual focus on aspects of unfairness in particular sociopolitical 
contexts (see Joas 2013: Chap. 6 on the concept of value generalization in social 
theory, as formulated in the work of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons). Th is social 
fact creates the broader ethnographic challenge of examining social spheres of 
value generalization from the point of view of diff erent social positions in a com-
munity, such as youth versus elders, or men versus women. Th is essay addresses 
that challenge.
Social Justice for Returnees: Transnational 
and Local Frames of ‘Seeing’7
Studies of the intersection of international human rights and local cultural be-
liefs often contrast ‘rights discourse’ of international law with other modalities 
of justice-making, such as reconciliation, communal sharing and mutual care, 
viewed as characteristic of local cultural practices (see Merry 2006: 133ff .). Th e 
analytical emphasis on the ethic of mutual care (and communal sharing) rather 
than human rights, however, can create a romanticized view of forms of social 
connectedness between individuals that overlooks the sober ethnographic fact 
that diff erent forms of social connectedness may be the problem and source of so-
cial injustice (Kiss 1999).8 Moreover, this dichotomy can defl ect attention from 
the manifold cross-cultural ethics of avoiding unfair treatment in various forms 
of social connectedness, for example, youth talking about the injustices of elders. 
A more encompassing theory of culture would underscore ‘the ways local cultural 
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practices and beliefs interact with global legal principles and the importance of 
seeing these in context’ (Merry 2006: 133; Goodale and Merry 2007; see also 
Clarke 2009 on the legal pluralism of micropractices of sociocultural diff erences 
in the discourse of rights and justice).
A good example of this interaction is the shared moral spirit manifest in the 
right to exit and right of non-refoulement. Th e 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights contains several articles that set out ideas related to the right to 
exit. Article 13 speaks directly of the right to leave your country, Article 14 iden-
tifi es the right to fi nd asylum from persecution by moving to another country, 
Article 15 defi nes the right to change your nationality and Article 18 speaks of 
the right to change your religion. Th is legal concept of ‘exiting’ has both spatial 
connotations, in the sense of the right to physically leave one’s community, and 
what might be called existential connotations, in the sense of the right to diff er-
entiate yourself in some way from your community’s cultural order of beliefs and 
values.
Th e right of ‘non-refoulement’ – the reverse of having a ‘right to exit’ – has 
a noteworthy legal history in human rights doctrine and refugee law. Th e right 
of refugees ‘not to be forcibly returned to countries where they face persecution’ 
on account of race, religion, nationality, social group membership, or political 
opinion was clarifi ed in international legal conventions on refugees in 1933 and 
1951, and further developed as fundamental international jurisprudence in addi-
tional legal instruments, such as the Convention against Torture adopted by the 
United Nations in 1984 and ratifi ed in 1987 (e.g. Adelman and Barkan 2011; 
Weissbrodt and Hortreiter 1999; for some analyses of African cases, see Kuruk 
1999 on Liberian refugees in Ghana, and Virmani 1999 on Uganda).
Th e legal principle of ‘non-refoulement’ is an ideal focal point for examining 
the local/global relationship as it pertains to the life of returnees to a postwar 
society. Consider, for example, that the legal vocabulary of non-refoulement de-
rives etymologically from the French word ‘refouler’ (‘to send back’ or ‘to turn 
away’), but it can also evoke connotations in the Anglo-Saxon language sense of 
‘foul’, that is, as something rotten, unclean, corrupt or off ensive to the senses. 
Th ese English connotations are not justifi ed etymologically, but they stimulate 
the thought experiment of asking what is socially noxious and unhealthy from 
the point of view of returnees. Th e next two sections suggest an answer in the 
structural form of big man patronage and its moral economy in the postwar pol-
itics of Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Patrimonial Patronage in Civil War 
Patrimonial politics formed the prewar conditions contributing to the violent 
confl ict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Th is political structure was not a suffi  cient 
cause of the civil war, but it did provide insurgency leaders with ideological jus-
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tifi cation (e.g. the idea of fi ghting against a corrupt government) and motivate 
some participants. Meanwhile, the actual day-to-day logic of the violence, in its 
microdimensions of patrimonial aggrandizement, had more to do with the so-
cial control of civilians and territorial resources than with overturning a corrupt, 
patrimonial government. Th e civil war was a site where diff erent patrimonial 
regimes – the government and rebel insurgencies, as well as factionalized rebel 
groups  – battled for this territorial and social control.
Th e ‘crisis of the patrimonial state’ is a canonical argument in the literature 
on causal mechanisms leading to the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some 
fundamental texts in this scholarly literature (explicitly or implicitly confi rming 
this political pattern) include, to cite just a few from a voluminous list, Abdullah 
(2004), Bolton (2012), Coulter (2009), Denov (2010), Duyvesteyn (2005), Ellis 
(1999), Ferme (2001), Gberie (2005), Hoff man (2011), Keen (2005), Kelsall 
(2009), Jackson (2004), Moran (2006), Murphy (2003), Peters (2011), Pham 
(2004, 2006), Reno (1995, 1998) and Richards (1996 and 2005a) and Utas 
(2005a, 2005b, 2012); also see McGovern (2011) on the interrelated civil war 
in Côte d’Ivoire. Th e locus classicus for conceptualizing key institutional features 
of this political form is Weber’s (1978: Chap. 12) analytical model of patrimo-
nialism (see Murphy 2010 for an application of this model to Upper Guinea 
Coast political and economic history, and Murphy 2003 for its application to the 
rebel regimes). Th e discretionary, autocratic power of big men in the patrimonial 
logic of governance is often generalized as a causal mechanism in the logic of the 
‘failed’ or ‘weak’ state syndrome (see Williams 2011: Chap. 3 on ‘neopatrimonial-
ism’ in African confl icts).9
Th e broad idea of patrimonial political system can be constructed with eth-
nographic specifi city by imagining a pyramid of nested, dyadic patron/client re-
lations emerging from political strategizing in various social contexts of severe 
dependency, inequality, economic need and power aggrandizement. In addition, 
the term ‘patrimonial patronage’ – patronage in governance structures at diff er-
ent territorial levels (nation, chiefdom, town, village, etc.) – can be used to dif-
ferentiate practices of ‘social patronage’ in nongovernmental domains of society, 
that is, families, households and the variety of social groups in civil society gen-
erally (youth gangs, trade unions, etc.).10 Patronage and clientelism as concrete 
practices are best conceptualized as sociopolitical strategies (Piattoni 2001), a 
conception that in turn justifi es a method of attending to the language used to 
evaluate the eff ectiveness and success – and the morality (fairness or unfairness) 
– of those strategies in particular social and political contexts.
Ethnographic Sketch
Postwar Liberia and Sierra Leone provide two powerful cases of institutional 
change and continuity of patrimonial structures resulting from civil war and its 
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aftermath. Th e second civil war in Liberia, locally called ‘World War II’, began 
in 1999 and opposed two rebel groups – Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy, and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia – against the govern-
ment of Charles Taylor, who in December 1989 had started the fi rst civil war, or 
‘World War I’, with his National Patriotic Front of Liberia insurgency. Taylor be-
came president in 1997 but was exiled to Nigeria in August 2003. His departure 
came to symbolize the end of both civil wars and later the war crimes and crimes 
against humanity that characterized the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
His election in 1997 – contested under the threat of war restarting if he was not 
elected – and his government rule until his departure in 2003 exemplifi ed the 
logic of ‘elite capture’ of national economic resources and political power charac-
teristic of patrimonial systems.
In March 2003 Taylor was indicted by the UN-backed Special Court for 
Sierra Leone for war crimes and crimes against humanity.11 In April 2012 in a 
trial held in Th e Hague, he was convicted on eleven counts of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, including crimes that had gender and age dimensions 
such as rape, sexual slavery and use of child soldiers. In May 2012, he was sen-
tenced to fi fty years in prison. Th e civil war in Sierra Leone (declared offi  cially 
over in 2002) had been started in March 1991, with the support of Charles 
Taylor, by Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). He 
died in 2003 before he could be brought to trial by the same Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, which indicted him on seventeen counts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.
Th e rebel regimes of both Taylor and Sankoh exemplifi ed the structural vul-
nerabilities characteristic of ‘warlord’ patrimonial organizations, such as coercive 
means of discretionary authority enabling immunity from traditional moral con-
straints, a system of authority that was fractionalized (and factionalized) by com-
petition among ‘big man’ warlords, and so forth. Th e rebel-group domination 
imposed on captured territories and civilian populations replicated the prewar 
patrimonial logic and ideology of social control, though with the addition of 
more extreme coercive means for controlling labour and monopolizing economic 
resources. Th e harsh use of subjects for forced labour in these warlord political 
regimes contributed to the war’s immense devastation of local and national in-
frastructures, and to extensive violence against civilians. Using the words of one 
young ex-combatant (from a Sierra Leone civil defence force), most civilians, 
aware of the RUF rebels’ predations on civilian lives and property, eventually 
viewed them as ‘just armed bandits’ and ‘thieves’, despite their lofty-sounding 
revolutionary ideology (quoted in Peters and Richards 1998: 200).
Another major indicator of the devastation and disruption of a civil war 
is the large-scale movement of refugees and internally displaced people, which 
creates one of the key analytical problems – and humanitarian challenges – for 
understanding postconfl ict societies: namely, the need to understand the socio-
204  William P. Murphy
political practices of trying to rehabilitate community life and rebuild physical 
infrastructures of war-torn villages and towns, and the need to reconcile ex-
combatants, both male and female, with their families and communities.12 Nev-
ertheless, many displaced persons, especially youth and women, have been un-
willing to return to their original communities and customary ways of life. Th eir 
hesitancy refl ects a social and existential crisis of ‘institutional doubt’ about post-
confl ict politics (to borrow a term from Habermas 1973: 15).
Analytical Puzzle: Th e Moral Economy of Patrimonial Patronage
In the political economy of the prewar, civil war and postwar periods in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, reciprocal obligations were often defi ned by a normative or-
der regulating dependency relations with big man patrons within a patrimonial 
political system. Typically, this cultural order of politics codifi es obligations of 
exchange in which patrons provide economic aid and political protection while 
clients and subjects provide labour, political loyalty and economic tribute. Th ese 
obligations and expectations constitute a moral economy of patronage.
Th e idea of a ‘moral economy’ – namely, a moral code regulating economic 
transactions between those with authority and their economic dependents – is 
most often associated with the work of E.P. Th ompson (1971; see also Scott 1976 
and Davis 1973; for application to African history, see Austin’s 1993 analysis of 
the moral economy of witchcraft). Th ompson’s use of the term ‘moral economy 
of the poor’ in his historical analysis of food riots in eighteenth-century Britain 
follows Marx’s preoccupation with the critique of and resistance to the injustices 
of capitalism. Th is concept seems to turn Weber on his head by focusing on the 
legitimate use of violence by the poor and less powerful, rather than on the le-
gitimacy of the monopoly of violence by the powerful in a political community. 
But the idea actually overlaps with Weber’s theoretical emphasis on the cultural 
order of meaning and morality as constitutive of economic transactions (and of 
legitimate violence). Th e relationship between morality and economic transac-
tions is clear in Weber’s theory of patrimonialism: the traditional moral order 
places a ‘“customary” limitation on economic exploitation’, and breaches in this 
customary moral order through ‘excessive demands – transcending tradition – 
could shake their [subjects’] loyalty, which had a merely traditional basis’ (Weber 
(1978: 1010).
A morality of reciprocity between the powerful and the less powerful charac-
terizes local theories of justice documented in the classic ethnographies of African 
law (e.g. Bohannan 1957; Gluckman 1955). Also characteristic of such systems, 
however, is the potential for transforming reciprocity into harsh extraction when 
the traditional, customary moral code becomes only a weak constraint on the ag-
grandizement of personalistic, autocratic power. Th is structural vulnerability was 
a central principle in Weber’s argument about the relationship between morality 
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and power in patrimonial systems – a principle often confi rmed by cross-cultural 
cases of big man systems, for instance, Sahlins’s (1963: 293) classic argument 
about Melanesian big men, who often substitute ‘extraction for reciprocity’.13 
Th e excesses of big man extraction are often represented in the Upper Guinea 
Coast region by the trope of ‘eating’ (Bolton 2012) and the related trope of a 
‘big belly’ (see Shepler 2011 for the case of Sierra Leone; for a generalization of 
this trope in understanding African politics, see Bayart 1993). In addition, the 
kinship tropes of reciprocity provide a moral language for critiquing the failures 
of big man patronage (Murphy, in press).
Patrimonialism as a political system exhibits a fundamental structural ten-
sion between the morality of reciprocity and the abuses by power-holders making 
excessive demands on subjects. Reciprocity in what might be called ‘benign’ pat-
rimonialism tempers the logic of domination and dependency because a moral 
code specifi es ‘the subjects’ claim to reciprocity, and this claim “naturally” ac-
quires social recognition as custom’ (Weber 1978: 1010). Hence ‘the master too 
“owes” something to the subject … according to custom and his own self-inter-
est’ – that is, the patrimonial ruler’s moral obligations include ‘external protec-
tion’, ‘help in case of need’, ‘humane treatment’ and ‘particularly a “customary” 
limitation of economic exploitation’ (Weber 1978: 1010). Such obligations and 
customary limitations constitute the normative elements of a moral economy of 
patrimonialism.
Moral Economy and the Language of Injustices
Th e moral economy of patrimonial patronage provides a local vocabulary for 
subordinates to critique the injustices of power-holders in terms of a cultural 
principle of ‘justice as fairness’ in asymmetrical social relations.14 Th is principle is 
a core idea in philosophical refl ections on justice, most notably in the infl uential 
formulation of John Rawls (1971). ‘Justice as fairness’, in his formulation, means 
that social and economic inequalities are acceptable if they satisfy two conditions: 
fi rst, equality of opportunity to acquire social positions and political offi  ces; and 
second, use of positions and offi  ces to the greatest benefi t of the least advantaged 
members of society (see Sen 2009: 59ff ., for an exegesis and critique of Rawls).
Th is philosophical formulation helps clarify the moral economy of obliga-
tions in patrimonial patronage. Consider, for example, that the fi rst condition 
of equality of opportunity is not met because patrimonial patronage is, by defi -
nition, a form of elite capture of political and economic resources. True, this 
institution can be seen ideally to meet the second condition when big man au-
thority is used to fairly redistribute resources to the community. Th e morality of 
redistribution, however, is highly vulnerable to political strategies of selectively 
channelling resources to build up a cadre of followers and clients in order to 
shore up autocratic power through big man patronage – to the detriment of 
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the majority in a community. Accumulation of power and privileges via these 
strategies in the patronage network of patrimonialism leads to the social injustice 
of impoverishment and political marginalization among the ‘least advantaged 
members of society’.
Th e second condition of ‘justice as fairness’ is also violated in patrimonial 
politics, especially when resources and wealth in people are coercively created 
through monopolies of military power (as in rebel insurgencies controlling peo-
ple and territory). For most people, the consequence of this type of political 
system is destitution and suff ering. Moreover, building up a personalistic, discre-
tionary authority with immense military power leads to a characteristic crisis of 
patrimonial politics – which Weber (1978: 1055) typifi es in the image of ‘centrif-
ugal forces’ of instability and confl ict inherent in this political form (see Murphy 
2010 on the centrifugal forces in the political and economic history of the Upper 
Guinea Coast). Th e moral economy, in other words, breaks down under the pres-
sure of changes in the political economy that enable the monopoly of political 
and economic resources, notably through increased use of coercive resources for 
social control, for example government repression or rebel insurgency control of 
captured territories. Th e next section outlines the breakdown and failure of the 
moral economy of patronage – in the form of both patrimonial patronage of gov-
ernance and the social patronage of everyday life outside government institutions 
– in the postconfl ict lives of youth and women.
Social Crisis and Malaise
Th e crisis of the neopatrimonial state is also a ‘crisis of youth’, a phrase often used 
in African political discourse as well as academic discourse in African studies. In 
the title of Peters’ (2011) book on the Sierra Leone civil war, the phrase evokes 
the social dependency and marginalization of youth as intensifi ed under the po-
litical and economic instabilities of the big man system. As Hoff man (2011: 8) 
notes, global media captured this crisis of youth with evocative captions like 
‘Sierra Leone Is No Place To Be Young’ and references to war-torn Sierra Leone 
such as calling the country a ‘teenage wasteland’. Similarly, the plight of women 
in the civil war would justify the analogous caption ‘Sierra Leone Is No Place To 
Be Female’. Th is media language can be translated into the theoretical language 
of patrimonial patronage. Neopatrimonialism is also a ‘crisis of women’. Women 
are especially vulnerable, in diff erent structural ways, to the excesses of a big 
man political system that justifi es forms of female subordination and servitude 
(and even, during the civil war, sexual slavery). Girls, moreover, have diff erent 
socioeconomic trajectories for rebuilding lives – and face diff erent structural con-
straints – than boys in postconfl ict communities, as many studies of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone have emphasized (e.g. Utas 2005b; Coulter 2009; Denov 2010; 
Moran 2010; Shepler 2014; Van Gog 2008).15 In general, the central theme in 
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these studies is the emergence of a new cultural and political space for youth and 
women to negotiate, redefi ne and rework prewar social identities and relations 
(e.g. Richards 2005b; Coulter 2009; Knörr 2010; Shepler 2010; Hoff man 2011; 
Peters 2011).16
Youth and women, however, confront a general social ‘malaise’ pervading the 
realignment of social relations during confl ict and postconfl ict (see Macek 2009 
for the case of civil war and postconfl ict in Bosnia). In postconfl ict Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, anomie – like creative agency – is typically structured by the social 
conditions of subordination and marginalization within reproduced patronage 
structures and practices (see Braithewaite et al. 2010 on the social dynamics of 
anomie in postconfl ict reconciliation in Indonesia). In the case of Sierra Leone, 
Denov (2010: 86), for example, emphasizes that the disruption inherent in civil 
war entails a dismantling of relationships within local communities, resulting 
in a profound loss of confi dence in one’s self and social world (Denov 2010: 
86). Coulter (2009: 251), who studied female ex-combatants and ‘bush wives’ 
of rebel commanders in Sierra Leone, argues in terms of gender and generational 
relations that men and women as well as parents and children ‘no longer really 
know what to expect from one another’. Knörr (2010: 226) underscores this 
social malaise in the special urban context of Krio identity processes in Sierra 
Leone: the violence of the civil war ‘has caused deep feeling of suspicion and 
distrust concerning one’s own people and institutions’. Shepler (2014) points to 
broader theoretical implications about the cultural constructions of childhood 
and children’s rights by focusing her ethnographic analyses on youth agency in 
the postconfl ict Sierra Leonean context of structural change and challenge. And 
Abramowitz (2014) delineates the trauma of war as an intersection of the social 
and the psychological and explores the eff ects of this mental health nexus on 
Liberian postconfl ict individual and collective healing (see also Murphy 2015 
on the sociopolitical complexities of ‘community reconciliation’ as a modality of 
psychological healing).
Many young people and women did not want to return to their villages and 
communities because they feared subordination under prewar customary forms 
of authority. Youth worry about gerontocratic processes controlling their labour 
and services. Women worry about patriarchal power subjugating them. Both 
worry about the charismatic authority of big men and their personalistic, discre-
tionary power to subjugate and marginalize. Both articulate a kind of ‘legitima-
tion crisis’ surrounding big man patronage in postconfl ict sociality.17 As Menzel 
(in press) shows for postconfl ict Sierra Leone, this crisis is manifest in the tension 
between complicity (out of necessity) in the patron/client logic, and criticism 
of this logic as producing barriers to societal and individual betterment. Similar 
structural tensions between big man patronage and clientalist dependency shape 
the reproduction of discursive critique in postconfl ict diasporic communities (see 
Steinberg 2011 on resettled Liberians in New York City).
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Youth
In impoverished postconfl ict conditions, youth are especially dependent on pa-
tronage assistance because families and kin groups lack the resources to provide 
adequately for their children’s future and the government fails to provide basic 
social services. Denov and Buccitelli (2013) analyse several important forms of 
social dependency in the case of postconfl ict Sierra Leone, for example relations 
with an older male who acts as a fi ctive older brother, or relations with an older 
woman who acts as a fi ctive older sister (respectively called ‘bra’ and ‘sisi’ in Sierra 
Leonean Krio). Th is exchange relation requires that young men or women pro-
vide services, for instance performing domestic chores or helping with market-
ing. In addition, peer groups and gangs provide cross-cutting support, serving to 
protect youth against mistreatment by a patron; however, they also add another 
form of dependency to the postconfl ict social structure that needs to be navigated 
(Denov and Buccitelli 2013). Newell’s (2012) detailed analysis of youth navigat-
ing the moral economy of patron/client relations in the gangs of Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, exemplifi es the reliance on patronage structures in marginal social spaces 
lacking government control and services.
Th e fi ctive kin ties of ‘bra’ and ‘sisi’ represent a form of ‘social patronage’ 
operating outside governmental political patronage but follow a similar logic of 
employing resources of wealth and authority to incorporate the labour and loy-
alty of clients and dependents. Social patrons are, in a sense, ‘small’ big men and 
women. In an impoverished postconfl ict country, even limited power and wealth 
can be suffi  cient resources for their holder to act as a ‘social patron’. And the la-
bour pool of potential dependents is extensive. Poor youth have little choice but 
to secure the protection and economic assistance of a patron.
Despite dire dependency, youth recognize unfairness in this patronage rela-
tionship and can very clearly articulate the diff erence between a good and an evil 
patron, according to a moral economy of patronage. While youth are expected to 
render services, obedience and money (e.g. from market trade), harsh Dickensian 
patrons are common, as this youth describes:
My former bra was very wicked. … He would kick me and slap me and 
beat me in public. People would try to intervene, but he would yell at 
them to go away. He would say: ‘Don’t get involved, he is my borbor 
[boy]!’ (Denov and Buccitelli 2013: 11–12; see also Denov, Doucet and 
Kamara 2012)
Th us social patrons and powerful political patrons alike are evaluated by the same 
moral economy of reciprocity that accepts social subordination when there is 
fairness in the asymmetrical exchanges between patron and client.
In some major towns, another notable example of social patronage strategies 
in the postconfl ict political economy is the motorbike trade unions made up 
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primarily of ex-combatants (e.g. Peters 2007 and 2011). Th e postconfl ict narra-
tive of the motorbike trade includes episodes of big men using their patronage 
power to treat ex-combatants as little more than serfs who are dependent upon 
patronage resources to gain access to a motorbike and a share in the business. 
Denov documents in ethnographic detail the harsh forms of social dependency 
in the patronage logic operating within this particular economic space. In one 
case of economic patronage, the ‘boss’ (patron) who owns the motorbike that an 
ex-combatant rides and uses to make his living treats the client harshly if he does 
not bring in enough money, as the ex-combatant explains:
My present trouble is that I don’t have a bike of my own and am just 
making money for someone else [my boss]. … My boss owns the bike. 
He can ask me to leave at any time because there is really no guarantee in 
the relationship. … Sometimes when I’m unable to raise 25,000 Leones 
from the bike, he abuses me verbally and insults me. … He threatens 
that he will take the bike from me, as if our relationship is just tied 
around the bike. … All he cares about is the money. … He is arrogant 
and disrespectful. (Denov 2011: 200–1.
Besides criticism of the ‘bad’ social patrons of everyday life, a second dis-
cursive type of critique arises when youth question their subordination under 
patrimonial authority in governance structures, and the various secular and reli-
gious forms of patriarchy and gerontocracy legitimating those structures. Peters’ 
studies (2005, 2007, 2010, 2011) are especially rich in documentation of Sierra 
Leonean ex-combatants’ critique of youth subordination under the patrimo-
nial authority of chiefs and elders (see also Richards 1996; Fithen and Richards 
2005). Th e group discussions documented by Archibald and Richards (2002) 
also provide extensive data on the discourse about the injustices of patrimonial 
practices, such as chiefs and elders co-opting postconfl ict humanitarian assis-
tance. As one villager lamented: ‘Th rough injustice we have turned our young 
people to rebels’ (Archibald and Richards 2002: 346; see also Utas 2005b). Such 
discourses ‘confi rm the salience of local debate about a “generation gap”… and 
both youth and elders’ groups ‘refer to young people quitting the village and 
becoming “footloose”, due to heavy fi nes’ imposed on youth by chiefs and elders 
(Archibald and Richards 2002: 346). Explicit comments about this generation 
gap clearly identify chiefs’ and elders’ abuse of patrimonial authority. According 
to one elders’ group, ‘the heavy fi nes levied by chiefs on youths have led to many 
leaving the villages’ (Archibald and Richards 2002: 346). And one youth group 
observes that ‘Chiefs victimize youth by imposing heavy and unjust fi nes’, and 
‘criminal summonses make youths run from the village, resulting in disunity and 
grievance’ (Archibald and Richards 2002: 347). Extractions of youth labour, debt 
servitude and ritual subservience produce what some analysts have called ‘judicial 
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serfdom’ (Mokuwa et al. 2011; see also Peters 2010) – a key institutional feature 
of harsh forms of patrimonialism and a danger youth try to avoid in postconfl ict 
social reconstruction. In the unique postconfl ict public sphere of institutional 
re-evaluations, youth become ‘iconoclasts’ of big man patronage (see Højbjerg 
2007 and Sarró 2009 on the iconoclastic structural tendencies shaped by social 
turmoil and crises in the Upper Guinea Coast region).
Women
Women’s special challenge to patrimonial authority and its patriarchal legitimacy 
– at both family and community levels – in the aftermath of war is a signifi cant 
feature of postconfl ict discourse about injustice. Many studies, notably Coulter 
(2009) and Denov (2010), document this structural tension and the extensive 
discourse of women’s criticism of the oppression and rejection they fi nd in patri-
archal households and communities as they try to reconcile with communities 
after having spent time with rebel groups as abducted ‘bush wives’ or girl soldiers. 
But subordination to patriarchal household and community regimes is only part 
of the ethnographic story of women’s lives in wartime and postconfl ict Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. As Moran (2010: 267) has emphasized for Liberia, ‘women had 
also held visible, highly authoritative positions in both rural and urban contexts’ 
before the war. And during the war, as Moran’s recent research on men who did 
not fi ght in the Liberian civil war demonstrates, women exercised power in subtle 
ways, such as when senior women took on the role of ‘either sending younger 
male kin to war or refusing them permission to join the armed factions’ (Moran 
2010: 268). Exclusive focus on ‘the discourse of prewar patriarchy’ can obscure 
the ‘authority of mothers, grandmothers, and aunts to deploy young men’s labor 
to defense or other tasks’ during the war (ibid.: 268). Th e complexity of power 
and authority in female roles in traditional Liberian societies, Moran (ibid.: 262) 
argues, is often neglected in postconfl ict reform projects, which ‘continue to be 
grounded in static, oversimplifi ed, or locally inappropriate notions of gender’. 
Th e explanatory idiom of ‘patriarchy’ can essentialize and overlook the multifac-
eted dimensions of struggle and challenge that women face in a weak postconfl ict 
political economy (e.g. ibid.: 267–68).
Th e analytical goal is not to discard the concept of patriarchy but to clearly 
specify how the ideology of patriarchy operates as a legitimating mechanism of 
authority in concrete practices within diff erent social structures and political 
economies of gender relations, such as when a successful woman becomes a kind 
of patriarch or big man (cf. Enloe 2005). Women’s postconfl ict discourse about 
the patriarchal justifi cation for their harsh servitude and suff ering during the civil 
war, for example, involves a larger discursive critique of big man (i.e. warlord) 
organizational structures of war making that used women for forced labour and 
sexual services.
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Research by Archibald and Richard (2002) extensively documents women’s 
critique of patriarchal and gerontocratic authority in postconfl ict communities 
(see also Ferme 2001). Regarding the village distribution of humanitarian aid, 
for instance, women complain that chiefs and elders monopolize the benefi ts of 
postwar development, preventing fair distribution. In one chiefdom discussion, 
‘the women’s group complained that women were marginalized and that “cus-
tomary law keeps women at the bottom of the social ladder” and “the chiefs grab 
everything that should be women’s”’ (Archibald and Richards 2002: 348). In this 
patrimonial logic, law as well as politics become the personal property of chiefs.
Some of the loudest and clearest voices against big man patronage in post-
confl ict Liberia and Sierra Leone have come from women’s organizations. For 
example, Leymah Gbowee, whose organization, the Liberian Women’s Initia-
tive, helped end the Liberian civil war in 2003, gained recognition worldwide 
when she won the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize for her heroic work for peace and 
women’s rights (Gbowee 2011). Similarly, in postconfl ict Sierra Leone women’s 
organizations were constructed with a ‘broader vision of gender equality and the 
transformation of prevailing patriarchal power’ (Maclure and Denov 2009: 619; 
see also Denov 2008). One of the unintended consequences of the civil wars in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone was the proliferation of women’s groups organizing to 
challenge, in light of their experience of the wars, the gender norms (and norms 
of youth subordination) legitimating the patronage institutions reinstituted in 
postconfl ict society.
Conclusion and Th eoretical Implications
Both international human rights eff orts and local critique are often driven by 
outrage at the injustices of abusive power. Outrage is also the driving force be-
hind much social theoretical work. A canonical example is Marx’s analysis of the 
abuse of workers in capitalist institutions. Marx off ered a diagnosis of a structural 
failure to provide workers with a just reward for the products of their labour, 
as well as a critique of failures in the distributive justice of allocating resources 
according to individual needs (Sen 2009: x). In intellectual history his work is 
emblematic of the integration of rigorous social theory and empathy for social 
justice.
Outrage, however, is not the privilege of an intellectual elite enlightened 
with penetrating perceptions of social injustice – a common idea in Marxist po-
litical thought. Rather, a broader moral (and social) theory of justice can be con-
structed on the human capability (in all its diff erent cultural modes of language 
and expression) to perceive and reason about social injustices (e.g. Sen 2009). 
Th is premise encourages methodological attention to the everyday language and 
critique of unfairness in social life, including special attention to the perceptions 
of those most vulnerable to the suff ering caused by that unfairness. ‘In a process 
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of enlightenment, there are only participants’ (Habermas 1994: 101). Th e social 
theorist or philosopher or international lawyer is only one participant off ering in-
sights enriched by dialogue with those who live the experience of social injustice.
Meanwhile, the outsider’s gaze can be limited by ‘not seeing’ forms of re-
pressive political authority (whether national or subnational) that limit the pos-
sibilities of public debate and dissent and create a mask of consensus despite 
widespread, though muted, dissent and dissension (Murphy 1990). Th e con-
sequence is that local social critique – its scope and penetration of institutional 
patterns of injustice – is overlooked. One methodological key to avoiding this 
oversight is to fi nd ‘a better way for the vocabulary of the actors to be heard loud 
and clear’ (Latour 2005: 30). In the case of social injustice, the challenge is to fi nd 
a better way to broadcast the vocabulary of those most vulnerable to the unjust 
consequences of institutional practices.
Th e methodology of ‘listening’ – with a particular theoretical focus – trans-
forms the large questions of postconfl ict social justice into more detailed ques-
tions about everyday social practices and the everyday language of rebuilding 
broken and unjust worlds (see Das and Kleinman 2001 on the everyday lived 
experience of collective violence, social suff ering and social recovery). More 
broadly, this methodological assumption is foundational in building a theory of 
justice, as Amarta Sen shows in his refl ections on the idea of justice:
We could have been creatures incapable of sympathy, unmoved by the 
pain and humiliation of others, uncaring of freedom, and – no less sig-
nifi cant – unable to reason, argue, disagree and concur. Th e strong pres-
ence of these features in human lives does not tell us a great deal about 
what particular theory should be chosen, but it does indicate that the 
general pursuit of justice might be hard to eradicate in human society, 
even though we can go about that pursuit in diff erent ways. (Sen 2009: 
414–15)
Reasoning and debating about injustices is an important part of what it means 
to be a human being. For anthropologists, the ‘strong presence of these features 
in human lives’ does not tell us what aspects of institutional and organizational 
structures produce unjust consequences, but it does encourage a methodologi-
cal orientation to people’s local discourse and reasoning about the sociopolitical 
structures leading to those unjust consequences.
Despite the variety of ideological justifi cations for causing human suff er-
ing, both the genealogy of human rights and the moral presumption of human 
dignity and individual worth within that genealogy (a kind of secular ‘sacraliza-
tion’ of the person) are shaped historically by the human and social response to 
‘negative, distressing, traumatizing experiences of our own and others’ suff ering’ 
(Joas 2013: 6). Th e idea of a secular ‘sacralization’ of the individual, which also 
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has roots in Durkheim’s theory of the growth of individuation through modern-
ization (see Giddens 1972), can be refi ned to capture the specifi c negative and 
traumatic experiences (and injustices) aff ecting particular social types of persons, 
such as women or youth.
Finally, the goal of examining those experiences in the study of social justice 
derives from two important principles of method and social theory: fi rst, theo-
rists of justice ‘must begin from a concrete understanding of the lives of those 
about whom they theorize’ (Kiss 1999: 6); and second, ‘exploited and margin-
alized people may be equally poor, but their diff erences in social position and 
experience must be taken into account in attempts to diagnose and remedy the 
injustice of their condition’ (Kiss 1999: 9). Th is essay has attempted to under-
stand such diff erences by taking into account the structural vulnerabilities of 
youth and women when they return to postconfl ict communities, their language 
of injustice in reaction to reinstituted forms of big man patronage, and the re-
lation of their moral language to the heuristic model of the international legal 
norm of non-refoulement.
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along the Upper Guinea Coast (Brill, 2010).
Notes
 1. On the legal relationship between the categories of internally displaced persons and ref-
ugees, see Lee (1996). In addition, a residual category of displacement include the ‘self-
settled’ (i.e. those who solve their displacement problems without the formal organi-
zational help of a refugee organization or refugee camp). I want to thank my colleague 
Akbar Virmani, who is also a refugee scholar, for introducing me to this third type of 
displaced persons. For the Upper Guinea Coast region, Ray’s (in press) research on Casa-
mance refugees in the Gambia has clarifi ed the sociopolitical logic of host/stranger rela-
tions that shape self-settlement processes.
 2. Th e analytical category of ‘big man’ – as well as the term for this institutional state of 
aff airs, ‘bigmanity’ (see Utas 2012) – glosses the meaning of various key cultural idioms 
of personalistic authority used in the languages of the Upper Guinea Coast. Such termi-
nological conventions illustrate a core methodological principle: namely, social scientifi c 
concepts are often constructed, implicitly or explicitly, with the data of local cultural 
idioms used to talk about and represent social reality.
 3. Th e phrase ‘big man patronage’, as used in this essay, implies sociological variation in 
institutional forms of patronage (Martin 2009: 216ff .).
 4. Th e terms ‘international’ and ‘transnational’ – as well as ‘global’ – are used interchangea-
bly in this essay to designate a legal normative order (and political economy) beyond the 
nation-state (and subnational communities). In addition, ‘postwar’ and ‘postconfl ict’ are 
used synonymously here.
 5. Legal approaches to individual culpability and anthropological approaches to institu-
tional structures sometimes intersect. For example, understanding the structure of com-
mand and control in military organizations helps international lawyers to identify the 
culpability of leaders in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity (e.g. see Hagan 
2003: Chap. 6 on the legal importance of identifying ‘command responsibility’ in the 
Foca rape trial for war crimes in Bosnia).
 6. I thank my colleague, Akbar Virmani, for this reference in refugee studies.
 7. Th e term ‘local’ is often used to distinguish sociopolitical levels within a system of con-
trasting scales of community, such as the village, town or chiefdom as distinguished from 
the wider scale of the nation-state or colonial state – or international system. In cultural 
theory, the term has been used to defi ne a perspective of meaning and interpretation 
within diff erent circumscribed domains of community (e.g. Geertz 1983). Th e ‘local’ in 
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this sense becomes a standpoint associated with particular structural spaces within a social 
system. Using the summary defi nition of Shaw and Wardorf (2010: 6), it is ‘a standpoint 
based on a particular locality but not bounded by it’. Logically, international legal doc-
trine is ‘local’ in this perspectival approach to codes of meaning in society.
 8. In postconfl ict discourse about women’s rights, for example, common rhetorical assump-
tions can limit social understanding – the ‘seeing’ – of the complexity of women’s social 
experience and needs by essentializing womanhood as war victim, peacemaker, or com-
munity builder (see critique by Schroven 2011). 
 9. See Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) for a penetrating critique of the misuse of this 
concept in African studies; see also Eisenstadt (1973) for further clarifi cation on the dif-
ference between traditional patrimonialism and modern neopatrimonialism.
10. On youth gangs as patrimonial organizations, see Collins (2011).
11. In adjudicating war crimes and crimes against humanity, a basic structural tension persists 
between international criminal justice and national amnesty laws. See R. Murphy (2006) 
for the jurisprudential and political dynamics of this tension in Uganda’s case against the 
Lord’s Resistance Army.
12. Th e Liberian civil war caused half the population of approximately 3 million to fl ee their 
homes. Most became internally displaced while approximately 700,000 became refugees 
in neighbouring countries.
13. Sahlins’s (1963) argument about the politics of Melanesian big men matches the analyti-
cal principles in Weber’s model of patrimonialism.
14. Violations of the moral economy of patronage are constituted as social realities by the 
victims’ construal of the meaning of ‘unfair’ social action in patron-client relations – i.e., 
interpreting social actions as signs of injustice (for the language and logic of refl exivity 
in Peircean semiotic theory, see Agha 2007, Lucy 1993, and Silverstein 1993). In this 
communicative logic, in other words, there is a metapragmatics of social injustice.
15. I thank Mariane Ferme for reminding me during discussions at the 2010 Upper Guinea 
Coast conference in Halle, Germany to underscore the structural diff erences of gender, 
which her own work does so insightfully. Another caveat about youth positionality should 
be mentioned: ‘youth’ is a sociopolitical, and semiotic, construction of shifting meanings, 
and not a rigid chronological category – a man of 40 years can be a ‘youth’ because of 
certain attributes of socioeconomic inadequacies (e.g. Durham 2004).
16. Th e analytical ideas of ‘navigation’, ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’ are central themes in contem-
porary studies of youth agency and social structure in Africa, e.g., Christensen, Utas and 
Vigh (2006), Cole and Durham (2008), Denov (2011), Honwana and De Boeck (2005) 
and Vigh (2006).
17. Th is is a key term in Habermas’s (1973) theory of communicative practice in political 
change.
References
Abdullah, I. (ed.). 2004. Between Democracy and Terror: Th e Sierra Leone Civil War. Dakar: 
CODESRIA.
Abramowitz, S.A. 2014. Searching for Normal in the Wake of the Liberian War. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Abramowitz, S., and M.H. Moran. 2012. ‘International Human Rights, Gender-Based Vio-
lence, and Local Discourses of Abuse in Postconfl ict Liberia: A Problem of “Culture”’, 
African Studies Review 55(2): 119–46.
216  William P. Murphy
Adelman, H., and E. Barkan. 2011. No Return, No Refuge: Rites and Rights in Minority Repa-
triation. New York: Columbia University.
Agha, A. 2007. Language and Social Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Allie, J.A.D. 2008. ‘Reconciliation and Traditional Justice: Tradition-Based Practices of the 
Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone’, in L. Huyse and M. Salter (eds), Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Confl ict: Learning from African Experiences. Stockholm: In-
ternational Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Retrieved 8 October 2014 
from http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/index.cfm.
Anders, G. 2012. ‘African Big Men and International Criminal Justice: Th e Case of Sierra 
Leone’, in M. Utas (ed.), African Confl icts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks. 
London: Zed Books, pp. 158–80.
Archibald, S., and P. Richards. 2002. ‘Converts to Human Rights? Popular Debate about War 
and Justice in Rural Central Sierra Leone’, Africa 72(3): 339–66.
Austin, R. 1993. ‘Th e Moral Economy of Witchcraft: An Essay in Comparative History’, in 
J. Comaroff  and J.L. Comaroff  (eds), Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in 
Postcolonial Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 89–110.
Bayart, J.F. 1993. Th e State in Africa: Th e Politics of the Belly. London: Longman.
Boas, M., and A. Hatloy. 2008. ‘“Getting In, Getting Out”: Militia Membership and Prospects 
for Re-integration in Postwar Liberia, Journal of Modern African Studies 46(1): 33–55.
Bohannan, P. 1957. Justice and Judgment among the Tiv. London: Oxford University Press.
Bolton, C. 2012. I Did It to Save My Life: Love and Survival in Sierra Leone. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Braithewaite, J., V. Braithwaite, M. Cookson and L. Dunn. 2010. Anomie and Violence: Non-
Truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding. Canberra: Australian National Uni-
versity E Press.
Chambers, R. 1979. ‘Rural Refugees in Africa: “What the Eye Does Not See”’, Disasters 3(4): 
381–92.
Christensen, C., M. Utas and H.E. Vigh (eds). 2006. Navigating Youth, Generating Adulthood: 
Social Becoming in an African Context. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
Christensen, M.M. 2012. ‘Big Man Business in the Borderland of Sierra Leone’, in M. Utas 
(ed.), African Confl icts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks. London: Zed Books, 
pp. 60–77.
Christensen, M.M., and M. Utas. 2007. ‘Mercenaries of Democracy: Th e “Politricks” of 
Remobilized Combatants in the 2007 General Elections, Sierra Leone’, African Aff airs 
107(429): 515–39.
Clapham, A. 2007. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, K.M. 2009. Fictions of Justice: Th e International Criminal Court and the Challenge of 
Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cole, J., and D. Durham (eds). 2008. Figuring the Future: Globalization and the Temporalities 
of Children and Youth. Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research.
Collins, R. 2011. ‘Patrimonial Alliances and Failures of State Penetration: A Historical Dy-
namic of Crime, Corruption, Gangs, and Mafi as’, Th e Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 636: 16–31.
Coulter, C. 2009. Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives through War and Peace in Sierra 
Leone. Ithaca: Cornell University.
Das, V., and A. Kleinman. 2001. ‘Introduction’, in V. Das (ed.), Remaking a World: Violence, 
Social Suff ering, and Recovery. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–30.
Davis, N.Z. 1973. ‘Th e Rites of Violence: Religious Riots in Sixteenth-Century France’, Past 
and Present 59(1): 51–91.
Transnational and Local Models of Non-Refoulement  217
Denov, M. 2008. ‘Girl Soldiers and Human Rights: Lessons from Angola, Mozambique, Sierra 
Leone and Northern Uganda’, Th e International Journal of Human Rights 12(5): 813–36.
———. 2010. Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
———. 2011. ‘Social Navigation and Power in Post-Confl ict Sierra Leone: Refl ections from 
a Former Child Soldier Turned Bike Rider’, in A. Ozerdem and S. Podder (eds), Child 
Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 191–212.
Denov, M., and A. Buccitelli. 2013. ‘Navigating Crisis and Chronicity in the Everyday: For-
mer Child Soldiers in Urban Sierra Leone’, Stability: International Journal of Security and 
Development 2(2): 1–18.
Denov, M., D. Doucet and A. Kamara. 2012. ‘Engaging War-Aff ected Youth through Pho-
tography: Photovoice with Former Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone’, Intervention: Th e In-
ternational Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work and Counseling in Areas of Armed 
Confl ict 10(2): 117–33.
Durham, D. 2004. ‘Disappearing Youth: Youth as Social Shifter in Botswana’, American Eth-
nologist 31(4): 589–605.
Duyvesteyn, I. 2005. Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia. 
London: Frank Cass.
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1973. Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. Beverly 
Hills and London: Sage.
Ellis, S. 1999. Th e Mask of Anarchy: Th e Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of 
an African Civil War. London: C. Hurst.
Enloe, C. 2005. ‘What If Patriarchy Is “the Big Picture”? An Afterword’, in M. Dyan, A. 
Raven-Roberts and J. Parpart (eds), Gender, Confl ict, and Peacekeeping. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefi eld, pp. 280–83.
Fanthrope, R. 2003. ‘Humanitarian Aid in Postwar Sierra Leone: Th e Politics of Moral Econ-
omy’, in S. Collinson (ed.), Power, Livelihoods, and Confl ict: Case Studies in Political 
Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action. Humanitarian Policy Group, Report 13, pp. 
53–65.
———. 2005. ‘On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in 
Postwar Sierra Leone’, African Aff airs 105: 27–49.
Farmer, P. 2003. Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ferme, M. 2001. Th e Underneath of Th ings: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ferme, M.C., and D. Hoff man. 2004. ‘Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights 
Discourse in Sierra Leone and Beyond’, Africa Today 50(4): 73–95.
Fithen, C., and P. Richards. 2005. ‘Making War, Crafting Peace: Militia Solidarities and De-
mobilization in Sierra Leone’, in P. Richards (ed.), No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of 
Contemporary Armed Confl icts. Athens: Ohio University Press, pp. 117–36.
Gberie, L. 2005. A Dirty War in West Africa: Th e RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Gbowee, L., with C. Mithers. 2011. Mighty Be Our Powers: How Sisterhood, Prayer, and Sex 
Changed a Nation. New York: Beast Books.
Geertz, C. 1983. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic 
Books.
Giddens, A. 1972. ‘Introduction: Durkheim’s Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy’, in 
Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings, trans. A. Giddens. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 1–50.
218  William P. Murphy
Gluckman, M. 1955. Th e Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.
Goodale, M., and S. Merry (eds). 2007. Th e Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between 
the Global and the Local. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Habermas, J. 1973. Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon.
———. 1974. ‘Th e Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)’. New German Critique 
3: 49–55.
———. 1989 [1962]. Th e Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: MIT.
———. 1994. Th e Past as Future, interviewed by M. Haller, translated and edited by M. Pen-
sky. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
———. 2003. Th e Future of Human Nature. Malden, MA: Polity.
Hagan, J. 2003. Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Hoff man, D. 2004. ‘Th e Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military 
Strategy, and Humanitarian Intervention’, African Aff airs 103(411): 211–26.
———. 2011. Th e War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Dur-
ham: Duke University Press.
Højbjerg, C.K. 2007. Resisting State Iconoclasm among the Loma of Guinea. Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press.
Honwana, A., and F. De Boeck (eds). 2005. Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Post-
colonial Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Jackson, M. 2004. In Sierra Leone. Durham: Duke University Press.
Joas, H. 2013. Th e Sacredness of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights. Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press.
Keen, D. 2005. Confl ict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey.
Kelsall, T. 2009. Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kiss, E. 1999. ‘Justice’, in A.M. Jaggar and I.M. Young (eds), A Companion to Feminist Philos-
ophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 487–99. Retrieved 8 October 2014 from http://www
.blackwellreference.com (DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631220671.1999.00050.x)
Knörr, J. 2010. ‘Out of Hiding? Strategies of Empowering the Past in the Reconstruction of 
Krio Identity’, in J. Knörr and W. Trajano Filho (eds), Th e Powerful Presence of the Past: 
Integration and Confl ict along the Upper Guinea Coast. Leiden: Brill, pp. 205–28.
Kuruk, P. 1999. ‘Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees: Th e Case of the Missing Ship-
load of Liberian Refugees’, Stanford Journal of International Law 35: 313–50.
Labonte, M.T. 2011. ‘From Patronage to Peacebuilding? Elite Capture and Governance from 
Below in Sierra Leone’, African Aff airs 111(442): 90–115.
Latour, B. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Th eory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Lee, L.T. 1996. ‘Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis?’ Journal 
of Refugee Studies 9(1): 27–42.
Lucy, J. 1993. Refl exive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Macek, I. 2009. Sarajevo under Siege: Anthropology in Wartime. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.
Maclure, R., and M. Denov. 2009. ‘Reconstruction versus Transformation: Postwar Education 
and the Struggle for Gender Equity in Sierra Leone’, International Journal of Educational 
Development 29: 612–20.
Martin, J.L. 2009. Social Structures. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Transnational and Local Models of Non-Refoulement  219
McGovern, M. 2011. Making War in Cote d’Ivoire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Menzel, A. in press. ‘Betterment versus Complicity: Struggling with Patron-Client Logics in 
Sierra Leone’, in C. Højbjerg, J. Knörr and W.P. Murphy (eds), Politics and Policies in 
Contemporary Upper Guinea Coast Societies: Change and Continuity. New York: Palgrave.
Merry, S.E. 2006. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local 
Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mokuwa, E., M. Voors, E. Bulte and P. Richards. 2011. ‘Peasant Grievance and Insurgency in 
Sierra Leone: Judicial Serfdom as a Driver of Confl ict’, African Aff airs 110(440): 339–66.
Moran, M. 2006. Liberia: Th e Violence of Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press.
———. 2010. ‘Gender, Militarism, and Peace-Building: Projects of the Postconfl ict Moment’, 
Annual Review of Anthropology 39: 261–74.
Murphy, R.B. 2006. ‘Establishing a Precedent in Uganda: Th e Legitimacy of National Am-
nesties Under the ICC’, Council for American Students in International Negotiations 3(1): 
33–56.
Murphy, W.P. 1990. ‘Creating the Appearance of Consensus in Mende Political Discourse’, 
American Anthropologist 92: 24–41.
———. 2003. ‘Military Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientelism in the Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean Civil Wars’, African Studies Review 46: 61–87.
———. 2010. ‘Patrimonial Logic of Centrifugal Forces in the Political History of the Upper 
Guinea Coast’, in J. Knörr and W. Trajano Filho (eds), Th e Powerful Presence of the Past: 
Integration and Confl ict along the Upper Guinea Coast. Leiden: Brill, pp. 27–53.
———. 2015. ‘Child Soldiers and Community Reconciliation in Postwar Sierra Leone: Af-
rican Psychiatry in the 21st Century’, in E. Akyeampong, A.G. Hill and A. Kleinman 
(eds), Th e Culture of Mental Illness and Psychiatric Practice in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, pp.282–310.
———. in press. ‘Kinship Tropes as Critique of Patronage in Postwar Sierra Leone’, in C. 
Højbjerg, J. Knörr and W.P. Murphy (eds), Politics and Policies in Contemporary Upper 
Guinea Coast Societies: Change and Continuity. New York: Palgrave. 
Newell, S. 2012. Th e Modernity Bluff : Crime, Consumption, and Citizenship in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Peters, K. 2005. ‘Reintegrating Young Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone: Accommodating In-
digenous and Wartime Value Systems’, in J. Abbink and I. van Kessel (eds), Vanguard or 
Vandals: Youth, Politics and Confl ict in Africa. Leiden: Brill, pp. 267–96.
———. 2007. ‘From Weapons to Wheels: Young Sierra Leonean Ex-combatants become Mo-
torbike Taxi-Riders’, Journal of Peace and Development 10: 1–23.
———. 2010. ‘Generating Rebels and Soldiers: On the Socio-economic Crisis of Rural Youth 
in Sierra Leone before the War’, in J. Knörr and W. Trajano Filho (eds), Th e Powerful 
Presence of the Past: Integration and Confl ict along the Upper Guinea Coast. Leiden: Brill, 
pp. 323–55.
———. 2011. War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Peters, K., and P. Richards. 1998. ‘“Why We Fight”: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra 
Leone’, Africa 68(2): 183–210.
Pham, J.P. 2004. Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State. New York: Reed.
———. 2006. Th e Sierra Leone Tragedy: History and Global Dimensions. New York: Nova Science.
Piattoni, S. 2001. ‘Clientelism in Historical and Comparative Perspective’, in S. Piattoni (ed.), 
Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: Th e European Experience in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–30.
220  William P. Murphy
Pitcher, A., M.H. Moran and M. Johnston. 2009. ‘Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatri-
monialism in Africa’, African Studies Review 52(1): 125–56.
Rawls, J. 1971. A Th eory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ray, C. in press. ‘Challenging the Classical Parameters of “Doing Host-Refugee Politics”: Th e 
Case of Casamance Refugees in Th e Gambia’, in C. Højberg, J. Knörr and W.P. Murphy 
(eds), Politics and Policies in Contemporary Upper Guinea Coast Societies: Change and Con-
tinuity. New York: Palgrave.
Reno, W. 1995. Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
———. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Lon-
don: James Currey.
———. 2005a. ‘New War: An Ethnographic Approach’, in P. Richards (ed.), No Peace No 
War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Confl icts. Athens: Ohio University Press, 
pp. 1–21.
———. 2005b. ‘To Fight or Farm? Agrarian Dimensions of the Mano River Confl ict (Liberia 
and Sierra Leone)’, African Aff airs 104: 571–90.
Sahlins, M. 1963. ‘Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and 
Polynesia’, Comparative Studies in History and Society 5: 285–303.
Sarró, R. 2009. Th e Politics of Religious Change on the Upper Guinea Coast: Iconoclasm Done and 
Undone. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Schroven, A. 2011. ‘Th e (Re-) Conceptualization of Women in Gendered International Inter-
ventions: Examples from Postwar Sierra Leone’, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropol-
ogy Working Papers no. 130.
Scott, J. 1976. Th e Moral Economy of the Peasant. New Haven: Yale University Press.
———. 1998. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sen, A. 2009. Th e Idea of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sesay, M.G., and M. Suma. 2009. ‘Transitional Justice and the DDR: Th e Case of Sierra Le-
one’, International Center for Transitional Justice. Retrieved 8 October 2014 from http://
ictj.org/sites/default/fi les/ICTJ-DDR-Sierra-Leone-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf.
Shaw, R. 2005. ‘Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Le-
one’, United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved 8 October 2014 from http://www.usip.org/
category/publications/special-reports.
———. 2010. ‘Linking Justice with Reintegration? Ex-combatants and the Sierra Leone Ex-
periment’, in R. Shaw and L. Waldorf (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions 
and Priorities after Mass Violence. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 111–32.
Shaw, R., and L. Wardorf. 2010. ‘Introduction: Localizing Transitional Justice’, in R. Shaw 
and L. Waldorf (eds), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass 
Violence. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 3–26.
Shepler, S. 2010. ‘Child Labour and Youth Enterprise: Postwar Urban Infrastructure and the 
“Bearing Boys” of Freetown’, Anthropology Today 26: 19–22.
———. 2011. ‘Th e Real and Symbolic Importance of Food in War: Hunger Pains and Big 
Men’s Bellies in Sierra Leone’, Africa Today 58: 43–56.
———. 2014. Childhood Deployed: Remaking Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone. New York: New 
York University Press.
Silverstein, M. 1993. ‘Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function’, in J. Lucy 
(ed.), Refl exive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 33–58.
Transnational and Local Models of Non-Refoulement  221
Steinberg, J. 2011. Little Liberia: An African Odyssey in New York City. London: Jonathan Cape.
Th ompson, E.P. 1971. ‘Th e Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, 
Past and Present 50: 76–136.
Utas, M. 2005a. ‘Agency of Victims: Young Women in the Liberian Civil War’, in A. Honwana 
and F. De Boeck (eds), Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa. 
Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 53–80.
———. 2005b. ‘Building a Future? Th e Reintegration and Remarginalisation of Youth in 
Liberia’, in P. Richards (ed.), No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed 
Confl icts. Athens: Ohio University Press, pp. 137–54.
———. 2012. ‘Introduction: Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Confl icts’, in 
M. Utas (ed.), African Confl icts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks. London: Zed 
Books, pp. 1–31.
Van Gog, J. 2008. Coming Back from the Bush: Gender, Youth, and Reintegration in Northern 
Sierra Leone. Leiden: African Studies Center.
Vigh, H. 2006. Navigating Terrains of War: Youth and Soldiering in Guinea Bissau. New York: 
Berghahn Books.
Virmani, A. 1996. ‘Th e Resettlement of Ugandan Refugees in Southern Sudan, 1979–1986: 
Th e Dynamics of Exodus, Asylum, and Forced Repatriation’, 2 vols., Ph.D. thesis. Evan-
ston: Northwestern University.
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society, 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weissbrodt, D., and I. Hortreiter. 1999. ‘Th e Principle of Non-refoulement’, Human Rights 
Law Review 5: 1–73.
Williams, P.D. 2011. War and Confl ict in Africa. Cambridge: Polity.
Chapter 11
Expanding the Space for 




Sierra Leone, a small country on the Upper Guinea Coast, was colonized by the 
British, who made it a settlement for freed slaves. Hence, the capital came to be 
known as Freetown. Th e offi  cial language is English, but denizens speak many 
other ethnic languages; Krio is the lingua franca. At the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, the country went through a bloody, destructive civil war that puts it in the 
unenviable group of African states that have been described as ‘dysfunctional’, 
‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ and given rise to much pessimism about the future of the 
African continent. Th e gruesome human rights violations that characterized the 
decade-long civil war became a ‘complex humanitarian emergency’ that captured 
the attention of the international community in a big way. Th is put transnational 
organizations in a comfortable position to meddle in the aff airs of Sierra Leone 
by promoting neoliberal prescriptions for postwar peace building and governance 
reform. Th e factors that led to state failure and outbreak of civil war in this coun-
try were long in the making and rooted in the history and politics of this postco-
lonial state. Hence, although the impact of external factors like neocolonialism, 
Cold War politics and world market forces cannot be discounted, internal factors 
are crucial variables in explaining the nature of the African states and the predic-
aments they face (Francis 2006: 51–53).
Most observers attribute the war to a prolonged period of bad governance 
manifested in, among other things, political patronage, intolerance of opposing 
views and marginalization of certain groups (Abraham 2000; Ayissi and Robin-
Edward 2000). Since neighbouring Liberia shared a similar history of bad gov-
ernance, it was not surprising that the rebel war that started there in 1989 spilled 
over into Sierra Leone in 1991, prompting the formation of an alliance of ‘free-
dom fi ghters’ from both sides of the border. When the diamond mines of eastern 
Sierra Leone fell into the hands of the insurgents, they found themselves in a 
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better position to generate the revenue needed to fund their military venture 
through illegal mining and sale of ‘blood diamonds’ to unscrupulous foreign 
dealers (Hirsh 2001).
Richards (1996, 2005), who was one of the fi rst to study the civil war in 
Sierra Leone, sees it as a crisis of youth: largely illiterate or poorly educated and 
unemployed youths facing a declining economy and an exploitative and repressive 
patrimonial regime had little prospect of a brighter future. Susceptible to extremist 
views, they were potential material for violent mob action. For Richards, it was 
youths living in the economically harsh and politically oppressive conditions of a 
rural context rather than disaff ected youths in an urban context (as later put for-
ward by Abdullah and others) that constituted the dynamic force of the rebellion.
In accounting for the formation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
and the outbreak of civil war in Sierra Leone, Abdullah (2004) highlights the role 
of ‘lumpen youths’ who, in the harsh sociopolitical and economic climate of the 
1970s and 1980s, became more and more alienated and found common course 
with disgruntled and radical students with whom they fraternized and shared 
hopes of changing ‘de [the] system’. Peters (2010) described the root causes of 
the confl ict in Sierra Leone as a highly explosive combination of neopatrimonial 
state collapse and the disaff ection of marginalized rural youths. Boas (2001) has 
argued that the wars in Sierra Leone and neighbouring Liberia could fundamen-
tally be attributed to an ‘extreme version’ of neopatrimonial politics rooted in a 
shared history of exclusiveness and marginalization that led to the build-up and 
later violent explosion of deep-seated hatred.
Whereas bad governance, as manifested in political patronage and margin-
alization, is a common thread running through the above explanations of the 
civil war in Sierra Leone, Kaplan (1994) claims that the wars in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia were devoid of political motives and driven purely by economic consider-
ations of resource accumulation. Th is view is also shared by Collier and Hoeffl  er 
(2003), who make a distinction between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ and assert that 
the real cause of the civil wars in West Africa is not the loud discourse of political 
grievance but the silent motivation of greed for economic resources.
Hoff man (2007) does not subscribe to such an apolitical view of the civil war 
in Sierra Leone. He argues that the violence perpetrated in the course of the war 
was a kind of political speech voiced by people desperate to capture attention and 
be heard. For Hoff man, RUF rapes, lootings, mutilations and other acts of terror 
should be looked at as springing only partly from economic motives. Th is resonates 
with Richards’ point that war may be likened to a violent attempt to enter a con-
versation from which one feels excluded (Richards 2005: xxiii–xxiv). As an ex-rebel 
fi ghter puts it, ‘Violence is the only language they [politicians] can understand. Th e 
more the violence, the more they are prepared to listen and understand.’1
Now that the war is over, frantic eff orts are being made to consolidate the 
nation’s hard-won fragile peace with the help of the international community, 
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which has made good governance a precondition for supplying aid and loans to 
developing countries (Milliken 2003; Neumayer 2003). Promoting the Western 
model of the right to freedom of expression is considered an important part of 
this mainly Western-driven governance reform programme. Freedom of expres-
sion may be defi ned as the liberty to make known one’s views, feelings, con-
victions and so on without violating the rights of others or jeopardizing their 
security. It is also the right to refrain from expressing one’s views as long as this is 
not due to any harassment or intimidation. It takes diff erent forms like speaking, 
writing, singing and acting.
Th is chapter employs theories, travelling models and translation to critically 
examine eff orts by transnational institutions (working in partnership with local 
actors) to promote the right of freedom of expression in a postwar setting. It seeks 
to scrutinize some of the strategies that are being utilized and to highlight unin-
tended outcomes and contextual challenges associated with the peculiar realities 
on the ground.
‘Travelling models’ refers to certain globally circulating ideas for tackling 
(among other things) governance-related problems like underdevelopment and 
civil confl icts. Often prescribed by Western countries and international fi nancial 
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, these models are often outcomes 
of peculiar experiences and discourses in the Western world. Th e freedom of 
expression model that is promoted as part of Sierra Leone’s postwar governance 
reform programme has deep roots in the political history of the West that can be 
traced from Greco-Roman times (Berti 1978) to the Humanist tradition of the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.2 However, only 
after the Second World War were vigorous eff orts made to universalize freedom 
of expression as seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 
1948.
Although travelling models like freedom of expression, decentralization and 
gender mainstreaming have proven very useful in the Western contexts from 
which they ‘travel’, they may not have the desired impacts in sociocultural and 
political contexts where they are newly arrived (Reyna 2007). Travelling ideas, 
it has been argued, ‘travel’ across transnational boundaries through a process of 
translation. Translation implies transformation, not just transfer or movement 
from one place to another (Rottenburg 2005; see also Rottenburg 2008). In 
other words, the ‘receiving culture’ is not just a passive recipient of the travelling 
idea but is actively involved in assessing, modifying, transforming or appropriat-
ing the models in line with local realities.
Transnational and Local Actors
Transnational and local actors work in partnership to promote the freedom of 
expression model in postwar Sierra Leone. Th ese include transnational govern-
Expanding Space for Free Expression in Sierra Leone  225
mental agencies like the United States Agency for International Development, 
the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development; United Na-
tions family members like the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) and 
the United Nations Educational Scientifi c and Cultural Organization; and me-
dia foundations like the Th ompson and Ford Foundations. Th ere are also state 
agencies and a host of international and local NGOs and civil society groups 
entangled in a complex transnational web.
Transnational interventions are clearly evident not only at state level but also 
locally, as many of Africa’s civil society groups are not purely local or grass-roots 
organizations, despite often giving that impression. Th ey are mainly international 
organizations or branches of them, and even where they spring up locally they 
tend to be organized, funded and guided by the vision of international bodies. 
Hence, Ferguson (2006) asserts that the state-versus-civil-society analytic frame-
work that is generally taken for granted in the study of African politics turns 
out to be fl awed when subjected to critical scrutiny. He points out that this an-
alytic framework presents a vertical image or topography of power that is rather 
simplistic and misleading when viewed against the transnational context within 
which both the powers at the top (state) and civil society, ideally representing the 
bottom (local), operate. Englund (2006) makes a similar assertion, maintaining 
that transnational connections and infl uences, as manifested in (among other 
things) funding, formulating and implementing human rights and democrati-
zation programmes, appear at both state and civil society levels, and that these 
crucial complex transnational links have to be factored into understanding the 
dynamics of the African state.
Transnational interventions in Africa and the Global South are not driven 
merely by humanitarian considerations. Th ey are also predicated on the West’s 
pursuit of strategic self-interest. Hence, international peace-building operations 
since the end of the Cold War are fi rmly anchored in the idea of the liberal peace. 
Such peace building in ‘failed’ and collapsed states revolves around a ‘security-
development’ nexus born of the view that these states are a threat to international 
peace in various ways, including their potential to become a breeding ground for 
terrorists and other extremists who may strike in the West (Duffi  eld 2001). Other 
spin-off s of wars in failed states on countries outside the immediate theatres of 
armed confl icts, include the proliferation of arms, drug traffi  cking, massive and 
unexpected displacement of people beyond established borders, the outbreak and 
spread of diseases, disruption of international trade, environmental degradation 
and more. Any of these could somehow directly or indirectly impact the stability 
and prosperity of the West. Underdevelopment due to bad governance and the 
resultant economic downslide, extreme poverty, corruption and weakened social 
cohesion are held to be the main precursors of these ‘new wars’. It is therefore 
assumed that development eff ected by neoliberal prescriptions would diff use ten-
sions in these areas and provide the stability that is vital to the continued stability 
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of the West. Th is brings to mind the Truman Doctrine, which in the interest 
of the United States and its World War II allies sought to contain the spread of 
communism by using funds to combat the poverty and underdevelopment that 
apparently create a seedbed for communist extremism (Urwin 1989).
Th e strategies that transnational actors employ in partnership with local ac-
tors to translate free expression to postwar Sierra Leone include establishment of 
a supportive legal framework, provision of media support and civic education 
programmes. However, the realities on the ground pose considerable challenges 
to the eff ectiveness of these strategies and militate against full achievement of the 
desired outcomes. In line with the concept of translation, the targeted culture is 
not just passively accepting the model wholesale but is involved in modifying and 
adapting the model to suit existing realities.
Local translators, who generally have more organic and direct contact with 
the local communities, are key partners in the translation process. As Lewis and 
Mosse (2006) point out, they often form a crucial link between local commu-
nities and transnational actors from other sociocultural backgrounds (Lewis and 
Mosse 2006). In this scheme of things, they are positioned to package the model 
by modifying or adapting it to fi t local logics and local context while also iden-
tifying commonalities (Merry 2006). Although human rights are said to be uni-
versal, cultural relativism tends to creep into how they are understood, translated 
and practised in diff erent sociocultural contexts (An-Na’im and Deng 1990). For 
instance, in traditional settings local translators of the right to freedom of expres-
sion tend to remain silent about the model’s potential to undermine and erode 
long cherished traditions and to bring about unwelcome shifts in power relations 
between, for instance, youths and elders or women and men. Furthermore, when 
it comes to the sensitive issue of secret societies serving as a traditional impedi-
ment to free expression, it is generally considered prudent to just gloss over that 
issue or shelve it until some future date.3
Working for a Supportive Legal Framework
Working for a supportive legal framework is a major strategy in translating free-
dom of expression. Th ose actors who promote this supportive legal framework 
are guided by the view that freedom of expression is both a political and a legal 
matter, and that it must be governed and regulated by a conducive legal frame-
work in order to be fully enjoyed and not abused. It is generally assumed that 
once laws are clearly laid down and penalties for infringement spelled out, people 
who do not want to be culpable are likely to observe them.4 Yet a closer look at 
the realities on the ground shows that this is simply not the case.
Transnational organizations like the Westminster Foundation for Democ-
racy, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Justice 
Initiative (OSJI) are involved in promoting a revisitation of the existing laws 
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guaranteeing and regulating free expression in Sierra Leone. Th eir aim in doing 
so is to determine how supportive of this right these laws are and how far they 
accord with modern democratic standards and trends. To this end they have sup-
ported advocacy movements for the review of such laws and even provided them 
with technical and fi nancial assistance. It is hoped that the reviews will result in 
enactment of new laws like the freedom of information law that is being strongly 
advocated. Some Sierra Leoneans have expressed hope that with transnational 
support, laws enacted as far back as the colonial period that do not fulfi l the 
requirements of a democratic postcolonial society will be expunged from the law 
books. Furthermore, legal reforms assisted by transnational bodies are expected 
to lead to a harmonizing of the contradictions and ambiguities that currently 
tend to serve as legal cover, allowing violations to take place with impunity.
Th e most unpopular legal restriction on freedom of expression in Sierra Le-
one, which has been repeatedly attacked with the help of transnational support, is 
part 5 of the 1965 Public Order Act, which criminalizes defamatory and seditious 
libel. Th e Public Order Act stems from the colonial period, when it was used to 
silence leaders of the nationalist struggle. In the post-independence period it 
has been used to gag opposition and critics, serving as a trap that has landed 
many journalists in jail. Th e Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Sierra Le-
one) – a transnational brainchild set up with transnational funds – states in its 
report that this law is a relic of the colonial period. Th e commission considers it 
outmoded and strongly recommends that it be expunged from the nation’s law 
books (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone 2004: 131–32). 
But despite many public pronouncements in favour of this measure, there has 
been considerable reluctance to make it a reality – apparently due to apprehen-
sion that decriminalizing libel would give citizens a stronger voice to fearlessly 
scrutinize politicians and hold them accountable, something long absent in the 
political culture of Sierra Leone.
Section 32(2) of the Public Order Act states:
Any person who publishes any false statement, rumour or report which 
is calculated to bring into disrepute any person who holds offi  ce under 
the constitution in the discharge of his duties shall be guilty of an off ence 
and liable on conviction to a fi ne not exceeding fi ve hundred Leones or 
to imprisonment not exceeding two years or both.
Section 33 states that a person who, among other things, utters a seditious state-
ment or ‘prints, publicizes, sells, off ers for sale, distributes or reproduces any 
seditious publication’ shall be guilty of seditious libel and will be imprisoned for 
up to three years for a fi rst off ence and up to seven years in the case of subsequent 
off ences. Subsection 2 makes it a crime to be in possession of a story or article 
declared to be seditious.
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Transnational translators of the free expression model insist that by modern 
standards, these provisions of the Public Order Act are draconian in that they im-
pose lengthy imprisonment on off enders just for, among other things, expressing 
their political views. Th ey maintain that statements critical of governments are 
necessary and vital to keep them in check. Many local civil society groups caught 
up in the complex web of transnationalism – especially media practitioners and 
human rights activists – have expressed the opinion that this law is contrary to 
the spirit of democracy and militates against development and the consolidation 
of the nation’s hard-won peace.5
Th e Sierra Leone Association of Journalists 
and the 1965 Public Order Act
With transnational support, the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) 
has been one of the most active agitators for the repeal of the 1965 Public Order 
Act, which has been called a ‘killer bill’. Th is is understandable because media 
practitioners, more than any other category of citizen, have fallen victim to this 
law. It is therefore unsurprising that when the Law Reform Commission was set 
up (with international but mainly British support) to review the nation’s laws, 
SLAJ was one of the earliest to appeal to it for a review of this law.
When a new government was elected in 2007, hopes ran high that the ill-
famed act would at last be nullifi ed because the new president had been an ardent 
critic of it while in the opposition. In fact, the ruling All Peoples’ Congress Party 
had, in its manifesto for the 2007 elections, pledged to review the Public Order 
Act and ‘improve public trust, confi dence and interest through information shar-
ing’ by removing ‘bottle necks and obstacles that stifl e this free fl ow [of informa-
tion]’(All Peoples Congress Party 2007).6 Th e spirit of optimism for a free press 
was also felt by the World Association of Newspapers (WAN), which welcomed 
the president’s declared commitment to abrogate the criminal libel law of 1965.7 
Under the previous government, headed by President Tejan Kabbah, WAN – in 
collaboration with the International Press Institute, another transnational organi-
zation – had written an open letter to the then president, fruitlessly calling upon 
him to repeal the nation’s libel law.8
When it became clear that the new government (in spite of many public 
pronouncements and commitments) was dragging its feet over the hoped-for 
repeal of the law, the SLAJ’s Bo Convention (of 2008) resolved to seek legal re-
dress. Th us SLAJ, with support from OSJI, the Society for Democratic Initiatives 
(Sierra Leone) and the Media Foundation for West Africa, fi led a lawsuit on 25 
February 2008 challenging the constitutional validity of part 5 of the Public Or-
der Act of 1965, which, the plaintiff s claimed, directly contravened the guarantee 
of freedom of expression enshrined in the third chapter of the 1991 Constitution 
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of Sierra Leone. Th is lawsuit has the distinction of being the fi rst direct legal 
challenge to criminal libel law in the region.9
It took the Supreme Court well over six months to issue a ruling on the mat-
ter, contrary to the constitutional provision, in Section 120 (16), that it should 
deliver its decision on matters brought before it not later than three months 
after the conclusion of the evidence and fi nal arguments. As media practitioners 
and some members of the public grew impatient with what they considered the 
judiciary’s sluggish response, journalists registered their impatience by imposing 
a news blackout on the judiciary and later staged a peaceful protest in front of 
the offi  ce of the ombudsman. Th e situation played into the hands of politicians, 
who excused themselves from addressing the matter by saying it was already in 
the hands of the judiciary, whose decision they were not supposed to infl uence. 
Th e long-awaited verdict held that the criminal libel laws contained in the Public 
Order Act did not contravene the provisions for freedom of expression contained 
in the 1991 Constitution, because the Constitution also makes provision for the 
right to be legally restricted, as seen in Section 25 (2).
Contextual Challenges
Promotion of freedom of expression through advocacy for appropriate legal and 
policy frameworks rests on the assumption that once these laws are in place, 
stakeholders will have no choice but to abide by them, if they do not wish to 
be culpable. However, experience has shown that even when these laws are in 
place, the lack of political will to let them serve their purpose often fosters crafty 
and ingenious manipulations by state and even nonstate actors. Th is tends to 
defeat the purposes of such laws. Writing about Africa’s media in this connection, 
Nyamnjoh (2005) observes:
One of the greatest threats to media freedom in Africa has been the re-
luctance on the part of government to liberalize press laws. Even where 
there was such liberalization in principle, governments tended to intro-
duce, by underhand or round about ways, measures and practices that 
eff ectively curtail press freedom.
Th is is often the case when the judiciary, which is supposed to blow the 
whistle and impose penalties when there is a breach of the law, has compromised 
its integrity and therefore lost credibility. Hence, in spite of all the clarion calls 
for repeal of the nation’s criminal libel laws, only recently did the Sierra Leone 
Bar Association produce a statement calling on the government to speedily repeal 
such laws and enact a freedom of information law. Th e ongoing judicial reforms, 
designed to put in place an uncompromised, independent, properly equipped 
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and adequately staff ed judiciary, could be considered a crucial part of the entire 
postwar democratization process in Sierra Leone. Th inking along similar lines 
led the commissioners of Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
to observe that ‘in a true democracy there is no compromise on the supremacy of 
the constitution and the rule of law’ (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Sierra Leone 2004: 140).
A major weakness of eff orts to reform media and free expression laws in this 
country is that translators have generally not taken into consideration the dual 
legal system: so far, the focus has been on only the formal legal system. Th is is 
not surprising, as the formal system is what the foreign translators of the free ex-
pression model most easily relate to. Meanwhile, their local partners are reluctant 
to vigorously confront certain long-cherished, sensitive traditions lest the eff ort 
provoke outright rejection of the model. However, it is vital to factor the tradi-
tional legal system into legal reforms that favour freedom of expression if this 
fundamental human right is to become truly national and universal.
Th e traditional legal system is rooted in the customs and traditions of ethnic 
communities in the former Protectorate. Th e judicial structure of Sierra Leone 
gives the Native Administration Courts of the traditional legal system jurisdic-
tion over certain matters, beyond which disputes should in principle be sent 
to the formal courts. Th e Native Administration Courts dispense justice in line 
with customary laws that are largely unwritten and thus leave ample room for 
abuse. Certain restrictions and expectations of this system are not friendly to free 
expression. For instance, women and youths are deprived of a strong, direct voice 
in political decisions that aff ect them. Th e system also favours a culture of secrecy 
that denies access to information to nonmembers of the secret societies that pre-
side over the making of certain decisions in some traditional settings.
Th us, despite the dreams and ongoing eff orts to harmonize the formal and 
traditional legal systems in Sierra Leone, the task has proven overwhelming and 
the dream is far from being realized in the face of enormous social and even po-
litical implications.
Providing Media Support
Some transnational organizations, such as the U.S.-based Search for Common 
Ground and the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service Trust, have 
pursued a strategy of providing media support as a way of promoting freedom 
of expression. Interviews with some of these organizations reveal that they are 
mainly driven by the conviction that an irresponsible and unprofessional media 
is worse than an autocratic regime because irresponsible media practices tend to 
help justify the autocratic dislike of free expression. Th ese groups operate under 
the rationale that proper training leads not just to technical knowhow but also 
to professionalism, dedication, discipline and responsibility. Th erefore, providing 
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training for media practitioners is an important component of media support. 
Media training is expected to nurture the media as a powerful instrument of free 
expression and curb reckless media practices. 
Media support also extends to funding media organizations. Some of these 
have been established by local initiatives but remain very much dependent on 
transnational support to meet their running costs and fulfi l their agendas. Trans-
national support for media organizations often refl ects the conviction that a 
free media plays an important part in promoting development and democratic 
good governance. For this to be done meaningfully and responsibly while also 
overcoming attempts to suppress and manipulate press freedom, so the logic 
goes, media practitioners need to protect themselves and the integrity of their 
profession through vibrant organizations. It is hoped that unifying individuals 
and groups will help promote professionalism, facilitate networking with media 
organizations within and outside the country (e.g. the Committee for the Pro-
tection of Journalists, which works to protect press freedom worldwide) and 
assist in building a united front with journalists, speaking with one voice in 
advocacy campaigns and in alerts raised about media violations. Th is is import-
ant because African media tend to be divided along ethnic and partisan lines. 
Hence, SLAJ has the stated objective ‘To unite the family of journalists to have 
one voice’.10
Impact and Contextual Challenges
Despite huge transnational support for media organizations, the increasing num-
ber of training opportunities available and the corresponding increase in the 
number of people taking advantage of them, the general opinion is that these fac-
tors have not had signifi cant impact on the press in terms of the quality of media 
coverage among other things. Th e training workshops and seminars are too brief 
for any eff ective training to take place. To somehow transcend this limitation, 
the Canada-based Journalists for Human Rights has a team of resident trainers 
attached to some media outlets in Sierra Leone, where they work alongside local 
journalists and hold regular monthly workshops.
Some media practitioners have often complained that the foreign trainers 
in particular tend to off er them only rudimentary materials that are not new to 
them, or not relevant to their professional needs. Some are drawn to these train-
ing workshops not by the prospect of improving themselves professionally but 
by fi nancial incentives for attending, which they consider a supplement to their 
low income.11 Indeed, the president of SLAJ, in presenting his election manifesto 
(2008), promised to compile a media training blueprint based on the felt needs 
of the nation’s media, so that ‘whichever international organization wants to or-
ganize a training program in the country will have to choose from our felt needs 
and not their self-imposed courses’.12
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Media trainers from outside Sierra Leone are usually unfamiliar with some 
of the peculiar constraints on the press in the country, so the training they off er 
tends not to refl ect the contextual realities (Carothers 1999: 242). For instance, 
in an eff ort to show what a badly written story is, a trainer from the United States 
fi shed one out of a local newspaper and specifi cally pointed out that it was one-
sided. Th en, however, the writer of the story explained that in the absence of a 
freedom of information act, it was diffi  cult to get other views; he had hoped that 
publishing a one-sided story ‘may smoke out’  other sides of it.13 Th e bottom 
line is that although training may be guided by very laudable intentions, to be 
meaningful it has to take into consideration local challenges aff ecting the media 
and freedom of expression in general. Th ese include not only the absence of 
a freedom of information law, which favours rumour-mongering and impedes 
investigative journalism, but also high levels of illiteracy and poverty and a frag-
mented, politicized media open to manipulation by unscrupulous politicians.
Th e focus on training journalists as a way of improving professionalism is 
based on the assumption that those trained will continue to stay on the job. But 
indications are that staff  retention is poor because low remuneration forces jour-
nalists to migrate to better paid jobs. Th is creates a vicious cycle in which there is 
always a need for trained journalists who, after training (especially young ones), 
are likely to move on to greener pastures. In this connection, the head of the Mass 
Communications Unit at Fourah Bay College (University of Sierra Leone) once 
lamented the problem of retaining journalists trained in the media profession 
by his unit, saying that their attraction to better paid jobs had kept them from 
making a positive impact on the media.14
Media support directed at getting the media to develop a corporate identity, 
pull their resources together and speak with one voice on issues that aff ect them has 
not yielded the desired result. Th is is owed in part to a failure to steer away from 
ethnic sentiments and political leanings, as the media in Sierra Leone – as in many 
other African countries – are torn by partisan and tribal strife, and media prac-
titioners, despite much rhetoric, have allowed these narrow and selfi sh consider-
ations to override professional ethics and national interests. In a speech marking the 
thirty-eighth anniversary of the founding of SLAJ, the association’s president, refer-
ring to undiminished infi ghting and disunity within the media, lamented that the 
nation’s media could become the cause of the next civil disturbance in the country 
if practitioners do not behave responsibly and put national interest above all else.
Undertaking Civic Education
Providing civic education with the aim of transmitting democratic knowledge 
and values, fostering democratic practices and encouraging civic engagement is 
another strategy employed in translating freedom of expression. Civic education 
may be defi ned as a form of education that, by itself or as part of a broader system 
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of education, is designed to formally or informally transmit knowledge, skills and 
values that are associated with responsible citizenship. Its fundamental aim is to 
equip and motivate citizens to eff ectively participate in governance and activities 
that aff ect the well-being of the public (Finkel 2003: 4–5).
In Sierra Leone, several governmental and nongovernmental agencies, poli-
ticians, educational institutions and civil society groups, among others, have en-
gaged in providing some form of civic education for the building of a democratic 
culture. However, few of these civic education providers focus explicitly on pro-
moting the right to freedom of expression in their programmes. Understandably, 
the media and some human rights groups devote more attention to promoting 
the right to freedom of expression.
In translating the model of the right to freedom of expression, civic educa-
tors with some training and initiative often seek to draw parallels with aspects 
of the local way of life that in some ways support the value of free expression. 
Th ese translators of the model often attempt to make their presentations lively, 
meaningful and acceptable in local contexts by drawing on local aphorisms, par-
ables, folklore, symbols and the like that in some way portray the value of airing 
one’s views. For example, in teaching the importance of the right to freedom of 
expression during a civic education outreach programme at Waterloo Village on 
the outskirts of Freetown, members of the civic group Adventist Youths Organi-
zation sought to drive home their message by linking it with popular local sayings 
such as ‘God has given us mouths so that we can speak out our minds’ and ‘Your 
grievances are only known when you reveal them’.
In the same vein, ‘fambul tok’ – a local concept that could be translated as 
‘frank family discussions’ – is used by Fambul Tok International (a ‘local’ NGO) 
to convey the importance of candid, open expressions of interests and grievances 
among community members. Th e ‘fambul tok’ concept is based on the notion 
that in an ideal family, members are at liberty to freely express the depth their 
minds, knowing full well that the grievances or concerns will be heard regardless 
of their nature, and that generally all eff orts will be made to amicably address 
these issues with the interest of the family in mind. Like other translators of 
Western models of confl ict management and good governance, Fambul Tok In-
ternational draws on some locally cherished social values and symbols as a strat-
egy for translating freedom of expression.
Th e strategy of linking the model with local symbols and drawing on cultural 
frames of reference in order to induce acceptance is also evident in the media 
and civic education programmes of the U.S.-based NGO Search for Common 
Ground, whose mission statement says:
We work with local partners to fi nd culturally appropriate means to 
strengthen societies’ capacity to deal with confl ict constructively; to un-
derstand the diff erences and act on the commonalities.15
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Search for Common Ground engages in (among other things) the training of 
media practitioners and produces good governance and civic education radio pro-
grammes through its Talking Drum Studios. Th e name ‘Talking Drum’ is a cul-
tural reference point and a cultural link to the notion of free expression. It refers 
to a common West African musical instrument that is used not only for enter-
tainment purposes but also to summon people to a gathering for discussion or 
call a meeting to attention.
Meaningful civic education requires more than just acquiring knowledge 
about freedom of expression and other human rights and being able to discuss 
the issues surrounding them. Apart from transmitting knowledge (which unfor-
tunately tends to be the emphasis in most cases) there is also a need to get citizens 
to internalize the civic value of free expression and refl ect it in their attitudes 
and behaviours. Th is demands systematic, sustained sessions rather than mere 
sporadic sessions devoted to mainly transmitting knowledge. Whereas knowledge 
may be acquired in several classroom sessions or community meetings, internal-
ization of values leading to a desired change in attitude and behaviour tends to 
be much more gradual. Th is is especially so when certain aspects of the political 
culture are at variance with the desired civic education goals. Th us eff ective civic 
education is not just delivered through lessons taught but also involves a complex 
web of corporation and reinforcement from interdependent social institutions 
like the home, social groups and the wider community, which are also engaged in 
the process of political socialization (Stroupe and Sabato 2004).
Impact and Contextual Challenges
Th at transmitting civic knowledge alone is not enough to promote freedom of 
expression is evident from the fact that even some highly educated citizens are at 
times hesitant to freely exercise their rights. Th is is very much so when it comes 
to exercising the right to free expression by speaking a contrary view or taking the 
opposite side on certain issues. Th is tendency could be partly attributed to the 
prevalence of a patronage system in which people at times seek to elicit a patron’s 
protection and support by turning a blind eye and keeping quiet about certain is-
sues bordering on that patron’s integrity. Apart from this political hypocrisy, there 
are also times when even highly educated people have been socially conditioned 
by a general culture of silence and what Ibelema (2008) calls ‘civic cynicism’, that 
is, the pessimistic conviction that the situation is so bad it cannot be remedied, 
no matter how much one speaks out against it.
Th e high level of intolerance of opposing views manifested by students, es-
pecially in student union elections at tertiary institutions, also underscores the 
observation that acquisition of knowledge alone does not guarantee that citizens 
will claim and freely exercise their right to free expression (or other rights). Free-
dom of expression involves more than making one’s own views known – rec-
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ognition of the other sides’ right to make their  views known in matters both 
political and nonpolitical. With regards to expressing political views, high levels 
of intolerance have been manifest at educational institutions where, for instance, 
students from rival student union political camps have violently persecuted their 
colleagues for holding diff erent views. Th is occurred during the 2008 student un-
ion elections at the Freetown Teachers College when one camp of students pre-
sented its election manifesto and then violently prevented members of the other 
camp from presenting theirs. In recent times the university campuses of Fourah 
Bay College (FBC) and Njala University have witnessed violent confrontations 
between student political camps that resulted in temporary bans of student union 
bodies. In fact, just under two years after the ban was lifted on student union 
politics at FBC, electoral violence erupted again between the ‘Black Camp’ and 
the ‘White Camp’, which are said to be receiving support from the two leading 
political parties in the country.
As the fever of the 2010 FBC student union election ran high, the Peace 
Society, Students for Democracy, and the Media and Public Relations Depart-
ment of the Sierra Leone Police, among others, took pre-emptive measures to 
forestall violence. Yet in spite of intervention by campus- and noncampus-based 
human rights and peace organizations preaching the values of free expression 
and political tolerance, violent outbursts resulted in wounding with intent and 
destruction of property. Th is ugly development at FBC was worrisome to most 
observers not only because the students, as future leaders, are expected to set an 
example of tolerating divergent political views, but also because student poli-
tics at FBC in the 1980s somehow became a seedbed that sprouted the revolu-
tionary fervour that culminated in the decade-long civil war (Abdullah 2004: 
Chaps. 2 and 3).
In assessing the use of civic education to promote freedom of expression 
and other rights, one has to examine whether the knowledge, skills and values 
transmitted have brought about the intended attitudinal and behavioural change 
manifested in a political orientation towards good citizenship and meaningful 
participation in governance.
Compared with what obtained in the prewar period, many more citizens 
across the country do have some knowledge about the right to freedom of ex-
pression and know they are entitled to enjoy it. However, a large percentage 
of the population of Sierra Leone have not demonstrated that they know how 
to exercise this right within the confi nes of the law. Apparently they have not 
fully realized and appreciated that there are very good reasons to do so. Th is 
should not be attributed only to failure to strike a balance between ‘rights’ and 
‘responsibilities’ or, in some cases, to initiate and sustain well-thought-out civic 
education programmes. It is also due to the fact that bringing about attitudinal 
and behavioural change is a gradual process – especially in postwar settings like 
Sierra Leone, where the political culture has long been marked by exclusiveness 
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and intolerance that can be traced far back to the early years of the post-inde-
pendence period.
Th e high level of illiteracy and lack of formal education do not help the situ-
ation. As the UNDP points out in its Practical Guidance Note on civic education, 
‘literacy levels are fundamental in civic education programming and can be a 
signifi cant barrier if not addressed appropriately’ (United Nations Development 
Plan 2004: 27). Illiteracy means that the educational information transmitted 
cannot be reinforced by the printed word; nor can the learning experience be sus-
tained and exchanged by that means. Furthermore, the lack of formal education 
may aff ect citizens’ capacity to appreciate abstract concepts and fully analyse and 
evaluate what is being conveyed. Th is is why the Sierra Leone Adult Education 
Association, in addition to its commitment to promote peace building and hu-
man rights among adults, is also engaged in supporting programmes to reduce 
the high rate of illiteracy among them.
A major weakness in translating freedom of expression through civic educa-
tion is the apparent over-emphasis on political and civil rights (i.e. the category 
of rights to which freedom of expression belongs) at the expense of economic, 
social and cultural rights. Englund (2006) describes how both political elites 
and civil society groups tend to fall short in this respect in their promotion of 
human rights in Malawi. While not subscribing to the view that there is a hier-
archy of rights, Englund asserts that political rights tend to be very abstract to 
the ordinary man, and that dwelling simply on them diverts attention from real 
bread-and-butter issues like health, employment and education, which are en-
shrined in economic, social and cultural rights and tend to have more immediate 
relevance to the needs and conditions of the masses. Englund maintains that this 
imbalance, evidenced by both political elites and civil society with support from 
transnational bodies, deprives the citizenry of the substantive meaning of democ-
racy. Still, this need not be the case if human rights are presented as indivisible 
or mutually supportive.
Although freedom of expression belongs to the category of civil and political 
rights and may be regarded as a primary right, it is more meaningfully promoted 
by positioning it alongside economic, social and cultural rights rather than solely 
with other civil and political rights. Th e right to freedom of expression is related 
to economic, social and cultural rights and can in many ways contribute to real 
socioeconomic and cultural gains. For instance, deprived communities have to 
be able to freely and openly voice their felt needs to engage the attention of gov-
ernment and attract an appropriate response. Also, for the development process 
to be meaningful to citizens, and for them to have a vested interest in the process, 
they are expected to participate in various ways, including by expressing their 
views on development policies and programmes. Th e vertical and horizontal fl ow 
of information may provide feedback helpful in managing confl ict and building 
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the peaceful environment that is often conducive to economic development and 
social well-being.
Conclusion
Despite many challenges, transnational interventions in translating the model 
of freedom of expression in postwar Sierra Leone have contributed to a gradual 
expansion of political space for increased participation in governance (although 
in some cases this participation is manipulated, as when people are, contrary 
to their political convictions, fi nancially seduced into putting up a show of 
support by masquerading in political party colours). Th e expanding space for 
free expression and participation in governance is evident in a growing media 
pluralism and the mushrooming of civil society groups (some of which have 
questionable credentials, however). Also increasing is the use of pop music, es-
pecially by young people, to express political views critical of their governments. 
Th rough the disparaging lyrics of pop songs like ‘Mr Government’ and ‘Positive 
Change’, Sierra Leonean youth have become very vocal about issues like mis-
management, corruption and tribalism. Th is unprecedented development is a 
far cry from what obtained in the past, when singing of such songs was enough 
to land one behind bars and discussing such issues was an off ence known as 
‘careless talk’.
Although the freedom of expression model has the potential to fulfi l the 
desired outcomes of managing confl icts and encouraging participation in govern-
ance, at times it inadvertently generates new confl icts associated with what some 
politicians view as irresponsible exercise of this freedom. Some concerned citizens 
have also bemoaned what they perceive as unhealthy rivalry among highly po-
liticized media groups as a new source of confl ict. Elderly citizens in particular 
have lamented the use of what they consider to be vulgar and inciting lyrics by 
allegedly contracted musicians. For instance, two of the songs of Sierra Leonean 
musician Innocent – ‘Bailiff ’ and ‘Ejectment [Eviction] Notice’ – convey the idea 
of forceful removal of the ruling government. In the latter song, which men-
tions unpopular politicians who insist on perpetuating their hold on power at all 
costs, he sings of stabbing them in the stomach. Similarly, the musician  Emerson 
Bockarie, in his popular ‘Borboh Belleh’ (Boy with Bloated Stomach) maintains 
that it is right to beat up a thief (which in this context refers to a corrupt poli-
tician) until he loses a tooth. Th is use of violent lyrics cannot be ascribed solely 
to the horrifying violence experienced during the country’s recent civil war. Also 
pertinent is that most of these artists are inspired by American hip-hop musi-
cians who, in exercising their right to free expression as provided for in the First 
Amendment of the American Constitution, have become notorious for their use 
of vulgar lyrics and glorifi cation of violence.
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Th e translation approach off ers a realistic expectation that the free expres-
sion model will not be wholly passively accepted by the culture into which it 
is being translated. It implies sensitivity to cultural and contextual diff erences, 
which may be taken on board in the process of translation. Translators should not 
be surprised or discouraged by unintended outcomes or achievements that only 
marginally refl ect what obtains back home in the West.
Sylvanus Spencer is a senior lecturer and the head of the Department of His-
tory and African Studies at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, University of Sierra 
Leone. His recent publications include ‘Singing for Change: Music as a Means 
of Political Expression for Young People in Sierra Leone and Liberia’ in Traveling 
Models in African Confl ict Management: Translating Technologies of Social Ordering 
(Brill, 2014) and ‘Th e Use of Pop Songs by Sierra Leonean Youths in Enjoying 
the Space Created for Freedom of Expression after the Civil War’, Africa Today 
59(1) (2012).
Notes
 1. Interview: Henry Lebbie, ex-combatant of the RUF (Revolutionary United Front), 19 
February 1997.
 2. Th e Renaissance and Enlightenment were intellectual movements in Europe that stressed, 
among other things, the need for free expression and tolerance.
 3. Interview: A.G. Sesay, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, 17 August 2010.
 4. Interviews: James Wolo, Head of Media Monitoring and Development (United Nations 
Mission in Liberia), 19 March 2008; J.C. Humper, Chairman Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Sierra Leone, 28 May 2007.
 5. Interview: Ronald Gidwani, President of Human Rights Clinic, Fourah Bay College, 7 
May 2007.
 6. All Peoples Congress Party Manifesto for the 2007 Elections, retrieved 19 October 2015 
from http://www.sierraherald.com/apc-manifesto.htm. 
 7. See Newsletter of the World Association of Newspapers, no. 38, April 2008.
 8. ‘Sierra Leone: Open Letter to President on Libel Laws’. Retrieved 9 November 2009 from 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/media/28778.
 9. ‘Lawsuit Seeks Greater Freedom of Expression in Sierra Leone’. Retrieved 20 March 2008 
from http://www.justiveinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=104048.
10. See the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists website: http://slajsl.com// (retrieved 22 
November 2008).
11. Interview: Mathew Qwerty, journalist, Radio Democracy, 7 May 2006.
12. Manifesto of Umaru Fofanah for the 2008 SLAJ presidential election. Retrieved from 
SLAJ Head Offi  ce, Campbell Street, Freetown.
13. Interview: Alpha Rashid Jalloh, media practitioner, Independent Newspaper, 11 May 2008.
14. Statement of Isaac Massaquoi, head of the Mass Communications Unit, Fourah Bay Col-
lege Faculty of Arts Board Meeting, 13 May 2009.
15. See the Search for Common Ground website: http: //www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_home.html 
(retrieved 5 April 2008).
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Chapter 12
Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers 
and Global Flows of 
Child Protection Expertise
Susan Shepler
In the fi eld of international struggles for the protection of children aff ected by 
war, there are many ‘fi rsts’ in the case of Sierra Leone. Th e peace accord signed 
in Lomé in 1999 was the fi rst African peace accord to specifi cally mention the 
reintegration of former child soldiers. Th e United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone was the fi rst UN peacekeeping mission to include a child protection 
offi  cer. Th e Special Court for Sierra Leone was the fi rst international crimi-
nal tribunal to convict individuals of war crimes for conscripting and enlisting 
children.1
Since then, the fi eld of child protection for children aff ected by war has 
only expanded. Disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programmes 
for children are now standard practice in nations where child soldiers exist. In 
2006, Th omas Lubanga of the DRC became the fi rst person ever arrested under 
a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for the war crime of con-
scripting and enlisting children under the age of fi fteen years and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities. Across the world, there are currently over sixty 
child protection advisers in seven UN peacekeeping missions and in two UN 
political missions, and there is a move to include child protection offi  cers in all 
peacekeeping missions.2 Th e UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
for Children and Armed Confl ict notes that
mainstreaming the issue of children and armed confl ict in United Na-
tions system-wide activities and within United Nations entities is a cen-
tral strategy to ensure the practical application of standards and norms 
for the protection of children. Signifi cant progress has been made, par-
ticularly in the peace and security sector. Th e General Assembly and the 
Security Council have led the way in enabling more concerted action 
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by the United Nations system as a whole on children aff ected by armed 
confl ict.3
Furthermore, the UN Security Council has asked regional organizations to in-
clude ‘child protection expertise’ in their secretariats and development of child 
protection action plans.
Th is phenomenal growth in the institutional development of child protec-
tion for children aff ected by war mirrors the speed with which the international 
community adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the most widely 
and quickly adopted human rights convention in history. At the risk of sound-
ing cynical, it seems clear that child protection for children aff ected by war is a 
growth industry, creating new employment and new expertise around the world. 
Th e focus of this chapter is these remarkable transnational processes of institu-
tionalization and knowledge production. At issue are the following questions: 
What is child protection expertise? Where does it come from? How is it created? 
How does it move around the world?
I address these questions through an exploration of child protection expertise 
as it was deployed in Sierra Leone during and after the confl ict there (1991 to 
2002). Th e war in Sierra Leone is known in the world for three things (rightly 
or wrongly): blood diamonds, amputation as a weapon of war and child sol-
diers. Although children and youth’s participation in violent confl ict is not new 
(Rosen 2005; Shepler 2010b) the modern phenomenon of ‘child soldier’ is new. 
My dissertation (Shepler 2005a) was based on eighteen months of ethnographic 
fi eldwork in interim care centres for demobilized child soldiers and in a number 
of communities where children were reintegrating. In it I described how the pro-
cess of child soldiers’ reintegration drew on two diff erent models of childhood: 
the Western, represented by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; and 
the Sierra Leonean, represented by traditions of child labour, fosterage, and train-
ing. My work focuses on the conjuncture of the global and the local models of 
childhood, describing how in practice child soldiers are made at the intersection 
of the two. Between these two models there are clear power diff erences, the West-
ern model better funded and based on child protection expertise. Despite the 
obvious power asymmetry, however, I do not regard this encounter as merely an 
imposition. Indeed, I found the intersection of the two models to be a productive 
site for all concerned, with some Sierra Leoneans strategically using child rights 
discourse for their own ends and international child rights practitioners honing 
their models for export to other postconfl ict contexts. Child rights discourse and 
child protection practice did ease the reintegration of some children and youth 
while also benefi ting some local NGOs and development workers. But it also had 
broader political eff ects in Sierra Leone, aff ecting what Sharon Stephens (1995) 
calls ‘the cultural politics of childhood’ and creating new subjectivities, especially 
for children and youth.
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Contending Models of Human Rights
Let us take a step back and discuss some of the contending models of how ‘uni-
versal’ discourses such as child rights interact with particular local contexts. Mark 
Goodale, in his introduction to the volume Th e Practice of Human Rights: Track-
ing Law Between the Global and the Local, notes that
diff erent orientations to the problem of human rights as a normative 
category can be usefully placed on a spectrum of degrees of expansive-
ness. At one end of the spectrum … are the diff erent variations of the 
view that ‘human rights’ refers to the body of international law… A 
somewhat more expansive orientation … consider[s] the ways in which 
the concept of human rights … is itself normative. [T]he other end of the 
spectrum … treat(s) human rights as one among several consequential 
transnational discourses. (2007: 6–8)
Goodale calls this last the discursive approach to human rights and argues that 
to conceptualize human rights as one among several key transnational discourses 
is to elevate social practice as both an analytical and methodological category. 
‘Discursive approaches to human rights assume that social practice is, in part, 
constitutive of the idea of human rights itself ’ (Goodale 2007: 8).
Th e discursive approach, with its focus on the importance of social practice, 
is much more satisfying to an anthropologist than a theory of simple norm diff u-
sion that is totally top down and does not consider power in the analysis. It takes 
seriously the actions of the people on the ground who are the supposed targets 
of rights-based interventions. A social practice approach is also more satisfying 
than a theory of imposition that sees any kind of universal rights discourse as an 
imperialism of the West, ignoring the contributions of Africans themselves. See-
ing rights discourse and practice as a form of neocolonialism or governmentality 
is also top-down but has the opposite problem of an exclusive focus on power.
Sally Engle Merry fi nds a happy medium by exploring ‘the practice of human 
rights, focusing on where and how human rights concepts and institutions are 
produced, how they circulate, and how they shape everyday lives and actions’ 
(Merry 2006b: 39). Her approach is built on the concept of individual transla-
tors, or intermediaries:4
Intermediaries play a critical role in translating human rights concepts 
to make them relevant to local situations. Th ese ideas become local-
ized through the work of individuals who serve as translators between 
transnational and local arenas. Th ey are people who hold a double con-
sciousness, combining both human rights conceptions and local ways of 
thinking about grievances. Th ey move between them, translating local 
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problems into human rights terms and human rights concepts into ap-
proaches to local problems. … On the one hand they have to speak the 
language of international human rights that the international donors 
prefer in order to get funds. On the other hand, they have to present 
their initiatives in cultural terms that will be acceptable to at least some 
of the local community. As they scramble for funds, they often need to 
select issues that the international donors are interested in, such as female 
genital cutting, women’s empowerment, or traffi  cking, even though local 
populations may be more interested in clean drinking water, changed 
inheritance laws, or good roads (Merry 2006a: 229).
Merry’s model, then, is that fi rst human rights are localized through the 
work of good local translators, and then ideas about discourse and practice move 
around transnational networks. Th ere is much to recommend this approach, but 
the model is still essentially top-down and maintains a polarization between the 
global centre and various local peripheries.5 I want to move away from the idea 
that expertise comes from the top down and is imposed on locals (though that is 
certainly still the model in many Sierra Leonean villages I worked in). I do not 
want to lose what is useful about Merry’s work on the vernacularization of rights, 
but at the end of Merry’s work, one gets the feeling that the local folks, though 
active translators and hence agentive, cannot leave their locations. Local folks can 
have local knowledge, which is then taken up and used by the global apparatus. 
One gets the sense that locals may be moving ideas up hierarchies, especially 
ideas about how they have cleverly localized rights in their respective contexts, 
but that as representatives of the local, they have no chance to leave their spot on 
the ground. Merry admits as much, saying, ‘Localizing human rights does not 
typically change the meaning and structure of human rights. Th e human rights 
approach retains its distinctive cultural conception of the person, embedded in 
the human rights documents, which values autonomy, security of the body, and 
equality’ (Merry 2006a: 229).
Tentative Steps towards a New Approach
My search for another way of understanding what I was seeing in Sierra Leone 
has led me to expertise.6 In my use of the term, I turn to scientifi c studies as a way 
of understanding the politics and social organization of the creation of expertise, 
and of addressing power head on.
What Is Expertise?
In a review of expertise for the Annual Reviews of Anthropology, Carr (2010) 
explains,
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Expertise is something people do rather than something people have or 
hold … (it) is inherently interactional because it involves the participa-
tion of objects, producers, and consumers of knowledge. … Expertise is 
always ideological because it is implicated in semistable hierarchies of 
value that authorize particular ways of seeing and speaking as expert. … 
Th ese practices are routinized and organized as institutional boundar-
ies are forged between diff erent ways of knowing the very same thing, 
spawning the social confi gurations we call profession, craft, and disci-
pline. (ibid.: 18)
Th is description resonates with my work on former child soldiers.  Ethics for the 
care of children and models for their reintegration after social crisis already ex-
isted in postwar Sierra Leone, but they did not count as expert knowledge. Th ey 
were local knowledge, or culture.
Carr also talks about naming practices that distinguish expert knowledge 
from everyday knowledge, and again, his description resonates with what hap-
pened around child protection and child rights in Sierra Leone. It was not that 
people did not know how to take care of their children, but that they were ex-
posed to a new expert language to describe it, what I have called ‘the Rites of the 
Child’ (Shepler 2005b). As Mitchell (2002) argues, the rise of modern Egyptian 
technopolitical expertise would have been impossible without the fi gure of the 
Egyptian peasant as nonintellectual Other (cited in Carr 2010: 22). Similarly, 
child protection experts cannot exist without Africans who do not know how to 
protect their children.
But expertise is about more than creating and maintaining hierarchies. From 
a more philosophical direction, Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ book Rethink-
ing Expertise (2007) presents the ‘Periodic Table of Expertises’ and discusses ubiq-
uitous and specialist expertises, meta-expertises and meta-criteria, ranging from 
‘beer mat knowledge’ to technical connoisseurship. It includes experience, track 
record, certifi cation, etc. Th ey conclude that credentials are not a very useful 
means of judging expertise and fi nd experience and track record to be better 
‘meta-criteria.’
What Is Child Protection Expertise?
Almost all child protection actors operate from a ‘rights-based framework’, but 
child protection expertise includes more than just knowledge of child rights. 
Child protection in confl ict and postconfl ict settings is certainly also built on 
some disciplinary foundations: psychology, education, social work and so on. I 
have argued for the importance of ethnography in understanding the situation 
of child soldiers in child protection settings, but I am up against scholars such 
as Th eresa Betancourt, who use psychological testing to diagnose post-traumatic 
stress disorder among former child soldiers (Betancourt et al. 2010). Betancourt’s 
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work is emblematic of another type of expertise: clinical, for which Sierra Leone 
is a case of a more generalizable condition. She and her team move from case to 
case administering psychological protocols and diagnosing pathologies. Th is sort 
of expertise is undergirded by the medical model and the disciplinary institu-
tions of the academy. Meanwhile, scholar-practitioners like Wessells (2007) and 
Boothby, Strang and Wessells (2006) apply a less ‘scientifi c’, more practice-based 
knowledge that grows out of the more practical disciplines of social work and 
social psychology.
However, since child protection in confl ict and postconfl ict contexts is such a 
new fi eld of endeavour, perhaps only a few decades old, a great deal of the exper-
tise is based on practical experience. In only a limited number of cases has pro-
gramming even been attempted, and most of the tacit knowledge undergirding 
child protection expertise is about what has worked and not worked in diff erent 
places. Th us the building programmes in Sierra Leone ten years ago relied heav-
ily on knowledge of what had been done in Mozambique, Uganda and Liberia 
(round one interventions).
One revealing example is the pressure that came from international child pro-
tection NGOs to fi nd (and fund) Sierra Leonean healing rituals in an astound-
ing confl ation of all African contexts: since traditional healing rituals existed in 
Mozambique and Uganda, the NGOs reasoned, they must exist in Sierra Leone. 
Transnational child protection expertise assumed there would be ‘local’ ways of 
dealing with war-aff ected children across all African contexts. In the case of Sierra 
Leone there was no such healing ritual, my informants told me, but savvy local 
‘healers’ were able to concoct a ritual that satisfi ed the international staff . Th e 
really revealing point is that the power asymmetry between the global and local 
models is so great that child protection expertise is not threatened by the adoption 
of ‘traditional healing rituals’ – on the contrary, putting the ‘traditional’ in its 
right place is an important part of its function. Th e logic of transnational child 
protection expertise undoes ethnographic specifi city, confl ating all ‘local’ settings.
Th ree Groups of People with Child Protection Expertise
In an eff ort to think through the various types of child protection expertise pres-
ent in the case of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone, as well as those expertises’ 
relationship to knowledge and experience, I have come up with a preliminary 
typology.
Th e fi rst type of expertise – that of former child soldiers themselves – comes 
from personal experience. Certain former child soldiers, like Ishmael Beah (au-
thor of best seller A Long Way Gone, 2007, famously sold at Starbucks) and oth-
ers, possess embodied expertise and have, in some ways, traded it on the child 
protection lecture circuit. Ishmael Beah became a poster boy for child soldiers as 
the Sierra Leone war became known for child soldiers, and a great many of the 
public’s general ideas about what child soldiers need come from that book. Th ey 
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are tokens in a way, but also powerful lobbying tools. I have recently been asked, 
by organizers of panels at places like the United States Institute of Peace, if I knew 
any former child soldiers for their panel: ‘A girl, or someone with a disability 
would be even better!’ Th e commodifi cation of the former child soldier is a clear 
phenomenon, but it is not exactly what I am talking about.7
Th e second group of people with a claim to child protection expertise are em-
ployees of international child protection NGOs. For the most part they are Amer-
icans and Europeans, and they generally have the educational certifi cation (though 
not always). But as I have noted above, child protection expertise is also very prac-
tical. It comes from a ‘track record’ of successfully implementing programmes. It 
operates on the currency of ‘lessons learned’ and ‘best practices’. Th is group of ex-
perts has mobile knowledge. Th ey move from context to context and have extensive 
transnational networks. Th ey have put programmes into practice elsewhere. Th ey 
showed up in Sierra Leone from postings in Mozambique and Uganda, and went 
on to postings in Liberia and Sri Lanka. Th eirs is ‘practical’ knowledge.
Th e third group of experts, and those I am most interested in, are local NGO 
workers. Like Merry’s translators, they use their so-called double consciousness 
to move back and forth between local expertise and, always in opposition to it, 
transnational expert knowledge. Within the devastated postwar Sierra Leonean 
economy, they are part of the new middle class, a professional NGO class whose 
professionalism is made possible only by international funding and transnational 
networks.
Of course there are other levels, including workers at smaller NGOs who 
try to access knowledge in order to access funds. Coulter (2004) has described 
these ‘briefcase NGOs’ in Sierra Leone. To the extent that they have managed 
to learn the language of child protection, representatives of local communities, 
headmen and schoolmasters also have gained a bit of expertise just by learning 
how to tell the NGOs and international NGOs (INGOs) what they want to 
hear. Th at is, they are somewhat less successful translators. Th ey may have par-
ticipated in a ‘training of trainers.’ Th ey may be able to enumerate the victims in 
their community. INGOs have ‘empowered’ them, but only to a certain extent. 
‘Sensitization’, the ubiquitous tool of norm diff usion, is supposed to spread child 
rights knowledge but still maintains the boundaries between local knowledge and 
expert knowledge (Shepler 2005b).
How Does Expertise Work?
Expertise involves, among other things, the establishment of asymmetries among 
people and between people and objects. It creates boundaries between expert 
and non-expert knowledge (even if they are very close in content). For example, 
while the war was still ongoing in the late 1990s before international NGOs were 
seriously active, local NGOs such as Christian Brothers and Children Aff ected 
by War were doing child protection activities their own way, building on pre-
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existing programmes for street kids and orphanages, and often making do with 
very little by drawing on Sierra Leonean models of child protection like child 
fosterage. Th ough in many ways they were doing the job in better, more sustain-
able ways before the international players arrived, they were outspent and out-
expertised when actors such as UNICEF, Save the Children and the International 
Rescue Committee arrived. In Sierra Leone, expertise bore a certain international 
imprimatur. Should we see this state of aff airs as primarily the imposition of the 
‘Western’ way of doing things, simply as power? I believe there is more going on.
Individual Career Trajectories and Actor Networks
Perhaps I can best illustrate this relationship between local and international ex-
pertise with an example. My friend Mohammed8 and my Sierra Leonean husband 
taught together at the same secondary school in the early 1980s. Mohammed 
went on to run a local NGO in Sierra Leone for former child soldiers, and was 
a skilled translator of transnational forms and of local knowledge. He eventually 
left Sierra Leone to put his child protection expertise to work for UNICEF in 
Afghanistan (which at the time had great need of staff  but little appeal as a desti-
nation). After that, he was transferred to several other African postings. What are 
the components of Mohammed’s child protection expertise?
Certainly he learned a lot from his experience in Sierra Leone as the head of 
a successful child protection NGO, but I believe it was his ability as a translator 
that made his international career possible. As I said earlier, understandings of 
local contexts in a handful of national cases form the knowledge base of this rela-
tively new fi eld; therefore being Sierra Leonean is an important part of Moham-
med’s expertise. Sierra Leone’s disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation 
programmes for children have been deemed successful and are now models for 
others. Th e structure of child protection expertise enables this by confl ating all 
local knowledge, as already discussed. Once Mohammed grasped local knowl-
edge in one setting, he could then move seamlessly to another ‘local’ context 
and in some ways continue to represent ‘the local’ in a diff erent national con-
text. Mohammed can trade on his Sierra Leone experiences, and also his Sierra 
Leonean-ness, not as a token but as part of what we might call an actor-network 
(Latour 1987). Understanding his experience allows us to move beyond Merry’s 
model of locals forever stuck ‘on the ground’ in their own settings. Mohammed 
was a skilled translator but also a mobile actor, contributing to an evolving body 
of child protection expertise as he moved.
Conclusion
One could argue that this whole chapter is based on the observation that a skilful 
Sierra Leonean got a job with the UN that he would not have got, had war not 
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come to his country. Th ere are no grand conclusions here; I have only reframed 
my original questions about what happens at the intersection of global and local 
models of childhood by shifting my focus to the nature of transnational child 
protection expertise to ask whether and how local-level expertise can move in 
that system. What are the conditions in which individual Sierra Leoneans make 
use of or contribute to that system? How often are Sierra Leoneans able to act in 
ways other than representing ‘local knowledge’? And how, therefore, does trans-
national expertise work to replicate existing power relations or create new chal-
lenges to existing power relations?
One thing is clear: Sierra Leone is the type of ‘case’ of child protection on 
which expertise is built. Sierra Leone is now a node in child-protection actor 
networks. Sierra Leone, as a laboratory of the most traumatized kids, has a new 
kind of capital. Th e dance therapy practitioner goes there to work with a set of 
war-traumatized youth. Th e psychological tests woman goes there to design and 
test her trauma protocols. Th e participatory research with girl mothers happens 
there. Others (e.g., Kanyako 2010) have written about the eff ects of aid fl ows 
directed towards reconstruction in postwar Sierra Leone. I want to ask how Sierra 
Leone has been aff ected by transnational fl ows of ‘expertise’.
Th e actor-network model is a good extension of Merry’s work because it 
allows for more creative energy from the bottom up and sees all the participants 
in the ‘global assemblage’ (Collier and Ong 2005) as active participants in its 
creation. Translators are no longer stuck in one location, but they are in some 
ways stuck being representatives of ‘the local’, even when they move to diff erent 
localities. Clearly there is more research to be done on this topic. Th ese are just 
preliminary thoughts towards a reframing of a research agenda. I believe the next 
step is to take Merry further and, after accounting for the various particularities 
of the localization of diff erent sorts of human rights in diff erent locations, to go 
beyond the relatively top-down model by focusing more on the kinds of moves 
(for individuals, but also for ideas and practices) that are possible within those 
various actor networks.
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Notes
 1. See Shepler (2010a) for more detail on these and other ‘fi rsts’ in child protection for 
children aff ected by war.
 2. Since 2001 Child Protection Offi  cers have been posted with Peacekeeping Operations in 
Sierra Leone, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Liberia, Haiti and the Sudan. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/
children/cpa.shtml for more information.
 3. Offi  ce of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Confl ict, ‘Mainstreaming the Issue of Children and Armed Confl ict’. Retrieved 25 Sep-
tember 2011 from http://www.un.org/children/confl ict/english/mainstreaming.html.
 4. See also Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan (2002) on ‘local development 
brokers’.
 5. Merry acknowledges this to some extent: ‘Th e term local is, of course, deeply problematic 
here, as is its oppositional twin global. In the context of discussions of transnationalism, 
local tends to stand for lack of mobility, wealth, education, and cosmopolitanism, as well 
as recalcitrant particularity, whereas global encompasses the ability to move across bor-
ders, to adopt universal moral frameworks, and to share in the affl  uence, education, and 
cosmopolitan awareness of elites from other parts of the world’ (Merry 2006b: 39).
 6. Th is move is in some ways driven by my time as an Assistant Professor in Washington, 
DC, and the omnipresent insistence on ‘policy relevance’. As a new participant in var-
ious child protection networks that include donors and practitioners, I encountered an 
unfamiliar knowledge economy and discovered I was an ‘expert’. I was even invited to 
talk about my work at the United Nations by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Confl ict, a moment when I most felt a part of transna-
tional child protection expertise.
 7. I have spoken elsewhere about the uses of the child soldier narrative in Shepler (2006); see 
also Meyers (2009) and Coundouriotis (2010).
 8. A pseudonym to protect confi dentiality.
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and Home Politics in 
the Twentieth-Century Gambia
Alice Bellagamba
British colonial sources of the 1930s make reference to diamond smuggling in 
the Colony and Protectorate of the Gambia. However, only in the 1990s did the 
key role of the Gambia in the diamond trade begin to receive attention due to 
international eff orts to regulate the rough-diamond market and disband the il-
licit commercial networks that supported confl icts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Guinea-Conakry (Gberie 2009: 75; Smillie 2010: 189–90).1 Pub-
lished in 2004, the bestseller Blood Diamonds by journalist Greg Campbell men-
tions the resettlement of major Gambian diamond dealers in their home country 
after Charles Taylor toppled the Liberian regime of Samuel Doe in 1989. What 
Campbell and other analysts left undiscussed is how this return migration of the 
1990s followed well-trodden paths laid by the movement of trade and labour 
forces between the Gambia River and Sierra Leone in earlier decades.
Pervasive Mande surnames such as Ceesay, Fofanna, Dumbuyaa and Darboe 
(Howard 1976; Skinner 1978; Howard and Skinner 1984) betray the common 
precolonial history of these two regions, whose socioeconomic and political in-
tegration was consolidated by the development of the cola trade in the nine-
teenth century (Curtin 1975: 228–29; White 1981) and by the fact that for 
several decades British possessions along the Gambia River (the most important 
of which was Bathurst, established at the river mouth in 1816) were adminis-
tered as a dependency of Sierra Leone (Gray 1966: 366–78, 457–65). Some of 
the Bathurst African traders had strong ties to Sierra Leone. One was Joseph D. 
Richards (Hughes and Perfect 2008: 189–90), who was born in Freetown in 
1843 and became a crucial actor in the development of commercial networks 
between Bathurst and the interior of the Senegambia in the second half of the 
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nineteenth century (Mbodji 1992: 216–17). Th e migration of the 1950s, in 
which thousands of rural Gambian youths sought their fortune in the diamond 
fi elds of Sierra Leone, was another phase in the long-term history of economic, 
social and political connections between the Gambia River and Sierra Leone. 
During that period, news that the Sierra Leonean government had opened up 
diamond-mining activities to small-scale operators (Swindell 1975: 182) spread 
rapidly throughout West Africa (Bredeloup 2007: 65ff .). As for the Gambia River 
area, the rush to the diamond fi elds marked the beginning of the international 
diaspora, as many of the men who arrived in Sierra Leone in the 1950s then trav-
elled to Congo, Zaire, Liberia and fi nally Angola in the following decades (Gai-
bazzi 2010). Th is chapter takes its cue from the life trajectory of Solo Darboe, 
a former diamond dealer born in the upper Gambia in the 1930s, to illustrate 
this early transnational aspect of twentieth-century Gambian history. I collected 
Solo’s life reminiscences in 2008 with the help of Bakary Sidibeh, who for many 
years was my mentor and research partner in the Gambia. In the years that fol-
lowed, I met many of Solo’s mates (elderly men such as Omar Suso, a close friend 
and working partner of Solo) and supplemented oral sources with the available 
written evidence. Such an exercise of historical reconstruction has broader meth-
odological implications. Philip Curtin (1975) and Boubacar Barry (1998) have 
promoted the integrated analysis of precolonial Senegambia in terms of its com-
mercial and cultural relationships with Europe, the Americas and the regions 
that are today part of Mauritania, Mali, Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau. 
Historians of the colonial and postcolonial period have instead opted for ‘meth-
odological nationalism’ – i.e., the tendency to frame the analysis mostly in terms 
of national boundaries (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003). By probing into the 
micro-level of Solo’s life trajectory, this chapter attempts to introduce a transna-
tional dimension into the study of the late colonial and postcolonial Gambia, a 
country that many scholars tend to overlook precisely because of its small size. 
In so doing, the analysis touches on the crucial role of the fi rst twentieth-century 
waves of international migrations in the very process of African nation-building.
As a Beginning: Family Ancestry
My conversations with Solo took place in Bakau New Town. Th e desirable lo-
cation and comfortable solidity of his house testifi ed to the wealth of its owner. 
Bakau is an old coastal village that the British brought under their control during 
the 1840s. Like other peri-urban areas around the capital city of Banjul, Bakau 
New Town evolved in the 1970s thanks to increased rural-to-urban migration 
and investment by the fi rst generation of Gambian civil servants and rich busi-
nessmen like Solo. Both Solo and Bakary Sidibeh, who was the intermediary for 
our encounters, were important actors in the decolonization process. Even if the 
political historiography of the Gambia barely mentions this detail (Hughes and 
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Perfect 2006: 136–38), Sidibeh was among the founders of the political move-
ment that brought about the establishment of the Protectorate People’s Party in 
1959, whose name was changed to the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) shortly 
before the fi rst national elections of 1960. Its leader was Dawda Jawara, son of a 
wealthy rural trader. With support from the colonial government, Jawara was ed-
ucated in Scotland, and when he returned to the Gambia he was appointed head 
of the veterinary service. After the 1962 national elections, the PPP assumed 
leadership of the country (Hughes and Perfect 2006; Bellagamba 2008), and in 
October 1963, upon the attainment of self-government, Jawara was appointed 
prime minister. Th at year Solo married Jawara’s niece, Fatouma Almami. With the 
Republican Referendum of 1970, Jawara became the fi rst president of the Gam-
bia. He remained in offi  ce until the 1994 military coup that led to the election 
of Yaya Jammeh, the coup’s leader, as the new president of the Gambia in 1996.
When I encountered Solo, the news that Jawara (2009) was working on his 
autobiography had just spread among his former supporters and age-mates. Solo, 
who had switched his allegiance to the opposition in the early 1970s after years 
of providing fi nancial support to Jawara and the PPP, felt that his experience also 
deserved attention. His self-narrative started with the assertion ‘We are people 
with history’.2 Th at statement was instrumental in re-marking the boundary be-
tween Solo and other members of the twentieth-century Gambian elite, who un-
like him could not so easily claim high birth and a historical pedigree. Such was 
the case of Jawara, whose affi  liation with the professional endogamous group of 
leatherworkers was rumoured from the beginning of his political career (Hughes 
and Perfect 2006: 136–37).
Similar to the Bayo, Ceesay, Danso, Fofanna and Signateh, the Darboe are 
jula, which means they belong to the precolonial elite of freeborn traders, Islamic 
scholars and warriors (Curtin 1975: 68–75; Galloway 1974). Th e Darboe family 
trace their history to their roots in the Casamance village of Tendindi, where their 
Malian ancestors are said to have fi rst settled during their movement towards the 
Atlantic coast (Wright 1977: 38). Th e settlements established by the Darboe in 
the Gambia River Valley strategically intersected with the indigenous and Euro-
African trading networks that crossed the Senegambia from north to south and 
from east to west.
Solo’s home village is Brifu, in the Gambian area of the precolonial kingdom 
of Wuli, not far from the wharves of Wuli Passimass and Yarbutenda, which are 
mentioned by early European sources on the upper river (Reeve 1912: 131–32). 
Th e wealth of Solo’s great-grandparents was derived as much from agriculture 
as from the slave and gold trades, whereas his father, Saloum Darboe, engaged 
in groundnut cultivation and the cattle trade, as was typical during the early 
colonial period. Solo grew up in the trading tradition of his family. In accord-
ance with customary values, he was raised to be self-disciplined, hardworking 
and forward-looking. In that conception of life, a young freeman such as Solo 
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had to be physically and morally strong as well as ambitious and adventurous to 
carve out a livelihood. Economic responsibility towards the extended family was 
a priority, as was the cultivation of leadership aspirations. Like other rural boys, 
Solo learned to farm and to respect his elders. As befi tted his ancestry, he was also 
initiated into the ways of trade.3 When he was fi fteen, his father supported his 
fi rst commercial venture by entrusting him with a small amount of capital with 
which to enter into petty trade. Solo travelled to Bathurst and headed homeward 
with a stock of cigarettes, mints, biscuits and other easily transportable items, 
which he meant to smuggle across the Senegalese border. His fi rst trip, however, 
was a failure – customs offi  cers confi scated all of his goods. When he decided in 
1953 to travel to Sierra Leone, his father denied him further fi nancial support 
because Solo had lost the initial investment to the customs offi  cers. Money came 
instead from his mother, who sold some of her cattle in order to help her son. 
Th us began Solo’s transnational life, during which he visited and lived in several 
African countries as well as Belgium and Israel.
Early Sierra Leonean Adventures
Colonial sources on the Upper River Division of the Gambia reported the attrac-
tion the Sierra Leone diamond fi elds held for young men in the 1950s.4 To be 
sure, poverty was one of the factors driving them out of their villages. In many 
areas of rural Gambia, a ‘hungry season’ before the new harvest was the rule 
(Swindell and Jeng 2006: 59; David 1980), and one of Solo’s age-mates once 
explained to me how ‘diffi  cult it was to stay in the village, if you had nothing’.5 
Family members, friends and other villagers expected young men to contribute 
to the betterment of the community. Th ose who could not, or did not show 
adequate commitment to hard work, were quickly isolated and treated with con-
tempt. Meanwhile, many young men resented the strict social control typical 
of village life and the labour demands that the government and chiefs imposed 
on them, such as the maintenance of roads after the rains. Places like 1950s 
Sierra Leone, or 1960s Congo Brazzaville and Kinshasa, which many interna-
tional migrants reached after leaving Sierra Leone, were seen as gateways to a 
more cosmopolitan lifestyle (Abdul-Korah 2008: 2; Hannerz 1992: 228).6 After 
successfully obtaining a travel permit from the British offi  cial in charge of the 
upper Gambia River, Solo left his home village. At that time, migrants reached 
Sierra Leone by either riding the postal service ship between Bathurst and Free-
town or following the old commercial routes connecting the Upper Gambia to 
Sierra Leone across the plains of Fouta Djallon. Travellers did not like to cross 
Guinea-Bissau; the despotic nature of Portuguese colonialism and the regime of 
forced labour it had in place were notorious throughout the region. Solo followed 
the road through Fouta Djallon to reach the eastern part of Sierra Leone, not 
far from the border with Liberia. Th e town was Baima, a locality on the ‘Mende 
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Line’ railway that connected Freetown to south-eastern Sierra Leone. For trains 
headed eastward, Baima was the last station before Pendembu, which was located 
at the intersection of the roads leading to Guinea-Conakry and across the Libe-
rian border. In the span of a few years, the population of the nearby diamond 
areas of Kono, Kenema and Bo districts grew fi fteenfold, from fi ve to seventy-fi ve 
thousand inhabitants (Stevens 1984: 164). Th e economy was vibrant; shops full 
of goods, new houses and cars were evidence of the prosperity linked to the dia-
mond industry.
My fi rst destination was Baima Station on Mende Line. I had one hun-
dred pounds, and I gave fi fty pounds to my ‘brother’ to keep so that I 
could invest the rest in diamond mining. After one month, there was 
no positive result. I returned to my ‘brother’ to collect my money, as I 
wanted to start a small business. But the man was twisting and turning 
me around by saying ‘come tomorrow’, until I realized he had ‘chopped’ 
[misused] my money. I took up barañini work to survive. I was then 
told that somebody was looking for help to cut two hundred trees and 
that he was ready to pay six pounds for the job. I went and asked for a 
cutlass. I worked hard to cut all the two hundred trees as fast as I could 
and I carried them on my head. Th e man was surprised and asked me 
whether I had gone crazy. He had another labourer whom he used to pay 
three pounds per month. So, the man continued, how could I pretend to 
do the job so quickly and be paid the equivalent of two months’ salary? 
He gave me only three pounds and I said: ‘If you want to pay me only 
three pounds, it is up to you! I will leave it with God!’7 With these three 
pounds I bought cigarettes to resell. I continued to serve as a porter, car-
rying bags of rice on my head. Th ey used to pay me three pence. I made 
gradual savings until I rebuilt my initial capital of fi fty pounds.8
Barañini (literally ‘job-seeker’) is a Mandingo and Bambara word used pri-
marily in the colonial Sahel to identify migrant unskilled labourers (Meillassoux 
1965: 140). In the Gambia, it described the young men who served as porters 
along the river and at the Bathurst harbour during the trading season, from No-
vember to May, when the harvest was over and people moved out of the villages 
in search of labour opportunities. Young Gambians were ready to work hard to 
earn money to support their families and achieve social autonomy; however, they 
preferred to do it far from their home communities, where menial jobs were often 
viewed as those fi lled by the lowest strata of society, such as former slaves and 
people of slave ancestry. Seasonal farming during the rains or working as barañini 
in colonial centres after the end of the agricultural season helped overcome status 
barriers and related behavioural codes: ‘the foreign land’, a local proverb goes, 
‘does not know about your good origins, but it can recognize a man of value’.9 
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Th is wisdom applied to freed slaves and slave descendants, who desired to hide 
their ancestry far from their communities, as well as to freemen like Solo, who 
in Sierra Leone had to endure forms of humiliation that would have been unac-
ceptable at home.
As a newcomer, Solo relied on the help of a ‘brother’, a very loose Mandinka 
expression that may be used to identify a blood relative or simply a person hail-
ing from the same village. Relationships between immigrants and Sierra Leone-
ans were structured along the principles of the landlord/stranger relation, which 
had dominated long-distance trading diasporas for centuries. Upon arriving in a 
new area, an immigrant (or a trader) had to fi nd a landlord who could provide 
him with lodging, protection and advice in exchange for labour, material sup-
port and loyalty. Th e system was based on trust (Zack-Williams 1995; Bredeloup 
2007), but agreements were not always honoured, as Solo rapidly discovered. 
Newcomers had to adjust to the dynamic, rough-and-ready environment of dia-
mond-mining areas full of unscrupulous middlemen and hundreds of thousands 
of equally ambitious young men. Selfi sh and opportunistic behaviour was the 
rule more than the exception. Anything could happen, from death – as when 
men illegally dove into creeks at night in search of diamonds10 – to unexpected 
strokes of luck. Solo continued to seek out opportunities. Th e story of how he got 
his fi rst diamond – one he surely has told time and again to friends and relatives 
– clearly refers to the diamond-smuggling networks between Sierra Leone and 
Monrovia, the capital of Liberia.
As I did not know diamonds, I established connections with a man in 
the bush. One day this man showed me a diamond, which according 
to him was worth fi fteen hundred pounds. I bargained and bargained 
until I obtained it for thirty-fi ve pounds, but I was not sure of the real 
value of the stone. In town, I sold it for one thousand and fi ve hundred 
pounds to a man, who gave me fi ve hundred pounds in advance, and 
said he would bring the rest after having resold the diamond in Liberia. 
After two, three days he was back and gave me my money. With that, I 
started buying and selling diamonds until I had about thirty-fi ve thou-
sand pounds in Monrovia.11
After the discovery of Sierra Leonean diamonds in the 1930s, Liberia became 
a major diamond exporter, although its government never published reliable 
statistics on its internal production (Greenhalgh 1985: 204). Th e stones came 
mostly from Sierra Leone, following the nineteenth-century patterns of trade 
between the two regions (Rosen 1973: 99–100). Omar Suso, Solo’s best friend 
in those days, took on the risky activity of transporting diamonds to Monrovia, 
which he recalled in 2008 when I asked him to talk about his early days with Solo 
in Sierra Leone:
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Solo used to tell me: ‘You know the place where we can sell this dia-
mond. We got it for two thousand dollars, go quickly to Monrovia’. Th at 
was how I smuggled diamonds into Monrovia. In those days, the police 
were vigilant, especially when they saw a person travelling to Monrovia. 
Most of the diamond buyers were in Monrovia. Th ere was a thick forest 
along the road, and a small hamlet in the bush called Foday Camara, 
which was already in Liberia. Th e last Sierra Leone village towards that 
area was located near a river at the border between Sierra Leone and 
Guinea. When you reached there, you would board a Land Rover; but 
only few traders ventured to Liberia by land as they would be searched 
‘from head to foot’. Police would take off  your trousers to search for 
diamonds. If they found any, you would be arrested. For me, I always 
pretended to be the drivers’ apprentice. Both Solo and I were very young 
at the time. I used to dress like an apprentice. When we reached the 
police station I would hold on to the back of the vehicle without taking 
a seat inside. I used to do this with diamonds on me. I would then jump 
down and say to the police: ‘Quick, we want to go!’ Th ey would push 
me aside and say: ‘Go away!’ Sometimes, I made two, three trips like this 
in one month, leaving people behind to spend several days before they 
could reach Monrovia.12
According to Omar’s account, stones were acquired directly from miners or 
from small-time intermediaries who commuted between the forest areas and the 
town of Bo, where Solo eventually settled: ‘When he took the diamond, he would 
say: “I will be back with your money soon”’. Diamonds were resold in Monrovia, 
where, Omar said, there were only three diamond-buying offi  ces, one of which 
was owned by the Diamond Corporation, the De Beers branch established in 
1929 to manage the supply and trade of rough diamonds (Bredeloup 2007: 36ff .). 
Money paid to Solo was immediately transferred to his London bank account, and 
from London it then wended its way back to Sierra Leone. Th is strategy helped 
circumvent police investigations: as Omar explained, ‘Th e government of Sierra 
Leone did not enquire about the source of money coming from London’.13
In addition to those who obtained a license to sell and exchange diamonds 
after the partial liberalization of the diamond market by the Sierra Leone govern-
ment in 1956, the diamond trade made use of innumerable unlicensed diamond 
diggers, supporters, distributors and intermediaries (Bredeloup 2007: 108). Th e 
Lebanese and Jewish trading diaspora played an important role in the system. 
Beirut wealth during the late 1950s and 1960s was ‘rumored to derive from 
Sierra Leone profi ts’ (Greenhalgh 1985: 248). Tel Aviv was another important 
node in the world diamond-trading network, as was London, where many of 
the Jewish diamond dealers of Antwerp had moved after the outbreak of World 
War II (Bredeloup 2007: 108–10). Solo’s ability to recognize good stones rapidly 
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attracted the attention of Jewish intermediaries linked to the Diamond Corpo-
ration. ‘I was not employed’, Solo emphasized in our conversations, ‘but only 
incorporated as a consultant because of my lack of Western education. I dealt 
with the Corporation for over forty years. Th ey were buying from me and I was 
advising them on the values of the diamonds coming to their offi  ce’.14
In only a few years, Solo became a grass-roots agent able to gain the trust of 
African diamond dealers and pass the rough diamonds over to the legal market. 
His stay in Sierra Leone, however, turned out to be short-lived. Solo and Omar 
were lucky to escape the 1956 ‘Operation Parasite’, which drove some forty-fi ve 
thousand foreigners from Kono, one of the major diamond areas (Rosen 1973: 
85ff .). But in 1961, Milton Margai’s government expelled them along with Bas-
sirou Jawara, another Gambian diamond dealer and a friend of Solo, who like 
Solo was to become a diamond magnate. Solo, Bassirou and Omar returned to 
the Gambia, where the political struggle for independence was escalating.
Stranger or Citizen? National Politics on Stage
According to Omar, the arrest of Solo and Bassirou happened at the same time 
as the arrests of Siaka Stevens and many of his supporters on the eve of Sierra 
Leone’s independence (Cartwright 1970: 70–71). Stevens was the leader of the 
All People’s Congress and an opponent of Milton Margai’s government. For some 
years he had served as minister of mines, land and labour, and his intimate knowl-
edge of miners and diamond dealers had alerted him to the political potential of 
the many immigrants who were living in very diffi  cult conditions in the diamond 
areas, a detail that is also mentioned in his autobiography (Stevens 1984; Smillie, 
Gberie and Hazleton 2001: 41–43). When recalling the story of his arrest, Solo 
described himself as among Stevens’s many followers:
In 1961, Milton Margai, fi rst Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, deported 
me. Because I am not a Sierra Leonean, I did not like politics. I like one 
man only … a retired police sergeant, who formed a party, Siaka Stevens, 
I gave him so many Land Rovers, so much money, that Milton said, 
‘Solo, you cannot stay in Sierra Leone’ and he deported me. When Mil-
ton died and Siaka Stevens’s party won, then I was in Israel, and Siaka 
brought me back to Sierra Leone.15
Milton Margai died in 1964 and was succeeded by his brother, Albert Margai. 
Stevens won the 1967 election but was then deposed in a coup aimed at rein-
stating Albert Margai. However, in 1968 Stevens was able to regain power. Th e 
expansion of the illicit diamond networks during his government, which lasted 
until 1985, and his ability to cultivate personal connections with major diamond 
dealers are a well-documented aspect of Sierra Leonean history.
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A consistent motif of Solo’s account is the place of migrants in these early 
1960s political transformations. When highlighting the role of migrations in the 
development of Ghanaian nationalistic feelings, Meyer Fortes (1971) referred 
specifi cally to the Ghanaian elite educated in Europe. Th e same holds true for 
many other African countries, whose initial cohorts of politicians were educated 
abroad. Politics also impacted the hundreds of thousands of illiterate rural mi-
grants like Solo, who experienced the on-the-ground implications of national 
identities while abroad in the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s. If Solo 
were to delineate his family legacy, Sierra Leone was rightly his second home-
land: both the Upper Gambia and Sierra Leone were British territories ruled 
by a hierarchy of British offi  cials and native chiefs, where there were speakers of 
Mandingo, Solo’s mother tongue, and people bearing his surname. Travelling to 
Liberia, he could follow the paths of Mande-speaking commercial diasporas and 
integrate into the vibrant Mande-speaking trading community of Monrovia. Al-
most overnight, Sierra Leone’s independence created a new geography of power 
based on national belonging. Interestingly, the fi rst historical and sociological 
literature on the place of ‘strangers’ in African societies developed immediately 
after the birth of the new nations (Peil 1971; Shack and Skinner 1979), when 
the commercial networks and the mobile labour force that had prospered in the 
colonial empires had to readjust to the enforcement of national boundaries.
Men like Solo found themselves involved in a variety of political transactions. 
Both abroad and at home, politicians courted the social and material wealth of 
these businessmen, which they needed to support the emergent political machin-
ery (Morgenthau 1979).
In addition to supporting Siaka Stevens, Solo cultivated his own social pres-
ence in the Gambia. ‘Build your place fi rst!’ is a Gambian saying that has become 
popular since international migration became an avenue to social mobility in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Solo’s fi rst investment in social respectabil-
ity was his father’s pilgrimage to Mecca in 1958. Th e second was to marry Fa-
toumata Barro, the maternal cousin whom his parents had chosen to be his wife. 
Marriage was the gateway to maturity, and migration helped young men to speed 
up the process by earning enough to assume the marital expenses, a phenomenon 
that colonial offi  cials commented upon as early as the 1890s.16 In 1959, the same 
year in which the PPP was formed, Solo travelled to the Gambia in order to bring 
Fatoumata to Sierra Leone. Political discussions, which in the fi rst part of the 
1950s had been the preserve of the educated elite of Bathurst, expanded to the 
rural areas, and the PPP, like Stevens’s All People’s Congress in Sierra Leone and 
other African parties of that period, cultivated populist promises of equality and 
progress for all, regardless of social diff erences.
Like other prominent families of the Protectorate, branches of the Darboe 
supported the United Party (UP), which had been established in 1954 by a Ba-
thurst lawyer, Pierre N’jie (Hughes and Perfect 2008: 124). Th e UP was strong 
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in the upper river region, but the overall political situation in that area of the 
country was complicated by the many instances of change that criss-crossed so-
ciety at various levels. Th e PPP’s candidate for the Wuli-Sandu constituency in 
1960 was Mussa Darboe, a distant relative of Solo. Th is explains the early interest 
of Solo and the Darboe of Wuli in the PPP. When Solo returned to the Gambia 
in 1961, the party had already gained its fi rst victory and was preparing for the 
second national election of 1962. Expulsion from Sierra Leone had taught Solo 
and other migrants of those days that good political connections at home could 
serve them well in case of problems with their host countries abroad as well as 
in the Gambia, where they were investing the profi ts of their migrations and us-
ing the judiciary to defend their business interests. Successful migrants like Solo 
strove for a social and political presence in the capital city of Bathurst and its elite 
circles. Not only did cities off er the returnees those facilities to which they had 
become accustomed abroad, but the emergence of the new nation was turning 
Bathurst into a hub where national policies were decided, resources shared and 
contracts signed.
In 1963, as I said above, Solo took Jawara’s niece as his second wife. Th is 
marriage sanctioned his allegiance with the Gambia’s emergent national power 
bloc. Personal relationships with national political elites became an important 
part of his transnational life, indirectly testifying to the strict interactions be-
tween business minorities and politics in the wake of African independences (Jal-
loh 2007: 90),17 and to the commitment of African presidents with respect to 
the growth of ‘shadow’ states – that is, patrimonial networks interlaced with the 
formal institutions of the state (Reno 1999, 2000; Ferguson 2006: 39).
In that same year of 1963, Solo established himself in Congo Brazzaville. 
Since the early colonial period the capital had hosted an important West African 
trading community (Balandier 1955; Bredeloup 2007: 1959; Whitehouse 2007). 
Solo and other West African men coming from the Sierra Leone diamond fi elds 
used already existing West African trading networks to develop smuggling activi-
ties within the former Belgian Congo, which at the time held a large share of the 
world’s diamond production (Bredeloup 1994: 82; MacGaff ey 1987: 121–22).
In Brazzaville, Solo had a license to buy diamonds. Omar and other Gam-
bians he had known in Sierra Leone served as couriers across the border with 
Congo Leopoldville. Solo’s fi rst wife played a part as well, as Omar recalled:
Because of the diffi  culties of access to Congo Brazzaville we used to take 
planes from Leopoldville to Lagos, and then back from Lagos to Brazza-
ville. Th e president of Congo Brazzaville was named Massemba-Débat. 
Massemba and Solo were close friends as ‘honey and honey producer’.18 
Solo was so popular that many thought he was one of the President’s 
closest associates. He was given security guards for the compound, and 
the key to the large safety box, where he kept the currency (franc CFA, 
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gration from rural areas, and the state’s administrative apparatus – despite its sig-
nifi cant growth (Sallah 1990: 628) – could not provide enough white-collars jobs 
for the increasing numbers of literate youths, who looked to Europe, the United 
States and Libya in search of better educational and employment opportunities. 
Electoral politics had turned into an instrument to guarantee the continuity of 
the political circles established at the time of independence. No room was left for 
innovative thinking and action besides what the PPP and its politicians needed 
to remain in power.
Solo was a transnational migrant, but the rest of his family aimed at main-
taining their long-term social and political infl uence in the Upper Gambia. One 
of his younger brothers had political aspirations, and apparently the PPP had 
withdrawn its support of his candidacy for Member of Parliament for the Wuli 
constituency in the 1977 elections (Hughes and Perfect 2006: 191). Solo reacted 
by shifting his allegiance to the NCP and provided this new party with access 
to a secure source of fi nancing for political rallies and propaganda to support 
his brother there. At the time, Solo’s material and social capital was impressive. 
While abroad, he kept in touch with expatriate Gambians and helped those in 
diffi  culty. Locally, his family network spread at the regional and transregional 
levels. Moreover, he had been investing in his home village since the beginning 
of his diamond-dealing career by paying the taxes of a large number of people 
and by providing food when they were in need. In the eyes of his countrymen, 
Solo came across as a hero, deftly able to tap the riches of foreign nations. His 
fi rst return from Sierra Leone, in 1961, was still remembered by his age-mates as 
recently as 2008. Solo and his friend Bassirou Jawara were each driving a brand-
new car, which stoked the imagination of their compatriots. Only a few years 
later, this time back from Congo Brazzaville, Solo patronized the band Super 
Eagles, whose music spread from Banjul nightclubs to the international stage.23
Th is display of success and cosmopolitan connections was in sharp contrast 
to the distress of 1970s rural and urban Gambia (Nyang 1977; Sallah 1990). Re-
current droughts and badly organized government intervention had struck heavy 
blows to the agricultural sector, which still constituted the main source of income 
for large segments of the population. Infl ation had turned life in towns into a 
never-ending struggle to make ends meet, and people were leaving the rural areas 
to settle in the rapidly growing urban centres.
In 1977 Solo organized the NCP campaign, and his younger brother con-
tested the Wuli constituency under the fl ag of the new party (Hughes and Perfect 
2006: 191–94). Th e NCP, however, never achieved the results that its founder, 
and Solo, expected. It proved hard indeed to undermine the popularity of the 
PPP as the party that had achieved independence. Th e PPP’s patronage resources, 
moreover, were far more dependable than those of the NCP. In his explanation of 
these events, Solo mentioned a letter that Jawara purportedly wrote to him, which 
contained one sentence that Solo would never forget: ‘You are a king without a 
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land!’ Th e meaning becomes clearer in the light of Solo’s common expression ‘I 
am the king of the world’, used when he boasted about his adventures abroad. 
By adding ‘without a land’, Jawara put things in the diff erent perspective. Solo’s 
transnational life was both a resource and a hindrance. Surely, his connections 
to diff erent places in the world increased his social and moral stature by com-
parison with those compatriots who had never had the opportunity to leave the 
Gambia, but his absences undermined his ability to establish roots in the thickly 
connected environment of home politics. It was Binta Cham, his youngest wife, 
who clearly spelled out this point by interjecting, during one of my conversations 
with Solo:
You can live with Gambians outside, they would not care about you. You 
will see them only when they are in need. Here, at home, they also do 
not care. When you return and you visit them, they will start the conver-
sation by saying, ‘When did you arrive? When are you going to leave?’ 
Th ey talk as if you do not belong to this country.
Transnational theory has shown how migrants’ investments in their home 
country have fed long-distance nationalism (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001). 
Th is applies to Solo and other migrants of his generation who, while making a 
point of cultivating patriotism, were also subject to the tenuous nature of rela-
tionships between the Gambian state and its diasporic citizenry. Th e social and 
material capital of migrants was welcomed as long as it aligned with the incum-
bent leader; however, the very fact that Solo was accused of participation in the 
1981 coup against Jawara shows that migrants’ use of their resources to support 
political alternatives prompted a much diff erent reaction from the government. 
Behind the mask of an extremely successful life, Solo’s trajectory therefore betrays 
a feeling that he never fully belonged to his home country. Of all the political 
connections he established during his career as a diamond dealer, the friendship 
with Sékou Touré is the only one I heard him describe nostalgically; further, he 
evinced an enduring admiration for this man, whom he aff ectionately called ‘my 
African President number one’. For the rest, by 2008 – like many men of his 
generation who truly believed in the transformative power of national politics 
during their youth – he had reached the conclusion that politics and politicians 
were not worth any further fi nancial, social or moral engagement. Both Jawara 
and Dibba had disillusioned him. His relationship with Dibba had ended before 
the 1992 national elections, when Solo was expelled from the NCP. From Dibba’s 
point of view, Solo’s independent attitude was undermining the cohesiveness of 
the party; from Solo’s perspective – which the opposition newspaper Foroyaa duly 
documented – Dibba had mismanaged NCP fi nancial resources.
For those elections Solo backed a newly established and small political party, 
the People’s Democratic Party, whose existence was abruptly terminated by the 
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political ban proclaimed by the military junta after the 1994 coup. Solo left the 
Gambia again. At this time Angola was liberalizing diamond mining and trading 
operations (Bredeloup 2007: 43). Solo tried to become a key player once again 
in a new diamond frontier, but he was not as successful as he used to be. Angola 
marked the end of his adventures as a diamond dealer.
In one of our 2008 conversations he remarked: ‘I cannot leave diamonds; 
even now, if asked, I could buy one-million-dollar stones in half an hour; the 
knowledge is still here’. But despite this assertion, Solo also made it clear to 
Sidibeh and myself that his time for adventure had come to an end: ‘I do not travel 
much these days.’ Not only had international border security become stricter and 
controls more diffi  cult to evade, but the political connections that helped him 
to secure his life and activities both in the Gambia and abroad were gone. Th us, 
after a transnational life during which he had crossed countries, territories and 
cultures in a way that none of his nineteenth-century jula ancestors could ever 
have imagined, Solo grew old in his home country – a common experience for 
many of his generation’s international migrants. Having prudently invested the 
proceeds of his activities in real estate, he had what he needed for a comfortable 
life that, although modest if compared to other periods of his life, was still out 
of reach for most Gambians. His children, most of whom lived in Europe or the 
United States, have been his major investment. Solo never went to school, but he 
soon understood the importance of literacy in the new world emerging out of de-
colonization. In his early days as a diamond dealer he had to write his name over 
and over to learn how to sign his fi rst cheque. Most of his children have studied 
abroad, and even the one who has chosen to follow in his father’s footsteps and 
take up diamond dealing holds a master’s degree from a London university. In 
2008, when I met Solo, this son was thinking of opening up a gold mining site in 
Guinea, where he could count on Solo’s relationship with Lansana Conté. Th at 
relationship had been established when Lansana Conté was serving Sékou Touré, 
and Solo was welcomed at the Guinea-Conakry presidential palace.
Conclusion
Th rough life histories one can study macrohistorical processes at the microhistor-
ical level, fl eshing out the aspirations, feelings and experiences of individual men 
and women at specifi c points in time and under broader sociocultural constraints 
(Th omson 1999; Fog Olwig 2007: 17). Th e rich details typical of this kind of 
evidence can trigger analyses in a plurality of diverging directions. In this chap-
ter, I have focused on two aspects of Solo’s trajectory. Th e fi rst is his exemplary 
capacity for grasping the global opportunities created by the expansion of the 
diamond industry in the 1950s. Many of his countrymen tried to do the same, 
but few matched his success. Th e second is Solo’s political engagement, in that 
his social trajectory serves as a summary of the highly personal relationships he 
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was able to establish with some of the major political personalities of twentieth-
century Africa. Th ose connections were in part instrumental to his activities as 
a diamond dealer, but his engagement in home politics is also representative of 
the aspirations and commitment of an entire African generation that saw the end 
of colonial rule and actively participated in the creation and development of the 
new nations. Men of this generation keenly desired to be recognized as active 
members of their home communities but at the same time also had hopes for so-
cial and political change on a national scale. Th is held true also for Solo, in spite 
of the fact that his close association with notoriously corrupt, neopatrimonial 
regimes and his activities as diamond dealer may give the impression that his life 
trajectory was determined more by opportunities for economic gain than by any 
idealistic motivation.
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Notes
 1. Gambian National Archive (GNA), Banjul, the Gambia, CSO 4/74, Consolidated Afri-
can Selection Trust Ltd. Request for Legislation Preventing Illicit Diamond Trade (1938).
 2. Solo Darboe, Bakau New Town, 24 November 2008.
 3. Bakoyo and Omar Suso, Dippakunda, 16 October 2006.
 4. National Archives of Th e Gambia, Banjul, CRU1-4, Upper River Divisional Bulletin 8 and 
9 (1956).
 5. Baba Suso, Fajikunda, 18 January 2008.
 6. Literature of the 1950s and 1960s on African migrations commonly stresses the impor-
tance of economic factors, such as the need to pay colonial taxes (e.g. Skinner 1960). It 
also casts light on the cultural signifi cance of migration. For instance, Jean Rouch’s 1956 
study of migrations from Niger to the Gold Coast concerns the mobility of youth labour 
as the expression of a long-rooted tradition of travel and the yearning for ‘adventure’. 
According to Isaac Schapera (1947), the same aspirations underpinned Tswana colonial 
migrations. See also Bredeloup (2008) and Timera (2009).
 7. ‘I leave it with God’ is a common Gambian expression that people use when they are 
mistreated in order to stress their forbearance and their faith in a higher form of justice.
 8. Solo Darboe, Bakau New Town, 24 November 2008.
 9. Th is Soninke, Bambara and Mandinka proverb is widespread not only in the Upper Gam-
bia but also in eastern Senegal and Mali (Whitehouse 2007: 301; Whitehouse 2012).
10. Junkung Sumbundu, Koto Quarry, 29 November 2008.
11. Solo Darboe, Bakau New Town, 24 November 2008.
12. Omar Suso, Dippakunda, 19 December 2008.
13. Omar Suso, Dippakunda, 19 December 2008.
14. Solo Darboe, Bakau New Town, 24 November 2008.
15. Solo Darboe, Bakau New Town, 24 November 2008.
16. Gambian National Archives, Banjul, ARP 28/1, Travelling Commissioner’s Report for 
December 1893.
17. Alusine Jalloh (2007) refers to Fula minorities in Sierra Leone. For other comparative 
analyses, see Meillassoux (1965) on the relationships between Bamako businessmen and 
the Malian-educated political and administrative elite; Morgenthau (1979) on the place 
of foreigners and multinationals in African national politics; and Diamond (1987) on 
private business’s structural dependence on government assistance in the postcolonial Af-
rican state.
18. Omar Suso was a griot, e.g. a praise-singer and oral historian. To make his point, he often 
used expressions drawn from Gambian oral traditions, such as this reference to honey and 
honey producer, which is a common way to stress the close relationship of two people.
19. Omar Suso, Dippakunda, 19 December 2008.
20. Solo Darboe, Bakau New Town, 24 November 2008.
21. Guinea-Conakry is a diamond-producing country on a level with Sierra Leone, but min-
ing activities were nationalized by Sékou Touré in 1961 (Gberie 2011: 6–7). Although 
this reduced overall production, Sékou Touré continued to encourage illicit miners and 
smugglers (Greenhalgh 1985: 259; Morice 1987: 13; Bah 1990).
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22. Solo Darboe, Bakau New Town, 25 November 2008.
23. For more details see ‘Super Eagles: Senegambian Sensation’: http://www.discogs.com/
Super-Eagles-Senegambian-Sensation/release/3264679
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Chapter 15
Market Networks and Warfare
A Comparison of the 
Seventeenth-Century Blade Weapons 
Trade and the Nineteenth-Century 
Firearms Trade in Casamance
Peter Mark and José da Silva Horta
Introduction
Seaborne commerce between West Africa and Europe was fi rst established in 
the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries along the coast of Senegambia.1 Within the 
northern reaches of ‘Guiné do Cabo Verde’, the Casamance region (south-west-
ern present-day Senegal) became an early focus for this commerce. Th e enduring 
structures of the burgeoning Atlantic trade were established there by the late 
sixteenth century. Among the lasting characteristics of Atlantic commerce was 
the importation of weapons from overseas. Th e early weapons trade, primarily 
in ‘armas brancas’ or steel swords and daggers, connected Casamance, through 
Senegambian trade networks, to a global web of production and commerce that 
extended not only to Europe but also to North Africa, the Indian Ocean and 
Spanish America.
Th e blade weapons trade expanded early in the seventeenth century, by 
which time it was tied inextricably to the slave trade; weapons fi gured signifi -
cantly among the goods exchanged for captives. Two centuries later, as the Casa-
mance entered the geopolitical orbits of France and England on the eve of the 
colonial period, the weapons trade again came to play a prominent role in over-
seas exchange with Europe. Th is time, however, it was not blade weapons but fi re-
arms that were imported into Casamance. Our chapter describes and compares 
the two stages in the weapons trade to the Casamance. Although the twentieth 
century lies outside the focus of our research, the observer may ironically wonder 
whether the contemporary independence struggle in the Casamance constitutes a 
third act in the importation of weapons to this beautiful but volatile land.
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We will revisit Martin Klein’s classic article, published in 1972 in Th e Jour-
nal of African History and entitled ‘Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim 
Revolution in Senegambia’. Klein argued cogently that nineteenth-century le-
gitimate commerce diff ered from the earlier slave trade in that goods imported 
into Senegambia were far more widely distributed than the earlier trade items. 
Th e result, he argued, was to foster a process of political change that ultimately 
challenged and then toppled the old warrior elite. He interpreted the ostensibly 
Islamic warfare of the mid and late nineteenth century as being a result of this 
more widespread dissemination of wealth from trade, including fi rearms.
Confi rming Klein’s main thesis, we raise new evidence to support it. Further, 
by taking a comparative approach we widen the context that led to transforma-
tions in the arms trade. Th ese historical changes become thoroughly understand-
able when placed within their interregional and transnational context in diff erent 
periods. We compare the spread of guns to the earlier (1590–1620 and later) 
spread of cavalry swords and daggers on the northern Upper Guinea Coast and, 
in smaller numbers, in southern Guiné do Cabo Verde. Th is blade weapons trade 
was almost wholly unknown before our recent research, published in our book 
Th e Forgotten Diaspora. In fact, the blade weapons trade was a crucial element fa-
cilitating the growing importance of cavalry in Senegambia. Th is historical devel-
opment, in turn, helped to entrench the warrior elite whose decline Klein traces. 
(Another factor in the earlier rise of cavalry, the desiccation of coastal areas, is 
covered by George Brooks [1993] in his discussion of climate change.) So our 
research confi rms the impact of trade on warfare. Th e inclusion of blade weapons 
in the early history of Senegambian warfare and trade makes the picture more 
complex. Th e model of a ‘horse-slave cycle’ followed by a ‘gun-slave cycle’ is not 
an accurate assessment of the role of Atlantic markets in the regional slave trade.2 
Not that another ‘cycle’ – of blade weapons – should be added: the chronology of 
blade arms extends into the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, contem-
porary with the introduction of guns in Senegambian markets. But blades could 
also be produced locally. Th us, African markets made their choices about when to 
take the opportunity to import ‘armas brancas’ from the Atlantic.
For the nineteenth century, besides revisiting Klein, we have uncovered new 
information on the traffi  c in fi rearms in the Casamance. Oral sources collected in 
1975 by Mark, correlated with French archival records from c 1860, testify to the 
mid-nineteenth-century circulation of fi rearms from England and France in sev-
eral Jola [Diola] communities of the Casamance. Th e presence of these weapons, 
even in limited numbers, in a northern Jola society characterized by small-scale 
polities attests that, as Klein argues, guns were more widely distributed than were 
the means of warfare in the earlier age of cavalry and blade weapons.
Th ese developments are also connected, as happened throughout Guiné do 
Cabo Verde, with changes within Euro-African trade networks and the European 
presence. In 1886, the year that France acquired Ziguinchor and the territory 
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along the south bank of the Casamance River from Portugal, thereby marking 
the advent of French colonial power in the region, the people of northern Casa-
mance successfully fought off  a raid by the Manding warriors of Combo Sylla. 
Th is Jola victory was possible because several villages that were traditional ene-
mies had allied with each other. Th e defeat of Sylla was also achieved because 
the local communities had amassed suffi  cient guns to defend themselves against 
mounted cavalrymen. Th is, too, clearly illustrates the accuracy of Klein’s model.
Part I: Th e Seventeenth Century
Recently discovered sixteenth- and seventeenth-century archival documents of 
the Lisbon Inquisition illustrate the production of blade weapons, or ‘armas 
brancas’, by Lisbon-based artisans. Th ese men worked with traders who, in turn, 
contracted for the swords. Many of these contractors were New Christians. Th eir 
work is documented for the thirty-year period from 1590 to 1618.3 Th e weap-
ons were transported to the rivers of Guinea, where they were traded to African 
elites.4 After 1608, the approximately three dozen Jewish merchants who had 
settled on the Petite Côte became important players in this coastal commerce. In 
West Africa, the weapons were exchanged for slaves and other goods. Th is com-
merce in swords and daggers contravened a Papal Bull that prohibited Catholics 
from trading weapons to non-Christians. Th e commerce, largely ignored by his-
torians,5 is corroborated by Portuguese travel narratives from the period.
Both the production and the military use of ‘armas brancas’ – a name that 
refers to the white tinge of steel-bladed hand weapons – were highly developed 
in Portugal. Th ese specialized arms came in many diff erent forms. Espadas were 
double-edged, full-length swords wielded in the right hand. Th e more readily 
handled terçados (or espadas curtas, short swords), mentioned above, were ideal 
for cavalry use. Shorter arms took the form of adagas with a broad, short, pointed 
blade, generally with two cutting edges, and punhais with narrower, shorter blades.
In Lisbon in the second decade of the seventeenth century, a minimum of 
300 swords but perhaps as many as 500 or 600 were produced annually for 
export to Upper Guinea. Over the period of eight or nine years documented by 
the Inquisition report of 1618, this trade would have totalled between 2,500 and 
5,000 weapons.6 Th e fi gures for the 1590s may have been slightly higher, as the 
Inquisition documents list eight artisans for that period.7 Production of these 
weapons was truly an international activity. Only the assembly and decoration 
of the swords and scabbards took place in Lisbon. Th ere, espadeiros or barbeiros 
de espadas assembled the fi nished weapons from blades that they imported from 
Italy and from Flanders. One type of sword, the terçado, was about 77 to 88 cm 
long.8
Weapons made in Europe were not the only ones to arrive on the northern 
Upper Guinea Coast. Documents discovered by Linda Newson and Susie Min chin 
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in the Archivio General de la Nación in Lima, Peru, document swords exported 
from India as part of the same worldwide network. In the African markets, these 
oriental weapons were even more highly valued than European-made weapons.9
As other European nations challenged Portugal’s trading monopoly, the ban 
on selling weapons to non-Christians could not be enforced. Two of the com-
petitors, England and the United Provinces, were not Catholic states. Th eir mer-
chants ignored the Papal ban with impunity, as did French Huguenot privateers. 
Portuguese lançados and their Luso-African descendants who had settled among 
African populations on the West African mainland quickly entered into contact 
with the French, English and Dutch interlopers, providing them with African 
trade goods in return for weapons. Th ere is evidence that as early as c 1590, 
Protestant ‘pirates’ (as the Portuguese refer to them) also brought blade weapons 
directly to Northern Senegal.10
Unsurprisingly, after the Inquisition discovered the Lisbon-based sword-
trade network, an alternative had to be found to pursue this important trade. 
Th is alternative was the use of French ports to bring weapons from Portugal to 
the African markets. As early as c 1622 the former governor D. Francisco de 
Moura (1618–1622) stated in a memorial addressed to the king that
As [the ‘gentes da Nação’] were forbidden by the Contractor [of the 
Guinea trade] to bring from this Kingdom [Portugal] forbidden mer-
chandise, not granting any ships licences to sail to Guinea, they pass 
this merchandise to France. From there they take the goods to the Coast 
(Petite Côte), trading more by this way than by the Kingdom, and 
they come from Cacheu to collect [the swords] and hide them in their 
houses.11
Th ese short swords and daggers served primarily to arm cavalry. Th e horses were 
acquired from European merchants along the coast and, in the interior, from 
the ‘Moors’. Th ese Arab-Berber merchants may have been the commercial me-
diators between the coast and the Sahelian hinterland.12 Th e European export 
of weapons to West Africa was actually part of a complex intercontinental and 
interregional traffi  c. Th e Atlantic trade complemented the caravan traffi  c across 
the southern Sahara, which provided horses from Arguim and across the Sahel 
(Austen 1993: 311–50). Yet even in the forested coastal zone to the south, blade 
weapons were highly in demand.
In the Casamance and in northern Guinea-Bissau, where the heavier forest-
ation rendered cavalry ineff ective, soldiers were armed with iron weapons and, 
when possible, espadas. In the Oporto manuscript of his Tratado (1594), Almada 
writes of the Cassangas of the Casamance, who were redoubtable warriors: ‘In 
warfare they use spears, arrows, shields, knives, short swords like the Wolof, and 
the same clothing.’13 In these southern regions in the late sixteenth century, short 
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swords would also have been used, in fewer numbers, by elite cavalry; infantry 
too used similar types of weapons. Th e fact that the late sixteenth- and early 
seventeenth-century accounts attest to the scarcity of horses in the kingdom of 
‘Casamança’ (then called Kasa) – horses were imported only among the elite14 – 
seems to confi rm that small numbers of cavalry swords would have been used in 
Casamance.
In fact, the animals most frequently used for travel through the forested 
coastal region between the Casamance and Geba Rivers were not horses at all, but 
cattle. Almada off ers several accounts of local rulers riding on bulls. ‘Th e Kings 
of this land’, he writes, ‘occasionally ride about on horses, but most of the time 
they use bulls, if the journey is short.’15 Th ere are other references to royal use of 
horses among the Biafada peoples of present-day Guinea-Bissau.16
From the Casamance to the Geba, the Blacks rarely rode on horses. A 
few ‘Kings’ and ‘nobles’ (fi dalgos, individuals ranked high by lineage) 
did, but rarely. Most of the time they went about on cows or bulls, which 
in these parts they tame and pierce through the nose by means of which 
the animals wear rope similar to a bit, with which they guide the ani-
mals. And in this manner they can travel for several days and they have a 
very good ride; the same method is used among the Casangas, Banhuns, 
Buramos and Bijagós.17 
South of the Rio Grande, in Nalu land, no horses were used or traded (Almada 
1594 [1964]: 112). In Sierra Leone cavalry are only mentioned among the Manes, 
coming from the Mande savannah heartland. Nevertheless, even if cavalry was 
essentially absent in the forest zone, the use of short swords by infantry was not 
precluded. A later report, the 1663–1664 account of the Franciscan Friar André 
de Faro, may attest to the extension of the short swords market, referring to the 
abundance of ‘traçados’ (terçados) in the ‘Kingdom of the Banhuns (Bainuk)’, 
namely in the port of Quinguim.18
In no known account from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth century 
is there any mention of Felupe19 use of short swords. Further south, blade weap-
ons were found during this period among the Buramos/Papel and Biafada, as 
w ell as the ‘Sapes’ and Manes in the Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone regions, 
according to Almada (1594 [1964]: 69, 73, 132, 139), Jesuit sources (Brásio 
1968: 393) and Franciscan sources (Brásio 1991: 242). Th e use of these weapons 
by both the Sapes and the Manes, who had moved into their territory in the 
mid-sixteenth century, could have implications for the historical reassessment 
of the Mane ‘invasions’.20 In fact, if the means of defence and destruction were 
not substantially diff erent between the local Sapes and the Manes (Hair 1977: n. 
169, 263)21  coming from the Futa Jalon, the unbalanced relation between them, 
which changed the political map of Sierra Leone, must be found elsewhere. It 
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was based less on warfare technology than on tactics and military formation22 
as well as demographic factors between local societies that were politically more 
fragmentary, facing the Manes’ migrations.
Th e role played in the region by a diff erent type of weapons, guns, is attested 
by Francisco de Lemos Coelho’s descriptions of 1669 and 1684. Th ese accounts 
give information primarily from the 1650s and 1660s. Lemos Coelho reports 
that fi rearms were imported in the Gambia region and adds important references 
to the Casamance region:
All of these above-named Kingdoms of the Banhuns, four in number 
outside of the Kasa Mansa, say that they were subjugated to the Kasa 
Mansa, and today they all live in liberty, they do not observe any reli-
gion, even if there is no lack of Manding who delude them with their 
cheating and the Falupos live in more barbarian manner and they have 
no communication with these people, and among them the Catholic re-
ligion could gain adherents and even more towards the south, the goods 
that are needed for these rivers are iron and kola and textiles and crystal 
and amber and spirits and powder and escopetas (short guns) and black, 
white and tile colour glass beads.23
Clearly, short guns (fl intlock muskets) were only one among many desired trad-
ing items (Peres 1990). Iron was more in demand, as local blacksmiths could 
fashion it into both agricultural implements and blade weapons.
Th e crucial point is that the only local use of imported fi rearms in the Casa-
mance region clearly evoked by Lemos Coelho is hunting: the Bainunk of the 
independent kingdom of Jasé considered themselves experts in shooting.24 No-
where does Coelho or the slightly earlier writing of Father André de Faro refer to 
the use of guns in warfare, although Europeans may have used them against the 
Africans. Blade weapons seem still to have been the main weapon. Th is would 
shortly change, however. John Th ornton has gathered evidence that European 
muskets introduced in the armies of Casamance (and the Gambia) in the 1670s 
as infantry weapons were decisive in the Casamance king’s defeat of an English 
naval attack (Th ornton 1999: 45 and 12 n. 11–12). Be that as it may, the growing 
quest for fi rearms in connection with the growth of the Senegambian slave trade 
from the late seventeenth century onwards is asserted by Walter Rodney (1970) 
in A History of the Upper Guinea Coast and confi rmed by Philip Curtin’s (1975) 
statistics of gun imports.
Part II: Th e Nineteenth Century
Although there may have been some continuity of trade from the late seven-
teenth century (which we do not intend to study in this chapter), by the early 
Market Networks and Warfare  305
nineteenth century there were still relatively few fi rearms in Casamance. Ac-
cording to George Brooks, during the eighteenth century Diola groups began 
to exclude Europeans and Eurafricans from the waterways linking the Gambia, 
Casamance, Cacheu and Geba Rivers, thus forcing Portuguese and Luso-Africans 
to use sea passages in longer sailing routes between trading posts like Ziguinchor 
and Cacheu. Th e closing of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers to slave trade in 1809 
and 1816 caused a redirection of caravans of African slave traders to Casamance 
and southwards, hence to the profi t of Portuguese and Luso-African slave traders 
(though there is evidence that inland water routes south of the Casamance River 
were still used in the early nineteenth century). But Brooks does not mention 
weapons among the products of what he names the ‘Cacheu-Casamance com-
mercial sphere’ between the 1780s and the 1810s. After 1816 these Luso-African 
traders’ activities were more severely aff ected by French and Franco-Africans and 
English and Anglo-Africans who became either their competitors or collaborators 
(Brooks 2010: xviii, 4, 47ff ., 161).
Firearms were acquired from the English trading post at Elinkin in the 
mouth of the Casamance River, near the island of Carabane. In 1836–37, how-
ever, French offi  cials opened two trading posts in the Casamance. Th e fort they 
constructed at Sedhiou, relatively far east in ‘Moyen Casamance’, followed the 
old Portuguese and Luso-African model of establishing trading escales at the point 
where the westward-fl owing rivers became impassable for any but the smallest 
draft vessels. Th e other trading post was on Carabane Island, near the mouth of 
the river. Th ere, as Mark (1985: 56) wrote, ‘Within months of the opening of 
the new comptoir, Diolas from both banks of the river were coming to exchange 
quantities of rice and wax for guns, textiles, iron, copper, and other items’.
Th is provided the local populations in the lower river with a second source of 
fi rearms. Previously, they had purchased guns from the English trading post estab-
lished early in the century at Elinkin. An undated report that is apparently from 
1850 states that Lower Casamance villages were armed with ‘guns, which they 
acquire from the English.’25 Th e French offi  cial in the region, E. Bertrand-Bocandé, 
wrote that year that Elinkin (the etymology comes from ‘Lincoln’) was still ‘un 
hameau anglais’[‘an English hamlet’].26 During his visit to Th ionk-Essyl, the larg-
est community in the region of Djougoutes, Bertrand-Bocandé estimated that 
800 to 1,000 men of this village cluster were armed with guns.27
By mid-century, some northern Jola were travelling to English Combo (in 
the Gambia) to obtain trade goods, most likely including weapons. Th ese the Jo-
las acquired in exchange for captives and cattle,28 but also and primarily for rice, 
their staple crop and the basis of their fi nancial transactions (Mark 1985: 64).
With the establishment of a French trading post at Carabane, people from 
Djougoutes – a heavily populated plateau north of the Casamance River – trav-
elled to Carabane to work as labourers and sell cattle, some of which they had 
stolen from neighbouring communities. Early on, a preference for English fi re-
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arms incised with the brand name Tower persisted, but eventually the Jola also 
procured weapons from the French. Brooks (2010: 172) observes that a French 
company employed Franco-Africans as ‘compradors’ to navigate pirogues along 
the Casamance River and its tributaries specifi cally selling English Tower mus-
kets, ‘because Africans disdained French models’. Gunpowder, musket balls and 
fl ints as well as sabres were also exchanged for local products such as rice, beeswax 
and hides. Rice often served as the unit of exchange value.
Early in 1860 the colonial authorities in Dakar sent a military force of eight 
hundred men under Pinet-Laprade on a punitive expedition against Th ionk-Es-
syl. Th e men of Th ionk had earned a reputation as pirates and had recently cap-
tured and held for ransom the wife and young child of Bertrand-Bocandé, the 
‘resident’ at Carabane. When the French met the men from Th ionk in battle, 
some of the Diola forces were armed with guns, others with lances and shields. 
Th ionk-Essyl sustained losses of 40 dead and 200 cattle; the French forces suf-
fered no fatalities. Th ionk was then, as it remains today, the largest community in 
Djougoutes (now called Buluf ). Yet the weapons at its disposal, and the fact that 
many of the men were armed with spears and hippopotamus-skin shields, left 
them unable to off er meaningful resistance to a modern military force.
In his post-expedition report Pinet-Laprade wrote, evidently speaking of the 
eighteen or twenty villages grouped along the edge of Djougouttes Plateau, ‘Th ese 
villages have a general population of 18,000 inhabitants and 3,000 fi rearms.’ It 
is not clear how Pinet-Laprade arrived at his estimate of 3,000 guns, especially in 
view of the fact that he did not visit all of the villages. But, given that his estimate 
of the population – 18,000 – is in line with late nineteenth-century estimates (in 
1960 the population was over 40,000; today, urban migration and ongoing civil 
war have probably decreased this number), and crediting Pinet-Laprade with 
similar accuracy for the weapons census, it appears a considerable quantity of 
fi rearms were already dispersed through Buluf. Nevertheless, the ‘Floups’ had 
nowhere near suffi  cient fi repower to protect themselves from the French.
A generation later, the situation was radically transformed by the infl ux of 
thousands of weapons, quite clearly associated with growth in the production 
of wild rubber and palm produce throughout the Casamance. Jola men sold 
these forest products in Bathurst or at Carabane. By the 1880s, palm kernels and 
palm oil, along with wild rubber, provided a regular, if small, source of income 
for the people of the Casamance. By 1880, seasonal migration to the Gambia 
to collect palm produce was giving the people of Djougoutes regular access to 
English goods, including weapons (Mark 1976: 341–61). Th e proximity of the 
Gambian border, easily accessible by pirogue, meant that the Jola of Djougoutes 
had their choice of either French (at Carabane) or English goods. Hence, their 
geographical situation and their earlier trading links gave them increased access 
to interregional and international markets. One result of this labour migration 
and the associated infl ux of consumer goods was that within a few years, the peo-
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ple of Djougoutes were able to defend themselves eff ectively against the recurrent 
attacks of Muslim slave raiders, most notably Fodé Sylla and Brahim NDiaye.
In Djougoutes in 1886, the men of several villages came together and in-
fl icted a crushing defeat on the Mandinka warlord and slave trader Fodé Sylla 
(also known as Combo Sylla). Th e Jola victory is recorded both in contemporary 
French reports preserved in the Senegalese archives, and in local oral traditions 
in Boulouf. In 1975, when Mark interviewed the elders in several of the villages 
that had united to defeat Sylla, the oldest of these informants had been born 
a decade after the battle. Th e men stopped the conversation to sing; the verse 
was about the battle. Th ey then recounted that ‘we captured a horse belonging 
to one of Sylla’s horsemen.’ (Th ey also captured his war drum, which they keep 
to this day.) ‘Until then we had thought that horse and rider were one frightful 
beast.’[interview with the elders of Th ionk-Essyl,Batine, including Cheikh Abba 
Badji, March 1975.] Th ese men were reciting songs they had learned at their own 
initiation in 1919, but the initiation songs had ‘belonged’ to their grandfathers, 
who were themselves the victorious soldiers.
Th e same oral traditions also preserve a memory of the importance of fi re-
arms. When Jola living in the village of Kartiak observed Sylla’s preparations for 
his attack, they gave the pre-arranged alarm – the fi ring of their guns – to the 
neighbouring villages. Warriors from the other villages arrived in time to ensure 
the Jola victory. Th is oral tradition is confi rmed, at least in part, by an 1888 re-
port written by the ‘Administrateur Supérieur’ of the Casamance:
Sylla attacked the people of Djougoutes … but they resisted coura-
geously and repulsed him … of Sylla’s forces, only nine managed to es-
cape and the Jola are said to have captured 45 horses. Th is fact is highly 
signifi cant as what had always facilitated the trouble-makers’ success was 
the fear that the Jola had of horses; if they are no longer afraid, they will 
certainly defend themselves even more successfully.29
Th e Jolas of Djougoutes prevailed. What contributed signifi cantly to their vic-
tory, besides the alliance among several villages that traditionally were at odds 
with each other, was the wide distribution of fi rearms by the 1880s, which en-
abled the Jola to eff ectively form a local militia. Klein’s thesis is supported by the 
nineteenth-century history of the northern Casamance.
Conclusion
Th e Casamance region of southern Senegal was an important part of the Por-
tuguese commercial sphere in Greater Senegambia as early as the mid-fi fteenth 
century. By the mid-sixteenth century it had become an important focus of the 
nascent Atlantic system. As such it was linked to a global economy that reached 
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from Portugal to Brazil to India. Th e resulting commerce brought the Casamance 
a wide range of goods, including, by the last two decades of the sixteenth century, 
blade weapons. Access to these weapons, however, was limited to those who con-
trolled the export trade in slaves. Hence, the distribution of the imported blade 
weapons was limited to, or at least controlled by, the local rulers who dominated 
the ‘production’ of slaves for export.
It is important to point out that in the Casamance, the focus of our inves-
tigation, cavalry never played a central role in warfare. From the seventeenth 
century, blade weapons (but not horses) were valued trade imports – as was iron, 
for local blacksmiths were able to craft new swords from iron bars. In this geo-
graphical area there was no warrior elite consisting of cavalry, nor – with the pos-
sible exception of the sixteenth-century Kassanké ruler named Massatamba – did 
local rulers maintain the means to raise and support fi ghting forces of horsemen. 
Rather, weapons were distributed broadly through the population, at least among 
those who had access to trade goods – beeswax early on, rice and hides, but also 
captives. Th ree centuries later, the situation diff ered substantially. Again, interna-
tional trading networks brought access to weapons, but by the 1880s at the latest, 
palm produce and rubber had replaced the earlier primary exports of wax and 
probably rice. Th ese forest products could be collected and sold by households or 
even by individuals. Th e main transformation to follow the growth of this trade 
was the widening of access to imported trade goods, including fi rearms. A village 
armed with guns could stave off  slave raiders and maintain local communities’ 
independence.
What was similar between the two contexts, and what changed? In both 
cases the arms came from abroad, not from an African market, although for sev-
enteenth-century Casamance we are not sure how many blade weapons arrived 
through the Atlantic trade and how many were made locally. Nevertheless, unlike 
the trade in blade weapons, the import of fi rearms represented access to weapons 
that local technology was not readily able to appropriate and reproduce.
Paradoxically, a mid-nineteenth-century protocolonial European implanta-
tion by the French gave Felupe/Jola access to a means of defence against both 
European and African (Mande) off ensives. Between 1600 and 1800 the Casa-
mance had gone from being a central focus of the Portuguese coastal commercial 
network to being only on its periphery. Th is loss of importance was due in part to 
the Luso-African network’s increasing inability to compete with Franco-Africans 
and Anglo-Africans. Unable as well to supply weapons to all of the Casamance 
from its local ‘escale’ at Ziguinchor, the Luso-African network lost its paramount 
role among the local Felupe/Jola.
In contrast to the earlier period of centralized trade, this latter commerce was 
more widely distributed among the population. Whereas the earlier swords were 
concentrated in the possession of wealthy and powerful individuals – for exam-
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ple, the King of Bussis in what is now Guinea-Bissau – the nineteenth-century 
trade placed guns in the hands of individuals. At fi rst sight this change looks like 
either a factor or a result of the remarkably egalitarian society that characterized 
the Jola of Djougoutes/Boulouf at the beginning of the colonial period. However, 
rather than mechanically linking social organizational factors to warfare technol-
ogy,30 this chapter has raised evidence to support the major role played by the 
market-based transformation in access to weapons that ultimately resulted from 
African purchasers’ choices. In either case, and despite the diff erences between 
the seventeenth- and the nineteenth-century long-distance commerce aff ecting 
the Casamance, the weapons trade played an important role in connecting re-
gional trade networks with wider, interregional and transnational commerce.
Th is chapter has off ered a diachronic comparative approach to the weapons 
trade in a single region, the Casamance, or northern Guiné do Cabo Verde. Th is 
methodological choice enabled us to show the relevance of diff erential access 
to various kinds of weapons in diff erent historical contexts. Th is comparative 
approach includes in the equation an important blade weapons trade that we 
have recently discovered. We compare this early period to the subsequent African 
consumption of guns in the Casamance, following the comprehensive perspec-
tive taken in recent historiography of African warfare (Th ornton 1999). Th e shift 
from swords to guns seems to correspond to more than a technological change. It 
refl ects, not the decline of Portuguese infl uence and the rise of French and British 
infl uence in the region, but rather, a shift in African market conditions.
Th is exercise in comparative history, based both on written sources and oral 
traditions, demonstrates that the major transformation in arms commerce in the 
Casamance region from the early seventeenth through the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury took the form of replacing limited acquisition of blade weapons (‘armas 
brancas’) with more widespread access to fi rearms in local communities. Th is en-
abled the communities to resist the attacks of nineteenth-century slave warriors 
and to maintain their autonomy. Paradoxically, this change was related to a new, 
protocolonial power, specifi cally the growing European presence in the region, in 
a new transnational historical context.
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Notes
 1. In this chapter we use the concept of Senegambia as meaning Greater Senegambia (which 
can be identifi ed with the Portuguese concept of ‘Guiné do Cabo Verde’). See Boubacar 
Barry (1988), as reformulated and developed by Horta and Mark (2007 [2010]) and 
Eduardo Costa Dias and Horta (2007 [2010]) 
 2. Th is ‘cycle’ model has been critically reassessed by John K. Th ornton (1999: 5–6). For a 
full discussion of African warfare factors in perspective and in several Atlantic regions, also 
see Th ornton (1999).
 3. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Hereafter ANTT), Inquisição de Lisboa, Livro 
194, folios 159–160v; Livro 208 fol. 640–644v. We are deeply grateful to Florbela Frade 
for having called our attention to the second reference and to Miguel Sanches de Baena 
for sharing with us his expertise on weapons and weapons production history. For a more 
detailed account of this trade see Mark and Horta (2011: chap. 4).
 4. In the same period an indeterminate number of swords assembled in Lisbon were also 
going to Angola (see Marques 2009), but the Inquisidores’ attention was focused on the 
weapons sent to the Upper Guinea Coast.
 5. Philip Curtin (1975) lists swords and cutlasses among the Senegambian imports from 
the 1680s to 1730s. Walter Rodney (1970) also makes reference to the importance of 
blade weapons among other merchandize traded by Luso-Africans. Although the earliest 
reference he gives is the 1669 account of Lemos Coelho, this trade developed much 
earlier.
 6. Not all of the sword makers or barbeiros de espadas named by one of them, Gaspar Car-
doso, were involved in the trade for the entire eight or nine years. In addition, one of the 
men is reported to have produced only 18 swords, and two others 20 or 30 per year; an-
other man made 40 per year. Th is renders any estimation of the total number of weapons 
exported quite approximate.
 7. Th e complete list of names engaged in sword production for the Guinea market in 1590 
is: Espinosa, Domingos Jorge, Francisco Álvares, Alexo Brás, Nuno Camelo, António 
Fernandes, Simão Carvalho and Manuel Teixeira. See ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, livro 
194, fl s. 59–60.
 8. ANTT, Inquisição de Lisboa, Livro 203, fol. 643v: ‘perguntado que terçados cujos quan-
tos são disse que são espadas larguas de quatro palmos pouco mais ou menos humas voltas 
(curved) e outras direitas que coustumão vir de Frandes e de Veneza, e aqui se guoarnes-
sem com cabos d’estanho.’
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 9. Archivo General de la Nación, Lima; Leg. 34; 1578–1624; Nueva signatura; SO-CO 
Ca 2; Do 8; Año 1573 F 1014v: ‘cargazones llevadas a Cacheu, en el Nuestra Señora del 
Vencimiento y San Juan Bautista, a cargo de Manoel Batista Peres; fecha August 15–26 
November 1616. We wish to thank Linda Newson and Susie Minchin for making this 
document available to us.
10. See Blanco (n.d. [1990]) for a translated edition of the ‘Instrucion que A. V. Magestad se 
da, para mandar fortifi car el mar Oceano, y defender se de todos los contrarios Piratas, 
ansi Franceses, como Ingleses, en todas las nauegaciones de su Real Corona dentro de los 
Tropiccos’.
11. ‘Porque prohibindolhes o Contratador leuarem deste Reino fazendas defezas, e naõ dando 
licença a alguns nauios para irem a Guiné, as passaõ a França e dahi as leuaõ á dita Costa, 
comerceando mais nella por aquella via que pella deste Reino, e de Cacheu as vaõ buscar 
para as recolherem em suas cazas’, D. Francisco de Moura, ‘Lembranças e advertencias’
(Brásio 1968: 698–700).
12. Almada’s account of c 1596 makes clear that there was an association between the horse 
trade and the cavalry expertise taught to the Wolof courts by these merchants. André Ál-
vares de Almada, untitled abridged version of his Tratado Breve dos Rios de Guiné do Cabo 
Verde: Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP, Lisbon), codex 525, fol. 7v.
13. ‘Usam nas guerras azagaias, frechas, adargas, facas, espadas curtas como os Jalofos e os 
mesmos vestidos’ (Almada 1594 [1964]: 69).
14. ‘… usam cavalos, mas poucos, porque alguns que têm se levam da Ilha do Cabo Verde, 
ou da terra dos Jalofos ou Mandingas’ (Th ey use horses but a few, because some are taken 
from the island of Cabo Verde [Santiago] and others from the lands of Wolof and Man-
dinka) (Almada 1594 [1964]: 63).
15. ‘Cavalgam os Reis desta terra algumas vezes em cavalos, e as mais das vezes em bois, sendo 
a jornada perto’ (ibid.: 68).
16. Ibid.: 95. At that time, the horses came from inland networks, such as from the Geba 
basin.
17. ‘Os mais dos negros, de Casamança até este Rio, … usam pouco cavalgarem cavalos; al-
guns Reis e fi dalgos o fazem, mas poucas vezes: a mais das vezes é em vacas e bois, que para 
isso têm mansos, com as ventas furadas, nas quais trazem uns cordeis ao modo de freio, 
com que os governam. E andam muitas jornadas e têm muito bom passeio; o mesmo 
usam Casangas, Banhuns, Buramos, Bijagós’ (ibid.: 98).
18. ‘… se leuantarão quanti(da)de de gentios com armas contra hum dos dittos mercadores 
soubre duuidas de seos negosios: aos gritos, e brados, acodimos os Religiozos a ver se 
podiamos aquietar e apaziguar a briga, hera tão grande a furia dos gentios, e tantos os tra-
cados (sic for traçados, i.e. treçados or terçados, short swords), fl exas (frechas) e azagaias, 
q̄ cahirão soubre os portuguezes e soubre nos, q̄ todos estiuemos arriscados a mortte.’ 
Friar André de Faro, in A. Brásio (1992: 192–93): ‘a large number of men rose up with 
arms against one of these merchants, because they doubted his trade [i.e. his honesty] 
screaming and shouting and we, the friars intervened, to see if we could calm and pacify 
the situation, (but) so great was their anger and they had so many terçados and frechas 
and spears, that they raised against the Portuguese and against us, that we felt we all risked 
being killed’. 
19. Felupe (fem. Felupa; Eng: Floop), a term used as early as the sixteenth century, is the label 
corresponding most closely to the ancestors of the Jola (Diola; Joola) peoples.
20. A change in the dominant political power in the Serra Leoa region in the mid-sixteenth 
century was characterized by Mane migrations followed by military actions. Nevertheless, 
the image of Mane invasions destroying the indigenous coastal Sapes societies was a Por-
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tuguese and Luso-African interpretation of local oral traditions. As Horta (2011: 308–10) 
has shown by confronting Almada’s Oporto ms. (and Lisbon ms.) with the abridged ver-
sion in the BNP codex 525, Mane polities attacked coastal Sapes to get tribute when the 
tribute was not paid. Although there was a fi rst moment of political change by military 
force, no destruction of the local societies whom Portuguese writers called ‘Sapes’ took 
place. Th is is confi rmed by Almada’s representation of a fusion of cultures as well as an 
example of continuity of previous Temné royal lineages, described by André Donelha 
(Horta 2007: 410–11). Furthermore, Sapes’ material culture was not destroyed, as Mark 
has shown in his revision of the dating of Sapes or Luso-African ivories (Mark and Horta 
2011: chap. 5). For a diff erent perspective on the eff ects of Mane invasion, see Green 
(2012). Green is correct to point to a rise in Sapes captives in the Atlantic trade as evi-
dence of fi ghting. Such fi ghting does not, however, imply the destruction of Sapes society. 
Indeed, Manuel Álvares, writing in 1615, clearly indicated that Sapes society survived – at 
least in part – the incursions of the Manes (Mark 2007: 189–211). 
21. According to Hair: ‘At the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was stated that the Sape 
used daggers called adibes and swords called adibe sabane, that is “large dagger” (Fer-
nandes, f. 125). Cf. Temne athis abana “knife big” (indef.), or Landuma atis “knife”. 
Many of the items of vernacular vocabulary quoted by the Portuguese and stated to be 
associated with the Mane turn out to be “Sape”. Possibly this indicates that the inform-
ants were “Sape” — i.e. Temne-speaking. But it also suggests that there may have been 
much less cultural discontinuity as a result of the Mane invasions than is argued by Rod-
ney’ (Hair 1970: 60-68). 
22. On Mane tactics and military formation see Th ornton (1999: 46).
23. ‘… todos estes Reinos dos Banhús que tenho nomeado que são quatro fora de Caçamança 
dizem forão subgeitos ao de Caçamança, hoje vivem todos em sua liberdade, não observão 
religião nenhuma, se bem que não faltão mandingas que os enganão com seus embustes, e 
mais barbaramente vivem os Falupos que não tem communicação com esta gente, e aqui 
já se pode fazer muito fruto na religião catholica, e quanto mais para o sul mais, os generos 
que são necessarios para estes rios he ferro, colla, roupa, christal, alambre agua ardente, 
polvora, escopetas, e avelorio preto, branco, e côr de telha’ (Peres 1990: 1–88, 32). See 
also Francisco de Lemos Coelho, Descripção da Costa da Guiné desde o cabo Verde athe 
Serra Lioa com Todas Ilhas e Rios que os Brancos Navegão Feita por (…) no Anno de 
1669: Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal /Lisbon (BNL), Res. Cód. 319. 
24. See Lemos Coelho (1684), ‘Discripção da Costa de Guiné e situação de todos os portos, 
e rios della; e roteyro para se poderem navegar todos seus rios’, BNL, Cód. 454, in Peres 
(1990: 89–250, 143).
25. Archives Nationales du Sénégal (hereafter ANS) 13G 361 1.
26. ANS 1G 23, ‘Rapport de M. Bertrand-Bocandé April 10, 1850’.
27. ANS 13G 361 1.
28. Ibid.
29. ANS 13H 462 2, 17 July 1888, ‘Administrateur Supérieur de la Casamance au Gouver-
neur du Senégal. (Th e correct date is undoubtedly 1886.) ‘Sylla … a attaqué les Djou-
goutes … mais les Djougoutes ont bravement resisté, l’ont repoussé, (des) hommes de 
Sylla, neuf seulement auraient pu échapper, et (les Jolas) auraient pris 45 chevaux. Ce fait 
d’avoir pris des chevaux a un grand importance, car, ce qui avait toujours fait le success des 
perturbateurs, était la crainte que les Yolas avaient des chevaux; s’ils n’en ont plus peur, ils 
se defendront certainement avec avantage’.
30. For a development of this discussion see Th ornton (1999).
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